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"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young 
science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. 
(Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there 
are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual 
confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method 
pass one another by." Wittgenstein PI p.232 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” BBB p18 
 
“The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can 
more complicated forms develop. Language--I want to say--is a refinement. ‘In the 
beginning was the deed.’” CV p31 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds 
to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein 
CV p10 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with 
its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For 
now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, 
which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” BBB p37 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To 
think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because 
it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
“Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ meant- so that he 
constantly called different things by that name-but nevertheless used the word in a way 
fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of the word ‘pain’-in short he used 
it as we all do.” PI p271 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. 
Is is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) what 
would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is 
labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no act of insight 
which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that “something must make 
us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion between cause and reason. We 
need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” 
Wittgenstein BBB p143 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not curiosities; 
however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted and which have only 
gone unremarked because they are always before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions.” Wittgenstein PI 126 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between 
it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of 
investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” 
BBB p125 
 
“For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that 
the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” PIp133 
 
“The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does 
not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose 
that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a 
representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that 
has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can 
analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions 
of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.” TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." "The Blue Book” p6 1933 
“The basic form of the game must be one in which we act.” Wittgenstein Philosophical 
Occasions p397 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about 
processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know 
more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking 
at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one we thought quite innocent).— And now the analogy which was to make us understand 
our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet 
unexplored medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And 
naturally we don’t want to deny them. PI p308 
“If God looked into our minds he would not be able to see there whom we were thinking 
of.” Wittgenstein PI p217 
 
“Ought the word “infinite” to be avoided in mathematics? Yes: where it appears to confer a 
meaning upon the calculus; instead of getting one from it.” RFM revised edition (1978) p141 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set it in relief— 
but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the very fact that 
language can and only does refer to it. For since language only derives the way in which it 
means, its meaning, from the world, no language is conceivable that does not represent this 
world.” Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks S47 
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” TLP 
 
“We may not advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything hypothetical in our 
considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its 
place.” PI 109 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a 
pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the existence of the 
pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a physical system. …In sum, the 
fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that 
programs provide causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, 
the brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description.” 
Searle Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
“All inference takes place a priori. The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of 
the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus. The freedom of the will consists in 
the fact that future actions cannot be known now. We could only know them if causality 
were an inner necessity, like that of logical deduction. -- The connexion of knowledge and 
what is known is that of logical necessity. (“A knows that p is the case” is senseless if p is a 
tautology.) If from the fact that a proposition is obvious to us, it does not follow that it is 
true, then obviousness is no justification for belief in its truth.” TLP 5.133-- 5.1363 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive capacities. It 
requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is essential for the use of 
language. At one level, the speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at 
another level the utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol 
itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it 
represents a type of a state of affairs" MSW 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has no causal 
powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying neurobiology…But 
causal reducibility does not lead to ontological reducibility…consciousness only exists as 
experienced…and therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a third person 
ontology, something that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
 
“Could a machine process cause a thought process? The answer is: yes. Indeed, only a 
machine process can cause a thought process, and ‘computation’ does not name a machine 
process; it names a process that can be, and typically is, implemented on a machine.” Searle 
PNC p73 
“…the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of a physical 
system from outside; and the identification of the process as computational does not identify 
an intrinsic feature of the physics, it is essentially an observer relative characterization.” 
Searle PNC p95 
 
“The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. I am now 
making the separate and different point that syntax is not intrinsic to physics.” Searle PNC 
p94 
“The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive decomposition fails, 
because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the physics is to put a homunculus in the 
physics.” Searle PNC p97 
...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because there is no 
way you can make explicit speech acts performed according to the conventions of a 
language without creating commitments. This is true not just for statements but for all 
speech acts" MSW p82 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between 
it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of 
investigation: it was a requirement.)" PI 107 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, 
are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations…the forms of the status 
function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic powers…to recognize 
something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action…these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The 
general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for action 
presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons for action.” Searle 
PNC p34-49 
“In short, the sense of ‘information processing’ that is used in cognitive science is at much 
too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of intrinsic 
intentionality…We are blinded to this difference by the fact that the same sentence ‘I see a 
car coming toward me,’ can be used to record both the visual intentionality and the output 
of the computational model of vision…in the sense of ‘information’ used in cognitive science, 
it is simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device.” Searle PNC p104- 
105 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the 
nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent’s desires, 
values, attitudes and evaluations?...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it 
tries to pose Hume’s guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of 
which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC p165- 171 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfactions, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: corresponding 
to Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are desires, corresponding to 
Commissives are intentions and corresponding to Expressives is the whole range of 
emotions and other intentional states where the Presup fit is taken for granted. But there is 
no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create 
facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat 
requires a language” Searle MSW p69 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because there is 
no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according to the conventions of a 
language without creating commitments. This is true not just for statements but for all 
speech acts” Searle MSW p82 
“So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by collective 
intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers…With the important exception 
of language itself, all of institutional reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization 
is created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations…all of human 
institutional reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the 
same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech 
acts in the explicit form of Declarations.” Searle MSW p11-13 
“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world direction of fit. 
And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the upward or world-to-mind 
(or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like statements, are supposed to represent 
how things are in the world, and in that sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have 
the mind-to-world direction of fit. The conative-volitional states such as desires, prior 
intentions and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we would like 
them to be or how we intend to make them be…In addition to these two faculties, there is a 
third, imagination, in which the propositional content is not supposed to fit reality in the 
way that the propositional contents of cognition and volition are supposed to fit…the world- 
relating commitment is abandoned and we have a propositional content without any 
commitment that it represent with either direction of fit.” Searle MSW p15 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further 
condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief...What needs to be clarified 
if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which 
the various concepts hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and 
incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of 
context dependency. To this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever.” (P.M.S Hacker--Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15- 
2005) 
 
 
“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of state…and the 
content of the state…so in the theory of language we can make a distinction between the 
type of speech act it is…and the propositional content…we have the same propositional 
content with different psychological mode in the case of the intentional states, and different 
illocutionary force or type in the case of the speech acts. Furthermore, just as my beliefs can 
be true or false and thus have the mind-to-world direction of fit, so my statements can be 
true or false and thus have the word-to-world direction of fit. And just as my desires or 
intentions cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied, so my 
orders and promises cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or 
unsatisfied—we can think of all the intentional states that have a whole propositional 
content and a direction of fit as representations of their conditions of satisfaction. A belief 
represents its truth conditions, a desire represents its fulfillment conditions, an intention 
represents its carrying out conditions…The intentional state represents its conditions of 
satisfaction…people erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be 
consciously thought…but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or 
fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction…we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social 
phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction.” Searle MSWp28-32 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.” 
PI 126 
 
“In philosophy we do not draw conclusions” PI 599 
 
“If one tried to advance theses in philosophy it would not be possible to debate them, 
because everyone would agree to them” PI 128 
 
“If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting whether the 
word ‘hand’ has any meaning? So that is something I seem to know, after all.” Wittgenstein 
- On Certainty p48 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that 
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! …. This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no depths 
have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or reconceived. 
How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the 
virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough”—Horwich 
‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’. 
“He who understands baboon would do more towards metaphysics than Locke” Charles 
Darwin 1838 Notebook M 
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PREFACE 
This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and revised to bring them up to 
date (2019). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about 
anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years 
or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework 
of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist 
Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in 
every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., 
of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), 
maybe civilization would have a chance. As things are however the leaders of society have 
no more grasp of things (nor more courage and unselfishness) than their constituents, and 
so collapse into anarchy is inevitable. 
It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section presents articles 
that try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior. I start with a brief review 
of the logical structure of rationality, which provides some heuristics for the description of 
language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates 
to the evolution of social behavior. This centers around the two writers I have found the 
most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine 
and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so 
useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially 
complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that 
concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought 
(behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how 
the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what 
makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. No 
neurophysiology, no metaphysics, no postmodernism, no theology. 
Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put 
it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse and 
behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ 
of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, 
religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal 
to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical 
facts are. Scientism is ever-present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., 
Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." BBB p18 
The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of 
smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton, the Democratic Party and the Pope 
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to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth. As W noted, 
it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of 
conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 
1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searle’s The 
Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard 
Social Science Model. 
The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly 
counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and 
in any case, there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in 
the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ 
(T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must lead directly to actions. 
Language is programmed in our genes and is involved in nearly all our social behavior. 
Philosophy in the strict sense (i.e., academic philosophy) is, as Wittgenstein showed us, the 
study of the way language is used (language games) and I regard it as the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought (i.e., pretty much everything involving language which 
is often called System 2 or slow thinking). However, as I hope I have shown in my writings 
over the last decade, nonlinguistic behavior or System 1 or fast thinking is also described 
with language and this leads to endless confusion which I have tried to clarify here and 
which is summarized in the tables that I present. 
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, 
personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least 
serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely 
philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics 
etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein 
and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious 
automated System 1 actions or reflexes. 
Thus, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at 
them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is 
universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that 
Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer 
from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in 
degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices 
by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and 
the nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot 
of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s futures. 
The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is 
reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups, I comment on three of the 
principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics 
(cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some 
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suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews 
of recent books by well-known writers. 
The next section describes the digital delusions, which confuse the language games of 
System 2 with the automatisms of System one, and so cannot distinguish biological 
machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers). The ‘reductionist’ 
claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that 
one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it. Hence the title of Searle’s classic 
review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”. 
In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, 
biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Even for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or physics, the path 
is blocked by chaos and uncertainty. Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when 
they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what the 
‘results’ mean. Reductionist metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and philosophers lack 
the appropriate sense of humor. 
Other digital delusions are that we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 
1 by computers/AI/robotics/nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2. The No Free 
Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and possibly fatal consequences. The 
adventurous may regard this principle as a higher order emergent expression of the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics. Hi- tech enthusiasts hugely underestimate the problems resulting 
from unrestrained motherhood and dysgenics, and of course it is neither profitable nor 
politically correct (and now with third world supremacism dominant, not even possible) to 
be honest about it. They also gloss over the fact that AI is reaching the point where it will be 
impossible for us to understand how it works or to control or fix it and to prevent 
catastrophic failures in communications, power, police, military, agricultural, medical and 
financial systems. 
The last section describes The One Big Happy Family Delusion, i.e., that we are selected for 
cooperation with everyone, and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and 
Equality will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things correctly (the possibility of 
politics). Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see 
throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, 
selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces 
these delusions. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we 
cooperate in selling our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, greatly exacerbating 
the problems. The most recent article is the short discussion of China, a threat to peace and 
freedom as great as overpopulation and climate change and one to which even most 
professional scholars and politicians are oblivious. 
I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just given a chance) 
as it appears in some recent books on sociology/biology/economics. Even Sapolsky’s 
otherwise excellent “Behave” (2017) embraces leftist politics and group selection and gives 
space to a discussion of whether humans are innately violent. I end with an essay on the 
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great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of 
our evolved psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1. Our 
psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa from ca. 6 million years 
ago, when we split from chimpanzees, to ca. 50,000 years ago, when many of our ancestors 
left Africa (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation), is now maladaptive 
and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of 
behavior (philosophy, psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, politics, law, literature, 
history, economics, soccer strategies, business meetings, etc.), this book is about 
evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness (kin selection, natural selection). 
One thing rarely mentioned by the group selectionists is the fact that, even were ‘group 
selection’ possible, selfishness is at least as likely (probably far more likely in most contexts) 
to be group selected for as altruism. Just try to find examples of true altruism in nature –the 
fact that we can’t (which we know is not possible if we understand evolution) tells us that 
its apparent presence in humans is an artefact of modern life, concealing the facts, and that 
it can no more be selected for than the tendency to suicide (which in fact it is). 
One might also benefit from considering a phenomenon never (in my experience) 
mentioned by groupies--cancer. No group has as much in common as the (originally) 
genetically identical cells in our own bodies-a 50 trillion cell clone- 
- but we all born with thousands and perhaps millions of cells that have already taken the 
first step on the path to cancer, and generate millions to billions of cancer cells in our life. If 
we did not die of other things first, we (and perhaps all multicellular organisms) would all 
die of cancer. Only a massive and hugely complex mechanism  built  into  our  genome 
that represses or derepresses trillions of genes in trillions of cells, and kills and creates 
billions of cells a second, keeps the majority of us alive long enough to reproduce. One might 
take this to imply that a just, democratic and enduring society for any kind of entity on any 
planet in any universe is only a dream, and that no being or power could make it otherwise. 
It is not only ‘the laws’ of physics that are universal and inescapable, or perhaps we should 
say that inclusive fitness is a law of physics. 
The great mystic Osho said that the separation of God and Heaven from Earth and 
Humankind was the most evil idea that ever entered the Human mind. In the 20th century 
an even more evil notion arose, or at least became popular with leftists—that humans are 
born with rights, rather than having to earn privileges. The idea of human rights is an evil 
fantasy created by leftists to draw attention away from the merciless destruction of the earth 
by unrestrained 3rd world motherhood. Thus, every day the population increases by 
200,000, who must be provided with resources to grow and space to live, and who soon 
produce another 200,000 etc. And one almost never hears it noted that what they receive 
must be taken from those already alive, and their descendants. Their lives diminish those 
already here in both major obvious and countless subtle ways. Every new baby destroys the 
earth from the moment of conception. In a horrifically overcrowded world with vanishing 
resources, there cannot be human rights without destroying the earth and our descendants 
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futures. It could not be more obvious, but it is rarely mentioned in a clear and direct way, 
and one will never see the streets full of protesters against motherhood. 
The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough resources in 
America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep 
them there. The attempt to do this is already bankrupting America and destroying the world. 
The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. And now, 
as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich. 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population people. 
Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial 
civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The 
earth loses at least 1% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing 
capacity will be gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is 
being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined 
with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the 
dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will 
continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship 
which limits selfishness and permits long term planning. The root cause of collapse is the 
inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat 
unrelated persons as though they had common interests (which I suggest may be regarded 
as an unrecognized -- but the commonest and most serious-- psychological problem-- 
Inclusive Fitness Disorder). This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to 
the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. 
Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch 
and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, 
social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent 
controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and 
immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country 
that follows a democratic system, especially now that the Neomarxist Third World 
Supremacists are taking control of the USA and other Western Democracies, and helping 
the Seven Sociopaths who run China to succeed in their plan to eliminate peace and freedom 
worldwide. Hence my concluding essay “Suicide by Democracy”. 
I had hoped to weld my comments into a unified whole, but I came to realize, as 
Wittgenstein and AI researchers did, that the mind (roughly the same as language as 
Wittgenstein showed us) is a motley of disparate pieces evolved for many contexts, and 
there is no such whole or theory except inclusive fitness, i.e., evolution by natural 
selection.long article on behavior and language (now a book - The Logical Structure of 
Human Behavior (2019)) with an 8 page abstract, and a new article warning of the threat 
posed by the Seven Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers who rule China. I also comment several 
places on the even greater threat posed by AI (Artificial Ignorance or Artificial Insanity - 
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commonly termed Artificial Intelligence) not only to peace and freedom but to our very 
survival as I note in several essays here. 
Finally, as with my other writings 3DTV and 3D Movie Technology-Selected Articles 1996- 
2017 2nd Edition (2018), Psychoactive Drugs-- Four Classic Texts (1976-1982) (2016), Talking 
Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and 
Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: 
Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), 
Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, Understanding the Connections between Science, 
Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, 
Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, 
Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty 
(2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019), and in all my letters and email and 
conversations for over 50 years, I have always used ‘they’ or ‘them’ instead of ‘his/her’, 
‘she/he’, or the idiotic reverse sexism of ‘she’ or ‘her’, being perhaps the only one in this part 
of the galaxy to do so. The slavish use of these universally applied egregious vocables is of 
course intimately connected with the defects in our psychology which generate academic 
philosophy, the modern form of democracy, and the collapse of industrial civilization, and 
I leave the further description of these connections as an exercise for the reader. 
I am aware of many imperfections and limitations of my work and continually revise it, but 
I took up philosophy 13 years ago at 65, so it is miraculous, and an eloquent testimonial to 
the conversion of System 2 behaviors into System 1 automatisms, that I have been able to 
do anything at all. It was thirteen years of incessant struggle and I hope readers find it of 
some use. 
vyupzz@gmail.com 
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THE DESCRIPTION OF BEHAVIOR WITHOUT 
DELUSION 
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The Logical Structure of Consciousness (behavior, 
personality, rationality, higher order thought, 
intentionality) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the 
behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by 
his logical successor John Searle, I have created the following table as a heuristic for 
furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns 
show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual 
processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as 
the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or 
better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced 
here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
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About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make 
complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 years ago had evolved to 
describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions with basic utterances that 
can be described as Primary Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast 
unconscious automated System One, true- only mental states with a precise time and 
location). We gradually developed the further ability to encompass displacements in space 
and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential 
 
 
events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions) with the Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- 
slow conscious true or false propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time 
and are abilities and not mental states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive  Modules,  Personality  Traits, 
Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, 
Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, capacit2ie8s, hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 
Preferences (W RPP2 
p148). “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically 
displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding 
lying) while third person statements about others are true or false (see my review of 
Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and 
memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed 
“inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” 
since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W 
and by Searle (e.g., Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer 
independent mental representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space 
while the evolutionarily more primitive System One mental states of perceptions memories 
and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 and 
System 3--the second and third major advances in vertebrate psychology after System 1— 
the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time 
(Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). 
S1 are potential or unconscious mental states (Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or primary 
LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, no tests possible, so they 
can be true-only. Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see 
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the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I know what 
I believe, think, feel until I act). Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written 
as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 
1930’s) and are not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, Hacker 
etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology, 
contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems framework, and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction 
with System 2. Though few have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) 
it was further developed by a few -- above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version 
of the table below in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey 
of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 
1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably 
the same), cognitive linguistics or the logical structure of Higher Order Thought (HOT), and 
in my view the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology), and 
thus in the study of behavior. See my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) and the 
recent work of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits the 
world (is Causally Self Referential --Searle) --the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis 
of rationality over which no control is possible). Emotions evolved to make a bridge between 
desires or intentions and actions. Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of 
slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities-- described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries 
to fit the world. 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) 
arise because we cannot see S1 working and desc2r9ibe all actions as SLG’s (The 
Phenomenological Illusion or TPI of Searle). W understood this and described it with 
unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout 
his works. Reason has access to working memory and so we use consciously apparent but 
typically incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs 
and other Dispositions are thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world 
direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions— PI, or Intentions In 
Action-IAA- Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind 
direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, p190). 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that 
results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a 
much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
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of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
 
 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the representations of S2 as 
public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this sense S1 such as perceptions do not have 
COS. In other writings S says they do but as noted in my other reviews I think it is then 
essential to refer to COS1 (private presentations) and COS2 (public representations). To 
repeat this critical distinction, public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by 
Searle and others as COS, Representations, truth makers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), 
while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and his ‘Direction 
of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” 
R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits 
usefulness. 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of Social Reality 
(the title of Searle’s well known book) and from many other viewpoints as well. 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and 
Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, 
Read, Baker, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following 
table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of 
studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors 
comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness 
(LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), of behavior 
(LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of 
Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the 
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Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in 
my other very recent writings. 
 
 
FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truth makers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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I give detailed explanations of this table in my other writings. 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to3“4relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only 
get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in its context. 
The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human 
Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one 
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The Foundation Stone of Psychology and Philosophy--A 
Critical Review of 'On Certainty' by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1969) (1951) 
ABSTRACT 
 
A critical review of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' which he wrote in 1950-51 and was first 
published in 1969. Most of the review is spent presenting a modern framework for 
philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) and positioning the work 
of Wittgenstein and John Searle in this framework and relative to the work of others. It is 
suggested that this book can be regarded as the foundation stone of psychology and 
philosophy as it was the first to describe the two systems of thought and shows how our 
unshakable grasp of the world derives from our innate axiomatic System 1, and how this 
interacts with System 2. It was a revolution in epistemology since it showed that our actions 
rest not on judgements but on innate undoubtable axioms leading directly to action. I situate 
the work of Wittgenstein and Searle in the framework of the two systems of thought 
prominent in thinking and decision research, employing a new table of intentionality and 
new dual systems nomenclature. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology,3S5cience, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), 
The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness 
(2019, Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, 
Politics, and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), 
Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
“If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting whether the 
word ‘hand’ has any meaning? So that is something I seem to know, after all.” On Certainty 
p48 
“But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false.” (OC p94). 
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“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that 
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! …. This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." "The Blue Book” p6 (1933) 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Frege’s 
reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) 
as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized 
forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s 
error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response 
to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of 
questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” ”-- 
Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’. 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no depths 
have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or reconceived. 
How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the 
virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich 
‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’. 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –that ALL truly 
‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or data gathering) are the 
same— confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions 
are the same— looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth 
conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. . The basic problem is that one can 
say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning 
is only possible in a very specific context. Thus, W looks at perspicuous examples of the 
varying uses of the words ‘know’ and ‘certain’, often in trialogues with his363 typical 
perspectives  of  narrator,   interlocutor   and commentator, leaving the reader to decide 
the best use (clearest COS) of the sentences in each context. One can only describe the uses 
of related sentences and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no metaphysical insights. It 
is truly sad that most philosophers continue to waste their time on the linguistic confusions 
peculiar to philosophy rather than turning their attention to those of the other behavioral 
disciplines and to physics, biology and mathematics, where it is desperately needed. 
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W wrote this ‘book’ (not really a book but notes he made during the last two years of his life 
while dying of prostate cancer and barely able to work) because he realized that G.E. 
Moore’s simple efforts had focused attention on the very core of all philosophy--how it’s 
possible to mean, to believe, to know anything at all, and not to be able to doubt it. All 
anyone can do is to examine minutely the working of the language games of ‘know’ and 
‘certain’ and ‘doubt’ as they are used to describe the primitive automated prelinguistic 
system one (S1) functions of our brain (my K1, C1 and D1) and the advanced deliberative 
linguistic system two (S2) functions (my K2, C2 and D2). Of course, W does not use the two 
systems terminology, which only came to the fore in psychology some half century after his 
death, and has yet to penetrate philosophy, but he clearly grasped the two systems 
framework (the ‘grammar’) in all of his work from the early 30’s on, and one can see clear 
foreshadowings in his very earliest writings. 
Much has been written on Moore and W and On Certainty (OC) recently, after half a century 
in relative oblivion. See e.g., Annalisa Coliva’s “Moore and Wittgenstein” (2010), “Extended 
Rationality” (2015), and The Varieties of Self-Knowledge’(2016), Brice’s ‘Exploring 
Certainty’(2014), Andy Hamilton’s ‘Routledge Philosophy Guide Book to Wittgenstein and 
On Certainty’, and above all the many recent books and papers of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock 
(DMS) and Peter Hacker (PH), including Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. For 
an excellent quick look at how various philosophers react to OC and how they go astray see 
McDougall’s ‘Critical Notice of Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty’, free on the net 
like most papers now. DMS and PH have been the leading scholars of the later W, each 
writing or editing half a dozen books (many reviewed by me) and many papers in the last 
decade. However, the difficulties of coming to grips with the basics of our higher order 
psychology, i.e., of how language (approximately the same as the mind, as W showed us) 
works are evidenced by Coliva, one of the most brilliant and prolific contemporary 
philosophers, who made remarks in a very recent article which show that after years of 
intensive work on the later W, she really does not quite get that he has solved the most basic 
problems of the description of human behavior. As DMS makes clear, one cannot even 
coherently state misgivings about the operations of our basic psychology (W’s ‘Hinges’ 
which I equate to S1) without lapsing into incoherence. DMS has noted the limitations of 
both of these workers (limitations shared by all students of behavior) in her recent articles, 
which (like those of Coliva, Hacker etc. are available free online - philpapers.org, 
researchgate.net, academia.edu, arixiv.org, libgen.is, b-ok.org etc.). 
As DMS puts it: “…the notes that make up On Certainty revolutionize the concept of basic 
beliefs and dissolve scepticism, making them a corrective, not only to Moore but also to 
Descartes, Hume, and all of epistemology. On Certainty shows Wittgenstein to have solved 
the problem he set out to solve – the problem that occupied Moore and plagued 
epistemology – that of the foundation of knowledge.” 
“Wittgenstein's revolutionary insight in On Certainty is that what philosophers have 
traditionally called 'basic beliefs' – those beliefs that all knowledge must ultimately be based 
on – cannot, on pain of infinite regress, themselves be based on further propositional beliefs. 
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He comes to see that basic beliefs are really animal or unreflective ways of acting which, 
once formulated (e.g. by philosophers), look like (empirical) propositions. It is this 
misleading appearance that leads philosophers to believe that at the foundation of thought 
is yet more thought. Yet though they may often look like empirical conclusions, our basic 
certainties constitute the ungrounded, non- propositional underpinning of knowledge, not 
its object. In thus situating the foundation of knowledge in nonreflective certainties that 
manifest themselves as ways of acting, Wittgenstein has found the place where justification 
comes to an end, and solved the regress problem of basic beliefs – and, in passing, shown 
the logical impossibility of hyperbolic scepticism. I believe that this is a groundbreaking 
achievement for philosophy – worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third 
masterpiece'.” [I reached the same general conclusions myself some years ago and stated it 
in my book reviews.] 
She continues:” … this is precisely how Wittgenstein describes Moore-type hinge certainties 
in On Certainty: they 'have the form of empirical propositions', but are not empirical 
propositions. Granted, these certainties are not putative metaphysical propositions that 
appear to describe the necessary features of the world, but they are putative empirical 
propositions that appear to describe the contingent features of the world. And therein lies 
some of the novelty of On Certainty. On Certainty is continuous with all of Wittgenstein's 
earlier writings – including the Tractatus – in that it comes at the end of a long, unbroken 
attempt to elucidate the grammar of our language-games, to demarcate grammar from 
language in use. Baker and Hacker have superbly elucidated the second Wittgenstein's 
unmasking of the grammatical nature of metaphysical or super-empirical propositions; 
what sets On Certainty apart is its further perspicuous distinction between some 'empirical' 
propositions and others ('Our "empirical propositions" do not form a homogenous mass' 
(OC 213)): some apparently empirical and contingent propositions being in fact nothing but 
expressions of grammatical rules. The importance of this realization is that it leads to the 
unprecedented insight that basic beliefs – though they look like humdrum empirical and 
contingent propositions – are in fact ways of acting which, when conceptually elucidated, 
can be seen to function as rules of grammar: they underlie all thinking (OC 401). So that the 
hinge certainty 'The earth has existed for many years' underpins all thought and action, but 
not as a proposition that strikes us immediately as true; rather as a way of acting that 
underpins what we do (e.g., we research the age of the earth) and what we say (e.g., we 
speak of the earth in the past tense): Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, 
comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, 
i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the 
language-game. (OC 204)” 
“The non-propositional nature of basic beliefs puts a stop to the regress that has plagued 
epistemology: we no longer need to posit untenable self-justifying propositions at the basis 
of knowledge. In taking hinges to be true empirical propositions, Peter Hacker fails to 
acknowledge the ground-breaking insight that our basic certainties are ways of acting, and 
not 'certain propositions striking us as true' (OC 204). If all Wittgenstein were doing in OC 
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was to claim that our basic beliefs are true empirical propositions, why bother? He would 
be merely repeating what philosophers before him have been saying for centuries, all the 
while deploring an unsolvable infinite regress. Why not rather appreciate that Wittgenstein 
has stopped the regress?” (“Beyond Hacker’s Wittgenstein” (2013). 
It is amazing (and a sign of how deep the divide remains between philosophy and 
psychology) that (as I have noted many times in recent reviews) in a decade of intensive 
reading I have not seen one person make the obvious connection between W’s ‘grammar’ 
and the automatic reflexive functions of our brain which constitute System 1, and its 
extensions into the linguistic functions of System 2. For anyone familiar with the two 
systems framework for understanding behavior that has dominated various areas of 
psychology such as decision theory for the last several decades, it should be glaringly 
obvious that ‘basic beliefs’ (or as I call them B1) are the inherited automated true-only 
structure of S1 and that their extension 38 experience into true or false sentences (or as I call 
them B2) are what non-philosophers call ‘beliefs’. 
This may strike some as a mere terminological trifle, but I have used the two systems view 
and its tabulation below as the logical structure of rationality for a decade and regard it as 
the single biggest advance in understanding higher order behavior, and hence of W or any 
philosophical or behavioral writing. In my view, the failure to grasp the fundamental 
importance of the automaticity of our behavior due to S1 and the consequent attribution of 
all social interaction (e.g., politics) to the superficialities of S2 is responsible for the 
inexorable collapse of industrial civilization. The almost universal oblivion to basic biology 
and psychology leads to endless fruitless attempts fix the world’s problems via politics, but 
only a drastic restructuring of society with understanding of the fundamental role of 
inclusive fitness as manifested via the automaticities of S1 has any chance to save the world. 
The oblivion to S1 has been called by Searle ‘The phenomenological Illusion’, by Pinker ‘The 
Blank Slate’ and by Tooby and Cosmides ‘The Standard Social Science Model’. 
OC shows W’s unique super-Socratic trialogue (narrator, interlocutor, commentator) in full 
bloom and better than anywhere else in his works. He realized by the late 20’s that the only 
way to make any progress was to look at how language actually works-otherwise one gets 
lost in the labyrinth of language from the very first sentences and there is not the slightest 
hope of finding one’s way out. The entire book looks at various uses of the word ‘know’ 
which separate themselves out into ‘know’ as an intuitive ‘perceptual’ certainty that cannot 
meaningfully be questioned (my K1) and ‘know’ as a disposition to act (my K2), which 
functions the same as think, hope, judge, understand, imagine, remember, believe and many 
other dispositional words. 
As I have suggested in my various reviews of W and S, these two uses correspond to the 
modern two systems of thought framework that is so powerful in understanding behavior 
(mind, language), and this (and his other work) is the first significant effort to show how 
our fast, prelinguistic automatic ‘mental states’ are the unquestionable axiomatic basis 
(‘hinges’) for our later-evolved, slow, linguistic, deliberative dispositional psychology. As I 
thought-DPHOT- or more precisely the study of the language used in DPHOT --which 
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have noted many times, neither W, nor anyone else to my knowledge, has ever stated this 
clearly. Undoubtedly, most who read OC go away with no clear idea of what he has done, 
which is the normal result of reading any of his work. 
On Certainty (OC) was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and has 
only recently begun to draw serious attention. There are few references to it in Searle (W’s 
heir apparent and perhaps the most eminent living philosopher) and one sees whole books 
on W with barely a mention. There are however reasonably good books and articles on it by 
Stroll, Svensson, McGinn, Coliva and others and parts of many other books and articles, but 
the best is that of Daniele Moyal- Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best 
starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. 
However (in my view) all analysis of W falls short of fully grasping his unique and 
revolutionary advances by failing to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and 
contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt here. Some may be disappointed that 
they don’t get a page by page explanation of OC but (as with any other book dealing with 
behavior-i.e., philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, law, politics, 
religion, literature etc.) we would not get past the first page, as all the issues discussed here 
arise immediately in any discussion of behavior. 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and psychology, 
it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work 
in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is now known as evolutionary psychology 
(EP), or if you prefer, cognitive psychology, cognitive linguist3ic9s, intentionality, higher 
order thought or just animal behavior. Sadly, few realize that his works are a vast and 
unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. 
He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and 
humanities, and even those few who have understood him have not realized the extent of 
his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (e.g., the two selves of fast 
and slow thinking—see below). John Searle (S), refers to him infrequently, but his work can 
be seen as a straightforward extension of W’s, though he does not seem to see this. W 
analysts such as Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto and Moyal- 
Sharrock do marvelously but stop short of putting him in the center of current psychology, 
where he certainly belongs. It should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and 
correct, all accounts of higher order behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought 
to translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of “Embodied 
Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and into W’s work (and they 
do). 
The failure of even the best thinkers to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the 
limited attention On Certainty (0C) and his other third period works have received until 
recently, but even more to the inability of many philosophers and others to understand how 
profoundly our view of philosophy (which I call the descriptive psychology of higher order 
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Searle calls the logical structure of rationality-LSR), anthropology, sociology, politics, law, 
morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature and all of animal behavior alters once we 
embrace the evolutionary framework. 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the default of the 
‘second self’ of slow thinking conscious system 2, which (without education) is oblivious to 
the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic 
structure of system 1 (Searle’s ‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Searle summed this up in a very 
insightful recent article by noting that many logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because the creation of meaningfulness (i.e., the COS of S2) out of 
meaninglessness (i.e., the reflexes of S1) is not consciously experienced. See Philosophy in a 
New Century (PNC) p115-117 and my review of it. 
Before remarking on this book, it is essential to grasp the W/S framework so I will first offer 
some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research 
as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, 
Hutto, Daniele Moyal- Sharrock(DMS) et. al. It will help to see my reviews of various books 
by Searle such as Philosophy in a New Century (PNC), and Making the Social World (MSW), 
the classics by W such as TLP, PI, and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide 
a clear description of higher order behavior not found in psychology books, that I will refer 
to as the Wittgenstein/Searle (W/S) framework. To say that Searle has carried on W’s work 
is not to imply that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE 
human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone 
accurately describing behavior must be enunciating some variant or extension of what W 
said. 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms of S1 (which I equate with W’s ‘hinges’) from the less mechanical 
linguistic dispositional behavior of S2. To rephrase: all study of higher order behavior is an 
effort to tease apart fast System 1 (S1) and slow System 2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions 
and other automatisms vs. dispositions. Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2 social behavior including ‘we intentionality’, while the later 
W shows how S2 is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1, which in evolution and in 
each of our personal histories developed into conscious dispositional pr4o0positional 
thinking (acting) of S2. 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to 
be explained by calling it a young science and that philosophers are irresistibly tempted to 
ask and answer questions in the way science does. He noted that this tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. See BBB p18. 
Another notable comment was that if we are not concerned with “causes” the activities of 
the mind lie open before us –see BB p6 (1933). Likewise, the 20,000 pages of his nachlass 
demonstrated his famous dictum that the problem is not to find the solution but to recognize 
as the solution what appears to be only a preliminary. See his Zettel p312-314. And again, 
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he noted 80 years ago that we ought to realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior 
and that these are not hints of explanations (BBB p125) 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature”) that language (mind, speech) is a window on 
or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor’s LOT, Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that 
there must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected 
by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples 
of language in action, that language is not a picture of but is itself thinking or the mind, and 
his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. Many have deconstructed 
the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my view, none better than W in BBB p37 — “if we 
keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its 
object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For 
now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, 
which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” So, language issues direct from 
the brain and what could count as evidence for an intermediary? 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology and 
computation could reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language Games (LG’s) did. The 
difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture 
vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of 
representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the 
principal way we interact) is not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is 
expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the 
later evolved Language Games (LG’s) of the Second Self--the dispositions such as imagining, 
knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second 
and his third periods are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 
1 and 2), the irrelevance of our subjective ‘mental life’ to the functioning of language, and 
the impossibility of private language. The bedrock of our behavior is our involuntary, 
System 1, fast thinking, true only, mental states- our perceptions and memories and 
involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later LG’s are voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
testable true or false dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., 
our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as 
always here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., in LWPP1—“the 
greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself”). 
W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our behavior 
(mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, 
computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and powerful ways to describe 
and extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but all they can do is provide the physical 
basis for our behavior, multiply our language games, and extend S2. The true-only axioms 
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of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we now 
call evolutionary psychology (EP), and which 
 
is traceable to the automated true-only r4e1actions of bacteria, which evolved and operate 
by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent works of Trivers for a popular intro 
to IF or Bourke’s superb “Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. The recent travesty 
of evolutionary thought by Nowak and Wilson in no way impacts the fact that IF is the 
prime mechanism of evolution by natural selection (see my review of 'The Social Conquest 
of Earth' (2012)). 
So, as W develops in OC, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true- 
only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found ‘mistaken’ without threatening our 
sanity—as he noted a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no test) has profoundly different consequences from 
one in S2 (testable). A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique 
manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain 
of other nonsense) cannot get a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary ‘fast 
thinking’ axioms and not testable propositions (as I would put it). 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, 
and especially in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of 
current research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but neither he, nor anyone 
afaik, has any idea W laid out the framework over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and 
automatic and which corresponds to the mental states of perception, emotion and memory, 
as W notes over and over. One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all 
our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less 
“conscious” (beware another network of language games!) second-self brain activity 
corresponds to what W characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to 
abilities or possible actions, are not mental states, are conscious, deliberate and 
propositional (true or false), and do not have any definite time of occurrence. 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar mostly 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only 
sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands'), originally termed Causally Self Referential (CSR) 
by Searle (but now Causally Self- Reflexive) or reflexive or intransitive in W’s Blue and 
Brown Books (BBB), and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be 
acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) in the strict sense, and are not CSR (called transitive in 
BBB). The equation of these terms from modern psychology with those used by W and S 
(and much else here) is my idea, so don’t expect to find it in the literature (except my reviews 
on Amazon, vixra.org, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, academia.edu). 
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Though seldom touched upon by philosophers, the investigation of involuntary fast 
thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and 
other disciplines under names like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” 
and “biases”. Of course these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful 
ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear, but of course he did not use this 
terminology), but presumably not ever of slow S2 dispositional thinking only, since any 
thought (intentional action) cannot occur without involving much of the intricate S1 
network of the “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and Searle call our 
EP) which must use S1 to move muscles (action). 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' (which as Searle notes are presupposed by all discussion of 
intentionality) are axiomatic true-only elements of S1, c4o2mposed of perceptions, 
memories and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of 
giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made clear numerous times, they are the basis for 
judgment and so cannot be judged. The true- only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. As he famously said in OC 94 — “but I did not get my picture of the world by 
satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. 
-no: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.” 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal 
actions of S1, which typically give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2, which produces 
reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by feedback 
into S1, causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by Searle `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby 
and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar 
with modern biology and psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS), i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, 
there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought 
is whatever I (honestly) say it is, as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's 
aphorisms (p132 in Budd’s lovely book on W) – “It is in language that wish and fulfillment 
meet and like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be 
found in the grammar of the language.” And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP or LSR (DPHOT—see table) and that, in spite of his frequent 
warnings against theorizing and generalizing) for which he is often incorrectly criticized by 
Searle), this is about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) as one can find (as DMS also notes). 
 W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, and Searle notes that 
there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning—“speaker meaning... is the 
imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction”-- which means to 
speak or write a well formed sentence expressing COS in a context that can be true or false, 
and this is an act and not a mental state. i.e., as Searle notes in Philosophy in a New Century 
p193 — “the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine 
conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine 
conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” -- 
propositions being public events that can be true or false. Hence, the famous comment by 
W from PI p217— “If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see 
there whom we were speaking of”, and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in "that's Him" and “what gives the image its interpretation is 
the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) –“what 
it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what happened 
the wish that that should happen-and- the question whether I know what I wish before my 
wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not 
mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied. 
Suppose it were asked -do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, 
then I do know.” 
One of W’s recurring themes is now referred to as Theory of Mind, or as I prefer, 
Understanding of Agency (UA). Ian Apperly, who is caref4u3lly analyzing UA1 and UA2 
(i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has recently become aware of the work of Daniel 
Hutto, who has characterized UA1 
as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation can be involved in UA1--that being reserved 
for UA2—see my review of his book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, 
Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible 
view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and 
higher order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite 
of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a 
century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching an 
adequate discussion in philosophy or other behavioral science texts, and commonly there is 
barely a mention. 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of Social Reality 
(the title of Searle’s well known book) and I will give some perspective. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make 
complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 years ago had evolved to 
describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions with basic utterances that 
can be described as Primary Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast 
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unconscious automated System One, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
location). We gradually developed the further ability to encompass displacements in space 
and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential events (the past and future and often 
counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the 
Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false 
propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not 
mental states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, capacities, hypotheses. 
Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 p148). “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person 
statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) while third person statements about 
others are true or false (see my review of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and 
memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed 
“inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” 
since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W 
and by Searle (e.g., Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer 
independent mental representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space 
while the evolutionarily more primitive System One mental states of perceptions memories 
and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 and 
System 3--the second and third major advances in vertebrate psychology after System 1— 
the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time 
(Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). 
S1 are potential or unconscious mental states (Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or primary 
LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, no tests possible, so they 
can be true- only. Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I 
see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I know 
what I believe, think, feel until I act). Dispositions also become Actions whe4n4 spoken or 
written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein 
(mid 1930’s) and are not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, 
Hacker etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology, 
contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems framework, and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction 
with System 2. Though few have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) 
it was further developed by a few --above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version 
of the table below in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey 
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of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 
1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably 
the same), cognitive linguistics or the logical structure of Higher Order Thought (HOT), and 
in my view the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology), and 
thus in the study of behavior. See my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) and the 
recent work of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits the 
world (is Causally Self Reflexive—Searle) --the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis 
of rationality over which no control is possible). Emotions evolved to make a bridge between 
desires or intentions and actions. Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of 
slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities- 
-described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit the world. Behaviorism and all the other 
confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see 
S1 working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion - TPI of Searle). 
W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of 
language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to working memory 
and so we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the 
Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions are thoughts which try to 
match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions 
to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA- Searle) plus acts which try to match 
the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, p190). 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that 
results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a 
much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the representations of S2 as 
public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this sense S1 such as perceptions do not have 
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COS. In other writings S says they do but as noted in my other reviews I think it is then 
essential to refer to COS1 (private presentations) and COS2 (public representations). To 
repeat this critical distinction, public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often r4e5ferred to 
by Searle and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), 
while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). 
Thus, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and his ‘Direction of 
Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” 
R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits 
usefulness. 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the 
behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by 
his successors Searle, Moyal- Sharrock, Read, Baker, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, 
Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary 
processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical 
Structure of Rationality (LSR), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of 
language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, 
the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), 
terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. I will make minimal comments 
here since those wishing further description may consult my articles and books dealing with 
Wittgenstein, Searle and others on academia.edu, philpapers.org, vixra.org, 
researchgate.net, libgen.io, b-ok.org and on Amazon. 
His wholly novel ideas and unique super-Socratic trialogues and telegraphic writing, 
coupled with his often solitary, almost solipsistic lifestyle, and premature death in 1951, 
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resulted in a failure to publish anything of his later thought during his lifetime and only 
slowly has his huge nachlass of some 20,000 pages been published- a project which 
continues to this day. The only complete edition of the largely German nachlass was first 
issued by Oxford in 2000 with Intelex now publishing it, as well as all the 14 Blackwell 
English language books on a searchable CD. The Blackwell CD costs ca. $100 but the Oxford 
CD is over $1000 or over $2000 for the set including the images of the original manuscripts. 
They can however be obtained via interlibrary loan and also, like most books and articles 
are now freely available on the net (libgen.io, b-ok.org and on p2p). The searchable CDROM 
of his English books as well as that of the entire German nachlass, is now on several sites 
on    the    net    and    the    Bergen    CD   is   due for a new edition ca 2021-- 
http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). And of course most academic 
articles and books are now free online on b-ok.org and libgen.is. 
I suggest we can describe behavior more cle4a6rly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions 
of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truth makers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only 
get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in its context. 
The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human 
Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) 
which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and generally happen in 
less than 500msec, while System 2 is abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are 
represented in conscious deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but 
frequently repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is 
a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness. 
Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long-term 
memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather 
than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual 
experience-the presentation49of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the 
same words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the 
percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically connected. E.g., 
Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be True only, will describe 
a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are 
causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have 
a precise duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special 
quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and working memory, 
are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have 
public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) cannot 
precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a 
combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not 
possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws which would have to state all 
the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make 
complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events (perceptions, 
memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). 
System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self- 
referential, intransitive, informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
location) and over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and often 
hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or 
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dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are 
slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction- Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 
for private S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 
representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions 
having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, 
Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, 
Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions (described by 
Searle as agitated desires), Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in 
the world and not to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are 
slowly developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W Remarks on the Philosophy 
of Psychology V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and fast to appear and 
disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts 
typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only 
(excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., 
S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and 
memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed 
“inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” 
since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W 
and by Searle (e.g., cf. Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer 
independent public representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space, 
while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are 
always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance 
in vertebrate psychology after Syst5e0m 1—the ability to represent events and to think of 
them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1) are potential or 
unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by primary LG’s 
(PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO TESTS possible so they 
can be True Only. 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and 
must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, 
think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of Johnston and Budd. Note 
well that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in 
other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be 
regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of 
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the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2. 
After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order 
Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who 
made a simpler version of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It 
expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed 
from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology 
and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or 
Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important 
work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental 
States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits (presents) the 
world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) -- the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis 
of rationality over which no control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are 
descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s- 
- in which the mind tries to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other 
confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see 
S1 working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). 
W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of 
language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so 
we use consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves 
or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described 
as thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while 
Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA-Searle) plus 
acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle 
e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. Disposition 
words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as 
verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or might act -‘I think that…) and 
are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and 
our innate programs (cognitive modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to 
produce Dispositions—(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc.,-actual or 
potential public acts (language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) 
of private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or mind). 
Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public psychology. 
PERCEPTIONS: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature 
MEMORIES: Remembering (X was true) 51 
PREFERENCES, DISPOSITIONS, INCLINATIONS :(X might become True) 
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CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, Judging, Thinking, 
Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing 
(including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, 
Intending, Considering, Desiring, Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), 
Seeing As (Aspects), 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE - (as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - Dreaming, 
Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. Their 
function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected maximum utility) 
by facilitating information processing of perceptions and memories for rapid action. There 
is some separation between S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, 
disgust and anger. We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): Longing, 
Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, Laughing, 
Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting (Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), 
Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public 
and Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior (The 
Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank Slate or the SSSM). 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of objects 
nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive 
modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of 
neurons organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to 
the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only preferences leading to 
actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive 
neurosciences when including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. 
Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, 
development and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the 
axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can 
enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving clear descriptions of how they 
work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive 
psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them faster and 
more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities 
which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
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Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of behavior 
which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and require 
consciousness, will and self, and in normal human adults nearly a52 cept perceptions and 
some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to 
relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or 
Bayesian utility maximization. Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This occurs via 
dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire Independent Reasons for 
Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes 
Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relate thoughts to the 
world via public acts (muscle movements) producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports 
etc. The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911, and with 
refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree 
of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 
1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W 
noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates (functions, 
concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be useful. 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the 
dispositional verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and rational with partial 
awareness (W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2. It is useful to 
regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental 
phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, 
hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or 
mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions 
of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act or event such as in speech, 
writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have 
information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, 
for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2. Developing 
language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced humans to substitute words 
(fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for acts (gross contractions of arm and leg 
muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called UA - Understanding of Agency (my 
term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2 – and can also be called 
Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production 
of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by 
contracting muscles. Thus, “propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal intuitive 
deliberative S2D or automated S2A speech and action. We see that the efforts of cognitive 
science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to 
tell us anything more about how the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how 
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the brain works) than we already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in 
full public view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, 
genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact 
that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics 
and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. 
Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we only 
examine carefully the workings of language. Language (mind, public speech connected to 
potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of 
resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, 
intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze 
it. 
Words and sentences have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have 
profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe”53normally describe 
my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem (in 
philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental state and so not based on knowledge 
or information (W and see my review of the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 
sense, it does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe 
it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense 
can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they are not testable (i.e., 
not T or F, not S2). However past or future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he 
believes” or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved by information that is true or false, 
as they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” 
has no information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” 
or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime 
that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
Nonreflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent (which I call 
S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by 
Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non- 
Propositional (Non- Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or abilities) 
of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle to be Mental 
States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal 
language our prior intentions are the conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, 
type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called 
Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal- 
Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
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Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading for an 
understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are Searle, Coliva, 
Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein and Read, who have posted most of their work 
free online at academia.edu. Baker & Hacker are found in their many joint works. The late 
Baker went overboard with a bizarre psychoanalytic and rather nihilistic interpretation that 
was ably refuted by Hacker whose “Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein” is 
free on the net and a must read for any student of behavior. 
One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to the attempt to 
explain higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal framework of S1 which Carruthers 
(C), Dennett, the Churchlands (3 of the current leaders of scientism, computationalism or 
materialist reductionism -- hereafter CDC—my acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) 
Disease Control) and many others pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently 
beginning with W in the BBB in the 30’s when he noted that – “philosophers constantly see 
the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer 
questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads 
the philosopher into complete darkness”- and by Searle, Read, Hutto, Hacker and countless 
others since. The attempt to ‘explain’ (really only to describe as W made clear) S2 in causal 
terms is incoherent and even for S1 it is extremely complex and it is not clear that the highly 
diverse language games of “causality” can ever be made to apply-even their application in 
physics and chemistry is variable and often obscure (was it gravity or the abscission layer 
or hormones or the wind or all of them that made the apple fall and when did the causes 
start and end)? But as W said-“now if it is not the causal connections which we are 
concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us”. 
However, I suggest it is a major mistake to see W as taking either side as usually stated, as 
his views are much more subtle, more often5t4han not leaving his trialogues unresolved. 
One might find it useful to start with my reviews of W, S etc., and then study as much of 
Read, Hutto, Horwich, DMS, Stern, etc. as feasible before digging into the literature of 
causality and the philosophy of science, and if one finds it uninteresting to do so then W has 
hit the mark. 
In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers have little 
grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different uses of ‘I know what 
I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’), or of the nature of dispositions, and many (e.g., CDC) 
still base their ideas on such notions as private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and 
computationalism, which W laid to rest ¾ of a century ago. 
Before I read any book, I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they cite. Often the 
authors most remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly complete omission of all the 
authors I cite here. W is easily the most widely discussed modern philosopher with about 
one new book and dozens of articles largely or wholely devoted to him every month. He 
has his own journal “Philosophical Investigations” and I expect his bibliography exceeds 
that of the next top 4 or 5 philosophers combined. Searle is perhaps next among moderns 
 (and the only one with many lectures on YouTube—over 100, which unlike almost all other 
philosophy lectures are a delight to listen to) and Read, etc., are very prominent with dozens 
of books and hundreds of articles, talks and reviews. But CDC and other metaphysicians 
ignore them and the thousands who regard their work as critically important. Consequently, 
the powerful W/S framework (as well by and large of that of modern research in thinking) 
is totally absent and all the confusions it has cleared away are abundant. If you read my 
reviews and the works themselves, perhaps your view of most writing in this arena may be 
quite different. But as W insisted, one has to work the examples through oneself. As often 
noted, his supersocratic trialogues (my term) had a therapeutic intent. 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted in my other 
reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as simple as pie—we must have 
a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only be external and public. He 
famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’. If we all have a box that cannot be 
opened nor x-rayed etc. and call what is inside a ‘beetle’ then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role 
in language, for every box could contain a different thing or even be empty. So, there is no 
private language that only I can know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not 
publicly demonstrable it cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down Carruthers’ 
ISA theory of mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references. I have 
explained W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection and the functioning of 
dispositional language (‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my reviews of Budd, 
Johnston and several of Searle’s books. See Stern’s “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations” (2004) for a nice explanation of Private Language and everything by Read et 
al for getting to the roots of these issues as few do. 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a ‘higher self’. The very act of 
writing, reading and all language and concepts (language games) of presuppose self, 
consciousness and will, so such accounts are self-contradictory cartoons of life without any 
value whatsoever (and zero impact on the daily life of anyone). W/S and others have long 
noted that the first person point of view is just not intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a 
third person one, but absence of coherence is no problem for the cartoon views of life. 
Likewise, with the description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, 
‘information processing’ etc., -- well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker 
and many others. 
 
Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning of many key 
terms varying almost at random without awareness, is schizoid and hopeless but there are 
thousands of science and philosophy books like this. T5h5ere is the description (not 
explanation as W made clear) of our behavior and then the experiments of cognitive 
psychology. Many of these dealing with human behavior combine the conscious thinking 
of S2 with the unconscious automatisms of S1 (absorb psychology into physiology). We are 
often told that self, will, and consciousness are illusions, since they think they are showing 
us the ‘real’ meaning of these terms, and that the cartoon use is the valid one. That is, S2 is 
‘unreal’ and must be subsumed by the scientific causal descriptions of S1. Hence the reason 
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for the shift from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind. See e.g., my review 
of Carruthers’ ‘The Opacity of Mind’. 
 
If someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly mistaken or if by 
choice he means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be described as having a ‘cause’ or 
that it’s not clear how to reduce ‘choice’ to ‘cause’ so we must regard it as illusory, then that 
is trivially true (or incoherent), but irrelevant to how we use language and how we live, 
which should be regarded as the point from which to begin and end such discussions. 
Perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant and Nietzsche (great 
intellects, but neither of them doing much to dissolve the problems of philosophy), who 
were voted the best of all time by philosophers-not Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or 
CDC. 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I consider here, 
keeping in mind W’s comment that not everything with the appearance of a question is one). 
We want to understand how the brain (or the universe) does it but S2 is not up to it. It’s all 
(or mostly) in the unconscious machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t ‘know’ but our DNA 
does, courtesy of the death of countless trillions of organisms over some 3 billion years. We 
can describe the world easily but often cannot agree on what an ‘explanation’ should look 
like. So we struggle with science and ever so slowly describe the mechanisms of mind. Even 
if we should arrive at “complete” knowledge of the brain, we would still just have a 
description of what neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing red, but it is not clear what it 
would mean (COS) to have an “explanation” of why it’s red (i.e., why qualia exist). As W 
said, explanations come to an end somewhere. 
For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruthers’ “Opacity of Mind” (a 
major recent work of the CDC school) are comprised largely of the standard confusions that 
result from ignoring the work of W, S and hundreds of others. It can be called Scientism or 
Reductionism and denies the ‘reality’ of our higher order thought, will, self and 
consciousness, except as these are given a quite different and wholly incompatible use in 
science. We have e.g., no reasons for action, only a brain that causes action etc. They create 
imaginary problems by trying to answer questions that have no clear sense. It should strike 
us that these views have absolutely no impact on the daily life of those who spend most of 
their adult life promoting them. This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in his 
article ‘The Hard Problem of Consciousness’—“the hardcore problem becomes more and 
more remote, the more we de- humanize aspects of the mind, such as information and 
perception and intentionality. The problem will only really be being faced if we face up to 
it as a ‘problem’ that has to do with whole human beings, embodied in a context 
(inextricably natural and social) at a given time, etc…then it can become perspicuous to one 
that there is no problem. Only when one starts, say, to ‘theorize’ information across human 
and non- human domains (supposedly using the non-human-the animal {usually thought 
of as mechanical} or the machine-as one’s paradigm, and thus getting things back to front), 
does it begin to look as if there is a problem…that all the ‘isms’ (cognitivism, reductionism 
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(to the brain), behaviorism and so on)…push further and further from our reach…the very 
conceptualization of the problem is the very thing which ensures that the ‘hard problem’ 
remains insoluble…no good reason has ever been given for us to think that there must be a 
science of something if it is to be regarded as real. There is no good reason to think that there 
should be a science of consciousness, or of mind or of society, any more than there need be 
a science of n5u6mbers, or of universes or of capital cities or of games or of constellations or 
of objects whose names start with the letter ‘b’…. We need to start with the idea of ourselves 
as embodied persons acting in a world, not with the idea of ourselves as brains with minds 
‘located’ in them or ‘attached’ to them… There is no way that science can help us bootstrap 
into an ‘external’/’objective’ account of what consciousness really is and when it is really 
present. For it cannot help us when there is a conflict of criteria, when our machines come 
into conflict with ourselves, into conflict with us. For our machines are only calibrated by 
our reports in the first place. There 
 
 
can be no such thing as getting an external point of view… that isn’t because… the hard 
problem is insoluble, …Rather, we need not admit that a problem has even been 
defined…’transcendental naturalism’ …guarantees... the keeping alive indefinitely of the 
problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological satisfaction of both a humble (yet 
privileged) ‘scientific’ statement of limits to the understanding and, the knowingness of 
being part of a privileged elite, that in stating those limits, can see beyond them. It fails to 
see what Wittgenstein made clear in the preface to the Tractatus. The limit can… only be 
drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.” 
Many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 85 years ago that ‘mysteries’ satisfy a 
longing for the transcendent, and because we think we can see the ‘limits of human 
understanding’, we think we can also see beyond them, and that we should dwell on the 
fact that we see the limits of language (mind) in the fact that we cannot describe the facts 
which correspond to a sentence except by repeating the sentence (see p10 etc. in his Culture 
and Value, written in 1931). I also find it useful to repeat frequently his remark that 
“superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus” -- written a century ago in TLP 5.1361. 
Also, apropos is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin of the philosophical 
problems about mental processes (and all philosophical problems). "How does the 
philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise? The 
first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave 
their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them -- we think. But 
that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a 
definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement 
in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.) 
-- And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, 
we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now 
it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them. 
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Another seemingly trivial comment by W (PI p271) asked us to imagine a person who forgot 
what the word ‘pain’ meant but used it correctly –i.e., he used it as we do! Also relevant is 
W’s comment (TLP 6.52) that when all scientific questions have been answered, nothing is 
left to question, and that is itself the answer. And central to understanding the scientistic 
(i.e., due to scientism not science) failures of CDC et al is his observation that it is a very 
common mistake to think that something must make us do what we do, which leads to the 
confusion between cause and reason. “And the mistake which we here and in a thousand 
similar cases are inclined to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in 
the sentence “It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is 
an idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the 
confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. 
The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
He has also commented that the chain of causes has an end and that there is no reason in 
the general case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. 
W saw in his own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ oneself by 
working out ‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of being told the answers. 
Hence his famous comments about philosophy as therapy and ‘working on oneself’. 
Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised philosophy 
throughout the behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that there is often no hint that there 
are other points of view— that many of the most prominent philosophers regard the 
scientistic view as incoherent. There is also the fact (seldom mentioned) that, provided of 
course we ignore its incoherence, reduction does not stop at the level of neurophysiology, 
but can easily be extended (and has often been) to the level of chemistry, physics, quantum 
mechanics, ‘mathematics’ or just ‘ideas’. What exactly should make neurophysiology 
privileged? The ancient Greeks generated the idea that nothing exists but ideas and Leibniz 
famously described the universe as a giant machine. Most recently Stephan Wolfram 
became a legend in the history of pseudoscience for his description of the universe as a 
computer automaton in ‘A New Kind of Science’. Materialism, mechanism, idealism, 
reductionism, behaviorism and dualism in their many guises are hardly news and, to a 
Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W dictated the Blue and Brown books in the 30’s, 
or at least since the subsequent publication and extensive commentary on his nachlass. But 
convincing someone is a hopeless task. W realized one has to work on oneself—self therapy 
via long hard working through of ‘perspicuous examples’ of language (mind) in action. 
An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how easy it is to change 
a word’s use without knowing it, was given by physicist Sir James Jeans long ago: “The 
Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine." But ‘thought’, 
‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘cause’, ‘event’, ‘happen’, ‘occur’, ’continue’, etc. do not have the 
same meanings (uses) in science or philosophy as in daily life, or rather they have the old 
uses mixed in at random with many new ones so there is the appearance of sense without 
sense. Much of academic discussion of behavior, life and the universe is high comedy (as 
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opposed to the low comedy of most politics, religion and mass media): i.e., “comedy dealing 
with polite society, characterized by sophisticated, witty dialogue and an intricate plot”- 
(Dictionary.com). But philosophy is not a waste of time-done rightly, it is the best way to 
spend time. How else can we understand dispel the chaos in the behavioral sciences or 
describe our mental life and the higher order thought of System 2--the most intricate, 
wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s examples 
describing how our innate psychology uses the reality testing of System 2 to build on the 
certainties of System 1, so that we as individuals and as societies acquire a world view of 
irrefutable interlocking experiences that build on the bedrock of our axiomatic genetically 
programmed reflexive perception and action to the amazing edifice of science and culture. 
The theory of evolution and the theory of relativity passed long ago from something that 
could be challenged to certainties that can only be modified, and at the other end of the 
spectrum, there is no possibility of finding out that there are no such things as Paris or 
Brontosaurs. The skeptical view is incoherent. We can say anything but we cannot mean 
anything. 
Thus, with DMS, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of human 
understanding and the most basic document on our psychology. Though written when in 
his 60’s, mentally and physically devastated by cancer, it is as brilliant as his other work and 
transforms our understanding of philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher order 
thought), bringing it at last into the light, after three thousand years in the cave. Metaphysics 
has been swept away from philosophy and from physics. 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, that we 
can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the matter is that we 
have already got everything, and that we have got it actually present; we need not wait for 
anything. We make our moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and 
this grammar is already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for 
the future.” (said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) 
p183 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center 
of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but 
scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest 
intellectual adventures possible. 
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Review of Wittgenstein And Psychology- A Practical 
Guide by Harre and Tissaw (2005) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
A major flaw of the book is its failure to note Wittgenstein’s role in destroying the 
mechanical or reductionist or computationalist view of mind. These continue to dominate 
cognitive science and philosophy, in spite of the fact that they were powerfully countered 
by W and later by Searle and others. There is much talk of W’s use of terms like “grammar”, 
“rules” etc. but never a clear mention that they mean our Evolved Psychology or our 
genetically programmed innate behavior. There are references to Baker and Hacker's works 
and to Malcolm Budd, but none to many standard W refs such as ter Hark, Johnston, and 
especially to the searchable Intelex CDROM and online sites of his complete works, nor to 
Searle, and none to the vast literature of evolutionary psychology. 
Many sections of the book are reasonably successful in describing W’s work but there is 
much aimless wandering and many mistakes and confusions. These will hopefully be 
obvious to those who read the above and my other reviews as I cannot recount more than a 
few of the hundreds of critical comments I made in my two readings of this book. A major 
flaw, common to most writing in the behavioral sciences, is the lack of awareness of the 
S1/S2 two selves or two systems of thought mode of describing personality that W pioneered 
(though nobody noticed) and a failure to be clear about nature/nurture issues. The fast, 
automatic perceptions, ‘rules’ and behaviors of S1 are mushed together with the slow 
conscious dispositional thinking, believing and rule following of S2 and neither are clearly 
nor consistently distinguished from arbitrary cultural behaviors. 
Like all authors until very recently, they fail to give Wittgenstein’s last work “On Certainty” 
the prominent position it deserves, and likewise fail to take advantage of the powerful dual 
systems of thought framework. Nor have they adopted the useful extensions of 
Wittgenstein’s work made by John Searle. So, I first lay out a framework for intentionality 
(behavior) and then provide some detailed comments. This book is a reasonable first 
attempt to bring W’s pioneering work on higher order thought to the attention of 
psychology but it has many failings and needs a thorough rewrite. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
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and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
Before remarking on “Wittgenstein and Psychology”, I will first offer some comments on 
philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in 
the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W). It will help to see my reviews of PNC 
(Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other 
books by and about these two geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order 
behavior, not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young 
science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. 
(Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there 
are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual 
confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method 
pass one another by." Wittgenstein PI p.232 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” Blue Book p18, 
1933 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds 
to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein 
CV p10 (1931) 
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"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does 
not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a 
pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the existence of the 
pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a physical system In sum, the 
fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that 
programs provide causal explanations of cognition...There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." Searle 
Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science is at much 
too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of intrinsic 
intentionality. We are blinded to this difference by the fact that the same sentence `I see a 
car coming toward me,' can be used to record both the visual intentionality and the output 
of the computational model of vision in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, 
it is simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104- 
105 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction people erroneously suppose 
that every mental representation must be consciously 6th1ought. but the notion of a 
representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that 
has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction we can 
analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions 
of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say is not that of finding the solution but rather that of 
recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas 
the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. 
If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312- 314 
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These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an 
outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive psychologists. In 
considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy is descriptive psychology. 
 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: “Wittgenstein resolved 
many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed 
for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about 
the relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self- 
knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of 
mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of logic and 
language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of 
psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics 
and mathematical truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed 
us a vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual 
confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late 
interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the two systems 
of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective linguistic dispositional S2. 
He explained how behavior only is possible with a vast inherited background that is the 
axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness 
self, time and space are innate true-only axioms. He noted in thousands of pages and 
hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not directly describable in 
language, this being possible only with terms that substitute for public behavior (the 
impossibility of private language). He invented truth tables and predicted the utility of 
paraconsistent logic. He patented helicopter designs which anticipated by three decades the 
use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas 
turbine engine, designed a heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a 
modernist house, and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed by 
others. He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist since he constantly explained 
the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it generates behavior. He 
described the psychology behind the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in EP 
decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature of language and the game-like nature of 
social interaction. He described and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the 
computational theory of mind, long before practical computers. He decisively laid to rest 
skepticism and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of 
the mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
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In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive psychology, 
philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to contribute to this topic that 
other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so after noting W’s above remark on 
science envy, I will quote again from Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further 
condition…, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want to know when 
knowledge does and when it does not require justification. We need to be clear what is 
ascribed to a person when it is said that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, 
an achievement, a performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that 
p be identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is not the 
case that p’, whereas one cannot say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the case that p’? Why are 
there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, but not 
belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, 
whether and how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, 
hesitantly, foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one 
know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on – 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge and belief, 
but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, noticing, recognising, 
attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to mention the numerous verbs of 
perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be 
answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang 
together, the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and 
purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable 
exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self- 
styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic 
turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that 
results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a 
much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
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when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits 
usefulness. 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the 
Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought 
(DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or autom6a3ted “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) 
has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps 
(see Searle) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
I give a detailed explanation of the table in my other writings. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truth makers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truth makers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is 
only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes 
on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared 
with this one. 
A major theme in all discussion of human b6eh6avior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is 
an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking (e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions or abilities to act), but the logical extensions of S2 into culture 
(S3). 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social 
behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later 
W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into 
conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror 
neuron, true- only, non-propositional, pre-linguistic mental states- our perceptions and 
memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 
1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 
2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 
and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often 
counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which 
can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker 
etc.). 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but 
graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct 
perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my 
hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential (CSR), and the S2 use, which is their normal 
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use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my 
way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other 
disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and 
"biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur 
without involving much of the intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference 
engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" --as W and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide 
array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well 
describes the basic structure of behavior. 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the 
paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on p40 with "conditions of 
satisfaction" as follows. 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are caused by 
the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified by S2 (‘free will’). 
We try to match how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should see that 
belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and 
other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- 
only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended 
cases such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of 
the COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is 
always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly 
by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that 
dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that `will', `self' and 
`consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of perceptions and 
reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) 
their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for 
judgment and so cannot be judged. The true- only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
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Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, 
perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, 
and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to 
understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. 
They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic 
intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it 
would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would 
return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed countless times and 
biology demonstrates, life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid 
reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, 
no people, no philosophy. 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to 
our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent 
Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that 
serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely 
related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate 
desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these 
are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the 
Pope wish to help the poor because it is right, but the ultimate cause is a change in their 
brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal 
actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified into 
the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is 
via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the 
brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker 
`The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that 
S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public truth 
conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' 
going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the 
vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms 
(p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of 
the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as 
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`EP' and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is 
about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes that there 
is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition 
of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which means to speak or write a 
well-formed sentence in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental 
state. 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have 
been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the 
whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image 
its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation 
(p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, 
he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops 
my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my 
wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? 
If I have learned to talk, then I do know." 
Disposition words refer to Potential Events which I accept as fulfilling the COS and my 
mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way dispositions 
function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, desiring etc. depending on 
the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express and which can only be expressed 
by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
This is another statement of W’s argument against private language. Likewise, with rule 
following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts. And one must note 
that many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W's frequent referrals 
to community practice into thinking it's just arbitrary public practice that underlies 
language and social conventions. W makes clear many times that such conventions are only 
possible given an innate shared axiomatic psychology which he often calls the background. 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are as clear as day— 
we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only be public. He 
famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’ as noted p191 of WAP. I have explained 
the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional attitudes’) and W’s dismantl6in9g 
of the notion of introspection above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of S’s 
books. Basically, he showed that the causal relation and word and object model that works 
for S1 does not apply to S2. 
W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work is devoted to describing why it 
cannot serve as a description of behavior. “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? 
Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction? If I 
do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) But real behaviorism is 
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rampant in its modern ‘functionalist’, ‘computationalist’,’dynamic systems’ forms. See my 
review of Carruthers’ ‘The Opacity of Mind’ for a recent egregious example. 
Behaviorism etc. have no practical impact. Unlike other cartoon views of life, they are too 
cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so unrealistic that 
even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. Unfortunately, not so with other 
cartoon theories like the Standard Social Science Model, the Blank Slate and The 
Phenomenological Illusion, widely shared by religions, governments, sociology, 
anthropology, pop psychology, history, literature, and mom and dad, in spite of well- 
known facts, such as that personalities of adults adopted as children are as different from 
those of their adoptive siblings and parents as people chosen randomly off the street. 
Religions big and small, political movements, and economics often generate or embrace 
already existing cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit forces 
terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions, wishful thinking and selfishness and 
help to accelerate the destruction of the earth (the real purpose of nearly every social 
practice). The point is to realize that these fantasies are on a continuum and have the same 
source. All of us are born with a cartoon view of life and few ever grow out of it. But the 
world is not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoons collide with 
reality. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ 
of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching 
an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly there is barely a mention. 
Now for some comments on “Wittgenstein and Psychology” (WAP). 
 
Many sections of the book are reasonably successful in describing W’s work but there is 
much aimless wandering and many mistakes and confusions. These will hopefully be 
obvious to those who read the above and my other reviews as I cannot recount more than a 
few of the hundreds of critical comments I made in my two readings of this book. A major 
flaw, common to most writing in the behavioral sciences, is the lack of awareness of the 
S1/S2 two-selves mode of describing personality that W pioneered (though nobody noticed) 
and a failure to be clear about nature/nurture issues. The fast, automatic perceptions, ‘rules’ 
and behaviors of S1 are mushed together with the slow conscious dispositional thinking, 
believing and rule following of S2 and neither are clearly or consistently distinguished from 
the arbitrary cultural behaviors of S3. Thus Chap 6 on Rules and Rule Following is severely 
limited by failing to note clearly the difference between the automatic unconscious ‘rules’ 
of S1 perception and reflexive actions and the deliberate conscious ‘rules’ of S2 thinking and 
understanding, both innate, and the arbitrary learned S3 rules that constitute the cultural 
veneer on behavior. S2 rule following is just dispositional behavior of understanding 
propositions with COS. Throughout the book they miss W’s teachings regarding the true 
only axiomatically based two systems of personality (half a century before it became 
popular) so beautifully laid out in his third period and above all in his last work On 
Certainty. 
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There is a good discussion of W’s remarks on reading in Chap 5 ‘Skills and Abilities’ but it 
fails here or anywhere to make it clear that these are dispositions, hence propositional and 
true or false S2 functions and, like all dispositions, have clear meaning due to their public 
outer Conditions of Satisfaction and not to any private internal phenomena. This is another 
demonstration of the impossibility of private language and introspection and contrary to its 
supposed complexity, it is a simple fact that there can be no such thing as a private test to 
determine the truth of any statement. This is the major topic of the fine books by Budd and 
Johnston—the Inner phenomena that we experience and the Outer behavior that determines 
the operation of language and all social interaction. 
Chap 8 on Cognition is better, and Chap 9 on Subjectivity and the PLA is the best in the 
book. It is critical to read p176-7 where the major issues of the rest of the book are 
summarized and answered. Chap 10 is feeble while 11 had some good material on intention 
and action but is crippled by blank slateism without any note that W embraced innateness 
and gave frequent references to our inherited background. Like most of the book, it cries 
out for close study more W examples and amalgamation with the powerful framework of 
Searle. In spite of much good material, I again find much to criticize in Chap 12 and 13 on 
Emotions and Perceptions—e.g. W noted that my emotions are basically S1 true only 
automated functions while my understanding of your emotions is most often an S2 exercise. 
Another major flaw of the book is its failure to note W’s role in destroying the mechanical 
or reductionist or computationalist view of mind. These continue to dominate cognitive 
science and philosophy in spite of the fact that they were powerfully countered by W and 
later by S and others. 
There is much talk of W’s use of terms like “grammar”, “rules” etc., but never a clear 
mention that they mean our EP or our genetically programmed innate behavior. There are 
references to Baker and Hackers works and to Budd, but none to many standard W refs such 
as ter Hark, Johnston, and especially to the searchable Intelex CDROM of his complete 
works, nor to Searle, and none to the vast literature of EP. This is a good first attempt to 
bring W’s pioneering work on higher order thought to the attention of psychology, but it 
has many failings and needs a thorough rewrite. 
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Review of Wittgenstein -- Rethinking the Inner by Paul 
Johnston (1993) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Overall Johnston has done a phenomenal job and this book should be required reading for 
all those interested in behavior. 
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study of behavior— 
linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, politics, sociology, and art, he is 
not even mentioned in most books and articles, with even the exceptions having little to say, 
and most of that distorted or flat wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in 
philosophy, and possibly this preposterous situation will change, especially due to the 
continuing efforts of Peter Hacker, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock and more recently Annalisa 
Coliva. I will first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle 
(S) and Wittgenstein from the modern two systems of thought perspective as W did 60 years 
ago. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
" But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein- OC94 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6(1933) 
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"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. 
If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the 
most important facts." Wittgenstein Z220 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein---- Philosophical Occasions p187 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds 
to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence (this has to do 
with the Kantian solution to the problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, 
are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations…the forms of the status 
function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic powers…to recognize 
something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action…these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The 
general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for action 
presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons for action.” Searle 
PNC p34-49 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality… Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced…it does 
not exist…This is… the phenomenological illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has no causal 
powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying neurobiology…But 
causal reducibility does not lead to ontological reducibility…consciousness only exists as 
experienced…and therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a third person 
ontology, something that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
 
Before commenting in detail on Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner (WRTI) I will first offer 
some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and 
Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place any commentator on W and 
behavior in proper perspective. 
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Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His work as a 
whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our 
conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges from unconscious machinations (System 1) 
(S1). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final extended treatment of this idea-and my review 
thereof for preparation. His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of 
animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is 
entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there 
is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all 
higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in 
humans this is extended into a personality (a cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based 
on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations 
that can be regarded as trivial). 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work and indeed all of philosophy is a development of or 
variation on these ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human 
behavior, is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, which underlie 
all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few philosophers, psychologists, 
anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be 
seen as the major problem they are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value 
to consider all study of higher order behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and 
slow thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 and S2--see 
below), but nature and nurture. 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are 
the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, cognitive 
linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost 
nobody seems to realize that his works are a unique textbook of descriptive psychology that 
is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology 
and other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or less 
understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and 
cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of fast and slow thinking etc., - 
-see below). Searle’s work expands upon this and provides a stunning description of higher 
order social behavior that is possible because of the recent evolution of genes for 
dispositional psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
I suggest the key to W is to regard his corpus as the pioneering effort in deciphering our EP, 
seeing that he was describing the two selves of S1 and S2 and the multifarious language 
games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd period works and reading 
backwards to the Proto-Tractatus. It should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent 
and correct, all accounts of behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to 
translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of "Embodied Mind" 
and "Radical Enactivism" should flow directly from and into W's work (and they do). 
However, almost nobody is able to follow his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to 
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perspicuous examples, so even the redoubtable Searle has to be filtered and translated to 
see that this is true, and even he does not get how completely W has anticipated the latest 
work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (writing, speaking, acting). 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—which can be 
regarded as the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of 
examples of language use in context. He exposes the many varieties of language games and 
the relationships between the primary games of the true-only unconscious, pre or proto- 
linguistic axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive thinking, emotions 
and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self, 
mirror neuron functions), and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional linguistic 
conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false 
propositional secondary language games of slow thinking that are the network of cognitive 
illusions that constitute the second-self personality of which we are so enamored. W dissects 
hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and 
reflexive actions of S1 grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of S2 
dispositions, and many of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. 
With this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human 
nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic 
value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems perspective illuminates all higher 
behavior. Dobzhansky famously commented: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the 
light of evolution." And nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of 
evolutionary psychology. 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature") that language is a window on or some sort of 
translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other "Language of 
Thought" of which it is a translation, were rejected by W (and likewise by S), who tried to 
show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in 
action, that language is the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human 
nature, and W's whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. Long before 
Searle, he rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental 
psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, Functionalism, Strong AI, DST, CTM, etc.) 
could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The 
principal difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can 
now see this as obliviousness to System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological 
illusion’) and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find 
a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle 
contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a window into the mind but is the mind 
itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our 
speech using the later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the 
dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). 
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As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment that even if 
God could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the 
motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, of Cognitive Psychology. But God could 
see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking, since these S1 
functions are always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. 
This is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S muddies the waters 
here because he refers to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, he 
shows that the language of causality just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 
descriptions—again not a theory but a description about how language (thinking) works. 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we can do is 
give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories but of course “theory” 
and “description” are language games too and it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s 
description—a rose by any other name…. W’s point was that by sticking to perspicacious 
examples that we all know to be true accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of 
theories that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to 
generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own mistakes in 
PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account for the multifarious 
language games, they get closer and closer to describing behavior by way of numerous 
examples as did W. Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods 
are the different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or 
roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the 
Inner and the Outer and the impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure 
of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first described S1 functions but as S2 evolved 
they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of inner resulting from 
e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain. The PLG's are 
utterances by and descriptions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, 
true only, non-propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary 
acts (including System 1 Truths and UA1 (Understanding of Agency 1) and Emotions1- such 
as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, 
testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, 
hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's 
just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, 
mathematics, just make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle for good 
disquisitions on this). 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons (e.g., `I see that 
as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms of EP, genetics, physiology, 
and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is meaningless to give "explanations" with the 
proviso that they will make sense in the   future--`Nothing   is   hidden'--they    make  
sense now or never. 
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A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 and 
Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even 
into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which result 
from the logical extension of Truths 1). W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our 
whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as 
always here in front of us-- we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding "language philosophy" as a 
separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since language is just another name for 
the mind. And, when W says that understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the 
progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion "The confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a `young science' --but cf. another comment 
that I have never seen quoted-- "Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. The 
realities that are discovered lighten the philosopher’s task. Imagining possibilities." (LWPP1, 
807). So, he is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out that our behavior 
(mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology and that all discussions of 
higher order behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and 
powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to provide the physical basis for 
our behavior and facilitate our analysis of language games which nevertheless remain 
unexplainable--EP just is this way-- and unchanged. The true-only axioms, most thoroughly 
explored in 'On Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only reactions of 
bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and operate by the mechanism 
of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution". 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions rather than 
explanations, but of course these too are complex language games and one person's 
description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their innate true- only, nonempirical 
(automated and nonchangeable) responses to the world, animals extend their axiomatic 
understanding via deductions into further true only understandings ("theorems" as we 
might call them, but this is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or 
our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human nature. Theory of Mind 
(TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of Agency (UA a term 
I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and worms if UA is suitably 
defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note 
here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 2 
versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UA1 and the Slow conscious UA2 and of 
course these are heuristics for multifaceted phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is 
S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of perception, 
memory, reflexive thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s examples 
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explore this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in 
Johnston). 
 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, intelligent person 
before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least half a century earlier. One cannot 
help but incorporate T. rex and all that is relevant to it into our true only background via 
the inexorable workings of evolutionary psychology (EP). Once one gets the logical 
(psychological) necessity of this it is truly stupefying that even the brightest and the best 
seem not to grasp this most basic fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and 
a few others) which was laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation 
of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature 
(as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but as far as I know nobody else, points out). 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of our 
axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. Football or 
Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, 
ideas, events, developed out of and are tied to countless others in the true only network that 
begins with birth and extends in all directions to encompass much of our awareness and 
memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of 
involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, 
and almost exclusively in OC (his last work `On Certainty'), are equivalent to the fast 
thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking 
Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is 
involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over in endless 
examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes" (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if 
measured by energy use in the brain). 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of language 
games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as "dispositions" or 
"inclinations", which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the 
same sense), and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But 
disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W 
discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but 
graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers inspired W to write 
OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, 
i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which 
is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or 
false (`I know my way home'). 
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The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics 
(e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", 
"priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so 
there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will 
vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 
thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network 
of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", 
"cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
One of W's recurring themes was what is now called Theory of Mind (TOM), or as I prefer 
Understanding of Agency (UA), but of course he did not use these terms, which is the 
subject of major research efforts now. I recommend consulting the work of Ian Apperly, 
who is carefully dissecting UA1 and 2 and who has recently become aware of one of the 
leading Wittgensteinian philosophers Daniel Hutto, since Hutto has now characterized UA1 
as a fantasy (or rather insists that there is no `Theory' nor representation involved in UA1-- 
that being reserved for UA2). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W 
laid the groundwork for this between 60 and 80 years ago. 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not accurately describe nor determine how we act— 
now a pillar of the behavioral sciences. See ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in Searle’s 
‘Philosophy in a New Century’ (PNC) for a grand example from philosophy. It is an obvious 
corollary of W’s and S’s descriptive psychology that it is the unconscious automatisms of 
System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and that the later evolved conscious 
dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the 
cake. This is most strikingly borne out by the latest experimental psychology, some of which 
is nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two Selves', but 
of course there is a huge volume of recent work he does not cite and an endless stream of 
pop and pro books issuing). It is an easily defensible view that most of the burgeoning 
literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is wholly 
compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
Regarding my view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has noticed that he 
very clearly explained several times specifically and many times in passing, the psychology 
behind what later became known as the Wason Test-- long a mainstay of EP research. 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but 
scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes aphoristically and telegraphically 
because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest 
intellectual adventures possible. 
W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true- 
only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is 
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itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. Sometimes “certainty” is revisable, 
but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our 
axiomatic and non-revisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as 
it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the “battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and over again. 
One word- two (or many) distinct uses. 
Again, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 functioning that is ‘subjective’ in 
several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, a matter of evidence but a true- 
only understanding in our own case and a true-only perception in the case of others. 
We again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and life) of identical words 
glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of ‘belief’, ‘seeing’ etc., as applied to S1 which is 
composed of mental states in the present only, and S2 which is not. From an evolutionary 
or Wittgensteinian perspective, is the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably and universally expanded during personal 
development into a wide array of automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, 
and arbitrarily into cultural variations on them. 
To put it in my terms, S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non- 
propositional, true only mental states –roughly the domain of the Inner, while slow S2 can 
only coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F)— 
roughly the domain of the Outer. 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the 
same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which seeks 
explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the 
automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious. 
However, it is true that most of behavior is mechanical and that The Phenomenological 
Illusion is of vastly greater reach than Searle describes. It is most striking to me when driving 
a car on the freeway and suddenly snapping back to S2 awareness startled to realize I have 
just driven for several minutes with no conscious awareness at all. On reflection, this 
automatism can be seen to account for almost all of our behavior with just minimal 
supervision and awareness from S2. I am writing this page and have to think about what to 
say, but then it just flows out into my hands which type it and by and large it’s a surprise to 
me except when I think of changing a specific sentence. And you read it giving commands 
to your body to sit still and look at this part of the page but the words just flow into you and 
some kind of understanding and memory happen but unless you concentrate on a sentence 
there is only a vague sense of doing anything. A soccer player runs down the field and kicks 
the ball and thousands of nerve impulses and muscle contractions deftly coordinated with 
eye movements, and feedback from proprioceptive and balance organs have occurred, but 
there is only a vague feeling of control and high level awareness of the results. S2 is the Chief 
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of Police who sits in his office while S1 has thousands of officers doing the actual work 
according to laws that he mostly does not even know. Reading, writing or soccer are 
voluntary acts A2 seen from above but composed of thousands of automatic acts A1 seen 
from below. 
It is a good idea to read at least Chapter 6 of PNC, “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI). 
It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking 
the slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank 
Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this over 60 years earlier and also gave the 
reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic axiomatic network of 
our innate System 1 which is the source of the Inner. Very roughly, regarding ‘observer 
independent’ features of the world as S1 or The Inner, and ‘observer dependent’ features as 
S2 or The Outer should prove very revealing. As S notes, the Phenomenologists have the 
ontology exactly backwards, but of course so does almost everyone due to the defaults of 
their EP. 
Though he was writing in the early 90’s when most of the above ideas from Searle and the 
recent work in psychology were not yet published, Johnston’s WRTI does a brilliant job of 
showing how W disposed of the myth of the Inner via careful examples of language in action. 
Central to this is one of W’s brilliant insights—the impossibility of a private language --and 
Johnston (J) explains and expands on W’s view of this quite well. There cannot be any test 
for the correctness of our private ‘Inner’ phenomena, only for Outer public behavior. Our 
Inner S1 phenomenology (sensations, perceptions, memories etc.) only has a description 
because, during growth, we generate a language in our more recently evolved higher 
cortical S2 regions for describing Outer behavior. The language of publicly viewable 
behaviors of feeling, thinking, knowing etc., are then applied as we grew up as a species 
and as individuals (ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny) to represent our Inner life. However, 
its only connection with the Inner is the behavior we can see. “Pain” is the inner S1 primitive 
that we learn to describe with many S2 terms— “My arm is throbbing”, “It hurts just to 
think of it” etc. 
J notes that some will object that if our reports and memories are really untestable they 
would have no value but “This objection misses the whole point of W’s argument, for it 
assumes that what actually happened, and what the individual says happened, are two 
distinct things. As we have seen, however, the grammar of psychological statements means 
that the latter constitutes the criteria for the former. If we see someone with a concentrated 
expression on her face and want to know ‘what is going on inside her’, then her sincerely 
telling us that she is trying to work out the answer to a complicated sum tells us exactly 
what we want to know. The question of whether, despite her sincerity, her statement might 
be an inaccurate description of what she is (or was) doing does not arise. The source of 
confusion here is the failure to recognize that psychological concepts have a different 
grammar from that of concepts used to describe outer events. What makes the inner seem 
so mysterious is the misguided attempt to understand one concept in terms of another. In 
fact, our concept of the Inner, what we mean when we talk of ‘what was going on inside her’ 
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is linked not to mysterious inner processes, but to the account which the individual offers 
of her experience…As processes or events, what goes on inside the individual is of no 
interest, or rather is of a purely medical or scientific interest (p13-14). 
“W’s attack on the notion of inner processes does not imply that only the Outer matters, on 
the contrary; by bringing out the true nature of utterances, he underlines the fact that we 
aren’t just interested in behavior. We don’t just want to know that the person’s body was in 
such and such a position and that her features arranged in such and such a way. Rather we 
are interested in her account of what lay behind this behavior…” (p16-17) 
In laying out W’s reasoning on the impossibility of private rules or a private language, he 
notes that “The real problem however is not simply that she fails to lay down rules, but that 
in principle she could not do so…The point is that without publicly checkable procedures, 
she could not distinguish between following the rule and merely thinking she is following 
the rule.” 
He then quotes one of W’s most famous passages which makes this issue crystal clear: 
“Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into 
anyone else’s box and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. 
-Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One 
might even imagining such a thing constantly changing. -But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had 
a use in these people’s language? If so, it would not be used as the name of a thing. The 
thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all, not even as a something: for the 
box might even be empty. No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels 
out, whatever it is” (PI P293). 
And J nicely sums it up “This approach to the Inner involves a completely new way of 
understanding our psychological concepts. It also involves rejecting the confusing picture 
which treats the Inner as though it were a substance whose changes, states and motions the 
individual observes and reports on. In contrast, W’s approach emphasizes that what 
interests us is the attitudes and behavior of human beings.” (p27). 
The mythology of the Inner can be seen as another instance of the Phenomenological Illusion 
so nicely deconstructed by Searle. Oblivious to the automaticity of the Inner System 1, we 
try, like the Phenomenologists, to explain the fast-automatic unconscious behaviors of S1 in 
terms of the slow, conscious behaviors of S2 and so we use the S2 dispositional language. ‘I 
think I’ll go out now’ comes out without a thought but it can also come out after thought. 
His next chapter “The World of the Senses” discusses the various language games of “seeing” 
and “seeing as”. Though generally quite good he fails to make clear enough to suit me, W’s 
distinction between the true only S1 game of ‘seeing’ as a mental state with clear duration 
and the S2 game of “seeing as” that lacks clear duration and which is not really a mental 
state in the same sense. The perception becomes an object of reflection (slow thinking) in 
seconds and so is ‘seen’ and ‘seen as’ essentially simultaneously by S1 and S2 which feed 
into each other. His quote shows that W understood this well: “This makes this object into 
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a chimera; a queerly shifting construction. For the similarity to a picture is now impaired.” 
(PI p196), and of course hundreds of pages from W’s third period discuss the relations 
between S1 and S2. 
On p55 J makes the point with respect to vision (which has been made many times by W 
and S in this and other contexts) that the discussion of the Outer is entirely dependent for 
its very intelligibility on the unchallengeable nature of our direct first-person experience of 
the Inner. The System 2 sceptical doubts concerning mind, will, senses, world, cannot get a 
foothold without the true only certainties of System 1 and the certainty that you are reading 
these words now is the basis for judgment, not a thing that can itself be judged. This mistake 
is one of the most basic and common in all philosophy. 
On p81 he makes the point that the impossibility, in the normal case, of checking your 
statements concerning your dispositions (often but confusingly called ‘propositional 
attitudes’) such as what you thought or are feeling far from being a defect of our psychology 
is exactly what gives these statements interest. “I am tired” tells us how you are feeling 
rather than giving us another bit of data about the Outer such as your slow movements or 
the shadows under your eyes. 
He then does an excellent job of explaining W’s debunking of the idea that meaning or 
understanding (and all dispositions) are experiences that accompany speech. As W pointed 
out, just consider the case where you think you understand, and then find out you did not, 
to see the irrelevance of any inner experience to meaning, understanding, thinking, 
believing, knowing etc. The experience which counts is the awareness of the public language 
game we participate in. Similar considerations dissolve the problem of the ‘lightning speed 
of thought’. “The key is to recognize that thinking is not a process or a succession of 
experiences but an aspect of the lives of conscious beings. What corresponds to the lightning 
speed of thought is the individual’s ability to explain at any point what she is doing or 
saying.” (p86). And as W says “Or, if one calls the beginning and the end of the sentence the 
beginning and end of the thought, then it is not clear whether one should say of the 
experience of thinking that it is uniform during this time or whether it is a process like 
speaking the sentence itself” (RPP2 p237). 
Again: “The individuals account of what she thought has the same grammar as her account 
of what she intended and of what she meant. What we are interested in is the account of the 
past she is inclined to give and the assumption that she will be able to give an account is 
part of what is involved in seeing her as conscious” (p 91). That is, all these disposition verbs 
are part of our conscious, voluntary S2 psychology. 
In “The Complexity of the Inner”, he notes that it is ironic that our best way to communicate 
the Inner is to refer to the Outer but I would say it is both natural and unavoidable. Since 
there is no private language and no telepathy, we can only contract muscles and by far the 
most efficient and deep communication is by contracting oral muscles (speech). As W 
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commented in several contexts, it is in plays (or now in TV and films) that we see language 
(thought) in its purest form. 
Dispositions like intending continue as long as we don’t change or forget them and thus 
lack a precise duration, as well as levels of intensity and the content is a decision and so it 
not a precise mental state so in all these respects they are quite different from S1 perceptions, 
memories and reflexive responses like S1 emotions. 
The difference between S1 and S2 (as I put - this was not a terminology available to J or W) 
also is seen in the asymmetry of the disposition verbs, with the first person use of ‘I believe’ 
etc., being (in the normal case of sincere utterance) true- only sentences vs the third person 
use ‘he believes’ etc., being true or false evidence-based propositions. One cannot say “I 
believe it is raining and it isn’t” but other tenses such as “I believed it was raining and it 
wasn’t” or the third person “He believes it is raining and it isn’t” are OK. As J says: “The 
general issue at the heart of the problem here is whether the individual can observe her own 
dispositions…The key to clarifying this paradox is to note that the individuals description 
of her own state of mind is also indirectly the description of a state of affairs…In other words, 
someone who says she believes P is thereby committed to asserting P itself…The reason 
therefor that the individual cannot observe her belief is that by adopting a neutral or 
evaluatory stance towards it, she undermines it. Someone who said “I believe it’s raining 
but it isn’t” would thereby undermine her own assertion. As W notes, there can be no first 
person equivalent of the third person use of the verb for the same reason that a verb meaning 
to believe falsely would lack a first person present indicative...the two propositions are not 
independent, for ‘the assertion that this is going on inside me asserts: this is going on outside 
me’ (RPP1 p490)” (p154-56). Though not commented on by W or J, the fact that children 
never make such mistakes as “I want the candy but I don’t believe I want it” etc., shows that 
such constructions are built into our grammar (into our genes) and not cultural add-ons. 
He then looks at this from another viewpoint by citing W “What would be the point of my 
drawing conclusions from my own words to my behavior, when in any case I know what I 
believe? And what is the manifestation of my knowing what I believe? Is it not manifested 
precisely in this-that I do not infer my behavior from my words? That is the fact.” (RPP1 
p744). Another way to say this is that S1 is the axiomatic true-only basis for cognition and 
as the non- propositional substrate for determining truth and falsity cannot be intelligibly 
judged. 
He ends the chapter with important comments on the variability within the LG’s (within 
our psychology) and I suggest it be read carefully. 
J continues the discussion in “The Inner/Outer Picture” much of which is summed up in his 
quote from W. “The inner is hidden from us means that it is hidden from us in a sense that 
it is not hidden from him. And it is not hidden from the owner in the sense that he gives 
expression to it, and we, under certain conditions, believe his expression and there error has 
no place. And this asymmetry in the game is expressed in the sentence that the Inner is 
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hidden from other people.” (LWPP2 p36). J goes on: “The problem is not that that inner is 
hidden but that the language game it involves is very different from those where we 
normally talk about knowledge.” And then he enters into one of W’s major themes 
throughout his life—the difference between man and machine. “But with a human being 
the assumption is that it is impossible to gain an insight into the mechanism. Thus, 
indeterminacy is postulated…I believe unpredictability must be an essential characteristic 
of the Inner. As also is the endless diversity of expressions.” (RPP2 p645 and LWPP2 p65). 
Again, W probes the difference between animals and computers. 
J notes that the uncertainties in our LG’s are not defects but critical to our humanity. Again 
W: “[What matters is] not that the evidence makes the feeling (and so the Inner) merely 
probable, but that we treat this as evidence for something important, that we base a 
judgement on this involved sort of evidence, and so that such evidence has a special 
importance in our lives and is made prominent by a concept.” (Z p554). 
J sees three aspects of this uncertainty as the lack of fixed criteria or fine shades of meaning, 
the absence of rigid determination of the consequences of inner states and the lack of fixed 
relationships between our concepts and experience. W: ”One can’t say what the essential 
observable consequences of an inner state are. When, for example, he really is pleased, what 
is then to be expected of him, and what not? There are of course such characteristic 
consequences, but they can’t be described in the same way as reactions which characterize 
the state of a physical object.” (LWPP2 p90). J “Here her inner state is not something we 
cannot know because we cannot penetrate the veil of the Outer. Rather there is nothing 
determinate to know.” (p195). 
In his final chapter, he notes that our LG’s are not likely to change regardless of scientific 
progress. “Although it is conceivable that the study of brain activity might turn out to be a 
more reliable predictor of human behavior, the sort of understanding of human action it 
gave would not be the same as that involved in the language game on intentions. Whatever 
the value of the scientists’ discovery, it could not be said to have revealed what intentions 
really are.” (p213). 
This indeterminateness leads to the notion that correlation of brain states with dispositions 
seems unlikely. “The difficulty here is that the notion of one thought is a highly artificial 
concept. How many thoughts are there in the Tractatus? And when the basic idea for it 
struck W, was that one thought or a rash of them? The notion of intentions creates similar 
problems…These subsequent statements can all be seen as amplifications or explanations 
of the original thought, but how are we to suppose this relates to the brain state? Are we to 
imagine that it too will contain the answer to every possible question about the thought?... 
we would have to allow that two significantly different thoughts are correlated with the 
same brain state…words may in one sense be interchangeable and in another sense not. This 
creates problems for the attempt to correlate brain states and thoughts…two thoughts may 
be the same in one sense and different in another…Thus the notion of one thought is a fragile 
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and artificial one and for that reason it is hard to see what sense it could make to talk of a 
one to one correlation with brain states.” (p218-219). 
 
Likewise, W denies that memory consists of traces in the nervous system. “Here the 
postulated trace is like the inner clock, for we no more infer what happened from a trace 
than we consult an inner clock to guess the time.” He then notes an example from W (RPP1 
p908) of a man jotting marks while he reads and who cannot repeat the text without the 
marks but they don’t relate to the text by rules… ”The text would not be stored up in the 
jottings. And why should it be stored up in our nervous system?” and also “…nothing seems 
more plausible to me than that people will some day come to the definite opinion that there 
is no copy in either the physiological or the nervous systems which corresponds to a 
particular thought or a particular idea of memory” (LWPP1 p504). This implies that there 
can be psychological regularities to which no physiological regularities correspond; and as 
W provocatively adds ‘If this upsets our concepts of causality, then it is high time they were 
upset.’” (RPP1 p905) … ’Why should not the initial and the terminal states of a system be 
connected by a natural law which does not cover the intermediary state? (RPP1 p909) ... [It 
is quite likely that] there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with 
thinking, so that it would be impossible to read off thought processes from brain 
processes…Why should this order, so to speak, not proceed out of chaos? ... as it were, 
causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not really hold for our thoughts, and 
hence for our talking and writing.’(RPP1 p903)…But must there be a physiological 
explanation here? Why don’t we just leave explaining alone? -but you would never talk like 
that if you were examining the behavior of a machine! –Well who says that a living creature, 
an animal body, is a machine in this sense?’” (RPPI p918) (p 220-21). 
Of course, one can take these comments variously, but one way is that W anticipates the rise 
of chaos theory, embodied mind and self-organization in biology. Since uncertainty, chaos 
and unpredictability are standard doctrine now, from subatomic to molecular scale, and in 
planetary dynamics (weather etc.,) and cosmology, why should the brain be an exception? 
J’s final section on Freud is ok but not especially interesting and the appendix on Seeing As 
and Perception likewise. I feel that there is a great advantage in treating these topics from 
the modern two systems perspective and that this is basically what W did 60 years ago. 
Overall J has done a phenomenal job and this book should be required reading for all those 
interested in behavior. 
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study of behavior— 
linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, politics, sociology, and art, he is 
not even mentioned in most books and articles, with even the exceptions having little to say, 
and most of that distorted or flat wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in 
philosophy, and possibly this preposterous situation will change, but probably not much. 
To show this framework and how it relates to a contemporary view of intentionality I have 
produced the following table. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of 
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Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may 
consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) from which it is taken. 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary 
processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical 
Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), 
of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, 
the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), 
terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by 
Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human 
Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by 
Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has 
no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
I give detailed explanations of this table in my other writings. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truth makers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology by 
Malcolm Budd 203p (1989) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A superb effort, but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive psychology 
of higher order thought) is not completely understood by anyone, so we can hardly expect 
Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern dual systems of thought view, and no 
comprehensive logical structure of rationality, to have grasped him completely. Like 
everyone, he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate 
Evolutionary Psychology and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and Searle’s work 
since laid out (e.g., in my recent articles) was unavailable to him. Nevertheless, he does a 
good job and nicely complements the work by Johnston (Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner) 
which I have also reviewed. Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The 
repudiation of the model of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words— 
the denial that the picture of the inner process provides a correct representation of the 
grammar of such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of 
introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate foundation.” 
An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full appreciation of W 
and so of both philosophy and psychology as I explain here and in my other reviews. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
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"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. 
If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the 
most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not curiosities; 
however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted and which have only 
gone unremarked because they are always before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds 
to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence (this has to do 
with the Kantian solution to the problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the 
nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent's desires, 
values, attitudes and evaluations? ... The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it 
tries to pose Hume's guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of 
which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, 
are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations...the forms of the status 
function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic powers...to recognize 
something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action...these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action...The 
general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for action 
presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons for action." Searle 
PNC p34-49 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does 
not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
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"So status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by collective 
intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers...With the important exception 
of language itself, all of institutional reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization 
is created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations...all of human 
institutional reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the 
same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech 
acts in the explicit form of Declarations." Searle MSW p11-13 
"Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world direction of fit. 
And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the upward or world-to-mind 
(or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like statements, are supposed to represent 
how things are in the world, and in that sense they are supposed to fit the world; they have 
the mind-to-world direction of fit. The conative-volitional states such as desires, prior 
intentions and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. 
They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we would like them to be or 
how we intend to make them be...In addition to these two faculties, there is a third, 
imagination, in which the propositional content is not supposed to fit reality in the way that 
the propositional contents of cognition and volition are supposed to fit...the world-relating 
commitment is abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment 
that it represent with either direction of fit." Searle MSW p15 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose 
that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a 
representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that 
has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can 
analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions 
of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
"But there is no pre-linguistic analog for the Declarations. Pre-linguistic intentional states 
cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing. This 
remarkable feat requires a language" MSW p69 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive capacities. It 
requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is essential for the use of 
language. At one level, the speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at 
another level the utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol 
itself. At one level it is a physical object like any other. At another level it has a meaning: it 
represents a type of a state of affairs" MSW p74 
"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because there is 
no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according to the conventions of a 
 language without creating commitments. This is true not just for statements but for all 
speech acts" MSW p82 
 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an 
outline of behavior from our two greatest descriptive psychologists. 
 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W). It will 
help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, WRTI and 
other books by these two geniuses. 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is 
an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking (e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions), but the logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social 
behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later 
W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into 
conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
Among W's frequent topics in his 3rd period were the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., 
Johnston-`Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner' (WRTI) on how confusing the two is a major 
industry in philosophy and psychology) -- the impossibility of private language and the 
axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like `thinking', `seeing' first described S1 functions 
but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of 
the inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside 
the brain. S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories 
and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1--Understanding of Agency 1-- and 
Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 
2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 
and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be 
described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms 
of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W for many examples 
and Searle and Hacker (Human Nature)for good disquisitions on this). 
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non- propositional, true 
only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms of reasons for 
actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are 
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or can become propositional (T or F). It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the 
mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--it is the default 
operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious-- 
called by S in PNC `The Phenomenological Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless 
philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our biology which produces the illusion 
that we control our life and the consequences are almost certain collapse of civilization 
during the next 150 years. 
I find W's description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in his OC 
and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S's (or anyone's). 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, 
economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so there will be more and 
less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or intentional 
action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", 
"inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", 
"background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
Though W warned frequently against theorizing and produced more revealing examples of 
language in action than anyone, one might say that his aggregate aphorisms illustrated by 
examples constitute the most comprehensive "theory" of behavior ever penned. 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but 
scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes telegraphically because we think and 
behave that way, and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures 
possible. I have had to cut the background info to a minimum, so those wishing for more 
please consult my many other reviews on W, S, Hutto, Johnston, etc. 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide 
array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well 
describes the basic structure of behavior. 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) on our 
thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or dispositions to act--still called 
by the inappropriate term `propositional attitudes' by many. COS are explained by S in 
many places such as on p169 of PNC: "Thus saying something and meaning it involves two 
conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of satisfaction." As S 
states it in PNC, "A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of 
satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that such and such is the case." Or, one needs 
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to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes 
clear in MSW. Regarding intentions, "In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must 
function causally in the production of the action."(MSWp34). 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher 
cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which 
inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A 
huge advance over pre-linguistic or proto-linguistic interactions in which only gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions. 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or "RPP1 and 2" or DMS's two 
books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true-only sentences 
describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior 
approach to S's taking S1 perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) 
since they can only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them in MSW) after one begins 
thinking about them in S2. 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of one event so 
for IAA "We have different levels of description where one level is constituted by the 
behavior at the lower level...in addition to the constitutive by way of relation, we also have 
the causal by means of relation."(p37 MSW). 
"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and intentions-in- 
action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are strikingly different."(p35 
MSW). The COS of PI need a whole action while those of IAA only a partial one. He makes 
clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) are mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they 
result in intentions-in-action(IAA) which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally 
self-reflexive (CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs and 
desires) it is essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These descriptions of 
cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1, which Searle has used for many years 
and is the basis for an extended one I have created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate 
this to modern psychological research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's true-only 
vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only perception, 
memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (e.g., see my review of Hutto 
and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from MSW p39 beginning 
"In sum" and ending on p 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (`will') are caused by the 
automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior intentions and intentions- 
in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should 
see that belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) 
and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are 
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totally dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- only 
reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such 
as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., 
with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always 
in the present. The two systems feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly 
by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that 
dominate our life S has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion.' 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd period work 
and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that ` will', `self' and ` consciousness' 
are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no 
possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made 
so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be 
judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
His summary of deontics (rights and obligations) on p50 of MSW needs translation. Thus 
"You have to have a pre-linguistic form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic 
forms are built, and you have to have the collective intentionality of the conversation in 
order to make the commitment" is much clearer (once you get used to my terminology) as 
"The prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our EP) 
which evolve during our maturation into their cultural manifestations in S3." 
It is critical to understand the notion of `function' that is relevant here. "A function is a cause 
that serves a purpose...In this sense functions are intentionality-relative and therefore mind 
dependent...status functions... require... collective imposition and recognition of a 
status"(p59 MSW). 
Again, I suggest the translation of "The intentionality of language is created by the intrinsic, 
or mind-independent intentionality of human beings" (p66 MSW) as "The linguistic, 
conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the unconscious axiomatic reflexive 
functions of S1". That is, one must keep in mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
S states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a 
propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other 
reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, 
that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and 
Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of 
S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, 
the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be 
possible. As W showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must be based on 
certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and 
pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
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Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of vocal 
muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than contractions of other 
muscles and this is on average several orders of magnitude higher for visual information. 
S1 and S2 are critical parts of human EP and are the results, respectively of billions and 
hundreds of millions of years of natural selections by inclusive fitness. They facilitated 
survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation). 
Everything about us physically and mentally bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk in 
S’s MSW (e.g., p114) about `extra- linguistic conventions' and `extra semantical semantics' 
is in fact referring to EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the 
basis for all behavior. As W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason invisible. 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which means that it is 
a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the true-only automatic cognitive 
functions of S1. Or you can say that spontaneous utterances and actions are the primitive 
reflexes of S1, while representations are the dispositional Secondary Language Games 
(SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial and indeed it is, but this is the most basic statement of how 
behavior works and hardly anyone has ever understood it. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal 
actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by 
the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is 
via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the 
brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker 
`The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that 
S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology who thinks a bit can 
see that this view is not credible. 
Here is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason operates: We yield to 
our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent 
Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time, often for reciprocal 
altruism--RA), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later 
in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness-IF (increased survival for genes in 
ourselves and those closely related). 
I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not at all unique to 
humans (think mother hen defending her brood from a fox) if we include the automated 
pre-linguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA of S2/3 or 
DIRA2 that require language are uniquely human. The paradox of how we can voluntarily 
carry out DIRA2/3 (i.e., the S2 acts and their S3 extension that are desire independent) is that 
the unconscious DIRA1, serving long term inclusive fitness, generate the conscious DIRA2 
which often override the short term personal immediate desires. Agents do indeed 
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consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted 
extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
On the contrary, following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true- 
only reflexive actions and cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for 
questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your awareness of it is the basis 
for doubting. 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that 
results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a 
much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits 
usefulness. 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the 
Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought 
(DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. System 1 is involuntary, reflexive 
or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or 
deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
I give detailed explanations of the table in my other writings. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only 
get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only an highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in its context. 
The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human 
Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
Now for some comments on Budd's WPP. 
 
As with all commentary on W, one must keep in mind when it was written and what works 
were consulted. On his death in 1951 W left behind a scattered collection of some 20,000 
pages. Apart from the Tractatus, they were unpublished and largely unknown, although 
some were widely circulated and read (as were notes taken in his classes), leading to 
extensive but largely unacknowledged influences. Some works are known to have been lost 
and many others W had destroyed. Most of this nachlass was microfilmed in 1968 by Cornell 
University and copies were bought by a very few libraries. Budd, like most W commentators 
of the period, does not reference the microfilm. Although much of the Nachlass is repetitive 
and appears in some form in his subsequently published works (which are referenced by 
Budd), many variant texts are of great interest and there is substantial material that has 
never been translated from the original German nor published in book form. In 1998 the 
Bergen CD of the complete nachlass appeared -- Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Text and Facsimile 
Version: The Bergen Electronic Edition $2500 ISBN 10: 0192686917. It is available through 
interlibrary loan and free on the net as well. Like the other CDs of W’s work, it is available 
from Intelex (www.nlx.com). It is indexed and searchable and the prime W resource. 
However, my extensive readings of the W literature show that very few people have 
bothered to consult it and thus their works are lacking a critical element. One can see 
Rodych’s papers on W’s remarks on Godel for one notable exception. 
Note that in 2019 a new version of the brown book dictate by W to Francis Skinner will 
appear from Springer and early lecture notes take by Yorick Smithies have recently been 
published. The searchable CDROM of his English books as well as that of the entire German 
nachlass, is now on several sites on the net and the Bergen CD is due for a new edition ca 
2021-- http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). And of course, most 
academic articles and books are now free online on b-ok.org and libgen.io. 
One major work dating from W’s middle period (1933) that was published as a book in 2000 
is the famous Big Typescript. Since Budd finished this book in 1989, neither this nor the 
Bergen CD was available to him and he neglected the Cornell microfilm. Nevertheless, by 
34 96  
far the most important works date from W’s 3rd period (ca. 1935 to 1951) and these were all 
used by Budd. 
In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century Viennese 
German into modern English. One must be a master of English, German, and W in order to 
do this and very few are up to it. All of his works suffer from clear translation errors and 
there are more subtle questions where one has to understand the whole thrust of his later 
philosophy in order to translate. Since, in my view, nobody has grasped the full import of 
his later works, one can see why W has yet to be fully appreciated. Even the more or less 
well-known critical difference e.g., between understanding ‘Satz’ as ‘sentence’ (i.e., an S1 
utterance) vs ‘proposition’ (i.e., an S2 utterance) in various contexts has never been fully 
understood (see my review of OC). 
The above comments seem to me to be as good a description of higher order behavior as 
one can find but of course it is not completely understood by anyone so we can hardly expect 
Budd, writing in the mid 80’s to have grasped it. Like everyone he does not get that W’s use 
of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our EP and the whole framework of W’s and S’s work laid 
out above was unavailable to him. Nevertheless, he does a good job and nicely complements 
the work by Johnston (Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner) which I have also reviewed. 
Inevitably, W’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of introspection and the 
impossibility of a truly private language pop up repeatedly (“…introspection can never lead 
to a definition…” p8). The basics of this argument are extremely simple—no test, no 
language and a test can only be public. If I grow up alone on a desert island with no books 
and one day decide to call the round things on the trees ‘coconut’ and then next day I see 
one and say ‘coconut’ again it seems like I have started on a language. But suppose what I 
say (since there is no person or dictionary to correct me) is ‘coca’ or even ‘apple’ and the 
next day something else? Memory is notoriously fallible and we have great trouble keeping 
things straight even with constant correction from others and with incessant input from 
media. This may seem like a trivial point but it is central to the whole issue of the Inner and 
the Outer— i.e., our true-only untestable statements of our experience vs the true or false 
testable statements regarding everything in the world, including our own behavior. Though 
W explained this with many examples beginning over ¾ of a century ago, it has rarely been 
understood and it is impossible to go very far with any discussion of behavior unless one 
does. As W, S, Hutto, Budd, Johnston and others have explained, anyone who thinks W has 
an affinity with Skinner, Quine, Dennett, Functionalism or any other behaviorist excretions 
that deny our inner life needs to go back to the beginning. 
On p21 he begins discussing dispositions (i.e., S2 abilities such as thinking, knowing, 
believing) which seem like they refer to mental states (i.e., to S1 automatisms), another major 
confusion which W was the first to set straight. Thus, on p28 ‘reading’ must be understood 
as another dispositional ability that is not a mental state and has no definite duration like 
thinking, understanding, believing etc. 
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Few notice (Budd p29-32 and Moyal-Sharrock recently are rare exceptions) that W 
presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science came into being) suggested that 
some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic processes in the brain-that e.g., there is 
not anything corresponding to a memory trace. He also suggested several times that the 
causal chain has an end and this could mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of 
the state of science) to trace it any further and that the concept of `cause' ceases to be 
applicable beyond a certain point (p34). Subsequently, many have made similar suggestions 
without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in fact over a century now in a few 
instances). On p32 the “counter-factual conditionals” refer again to dispositions such as 
“may think it’s raining” which are possible states of affairs (or potential actions—S’s 
conditions of satisfaction) which may arise in chaos. It may be useful to tie this to S’s 3 gaps 
of intentionality which he finds critically necessary. 
Budd notes W’s famous comment on p33 -- “The mistake is to say that there is anything that 
meaning something consists in.” Though W is correct that there is no mental state that 
constitutes meaning, S notes (as quoted above) that there is a general way to characterize 
the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction” which is an act and not a mental state. As Budd notes on p35 this 
can be seen as another statement of his argument against private language (personal 
interpretations vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule following and interpretation 
on p36-41—they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or private 
interpretations either. And one must note here it is that many (most famously Kripke) miss 
the boat here, being misled by W’s frequent referrals to community practice into thinking 
it’s just arbitrary public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W makes 
clear many times that such conventions are only possible given an innate shared psychology 
which he often calls the background. Budd correctly rejects this as W’s idea several times 
(e.g., p58). 
In his next chapter, he deals with sensations which in my terms (and in modern psychology) 
is S1 and in W’s terms the true-only undoubtable and untestable background. His comment 
(p47) ”that our beliefs about our present sensations rest upon an absolutely secure 
foundation- the “myth of the given” is one of the principal objects of Wittgenstein’s attack...” 
can easily be misunderstood. Firstly, he makes the universal mistake of calling these ‘beliefs’, 
but it is better to reserve this word for S2 true or false dispositions. As W made very clear, 
the sensations, memories and reflexive acts of S1 are axiomatic and not subject to belief in 
the usual sense but are better called understandings. Unlike our beliefs (including those in 
other people’s S1 experiences), there is no mechanism for doubt. Budd explains this well, as 
on p52 where he notes that there is no possible justification for saying one is in pain. That is, 
justifying means testing and that is possible with S2 dispositional slow conscious thinking, 
not S1 reflexive fast unconscious processing. His discussion of this on p52-56 is excellent but 
in my view, like everyone who discusses W on rules, private language and the inner, all he 
needs to do is say that in S1 there is no possible test and this is the meaning of W’s famous 
the ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria’. 
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Budd’s footnote 21 confuses the true only causal experiences of S1 and the reasoned 
dispositions of S2. 
The point of the next few pages on names for ‘internal objects’ (pains, beliefs, thoughts etc.) 
is again that they have their use (meaning) and it is the designation of dispositions to act, or 
in S’s terms, the specification of Conditions of Satisfaction which make the utterance true. 
Again, his discussion of “Sensations and Causation” is wrong in stating that we ‘self-ascribe’ 
or ‘believe’ in our sensations or ‘take a stance’ (Dennett) that we have a pain or see a horse, 
but rather we have no choice—S1 is true-only and a mistake is a rare and bizarre occurrence 
and of an entirely different kind than a mistake in S2. And S1 is causal as opposed to S2, 
which concerns reasons, and that is why seeing the horse or feeling the pain or jumping out 
of the way of a speeding car is not subject to judgments or mistakes. But he gets in right 
again— “So the infallibility of non-inferential self-ascriptions of pain is compatible with the 
thesis that a true self-ascription of pain must be caused by a physical event in the subject’s 
body, which is identical with the pain he experiences (p67).” I do not accept his following 
statement that W would not accept this based on one or two comments in his entire corpus, 
since in his later work (notably OC) he spends hundreds of pages describing the causal 
automated nature of S1 and how it feeds into (causes) S2 which then feeds back to S1 to 
cause muscle movements (including speech). Animals survive only because their life is 
totally directed by the phenomena around them which are highly predictable (dogs may 
jump but they never fly). 
The next chapter on Seeing Aspects describes W’s extensive comments on how S1 and S2 
interact and where our language is ambiguous in what we may mean by ‘seeing’. In general, 
it’s clear that ‘seeing as’ or aspectual seeing is part of the slow S2 brain actions while just 
seeing is the true-only S1 automatisms, but they are so well integrated that it is often possible 
to describe a situation in multiple ways which explains W’s comment on p97.He notes that 
W is exclusively interested in what I have elsewhere called ‘Seeing2’ or ‘Concepts2’—i.e., 
aspectual or S2 higher order processing of images. 
Here, as throughout this book and indeed in any discussion of W or of behavior, it is of great 
value to refer to Johnston’s book and especially to his discussions of the indeterminate 
nature of language. 
In chapter 5 we again deal with a major preoccupation of W’s later work—the relations 
between S1 and S2. As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any have fully understood 
the later W and, lacking the S1, S2, framework it is not surprising. Thus, Budd’s discussion 
of seeing (unconscious S1) vs visualizing (conscious S2 which is subject to the will) is 
severely hampered. Thus, one can understand why one cannot imagine an object while 
seeing it as the domination of S2 by S1 (p110). And on p115 it is the familiar issue of there 
being no test for my inner experiences, so whatever comes to mind when I imagine Jack’s 
face is the image of Jack. Similarly, with reading and calculation which can refer to S1, S2 or 
a combination and there is the constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes where 
37 99  
that lack of any test makes them inapplicable. On p120 et seq. he mentions two of W’s 
famous examples used for combatting this temptation— playing tennis without a ball (‘S1 
tennis’), and a tribe that had only S2 calculation so ‘calculating in the head (‘S1 calculating’) 
was not possible. ‘Playing’ and ‘calculating’ describe actual or potential acts—i.e., they are 
disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before one really 
ought to keep them straight by writing ‘playing1’ and ‘playing2’ etc. But we are not taught 
to do this and so we want to either dismiss ‘calculating1’ as a fantasy, or we think we can 
leave its nature undecided until later. 
Hence W’s famous comment (p120)— “The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has 
been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent.” 
 
Chapter 6 explains another frequent topic of W’s—that when we speak, the speech itself is 
our thought and there is not some other prior mental process and this can be seen as another 
version of the private language argument for there are no such things as ‘inner criteria’ 
which enable us to tell what we thought before we act (speak). 
The point of W’s comments (p125) about other imaginable ways to use the verb ‘intend’ is 
that they would not be the same as our ‘intend’—i.e., the name of a potential event (PE) and 
in fact it is not clear what it would mean. “I intend to eat” has the COS of eating but if it 
meant (COS is) eating then it wouldn’t describe an intention but an action and if it meant 
saying the words (COS is speech) then it wouldn’t have any further COS and how could it 
function in either case? 
To the question on p127 as to when a sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), we can 
say ‘When it has clear COS’ and this means has public truth conditions. Hence the quote 
from W: ” When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought.” And, if I 
think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no 
other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W’s lovely aphorisms (p132) “It is in language that 
wish and fulfillment meet” and “Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.” And one might note 
here that ‘grammar’ in W can usually be translated as ‘EP’ and that in spite of his frequent 
warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of 
philosophy and higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
It helps greatly in this section on the harmony of thought with reality (i.e., of how 
dispositions like expecting, thinking, imagining work-- what it means to utter them) to state 
them in terms of S’s COS which are the PE (possible events) which make them true. If I say 
I expect Jack to come then the COS (PE) which makes it true is that Jack arrives and my 
mental states or physical behavior (pacing the room, imagining Jack) are irrelevant. The 
harmony of thought and reality is that jack arrives regardless of my prior or subsequent 
behavior or any mental states I may have and Budd is confused or at least confusing when 
he states (p132 bottom) that there must be an internal description of a mental state that can 
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agree with reality and that this is the content of a thought, as these terms should be restricted 
to the automatisms of S1 only and never used for the conscious functions of S2. The content 
(meaning) of the thought that Jack will come is the outer (public) event that he comes and 
not any inner mental event or state, which the private language argument shows is 
impossible to connect to the outer events. 
We have very clear verification for the outer event but none at all for ‘inner events’. And as 
W and S have beautifully demonstrated many times, the speech act of uttering the sentence 
‘I expect Jack to come’ just is the thought that Jack will come and the COS is the same—that 
Jack does come. And so, the answer to the two questions on p133 and the import of W’s 
comment on p 135 should now be crystal clear — “In virtue of what is it true that my 
expectation does have that content?” and “What has become now of the hollow space and 
the corresponding solid?” as well as “…the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. 
For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow.” And thus, it should also be quite 
clear what Budd is referring to as to what makes it “possible for there to be the required 
harmony (or lack of harmony) with reality.” 
Likewise, with the question in the next section-- what makes it true that my image of Jack is 
an image of him? Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the image I have in 
my head is Jack and that’s why I will say ‘YES’ if shown his picture and ‘NO’ if shown one 
of someone else. The test here is not that the photo matches the vague image I had but that 
I intended it (had the COS that) to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: “If 
God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were 
speaking of (PI p217)” and his comments that the whole problem of representation is 
contained in “that’s Him” and “…what gives the image its interpretation is the path on 
which it lies.” Hence W’s summation (p140) that “What it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen” … 
the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And 
the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied” … Suppose it were asked ‘Do I know 
what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know.” Disposition words 
refer to PE’s which I accept as fulfilling the COS and my mental states, emotions, change of 
interest etc., have no bearing on the way dispositions function. 
As Budd rightly notes, I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, desiring etc. 
depending on the state I take myself to be-- on the COS that I express. Thinking and 
intending are S2 dispositions which can only be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle 
contractions, especially those of speech. 
W never devoted as much time to emotions as he did to dispositions so there is less 
substance to chapter 7. He notes that typically the object and cause are the same—i.e., they 
are causally self-referential—a concept further developed by S. If one looks at my table it is 
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clear they have much more in common with the fast, true-only automatisms of S1 than with 
the slow, true or false thinking of S2 but of course S1 feeds S2 and in turn is often fed by it. 
Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the model of ‘object 
and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the denial that the picture of the inner 
process provides a correct representation of the grammar of such words, is not the only 
reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of introspection in the philosophy of 
psychology. But it is its ultimate foundation.” 
An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full appreciation of W as 
I have explained above and in my other reviews. 
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Review of Making the Social World by John 
Searle (2010) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Before commenting in detail on making the Social World (MSW) I will first offer some 
comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since 
I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper 
perspective. It will help greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW and other 
books by these two geniuses of descriptive psychology. 
S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, and his 
destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these 
mechanical views of behavior, and the most important descriptive psychologist 
(philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do 
others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and 
AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly 
spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W S and 
other books for more details. 
Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein 
resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled for basic 
psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my reviews). Ideally, they should be read 
together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, 
illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant 
aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
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"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. 
If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the 
most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not curiosities; 
however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted and which have only 
gone unremarked because they are always before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds 
to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence (this has to do 
with the Kantian solution to the problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a 
pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the existence of the 
pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a physical system. …In sum, the 
fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that 
programs provide causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, 
the brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description.” 
Searle Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the 
nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent’s desires, 
values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it 
tries to pose Hume’s guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of 
which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC p165-171 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, 
are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations…the forms of the status 
function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic powers…to recognize 
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something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action…these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The 
general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for action 
presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire- independent reasons for action.” Searle 
PNC p34-49 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality… Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced…it does 
not exist…This is… the phenomenological illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has no causal 
powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying neurobiology…But 
causal reducibility does not lead to ontological reducibility…consciousness only exists as 
experienced…and therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a third person 
ontology, something that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfactions, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
“So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by collective 
intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers…With the important exception 
of language itself, all of institutional reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization 
is created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations…all of human 
institutional reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the 
same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech 
acts in the explicit form of Declarations.” Searle MSW p11-13 
“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world direction of fit. 
And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the upward or world-to-mind 
(or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like statements, are supposed to represent 
how things are in the world, and in that sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have 
the mind-to-world direction of fit. The conative-volitional states such as desires, prior 
intentions and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we would like 
them to be or how we intend to make them be…In addition to these two faculties, there is a 
third, imagination, in which the propositional content is not supposed to fit reality in the 
way that the propositional contents of cognition and volition are supposed to fit…the world- 
relating commitment is abandoned and we have a propositional content without any 
commitment that it represent with either direction of fit.” Searle MSW p15 
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“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of state…and the 
content of the state…so in the theory of language we can make a distinction between the 
type of speech act it is…and the propositional content…we have the same propositional 
content with different psychological mode in the case of the intentional states, and different 
illocutionary force or type in the case of the speech acts. Furthermore, just as my beliefs can 
be true or false and thus have the mind-to-world direction of fit, so my statements can be 
true or false and thus have the word-to-world direction of fit. And just as my desires or 
intentions cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied, so my 
orders and promises cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or 
unsatisfied—we can think of all the intentional states that have a whole propositional 
content and a direction of fit as representations of their conditions of satisfaction. A belief 
represents its truth conditions, a desire represents its fulfillment conditions, an intention 
represents its carrying out conditions…The intentional state represents its conditions of 
satisfaction…people erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be 
consciously thought…but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or 
fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction…we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social 
phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction.” Searle MSW p28-32 
“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: corresponding 
to Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are desires, corresponding to 
Commissives are intentions and corresponding to Expressives is the whole range of 
emotions and other intentional states where the Presup fit is taken for granted. But there is 
no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create 
facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat 
requires a language” MSW p69 
“Speaker meaning… is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive capacities. It 
requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in away that is essential for the use of 
language. At one level, the speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at 
another level the utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol 
itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it 
represents a type of a state of affairs” MSW p74 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because there is 
no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according to the conventions of a 
language without creating commitments. This is true not just for statements but for 
allspeech acts” MSW p82 
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These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews of books 
by these two geniuses) are a précis of behavior from our two greatest descriptive 
psychologists. 
Before commenting in detail on Making the Social World (MSW) I will first offer some 
comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since 
I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper 
perspective. It will help greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC,TARW and other 
books by these two geniuses of descriptive psychology, To say that Searle has carried on 
W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is 
only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), 
that anyone accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of 
what W said (as they must if they are both giving correct descriptions of behavior). I find 
most of S foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room argument 
against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the 
Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's excellent, but virtually 
unknown, supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw.” 
S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, and his 
destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these 
mechanical views of behavior, and the most important descriptive psychologist 
(philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do 
others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and 
AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly 
spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W S and 
other books for more details. 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His work as a 
whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our 
conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges from unconscious machinations (System 1) 
(S1) and is extended logically into culture (System 3 (S3). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his 
final extended treatment of this idea-and my review thereof for preparation. His corpus can 
be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind 
works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a 
common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that 
this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved 
psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality 
(a cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based on throat muscle contractions (language) 
that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as trivial). 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work is a development of or variation on these ideas. Another 
major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human behavior, is the need to separate 
the genetically programmed automatisms, which underlie all behavior, from the effects of 
45 107  
culture. Though few philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., 
explicitly discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they are 
dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all study of higher order 
behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions and 
other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 and S2-- see below), but the logical extensions of S2 
into culture (S3). 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are 
the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, cognitive 
linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost 
nobody seems to realize that his works are a unique textbook of descriptive psychology that 
is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology 
and other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or less 
understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and 
cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of fast and slow thinking etc., - 
- see below). Searle’s work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order social 
behavior that is possible because of the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true only unconscious axioms of S1 
which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
Long before Searle, W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, 
experimental psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, Functionalism, Strong AI, 
Dynamic Systems Theory, Computational Theory of Mind, etc.) could reveal what his Top 
Down deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he noted 
are to understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can now see this as obliviousness 
to System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological illusion’) and to capture vagueness 
("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" 
LWPP1, 347). 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment that even if 
God could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the 
motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, of Cognitive Psychology. But God could 
see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking, since these S1 
functions are always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. 
This is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S muddies the waters 
here because he refers to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, he 
shows that the language of causality just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 
descriptions—again not a theory but a description about how language (thinking) works. 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we can do is 
give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories but of course “theory” 
and “description” are language games too and it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s 
description—a rose by any other name…. W’s point was that by sticking to perspicacious 
examples that we all know to be true accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of 
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theories that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to 
generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own mistakes in 
PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account for the multifarious 
language games they get closer and closer to describing behavior by way of numerous 
examples as did W. 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the different (but 
interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or roughly Primary Language 
Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., 
Johnston- ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ on how confusing the two is a major industry 
in philosophy and psychology), the impossibility of private language and the axiomatic 
structure of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first described S1 functions but as S2 
evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of inner 
resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain. 
The PLG's are the simple automated utterances by our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true only, non- propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories 
and reflexive acts (‘will’) including System 1 Truths and UA1 -- Understanding of Agency 
1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and 
Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be 
described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms 
of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see W for many 
examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons (e.g., `I see that 
as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms of EP, genetics, physiology, 
and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is meaningless to give "explanations" with the 
proviso that they will make sense in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now 
or never. 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 and 
Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even 
into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which result 
from the logical extension of Truths 1). W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our 
whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as 
always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and 
powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to provide the physical basis for 
our behavior and facilitate our analysis of language games which nevertheless remain 
unexplainable--EP just is this way--and unchanged. The true-only axioms, most thoroughly 
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explored in 'On Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only reactions of 
bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and operate by the mechanism 
of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution". 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions rather than 
explanations, but of course these too are complex language games and one person's 
description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their innate true- only, nonempirical 
(automated and nonchangeable) responses to the world, animals extend their axiomatic 
understanding via deductions into further true only understandings ("theorems" as we 
might call them, but this is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or 
our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human nature. Theory of Mind 
(TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of Agency (UA a term 
I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and worms if UA is suitably 
defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note 
here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 2 
versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UA1 and the Slow conscious UA2 and of 
course these are heuristics for multifaceted phenomena. 
Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— higher cortical feedback 
to the lowest levels of perception, memory, reflexive thinking that is a fundamental of 
psychology. Many of W’s examples explore this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of 
the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in Johnston). 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, 
and almost exclusively in OC (his last work `On Certainty'), are equivalent to the fast 
thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman-- "Thinking 
Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is 
involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over in endless 
examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 99% of all our cerebration if 
measured by energy use in the brain). 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of language 
games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as "dispositions" or 
"inclinations", which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the 
same sense), and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But 
disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W 
discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but 
graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers inspired W to write 
OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, 
i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which 
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is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or 
false (`I know my way home'). 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics 
(e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", 
"priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so 
there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will 
vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 
thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network 
of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", 
"cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
Though W warned frequently against theorizing and produced more and better examples 
of language in action than anyone, one might say that his aggregate aphorisms illustrated 
by examples constitute the most comprehensive “theory” of behavior (“reality”) ever 
penned. 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but 
scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes aphoristically and telegraphically 
because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest 
intellectual adventures possible. 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that 
results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a 
much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits 
usefulness. 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the 
Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical 
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Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought 
(DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has 
no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as exemplified 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
I have a detailed explanation of this table in my other writings. 
 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only 
get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in its context. 
The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human 
Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis 
of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and 
Searle (2016). 
Now for some comments on Searle’s MSW. I will make some references to another of his 
recent works which I have reviewed- Philosophy in a New Century (PNC). 
The ideas here are already published and nothing will come as a surprise to those who have 
kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time 
and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. In 
various places in his work (e.g., p7 of PNC) he twice notes that our certainty about basic 
facts is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed 
definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true- only axiomatic 
structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is itself the basis for 
judgment (reason) and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 of PNC he tells us 
that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the 
result of extending our axiomatic and non-revisable certainty (Certainty1 of S1) via 
experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a 
classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” 
which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct uses. 
On p12 of PNC, ‘consciousness’ is described as the result of automated System 1 functioning 
that is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, a matter of 
evidence but a true-only understanding in our own case and a true-only perception in the 
case of others. 
I feel that W has a better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards them as 
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in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now if it is not the 
causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open 
before us." One can deny that any revision of our concepts (language games) of causation 
or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read just about any page of W for the 
reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples from quantum 
mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything relevant to our normal use of 
words. 
The deontic structures or ‘social glue’ are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide 
array of automatic unconscious universal cultural deontic relationships with others (S3). 
Though this is my précis of behavior I expect it fairly describes S’s work. 
Those who wish to become acquainted with S’s well-known arguments against the 
mechanical view of mind, which seem to me definitive, may consult Chaps 3-5 of his PNC. 
I have read whole books of responses to them and I agree with S that they all miss the very 
simple logical (psychological) points he makes (and which, by and large, W made half 
acentury earlier). To put it in my terms, S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, 
automatic, non- propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to 
behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). Computers and 
the rest of nature have only derived intentionality that is dependent on our perspective 
while higher animals have primary intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S 
and W appreciate, the great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical reductions of 
psychology masquerade as cutting edge science, but in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. 
Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and cognitive psychology (freed of superstition) are 
becoming hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the 
cold. 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the 
same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which seeks 
explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the 
automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious (TPI). I find W’s description of our 
axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in his OC and other 3rd period works to 
be deeper than S’s (or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but 
rather it is not open to (not possible to) doubt. 
Chapter 5 of S’s PNC nicely demolishes Computational Theory of Mind, Language of 
Thought etc., noting that ‘computation’, ‘information’, ‘syntax’, ‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, 
‘program’, etc., are observer relative (i.e., psychological) terms and have no physical or 
mathematical meaning in this psychological sense, but of course there are other senses they 
have been given recently as science has developed. Again, people are bewitched by the use 
of the same word into ignoring the vast difference in its use (meaning). And of course, this 
is all an extension of classic Wittgenstein. 
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Every thinking person should read Chapter 6 of S’s PNC “The Phenomenological Illusion” 
(TPI) as it shows his supreme logical abilities and his failure to appreciate the full power of 
the later W, and the great heuristic value of recent psychological research on the two selves. 
It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking 
the slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank 
Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier and also gave the 
reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic axiomatic network of 
our innate System 1 (though of course he did not use these terms). 
But the really important thing is that TPI is not just a failing of a few philosophers, but a 
universal blindness to our Evolutionary Psychology (EP) that is itself built into EP and 
which has immense (and fatal) implications for the world. We are all meat puppets 
stumbling through life on our genetically programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our 
almost total preoccupation with using the second self S2 personality to indulge the infantile 
gratifications of S1 is creating Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, it’s only about 
reproduction and accumulating resources therefor. S1 writes the play and S2 acts it out. Dick 
and Jane just want to play house—this is mommy and this is daddy and this and this and 
this is baby. 
Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and not just another primate-a fatal 
cognitive illusion. 
The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) of the meat 
puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read my comments on W’s OC so he 
changes the “good reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” 
(in the true-only sense). 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) on our 
thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or dispositions to act--still called 
by the inappropriate term ‘propositional attitudes’ by many. COS are explained by S in 
many places such as on p169 of PNC: “Thus saying something and meaning it involves two 
conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of satisfaction.” As S 
states it in PNC, “A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of 
satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” Or, one 
needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case, as he 
makes clear in MSW. 
Regarding intentions, “In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally in 
the production of the action.” (MSWp34). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher 
cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which 
inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A 
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huge advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions. 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or “RPP1 and 2” or DMS’s two 
books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true-only sentences 
describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior 
approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) 
since they can only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them here) after one begins thinking 
about them in S2. However, his point in PNC that propositions permit statements of actual 
or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge 
advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. S often describes the critical need to 
note the various levels of description of one event so for IAA “We have different levels of 
description where one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower level…in addition to 
the constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of relation.” (p37). 
“The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and intentions-in- 
action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are strikingly different.” (p35). 
The COS of PI need a whole action while those of IAA only a partial one. He makes clear 
(e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) are mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result 
in intentions-in-action (IAA) which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self- 
referential (CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs and desires) 
it is essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These descriptions of cognition 
and volition are summarized in Table 2.1, which Searle has used for many years and is the 
basis for an extended one I have created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to 
modern psychological research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W’s true-only vs 
propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only perception, 
memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
So, recognizing the S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (e.g., see Hutto and Myin’s 
‘Radical Enactivism’) I would change the paragraphs from p39 beginning “In sum” and 
ending on pg 40 with “conditions of satisfaction” as follows. 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (‘will’) are caused by the 
automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior intentions and intentions- 
in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should 
see that belief, desire (and imagination—desires time shifted and so decoupled from 
intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second 
self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true 
only reflexive S1. In language and perhaps in neurophysiology there are intermediate or 
blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal 
connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, 
unlike S1 which is always in the present. The two systems feed into each other and are often 
orchestrated by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3 seamlessly, so that our normal 
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experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive 
illusions that dominate our life S has described as ‘The Phenomenological Illusion.’ 
 
He ends this amazing chapter by repeating for maybe the 10th time in his writings, what I 
regard as a very basic mistake that he shares with nearly everyone—the notion that the 
experience of ‘free will’ may be ‘illusory’. It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable 
fashion, both from W’s 3rd period work and from the observations of contemporary 
psychology, that ‘will’, ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are axiomatic true-only elements of System 
1 just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating 
(of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they 
are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. S understands and uses basically this 
same argument in other contexts (e.g., skepticism, solipsism) many times, so it is quite 
surprising he can’t see this analogy. He makes this mistake frequently when he says such 
things as that we have “good evidence” that our dog is conscious etc. The true-only axioms 
of our psychology are not evidential. Here you have the best descriptive psychologist since 
W, so this is not a stupid mistake. 
His summary of deontics on p50 needs translation. Thus “You have to have a prelinguistic 
form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are built, and you have to 
have the collective intentionality of the conversation in order to make the commitment” is 
much clearer if supplemented with “The prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the 
linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our EP) which evolve during our maturation into their 
cultural manifestations in S3.” 
Since status function declarations play a central role in deontics it is critical to understand 
them and so he explains the notion of ‘function’ that is relevant here. “A function is a cause 
that serves a purpose…In this sense functions are intentionality-relative and therefore mind 
dependent…status functions… require… collective imposition and recognition of a status” 
(p59). 
Again, I suggest the translation of “The intentionality of language is created by the intrinsic, 
or mind-independent intentionality of human beings” (p66) as “The linguistic, conscious 
dispositionality of S2 is generated by the unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1” 
(p68). That is, one must keep in mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
However, I strongly object to his statements on p66-67 and elsewhere in his writings that S1 
(i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I 
have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, 
and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic 
and true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, 
axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same 
sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return and in fact life would not be possible (no this is not a joke). As W showed 
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countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty—automated 
unconscious rapid reactions. 
Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die. 
 
Contrary to his comments (p70) I cannot imagine a language lacking words for material 
objects any more than I can imagine a visual system that cannot see them, because it is the 
first and most basic task of vision to segment the world into objects and so that of language 
to describe them. Likewise, I cannot see any problem with objects being salient in the 
conscious field nor with sentences being segmented into words. How could it be otherwise 
for beings with our evolutionary history? 
On p72 and elsewhere, it will help to remember that expressions are the primitive reflexive 
PLG’s of S1 while representations are the dispositional SLG’s of S2. 
 
Another translation from Philosophese into English is needed for the second paragraph on 
p79 beginning ‘So far’ and ending ‘heard before’. “We convey meaning by speaking a public 
language composed of words in sentences with a syntax.” 
To his questions 4 and 5 on p105 as to the special nature of language and writing, I would 
answer: ’They are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of vocal muscles enable 
much higher bandwidth information transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is 
on average several orders of magnitude higher for visual information.’ 
On p106, a general answer to question 2 (How do we get away with it—i.e., why does it 
work) is EP and S1 and his statement that “My main strategy of exposition in this book is to 
try to make the familiar seem strange and striking” is of course classic Wittgenstein. His 
claim on the next page that there is no general answer to why people accept institutions is 
clear wrong. They accept them for the same reason they do everything—their EP is the result 
of inclusive fitness. It facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally bottoms out in 
genetics. All the vague talk here (e.g., p114) about ‘extra- linguistic conventions’ and ‘extra 
semantical semantics’ is in fact referring to EP and especially to the unconscious 
automatisms of S1 which are the basis for all behavior. Yes, as W said many times, the most 
familiar is for that reason invisible. 
S’s suggestion (p115) that language is essential to games is surely mistaken. Totally illiterate 
deaf-mutes could play cards, soccer and even chess but of course a minimal counting ability 
would be necessary. I agree (p121) that the ability to pretend and imagine (e.g., the 
counterfactual or as-if notions involved in time and space shifting) are, in full form, uniquely 
human abilities and critical to higher order thought. But even here there are many animal 
precursors (as there must be), such as the posturing of ritual combats and mating dances, 
the decoration of mating sites by bower birds, the broken wing pretense of mother birds, 
fake alarm calls of monkeys, ‘cleaner’ fish that take a bite out of their prey and simulation 
of hawk and dove strategies (cheaters) in many animals. 
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More translation is needed for his discussion of rationality (p126 et seq). Saying that 
thinking is propositional and deals with true or false ‘factitive entities’ means that it is a 
typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the true-only automatic cognitive 
functions of S1. 
In ‘Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts’ he updates parts of his classic book 
‘Rationality in Action’ and creates some new terminology for describing the formal 
apparatus of practical reasons which I do not find felicitous. 
“Factitive Entities’ do not seem different from dispositions and ‘motivator’ (desire or 
obligation), ‘effector’ (body muscles),‘constitutor’ (speech muscles) and ‘total reason’ (all 
relevant dispositions) do not, at least here seem to add to clarity (p126-132). 
We should do something here that rarely happens in discussions of human behavior and 
remind ourselves of its biology. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the 
unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2 (often modified by the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. 
The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in various 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. This may seem infelicitous as well, but has 
the virtue that it is based on fact, and given the complexity of our higher order thought, I 
don’t think a general description is going to get much simpler. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’) is that S2/S3 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar 
with modern biology and psychology knows this view is not credible. 
Thus, I would translate his summary of practical reason on p127 as follows: “We yield to 
our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire –Independent 
Reasons for Action (DIRA—i.e., desires displaced in space and time, most often for 
reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner 
or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes 
in ourselves and those closely related).” 
Contrary to S’s comment on p128 I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher 
animals and not at all unique to humans (think mother hen defending her brood from a fox) 
if we include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher 
order DIRA of S2/3 or DIRA2 that require language are uniquely human. This seems to me 
an alternative and clearer description of his “explanation” (as W suggested these are much 
better called ‘description’) on the bottom of p129 of the paradox of how we can voluntarily 
carry out DIRA2/3 (i.e., the S2 desires and their cultural S3 extensions). That is, “The 
resolution of the paradox is that the recognition of desire-independent reasons can ground 
the desire and thus cause the desire, even though it is not logically inevitable that they do 
and not empirically universal that they do” can be translated as “The resolution of the 
paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the 
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conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires.” 
Likewise, for his discussion of this issue on p130-31—it is EP, RA, IF, S1 which ground the 
dispositions and ensuing actions of S2/3. 
On p140 he asks why we can’t get deontics from biology but of course we must get them 
from biology as there is no other option and the above description shows how this happens. 
Contrary to his statement, the strongest inclinations DO always prevail (by definition, 
otherwise it is not the strongest), but deontics works because the innate programming of RA 
and IF override immediate personal short term desires. His confusion of nature and nurture, 
of S1 and S2, extends to conclusions 2 and 3 on p143. Agents do indeed create the proximate 
reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are not just anything but, with few if any exceptions, very 
restricted extensions of DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). If he really means to ascribe deontics to 
our conscious decisions alone then he is prey to ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’(TPI) which 
he so beautifully demolished in his classic paper of that name (see my review of PNC). As I 
have noted above, there is a huge body of recent research exposing cognitive illusions which 
comprise our personality. TPI is not merely a harmless philosophical error but a universal 
obliviousness to our biology which produces the illusion that we control our life and our 
society and the world and the consequences are almost certain collapse of civilization during 
the next 150 years. 
He notes correctly that human rationality makes no sense without the ‘gap’ (actually 3 gaps 
which he has discussed many times). That is, without free will (i.e., choice) in some non- 
trivial sense it would all be a pointless, and he has rightly noted that it is inconceivable that 
evolution could create and maintain an unnecessary genetically and energetically expensive 
charade. But, like nearly everyone else, he cannot see his way out and so once again he 
suggests (p133) that choice may be an illusion. On the contrary, following W, it is quite clear 
that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive actions and cannot be questioned 
without contradiction as S1 is the basis for questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading 
this page as your awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
Few notice (Budd in his superb book on W is one exception) that W posed an interesting 
resolution to this by suggesting that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic 
processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a memory trace. He 
also suggested several times that the causal chain has an end and this could mean both that 
it is just not possible (regardless of the state of science) to trace it any further and that the 
concept of ‘cause’ ceases to be applicable beyond a certain point. Subsequently, many have 
made similar suggestions based on physics and the sciences of complexity and chaos (which 
was shown long ago by DaCosta and Doria to be both incomplete and undecidable). 
On p155 one should note that the Background/Network is our EP and its cultural extensions 
of S1, S2, S3. 
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Given the above I don’t feel it necessary to comment on his discussion of Power and Politics 
but I will say a few words about human rights. I agree completely with his comment on 
p185 that the UN Declaration of Human Rights is an irresponsible document. The rapid and 
probably inexorable collapse of society is due to people having too many rights and too few 
responsibilities. The only tiny ray of hope for the world is that somehow people can be 
forced (few will ever do it voluntarily) to place the earth first and themselves second. 
Consuming resources and producing children must be regulated as privileges or the tragedy 
of the commons will soon end the game. 
Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein 
resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled for basic 
psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my reviews). Ideally, they should be read 
together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, 
illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant 
aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
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Review of 'John R Searle-Thinking About the Real 
World' by Franken et al eds. (2010) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This book is the result of Searle's stay in the Munster University Philosophy Dept in 2009 
and all the papers except his introductory one and his final response are from persons 
associated with Munster. However, all the papers were written or revised later and so are 
one of the most up to date looks at his views available as of mid-2013. S has in my view 
made more fundamental contributions to higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) 
than anyone since Wittgenstein (W), and has been writing world class material for over 50 
years. He is also (like W before him) regarded as the best standup philosopher alive and has 
taught and lectured worldwide. He is also one of the clearest and most careful writers in the 
field, so one would think that every philosopher writing an article on his work would have 
an up to date and accurate understanding of his ideas. Unfortunately, this book shows that 
this is far from true. All the 11 articles make major mistakes regarding his views and 
regarding what he (and I) would regard as an accurate description of behavior. 
Searle's obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two systems 
framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology, as stated most 
dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate (as I have noted in many 
reviews). It was Wittgenstein who did the first and best job of describing the two systems 
(though nobody else has noticed) and OC represents a major event in intellectual history. 
Not only is Searle unaware of the fact that his framework is a straightforward continuation 
of W, but everyone else is too, which accounts for the lack of any significant reference to W 
in this book. As usual one also notes no apparent acquaintance with Evolutionary 
Psychology, which can enlighten all discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate 
evolutionary and biological explanations rather than the superficial proximate cultural ones. 
However, his comment on p212 is right on the money—the ultimate explanation (or as W 
insists the description) can only be a naturalized one which describes how mind, will, self, 
intention work and cannot meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena. Recall Searle’s 
famous review of Dennett’s ‘Conscious Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained 
away”. And this makes it all the more bizarre that Searle should repeatedly state that we 
don’t know for sure if we have free will and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
As he notes “The neuro-biological processes and the mental phenomena are the same event, 
described at different levels” and “How can conscious intentions cause  bodily  
movement? …How can the hammer move the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze 
what solidity is causally…if you analyze what intention-in-action is causally1, y5ou see 
analogously there is no philosophical problem left over.” 
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Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, as commonly 
understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our representations.” (p223) 
as “Our life shows a world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly 
challenged.” 
This book is valuable principally as a recent synopsis of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times. But there is also value in analyzing his responses to the many 
basic confusions manifested in the articles by others. Since this review, I have written many 
articles extending the framework of the logical structure of rationality and commenting in 
depth on Searle and Wittgenstein which are all readily available on the net. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young 
science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. 
(Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there 
are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual 
confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method 
pass one another by." Wittgenstein PI p.232 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” BBB p18 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
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"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187"The limit of language is shown by its being 
impossible to describe a fact which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without 
simply repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To 
think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because 
it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. 
It is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of  general  disease  of thinking which  always  looks  for (and  finds) what 
would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is 
labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no act of insight 
which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that “something must make 
us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion between cause and reason. We 
need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with 
its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For 
now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, 
which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” BBB p37 
“Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are obviously not 
aware of the many different usages of the word “proof”; and that they are not clear about 
the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, when they talk of kinds of numbers, 
kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” here meant the same thing as in the context 
“kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, they are not aware of the different meanings of the word 
“discovery” when in one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon 
and in the other case of the discovery of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does 
not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
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"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose 
that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a 
representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological noti1o5n. Anything 
that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can 
analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions 
of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.” TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems 
of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this 
itself is the answer.” TLP 6.52 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. 
If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the 
most important facts.” Z 220 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions.” PI 126 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between 
it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of 
investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, that we 
can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the matter is that we 
have already got everything, and that we have got it actually present; we need not wait for 
anything. We make our moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and 
this grammar is already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for 
the future.” (said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) 
p183 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that 
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! ….This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
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“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” 
BBB p125 
 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an 
outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive psychologists. In 
considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy is the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought (DPHOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are 
totally overlooked–i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. 
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive psychology, 
philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to contribute to this topic that 
other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so after noting W’s above remark on 
science envy, I will quote again from Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further 
condition…, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want to know when 
knowledge does and when it does not require justification. We need to be clear what is 
ascribed to a person when it is said that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, 
an achievement, a performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that 
p be identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is not the 
case that p’, whereas one cannot say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the case that p’? Why are 
there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, but not 
belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, 
whether and how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, 
hesitantly, foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one 
know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on – 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge and belief, 
but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, noticing, recognising, 
attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to mention the numerous verbs of 
perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be 
answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang 
together, the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and 
purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable 
exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self- 
styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic 
turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle 
(S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in 
a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and 
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about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found 
in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. 
To show this framework and how it relates to a contemporary view of intentionality I have 
produced the following table. 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary 
processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical 
Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), 
of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosop1h6ical 
term, the  Descriptive  Psychology  of  Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology 
of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought 
(LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by 
Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human 
Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by 
Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has 
no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
 
I give detailed explanations of the table in my other writings. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is 
an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social 
behavior, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 
which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. S1 is the simple 
automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, 
non-propositional, pre-linguistic men1ta6l states- our perceptions and memories and 
reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and 
Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 
2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 
and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often 
counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which 
can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker 
etc.). 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but 
graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct 
perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my 
hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential (CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), 
and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which 
can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) and are not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other 
disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and 
"biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur 
without involving much of the intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference 
engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" --as W and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide 
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array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well 
describes the basic structure of behavior. 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the 
paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on p40 with "conditions of 
satisfaction" as follows. 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are caused by 
the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified by S2 (‘free will’). 
We try to match how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should see that 
belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and 
other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- 
only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases 
such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of the 
COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is 
always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly 
by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that 
dominate our life Searle has described as ` 16 Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary  psychology,  that  `will',  `self' 
and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of perceptions and 
reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) 
their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for 
judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, 
perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, 
and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to 
understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. 
They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic 
intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it 
would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would 
return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed countless times and 
biology demonstrates, life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid 
reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, 
no people, no philosophy. 
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I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to 
our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent 
Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that 
serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely 
related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate 
desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these 
are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the 
Pope wish to help the poor because it is right but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain 
chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. Evolution by 
inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which 
often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural 
extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body 
and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The 
overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank 
Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, 
but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view is not 
credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public truth 
conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' 
going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the 
vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms 
(p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of 
the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as 
EP and that in spite of his frequent war1n6ings against theorizing and generalizing, this is 
about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as 
one can find. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes that there 
is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition 
of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which means to speak or write a 
well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act 
and not a mental state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds 
he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what 
gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence 
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W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without any 
further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question 
whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have 
been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long 
for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know." 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He dissects 
hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and 
reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the 
nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a 
breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. 
Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view 
is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes 
sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to 
all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not 
to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop 
trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” 
(e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). Incidentally, 
the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is essential to 
understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but so far as I know nobody else, points out). 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot 
be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the consequences of an S1 
‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and 
elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and 
other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get 
a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false 
propositions. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ 
of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching 
an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly there is barely a mention. 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics 
(e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like “cognitive 
illusions”, “priming”,“framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course these too are language 
games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and 
discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made 
clear), but presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any 
System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
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network of “cognitive modules”,“inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call 
our EP). 
Now for some comments on “John R Searle: Thinking About the Real World” (TARW). 
 
The first and most important comment is that since I wrote this review my ideas have 
continued to evolve so even though I have revised it, I strongly recommend reading my 
more recent articles first, especially The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind 
and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd Ed (2019). 
This book is the result of S’s stay in the Munster University Philosophy Dept. in 2009 and 
all the papers except his introductory one and his final response are from persons associated 
with Munster. However, all the papers were written or revised later and so are one of the 
most up to date looks at his views available as of mid-2013. S has in my view made more 
fundamental contributions to higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) than 
anyone since W and has been writing world class material for over 50 years. He is also (like 
W before him) regarded as the best standup philosopher alive and has taught and lectured 
worldwide. He is also one of the clearest and most careful writers in the field so one would 
think that every philosopher writing an article on his work would have an up to date and 
accurate understanding of his ideas. 
Unfortunately, this book shows that this is far from true. All the 11 articles make major 
mistakes regarding his views and regarding what he (and I) would regard as an accurate 
description of behavior. 
Recently  there  have  been  some   exchanges  between   Searle  and   Hacker  recorded  in 
“Neuroscience and Philosophy,” which appeared as a result of Hacker’s views expressed 
e.g. in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience . Both authors score some points and miss 
critical ideas in the others work. I have noted S’s failure to appreciate W before. Hacker is 
representing W’s views or at least Wittgensteinian views most of the time so we get as close 
as we ever will to a confrontation between these two geniuses of descriptive psychology -- 
W and S. 
Anyone interested in a concise demolition of Quine (another great mind who totally missed 
W and thus the whole enterprise of philosophy) should see Hacker’s paper ‘PASSING BY THE 
NATURALISTIC TURN: ON QUINE’S CUL-DE-SAC’ (though of course Q’s deconstruction has been 
done by many including S). 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes and the S2 
reasons in Chapter 7 of Hacker’s recent book Human Nature, esp. on p226-32 is critical for 
any student of behavior. It is a nearly universal delusion that “cause” is a precise logically 
exact term while “reason” is not, but W exposed this many times. Of course, the same 
issue arises with all scientific and mathematical concepts. And of course, one must keep 
constantly in mind that ‘action’, ‘condition’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘intention’, and even ‘and’, ‘or’, 
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‘prior’, ‘true’ etc. are all complex language games able to trip us up as W so beautifully 
described in BBB in the early 30’s. 
On p21 we again run into what I regard as the most glaring flaw in S’s work and one that 
should have been obviated long ago had he only read the later W more carefully. He refers 
to free will as an “assumption” that we may have to give up! It is crystal clear from W that 
will, self, world, and all the phenomena of our lives are the basis for judging-the axiomatic 
bedrock of our behavior and there is no possibility of judging them. Can we “assume” we 
have two hands or live on the surface of the earth or that Madonna is a singer etc.? Perhaps 
this huge mistake is connected with his blending of true only S1 and propositional S2 which 
I have noted. Amazing that he can get nearly everything else right and stumble on this! 
On p22 and elsewhere he uses the notion of unconscious intentionality, which he first 
discussed in his 1991 paper in Phil. Issues, noting that these are the sorts of things that could 
become conscious (e.g., dreams). W was I think the first to comment on this noting that if 
you can’t speak of unconscious thoughts you can’t speak of conscious ones either (BBB). 
Here and throughout his work it is unfortunate that he does not use the S1, S2 concepts as 
it makes it so much easier to keep things straight and he still finds it necessary to indulge in 
very un-Wittgensteinian jargon. E.g., “Once you have manipulable syntactical elements, 
you can detach intentionality from its immediate causes in the form of perceptions and 
memories, in a way that it is not possible to make detachments of unsyntactically structured 
representational elements.” (p31) just says that with language came the dispositional 
intentionality of S2 where conscious thought and reason became possible. 
Regarding reasons and desires (p39) please see above and my reviews of his other works. 
 
S’s continued reference to dispositions as mental states and his reference to mental states as 
representations (actually ‘presentations” in here) with COS, is (in my view) 
counterproductive. On p25 e.g., it seems he wants to say that the apple we see is the COS of 
the CSR (Causally Self Reflexive) (i.e., cause is built in) perception of the apple and the 
reflexive unconscious scratching of an itch has the same status (i.e., a COS) as the deliberate 
planned movement of the arm. Thus, the mental states of S1 are to be included with the 
actions of S2 as COS. Though I accept most of S’s ontology and epistemology I don’t see the 
advantage, but I have the greatest respect for him so I will work on it. I have noted his 
tendency (normal for others but a flaw in S) to mix S1 and S2 which he does on p29 where 
he seems to be referring to beliefs as mental states. It seems to me quite basic and clear since 
W’s BBB in the 30’s that S2 are not mental states in anything like the sense of S1. 
The paragraph beginning “Because” on p25 is discussing the true only unconscious percepts, 
memories and reflexive acts of S1—i.e., our axiomatic EP. As noted, one can read Hutto and 
Myin for a very different recent account of the nonrepresentational or enactive nature of S1. 
The table of intentionality on p26 updates one he has used for decades and which I have 
used as the basis for my extended table above. 
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Nearly half a century ago S wrote “How to derive ought from is” which was a revolutionary 
advance in our understanding of behavior. He has continued to develop the naturalistic 
description of behavior and on p39 he shows how ethics originates in our innate social 
behavior and language. A basic concept is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA) 
which is explained in his various books. For an outline see my reviews of his MSW and 
other works. He tends to use the proximate reasons of S2 and S3 (i.e., dispositional 
psychology and culture) to frame his analysis but as with all behavior I regard it as 
superficial unless it includes the ultimate causes in S1 and so I break his DIRA into DIRA1 
and DIRA2. This enables the description in terms of the unconscious mechanisms of 
reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness. Thus, I would restate the last sentence on p39 
“…people are asked to override their natural inclinations by making ethical considerations 
prevail” as “…people are compelled to override their immediate personal benefits to secure 
long term genetic benefits via reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.” 
I won’t comment on the 11 papers, mostly of poor quality, which critique S, since he does a 
great job in his replies. However, I must draw attention to the only reference to W (p49) 
where the authors show they don’t have a clue about what he did. 
Any discussion of behavior benefits greatly from S’s concepts such as Prior Intention, 
Intention in Action, intentional gaps, DOF, COS, CSR etc. but these authors seem only 
vaguely aware of most of his writings. 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). 
S’s obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two systems 
framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology as stated most 
dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate (as I have noted in many 
reviews). It was W who did the first and best job of describing the two systems (though 
nobody else has noticed) and OC represents a major event in intellectual history. Not only 
is S unaware of the fact that his framework is a straightforward continuation of W, but 
everyone else is too, which accounts for the lack of any significant reference to W in this 
book. As usual one also notes no apparent acquaintance with EP, which can enlighten all 
discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate evolutionary and biological 
explanations rather than the superficial proximate cultural ones. 
Thus, S’s discussion of the two ways to describe sensations (‘experiences’) on p202 is in my 
view vastly clearer if one realizes that seeing red or feeling pain is automatic true only S1, 
but as soon as we attend to it consciously (normally in msec) it becomes ‘seeing as’ and a 
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propositional (true or false) S2 function that can be expressed publicly in language (and 
other bodily muscle contractions) as well. Thus, the S1 ‘experience’ that is identical with red 
or the pain vs the S2 ‘experience’ of red or pain once we begin to reflect on it normally are 
blended together into one ‘experience’. And for me by far the best place to get an 
understanding of these issues is still in W’s writings beginning with the BBB and ending 
with OC. Nobody else has ever described the subtleti1e6s of the language games with such 
clarity. One must keep constantly in mind the vagueness and multiple meanings of ‘mistake’, 
‘true’, ‘experience’, ‘understand’, ‘know’, ‘see’, ‘same’ etc., but only W was able to do it— 
even S stumbles frequently. And it is not a trivial issue—unless one can clearly restate all of 
p202 separating the true only nonjudgeable S1 from the propositional S2 then nothing about 
behavior can be said without confusion. And of course, very often (normally) words are 
used without a clear meaning—one has to specify how ‘true’ or ‘follows from’ or ‘see’ is to 
be used in this context and W is the only one I know of who consistently gets this right. 
Again, on p203-206, the discussion of intrinsically intentional unconscious causal 
dispositionality only makes sense to me because I look at it as just another way to describe 
S1 states which provide the raw material for conscious S2 dispositionality which, from a 
biological evolutionary point of view (and what other can there be?) has to be the case. Thus, 
his comment on p212 is right on the money—the ultimate explanation (or as W insists the 
description) can only be a naturalized one which describes how mind, will, self, intention 
work and cannot meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena. Recall S’s famous 
review of Dennett’s ‘Conscious Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained away”. And 
this makes it all the more bizarre that S should repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure 
if we have free will and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
Also, I once again think S is on the wrong track (p214) when he suggests that the confusions 
are due to historical mistakes in philosophy such as dualism, idealism, materialism, 
epiphenomenalism etc., rather than in universal susceptibility to the defaults of our EP— 
TPI as he has noted, and bewitchment by language as beautifully described by W. As he 
notes “The neurobiological processes and the mental phenomena are the same event, 
described at different levels” and “How can conscious intentions cause  bodily  
movement? … How can the hammer move the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze 
what solidity is causally…if you analyze what intention-in-action is causally, you see 
analogously there is no philosophical problem left over.” 
I would translate his comment (p220) “A speaker can use an expression to refer only if in 
the utterance of the referring expressions the speaker introduces a condition that the object 
referred to satisfies; and reference is achieved in virtue of the satisfaction of that condition.” 
As “Meaning is achieved by stating a publicly verifiable condition of satisfaction (truth 
condition).” “I think it is raining” is true if it is raining and false otherwise. 
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Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, as commonly 
understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our representations.” (p223) 
as “Our life shows a world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly 
challenged.” 
 
 
This book is valuable principally as a recent synopsis of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times. But there is also value in analyzing his responses to the many 
basic confusions manifested in the articles by others. 
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Review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’ by John 
Searle (2008) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle and the logical 
structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade 
(though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will 
come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the 
best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and 
groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads 
to some mistakes and confusions. Just a few examples: on p7 he twice notes that our 
certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our 
claims, but W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting 
the true- only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, 
since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 
he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call 
Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) 
via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a 
classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” 
which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct uses. 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) would also benefit 
greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as 
they make clear the difference between true only sentences describing S1 and true or false 
propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 
perceptions as propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about 
them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential 
truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre 
or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such 
is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined 
to be the case. 
 
 
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein 
resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled once you grasp 
what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose 
and generalizations, illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If 
I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
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Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (20117 The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of  Consciousness 
(2019, Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy,  Psychology, 
Religion, Politics, and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology 
(2019), Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, 
Randomness, Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, 
Psychology and Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
" But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. 
If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the 
most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not curiosities; 
however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted and which have only 
gone unremarked because they are always before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds 
to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence (this has to do 
with the Kantian solution to the problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
“Could  a machine  process  cause  a thought  process?  The  answer is: yes.  Indeed, only a 
machine process can cause a thought process, and ‘computation’ does not name a machine 
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process; it names a process that can be, and typically is, implemented on a machine.” Searle 
PNC p73 
 
“…the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of a physical 
system from outside; and the identification of the process as computational does not identify 
an intrinsic feature of the physics, it is essentially an observer relative characterization.” 
Searle PNC p95 
 
“The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. I am now 
making the separate and different point that syntax is not intrinsic to physics.” Searle PNC 
p94 
“The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive decomposition fails, 
because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the physics is to put a homunculus in the 
physics.” Searle PNC p97 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a 
pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the existence of the 
pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a physical system. …In sum, the 
fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that 
programs provide causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, 
the brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description.” 
Searle PNC p101-103 
 
“In short, the sense of ‘information processing’ that is used in cognitive science is at much 
too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of intrinsic 
intentionality…We are blinded to this difference by the fact that the same sentence ‘I see a 
car coming toward me,’ can be used to record both the visual intentionality and the output 
of the computational model of vision…in the sense of ‘information’ used in cognitive science, 
it is simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device.” Searle PNC p104- 
105 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the 
nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent’s desires, 
values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it 
tries to pose Hume’s guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of 
which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC p165-171 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, 
are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations…the forms of the status 
function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic powers…to recognize 
something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action…these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The 
general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for action 
45 145  
presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons for action.” Searle 
PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality… Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced…it does 
not exist…This is… the phenomenological illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has no causal 
powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying neurobiology…But 
causal reducibility does not lead to ontological reducibility…consciousness only exists as 
experienced…and therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a third person 
ontology, something that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfactions, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
Before commenting in detail on Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) I will first offer some 
comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since 
I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper 
perspective. 
Though S does not say and seems to be largely unaware, the bulk of his work follows 
directly from that of W, even though he often criticizes him. To say that Searle has carried 
on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is 
only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), 
that anyone accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of 
what W said (as they must if they are both giving correct descriptions of behavior). I find 
most of S foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room argument 
against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the 
Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's excellent, but virtually 
unknown, supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a 
series of superb papers on W's philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary 
Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 ability of counting up to 3, as extended into the 
endless System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. W’s insights into the 
psychology of math provide an excellent entry into intentionality. I will also note that 
nobody who promotes Strong AI, the multifarious versions of behaviorism, computer 
functionalism, CTM (Computational Theory of Mind) and Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), 
seems to be aware that W's Tractatus can be viewed as the most striking and powerful 
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statement of their viewpoint ever penned (i.e., behavior (thinking) as the logical processing 
of facts-- i.e., information processing). 
Of course, later (but before the digital computer was a gleam in Turing's eye) W described 
in great detail why these were incoherent descriptions of mind that must be replaced by 
psychology (or you can say this is all he did for the rest of his life). S however makes little 
reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism, and his destruction of it in his 
later work. Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of 
behavior, and the most important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not 
realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many 
papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly easier 
to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you 
approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W and other books for more details. 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His work as a 
whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our 
conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges from unconscious machinations (System 1) 
(S1). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final extended treatment of this idea-and my review 
thereof for preparation. His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of 
animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is 
entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there 
is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all 
higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in 
humans this is extended into a personality (a cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based 
on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations 
that can be regarded as trivial). 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work is a development of or variation on these ideas. Another 
major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human behavior, is the need to separate 
the genetically programmed automatisms, which underlie all behavior, from the effects of 
culture. Though few philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., 
explicitly discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they are 
dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all study of higher order 
behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions and 
other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 and S2--see below), but nature and nurture. 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier  work  in  a  less  clear  
way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, 
cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. Sadly, 
almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a unique textbook of descriptive 
psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally 
ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few 
who have more or less understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of 
the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves 
 of fast and slow thinking etc., -- see below). Searle’s work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order social behavior that is possible because of the recent evolution 
of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional 
thinking of S2. 
I suggest the key to W is to regard his corpus as the pioneering effort in deciphering our EP, 
seeing that he was describing the two selves of S1 and S2 and the multifarious language 
games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd period works and reading 
backwards to the Proto-Tractatus. It should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent 
and correct, all accounts of behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to 
translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of "Embodied Mind" 
and "Radical Enactivism" should flow directly from and into W's work (and they do). 
However, almost nobody is able to follow his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to 
perspicuous examples, so even the redoubtable Searle has to be filtered and translated to 
see that this is true, and even he does not get how completely W has anticipated the latest 
work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (writing, speaking, acting). 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—which can be 
regarded as the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of 
examples of language use in context. He exposes the many varieties of language games and 
the relationships between the primary games of the true-only unconscious, pre or 
protolinguistic axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive thinking, 
emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain 
first-self, mirror neuron functions), and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional 
linguistic conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or 
false propositional secondary language games of slow thinking that are the network of 
cognitive illusions that constitute the second-self personality of which we are so enamored. 
W dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories 
and reflexive actions of S1 grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of S2 
dispositions, and many of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. 
With this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human 
nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic 
value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems perspective illuminates all higher 
behavior. Dobzhansky famously commented: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the 
light of evolution." And nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of 
evolutionary psychology. 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature") that language is a window on or some sort of 
translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other "Language of 
Thought" of which it is a translation, were rejected by W (and likewise by S), who tried to 
show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in 
action, that language is the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human 
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nature, and W's whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. Long before 
Searle, he rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental 
psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, Functionalism, Strong AI, Dynamic 
Systems Theory, Computational Theory of Mind, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down 
deconstructions of Language Games (LG's)1d7id. The principal difficulties he noted are to 
understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can now see this as obliviousness to 
System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological illusion’) and to capture vagueness 
("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" 
LPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is 
not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts 
about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved Secondary 
Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the dispositions --imagining, knowing, 
meaning, believing, intending etc.). 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment that even if 
God could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the 
motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, of Cognitive Psychology. But God could 
see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking, since these S1 
functions are always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. 
This is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S muddies the waters 
here because he refers to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, he 
shows that the language of causality just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 
descriptions—again not a theory but a description about how language (thinking) works. 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we can do is 
give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories but of course “theory” 
and “description” are language games too and it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s 
description—a rose by any other name…. W’s point was that by sticking to perspicacious 
examples that we all know to be true accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of 
theories that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to 
generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own mistakes in 
PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account for the multifarious 
language games they get closer and closer to describing behavior by way of numerous 
examples as did W. 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the different (but 
interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or roughly Primary Language 
Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., 
Johnston- ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ on how confusing the two is a major industry 
in philosophy and psychology), the impossibility of private language and the axiomatic 
structure of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first described S1 functions but as S2 
evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of inner 
resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain. 
The PLG's are utterances by and descriptions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
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mirror neuron, true only, nonpropositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories 
and involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths and UA1 (Understanding of Agency 1) and 
Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and 
Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be 
described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms 
of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see W for many 
examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons (e.g., `I see that 
as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms of EP, genetics, physiology, 
and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is meaningless to give "explanations" with the 
proviso that they will make sense in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now 
or never--(e.g., "The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459). 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 and 
Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even 
into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which result 
from the logical extension of Truths 1). W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our 
whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as 
always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding "language philosophy" as a 
separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since language is just another name for 
the mind. And, when W says that understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the 
progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion "The confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a `young science' --but cf. another comment 
that I have never seen quoted-- "Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. The 
realities that are discovered lighten the philosophers task. Imagining possibilities." 
(LWPP1,807). So, he is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out that our 
behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology and that all 
discussions of higher order behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and 
powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to provide the physical basis for 
our behavior and facilitate our analysis of language games which nevertheless remain 
unexplainable--EP just is this way-- and unchanged. The true-only axioms, most thoroughly 
explored in 'On Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only reactions of 
bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and operate by the mechanism 
of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution". 
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W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions rather than 
explanations, but of course these too are complex language games and one person's 
description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their innate true-only, nonempirical 
(automated and nonchangeable) responses to the world, animals extend their axiomatic 
understanding via deductions into further true only understandings ("theorems" as we 
might call them, but this is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or 
our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human nature. Theory of Mind 
(TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true- only Understandings of Agency (UA a term 
I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and worms if UA is suitably 
defined) have, and which subsequently evolved greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, 
as I note here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and 
System 2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UA1 and the Slow conscious UA2 
and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted phenomena. Although the raw material 
for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of 
perception, memory, reflexive thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s 
examples explore this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing 
as’ in Johnston). 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, intelligent person 
before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least half a century earlier. One cannot 
help but incorporate Tyrannosaurus rex and all that is relevant to it into our true only 
background via the inexorable workings of EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) 
necessity of this, it is truly stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp 
this most basic fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) 
which1w7as laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation of logic and 
our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature (as Daniele 
Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but as far as I know nobody else, points out). 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of our 
axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. Football or 
Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, 
ideas, events, developed out of and are tied to countless others in the true only network that 
begins with birth and extends in all directions to encompass much of our awareness and 
memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of 
involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, 
and almost exclusively in OC (his last work `On Certainty'), are equivalent to the fast 
thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking 
Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is 
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involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over in endless 
examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 99% of all our cerebration if 
measured by energy use in the brain). 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of language 
games!) second- self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as "dispositions" or 
"inclinations", which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the 
same sense), and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But 
disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W 
discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but 
graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers inspired W to write 
OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, 
i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which 
is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or 
false (`I know my way home'). 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics 
(e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", 
"priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so 
there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will 
vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 
thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network 
of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", 
"cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
One of W's recurring themes was what is now called Theory of Mind (TOM), or as I prefer 
Understanding of Agency (UA), but of course he did not use these terms, which is the 
subject of major research efforts now. I recommend consulting the work of Ian Apperly, 
who is carefully dissecting UA1 and 2 and who has recently become aware of one of the 
leading Wittgensteinian philosophers Daniel Hutto, since Hutto has now characterized UA1 
as a fantasy (or rather insists that there is no `Theory' nor representation involved in UA1-- 
that being reserved for UA2). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W 
laid the groundwork for this between 60 and 80 years ago. 
Another point made countless times by W w17as that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not accurately describe nor determine how we act— 
now a pillar of the behavioral sciences. See ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in PNC for a 
grand example from philosophy. It is an obvious corollary of W’s and S’s descriptive 
psychology that it is the unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe 
behavior and that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, 
desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most strikingly borne out by the 
latest experimental psychology, some of which is nicely summarized by 
52 152  
 
Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two Selves', but of course there is a huge 
volume of recent work he does not cite and an endless stream of pop and pro books issuing). 
It is an easily defensible view that most of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, 
automatisms and higher order thought is wholly compatible with and straightforwardly 
deducible from W. 
Regarding my view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has noticed that he 
very clearly explained several times specifically and many times in passing, the psychology 
behind what later became known as the Wason Test--long a mainstay of EP research. 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but 
scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes aphoristically and telegraphically 
because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest 
intellectual adventures possible. 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that 
results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a 
much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits 
usefulness. 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the 
Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought 
(DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has 
no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
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I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and17“cause originates 
in the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
I give detailed explanations of the table in my other writings. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
32 156  
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truth makers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truth makers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is 
only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes 
on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared 
with this one. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis 
of behavior from the modern two systems18view may consult my book The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and 
Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
Now for some comments on Searle’s PNC. The essays in PNC are mostly already published 
during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, 
and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, 
he is regarded by many as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is 
solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W 
seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. 
On p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming weight 
of reason supporting our claims, but W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is 
no possibility of doubting the true- only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, 
memories and thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. 
In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, 
which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable 
certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or 
false). This is of course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or 
many) distinct uses. 
On p10 he chastises W for his antipathy to theorizing but as I noted above, ‘theorizing’ is 
another language game (LG) and there is a vast gulf between a general description of 
behavior with few well worked out examples and one that emerges from a large number of 
such that is not subject to many counterexamples. Evolution in its early days was a theory 
with limited clear examples but soon became just a summary of a vast body of examples 
and a theory in a quite different sense. Likewise, with a theory one might make as a 
summary of a thousand pages of W’s examples and one resulting from ten pages. 
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Again, on p12, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 functioning that is 
‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, a matter of evidence 
but a true-only understanding in our own case and a true-only perception in the case of 
others. 
As I read p13 I thought: “Can I be feeling excruciating pain and go on as if nothing is wrong?” 
No! — this would not be ‘pain’ in the same sense. “The inner experience stands in need of 
outer criteria” (W), and Searle seems to miss this. See W or Johnston. 
As I read the next few pages, I felt that W has a much better grasp of the mind/language 
connection, as he regards them as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant 
exposition of mind as exemplified in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. As 
quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." And as explained above I feel the questions 
with which S ends section 3 are largely answered by considering W’s OC from the 
standpoint of the two systems. Likewise, for section 6 on the philosophy of science. Rodych 
has done an article on Popper vs W which I thought superb at the time, but I will have to 
reread it to make sure. Finally, on p25, one can deny that any revision of our concepts 
(language games) of causation or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read just 
about any page of W for the reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world 
using examples from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything 
relevant to our normal use of words. 
On p31, 36 etc., we again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and life) of 
identical words glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of ‘belief’, ‘seeing’ etc., as applied 
to S1 which is composed of mental states in the present only, and S21w8hich is not. The rest 
of the chapter summarizes his work on ‘social glue’ which, from an EP, Wittgensteinian 
perspective, is the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which 
are inexorably and universally expanded during personal development into a wide array of 
automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, and arbitrarily into cultural 
variations on them. 
Chapters 3 to 5 contain his well-known arguments against the mechanical view of mind 
which seem to me definitive. I have read whole books of responses to them and I agree with 
S that they all miss the very simple logical (psychological) points he makes (and which, by 
and large, W made half a century earlier before there were computers). To put it in my terms, 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, nonpropositional, true only 
mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions 
that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can 
become propositional (T or F). Computers and the rest of nature have only derived 
intentionality that is dependent on our perspective while higher animals have primary 
intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S and W appreciate, the great irony is 
that these materialistic or mechanical reductions of psychology masquerade as cutting edge 
science, but in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and 
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cognitive psychology (freed of superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, 
Dennett, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
Page 62 nicely summarizes one of his arguments but p63 shows that he has still not quite let 
go of the blank slate as he tries to explain trends in society in terms of the cultural extensions 
of S2. As he does in many other places in his writings, he gives cultural, historical reasons 
for behaviorism, but it seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view 
of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our 
EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly, 
rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious (i.e., an instance of 
what Searle has name “The Phenomenological Illusion). Again, on p65 I find W’s description 
of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in his OC and other works to be 
deeper than S’s (or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but 
rather it is not clear what doubting it means (what COS are there that can make it false?). 
Chapter 5 nicely demolishes CTM, LOT etc., noting that ‘computation’, ‘information’, 
‘syntax’, ‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer relative (i.e., psychological) terms 
and have no physical or mathematical meaning in this psychological sense, but of course 
there are other senses they have been given recently as science has developed. Again, people 
are bewitched by the use of the same word into ignoring that vast difference in its use 
(meaning). All extensions of classic Wittgenstein, and I recommend Hutto’s papers too. 
Chapter 6 “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) is by far my favorite, and, while 
demolishing phenomenology, it shows both his supreme logical abilities and his failure to 
grasp the full power of both the later W, and the great heuristic value of recent psychological 
research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to obliviousness to the 
automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but 
as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 
60 years earlier and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious 
automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1. Like so many others, Searle dances all 
around it but never quite gets there. Very roughly, regarding ‘observer independent’ 
features of the world as S1 and ‘observer dependent’ features as S2 should prove very 
revealing. As S notes, Heidegger and the others have the ontology exactly backwards, but 
of course so does almost everyone due to the defaults of their EP. 
But the really important thing is that S doe1s8 not take the next step to realizing that TPI is 
not just a failing of a few philosophers, but a universal blindness to our EP that is itself built 
into EP. He actually states this in almost these words at one point, but if he really got it how 
could he fail to point out its immense implications for the world. 
With rare exceptions (e.g., the Jaina Tirthankaras going back over 5000 years to the 
beginnings of the Indus civilization and most recently and remarkably Osho, Buddha, Jesus, 
Bodhidharma, Da Free John etc., we are all meat puppets stumbling through life on our 
genetically programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our almost total preoccupation with 
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using the second self S2 personality to indulge the infantile gratifications of S1 is creating 
Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, it’s only about reproduction and accumulating 
resources therefor. Yes, much noise about Global Warming and the imminent collapse of 
industrial civilization in the next century, but nothing is likely to stop it. S1 writes the play 
and S2 acts it out. Dick and Jane just want to play house—this is mommy and this is daddy 
and this and this and this is baby. Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and 
not just another primate. 
Chapter 7 on the nature of the self is good but nothing really struck me as new. Chapter 8 
on property dualism is much more interesting even though mostly a rehash of his previous 
work. The last of his opening quotes above sums this up, and of course the insistence on the 
critical nature of first person ontology is totally Wittgensteinian. The only big blunder I see 
is his blank slate or (cultural) type of explanation on p 158 for the errors of dualism, when 
in my view, it is clearly another instance of TPI— a mistake which he (and nearly everyone 
else) has made many times, and repeats on p177 etc., in the otherwise superb Chapter 9. The 
genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) of the meat 
puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read my comments on W’s OC so he 
changes the “good reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” 
(in the true-only sense i.e., K1). 
A critical point is made again on p169. “Thus, saying something and meaning it involves 
two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of satisfaction.” One 
way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher 
cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which 
inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A 
huge advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions and S makes a 
similar point in Chapter 10. 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) would also benefit 
greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as 
they make clear the difference between true only sentences describing S1 and true or false 
propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 
perceptions as propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about 
them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential 
truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre 
or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such 
is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined 
to be the case. 
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Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein 
resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled once you grasp 
what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose 
and generalizations, illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant a1p8horisms. 
If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
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Can there be a Chinese Philosophy? -- a Review of 
Searle's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy--Bo Mou 
Ed 440p (2008) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This book is invaluable as a synopsis of some of the work of one the greatest philosophers 
of recent times. There is much value in analyzing his responses to the basic confusions of 
philosophy, and in the generally excellent attempts to connect classical Chinese thought to 
modern philosophy. I take a modern Wittgensteinian view to place it in perspective. 
This book is a unique attempt to correlate classical Chinese philosophy with that of Searle 
(S), whom I regard as the best since Wittgenstein (W) and his intellectual heir. The quality 
of the articles is unusually high for such a collection, which must be due to Mou’s careful 
selection of papers. Readers will find it instructive to compare this with another recent 
volume of papers on S’s philosophy – “Thinking About the Real World”— another book on 
which I have written one of the very few reviews. As with W, everything that S writes is a 
treasure, but sadly this tome has attracted so little attention that this appears to be the only 
review, even though it appeared 6 years ago. Its only real deficiency is the failure to print 
S’s reply to Allinson, since it would correct his numerous substantial mistakes. As noted in 
my other reviews, such mistakes are of interest since they are the universal defaults of our 
psychology due to the fact that our language lacks perspicuity, as W first noted in the BBB 
(Blue and Brown Books) ¾ of a century ago. As the conference was taped, I tried to get the 
video or a transcript of S’s reply from Mou, S, Allinson and 3 persons at HKUST but nobody 
would help. 
The issue of spirituality is inevitably mixed in with the language issues of philosophy in 
some of the papers here. The many subtleties on the road to dispelling the illusion of the 
ego and the attaining of enlightenment are another issue entirely, although as in all other 
arenas, philosophical confusions inevitably arise when talking about religion, as opposed to 
practicing it. That is, philosophy in the broad sense, as musing on ethics, religion, morality, 
how we ought to live or feel about our life and the world is not the narrower sense in which 
W and S are practicing it, though inevitably and almost universally the broad sense gets 
mixed with issues about how language (the mind as W showed us) works. 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness 
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(201198, Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, 
Religion, Politics, and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology 
(2019), Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, 
Randomness, Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, 
Psychology and Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
This book is invaluable as a synopsis of some of the work of one the greatest philosophers 
of recent times. There is much value in analyzing his responses to the basic confusions of 
philosophy, and in the generally excellent attempts to connect classical Chinese thought to 
modern philosophy. I take a modern Wittgensteinian view to place it in perspective. 
This book is a unique attempt to correlate classical Chinese philosophy with that of Searle 
(S), whom I regard as the best since Wittgenstein (W) and his intellectual heir. The quality 
of the articles is unusually high for such a collection, which must be due to Mou’s careful 
selection of papers. Readers will find it instructive to compare this with another recent 
volume of papers on S’s philosophy – “Thinking About the Real World”— another book on 
which I have written one of the very few reviews. As with W, everything that S writes is a 
treasure, but sadly this tome has attracted so little attention that this appears to be the only 
review, even though it appeared 6 years ago. Its only real deficiency is the failure to print 
S’s reply to Allinson, since it would correct his numerous substantial mistakes. As noted in 
my other reviews, such mistakes are of interest since they are the universal defaults of our 
psychology due to the fact that our language lacks perspicuity, as W first noted in the BBB 
(Blue and Brown Books) ¾ of a century ago. As the conference was taped, I tried to get the 
video or a transcript of S’s reply from Mou, S, Allinson and 3 persons at HKUST but nobody 
would help. 
The issue of spirituality is inevitably mixed in with the language issues of philosophy in 
some of the papers here. The many subtleties on the road to dispelling the illusion of the 
ego and the attaining of enlightenment are another issue entirely, although as in all other 
arenas, philosophical confusions inevitably arise when talking about religion, as opposed to 
practicing it. That is, philosophy in the broad sense, as musing on ethics, religion, morality, 
how we ought to live or feel about our life and the world is not the narrower sense in which 
W and S are practicing it, though inevitably and almost universally the broad sense gets 
mixed with issues about how language (the mind as W showed us) works. 
As always, the first thing to keep in mind is W’s dictum that there are no new discoveries 
to be made in philosophy nor explanations to be given, but only clear descriptions of 
behavior (language). Once one understands that all the problems are confusions about how 
language works, we are at peace and philosophy in his sense has achieved its purpose. As 
W/S have noted, there is only one reality, so in the narrow sense, there are not multiple 
versions of the mind or life or the world that can meaningfully be given, and we can only 
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communicate in our one public language. W famously showed that there cannot be a private 
language and any “private inner” thoughts cannot be communicated and cannot have any 
role in our social life. It should also be very straightforward to solve philosophical problems 
in this sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein" The Blue Book" p6(1933) 
We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior (human nature 
or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the bedrock or background, and 
reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which S calls the logical structure of rationality 
and I call the descriptive psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT) or, taking the cue 
from W, the study of the language describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s 
comments on philosophical aspects of human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into 
the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which illuminate the use of language. If 
not, then showing how they have been bewitched by language dispels the confusion. As 
Horwich has noted on the last page of his superb ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my 
review): “What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no 
depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or 
reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein 
suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough.” 
Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say “describing”) 
and S states that the logical structure of rationality constitutes various “theories”, and there 
is no harm in it, provided one realizes they are comprised of a series of examples that let us 
get a general idea of how language (the mind) works and that as his “theories” are 
explicated via examples they become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by 
any other name...” When there is a question one has to go back to the examples or consider 
new ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and context sensitive (W being 
the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly unlike physics, where one 
can often derive a formula and dispense with the need for further examples. Scientism (the 
use of scientific language and the causal framework) leads us astray in describing HOT and 
for me it is essential to keep in mind another of W’s famous comments: “Philosophers 
constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask 
and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of 
metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” (BBB p18). Unlike so many 
others, S has largely avoided and often demolished scientism, but there is a residue which 
evinces itself when he remarks in various writings that he is prepared to give up causality, 
will or mind. W made it abundantly clear that such words are constituted by many language 
games, which are the innate axiomatic basis of thought, and giving them up or even 
changing them substantially is not possible. I think the residue of scientism results from the 
major tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his failure to 
take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went to England to study). 
And, as it seems to me critical to understand the difference between the dispositional 
language games of “explaining” and “understanding”, permit me to quote W again. 
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“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that 
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! …. This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” 
BBB p125 
 
“Every sign [WORD] is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W’s BBB p34 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that `will', `self' 
and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elem1e8nts of the reptilian subcortical System 
One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes, and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so 
wonderfully clear, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only 
axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to contribute that other 
students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s above remark on science envy, I 
will quote from P.M.S Hacker (for many years the leading expert on W) who gives a good 
start on it and a counterblast to scientism. 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further 
condition…, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ...What needs to be clarified 
if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which 
the various concepts hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and 
incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of 
context dependency. To this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15(2005) 
Before making detailed remarks on the book, I will first offer some essential comments on 
philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in 
the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of 
S’s PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the Social World (MSW), Seeing Things 
As They Are (STATA) and W’s BBB (Blue and Brown Books), PI (Philosophical 
Investigations), OC (On Certainty), and other books by and about these geniuses, who 
provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found in complete detail anywhere 
that I have seen, that I will refer to as the W/S framework. 
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INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of Social Reality 
(the title of Searle’s well known book) and I will give some perspective. 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make 
complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 years ago had evolved to 
describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions with basic utterances that 
can be described as Primary Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast 
unconscious automated System One, true- only mental states with a precise time and 
location). We gradually developed the further ability to encompass displacements in space 
and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential events (the past and future and often 
counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the 
Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false 
propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not 
mental states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, capacities, hypotheses. 
Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 p148). “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person 
statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) while third person statements about 
others are true or false (see my review of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and 
memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed 
“inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” 
since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W 
and by Searle (e.g., Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer 
independent mental representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space 
while the evolutionarily more primitive System One mental states of perceptions memories 
and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 and 
System 3--the second and third major advances in vertebrate psychology after System 1— 
the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time 
(Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). 
S1 are potential or unconscious mental states (Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or primary 
LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, no tests possible, so they 
can be true-only. Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see 
the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I know what 
I believe, think, feel until I act). Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written 
as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 
1930’s) and are not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, Hacker 
etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology, 
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contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems framework, and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction 
with System 2. Though few have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) 
it was further developed by a few --above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version 
of the table below in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey 
of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 
1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably 
the same), cognitive linguistics or the logical structure of Higher Order Thought (HOT), and 
in my view the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology), and 
thus in the study of behavior. See my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) and the 
recent work of Daniele Moyal- Sharrock. 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits the 
world (originally called Causally Self Referential, but now Causally self-reflexive by Searle) 
--the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is 
possible). Emotions evolved to make a bridge between desires or intentions and actions. 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary 
Abilities--described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit the world. 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) 
arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The 
Phenomenological Illusion or TPI of Searle). W understood this and described it with 
unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout 
his works. Reason has access to working memory and so we use consciously apparent but 
typically1i8ncorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs 
and other Dispositions are thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world 
direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In 
Action-IAA- Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind 
direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, p190). 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that 
results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a 
much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
44 168  
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the representations of S2 as 
public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this sense S1 such as perceptions do not have 
COS. In other writings S says they do but as noted in my other reviews I think it is then 
essential to refer to COS1 (private presentations) and COS2 (public representations). To 
repeat this critical distinction, public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by 
Searle and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), 
while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and his ‘Direction 
of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” 
R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted this terminology in the table. 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists, but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits 
usefulness. 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the 
Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality (1L9SP), the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher 
Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truth makers, Conditions o1f 9Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is 
only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes 
on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared 
with this one. 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE 
 
System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to 
consciousness, are automated and generally happening in less than 500msec, while System 
2 are abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in consciousness 
(S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also 
become automated (S2A -my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness from coma 
through the stages of sleep to full awareness. Memory includes short term memory 
(working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. 
For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than T or F. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically connected. E.g., 
Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be True only, will describe 
a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are 
causally self-reflexive (self- referential), cause originates in the world and causes changes in 
the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have 
a special quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and working 
memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will 
not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words cannot precisely match the actual 
complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of 
contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher 
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order behavior to a system of laws which would have to state all the possible contexts – 
hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make 
complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events (perceptions, 
memory, reflexive actions and some Primary or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 
1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, 
intransitive, informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location) and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical S2 with the further ability to describe 
displacements in space and time (conditionals, hypotheticals or fictionals) of potential 
events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions - the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of 
System 2 slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public 
Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into 
COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational—which I again divide into 
R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2), true or false propositional attitudinal thinking, with 
all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences 
are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive 
Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, 
Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W RPP2 148) while others are typical 
S1—fast and automatic to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible 
public acts typically displaced in spacetim1e9. My first-person statements about myself are 
true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about others are true or 
false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and 
memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed 
“inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” 
since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W 
and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer 
independent public representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System1 to System 2 – Searle - Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts 
displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories 
and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 - 
the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent 
events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of 
counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ are 
potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or primary 
LG’s (PLG’s-- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO TESTS possible so 
they can be True Only. Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I 
believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do 
I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of 
Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology’). Note well that Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as 
well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) 
and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a 
unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was 
extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table in his classic book 
Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of 
evolutionary psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully 
laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone 
of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or 
Higher Order Thought, and in my view the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive 
actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be 
described in PL G’s, in which the mind automatically fits the world (is Causally Self 
Referential--Searle) -- the unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over 
which no control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow 
thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind 
tries to fit the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive 
psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as 
SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it 
with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action 
throughout his works. 
Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often incorrect 
reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Pro1c9esses of current research). 
Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of 
the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA-Searle) plus acts which try to match the world 
to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. Disposition 
words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as 
verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or might act --‘I think that…) and 
are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and 
our innate programs (cognitive modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to 
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 produce Dispositions — (believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc.,-actual or 
potential PUBLIC ACTS (language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) 
of PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or mind). 
Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public psychology. 
PERCEPTIONS: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Temperature, Pain, Touch 
 
MEMORIES: Remembering, Dreaming? 
 
PREFERENCES, DISPOSITIONS, INCLINATIONS: (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS: of Believing, Judging, Thinking, 
Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing 
(including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, 
Intending, Considering, Desiring, expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), 
Seeing As (Aspects), 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - Dreaming, 
Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. Their 
function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected maximum utility) 
by facilitating information processing of perceptions and memories for rapid action. There 
is some separation between S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, 
disgust and anger. 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): Longing, 
Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do INTENTIONS: (I will 
make “X” True) Intending 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, Laughing, 
Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting(describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), 
Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs –these are Public 
and Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior. 
WORDS EXPRESS POTENTIAL ACTIONS HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR 
LIFE AND ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
 
The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent 
to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which 
lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken 
to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is 
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 the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including 
neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be 
regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules which 
produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development and individual action 
with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) 
of our psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding by giving clear 
descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, 
philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus 
making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as 
conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of behavior 
which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and require 
consciousness, will and self and in normal human adults nearly all except perceptions and 
some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to 
relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility--Bayesian 
utility maximization but Bayesianism is highly questionable) via dominance and reciprocal 
altruism (Desire Independent Reasons for Action-Searle- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and impose Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction - 
Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, 
language, art, music, sex, sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by our greatest 
natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle 
beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for 
exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (i.e., 
of our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes 
conscious and deliberative. All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have 
fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be useful. 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the 
dispositional verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and rational with partial 
awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2. It is useful to regar 
d these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental 
phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, 
hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or 
mind. Thinking like all dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) lacks any test, is 
not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a 
public act in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories 
can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested in public 
actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for 
ourselves. 
 
(Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon). Developing language means 
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manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. TOM (Theory of Mind) is much 
better called UA-Understanding of Agency–my term-and UA1 and UA2 for such functions 
in S1 and S2 ) –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate 
genetically programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to 
intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles. Thus, “propositional attitude” is a 
confusing term for normal intuitive rational S2D or nonrational automated S2A speech and 
action. We see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by 
studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the BRAIN works) than we already know, 
because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any phenomena that 
are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string 
theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which 
“obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As 
W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. Language 
(mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social 
interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely 
confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences have multiple uses depending 
on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed 
or I believe and he believes. The present tense first person expressive use of inclinational 
verbs such as “I believe” describe my ability to predict my probable acts and are not 
descriptive of my mental state nor based on knowledge or information in the usual sense of 
those words (W). It does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it -- 
i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person 
present tense are causally self-referential--they instantiate themselves but as descriptions of 
possible states they are not testable (i.e., not T or F). However past or future tense or third 
person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain information that is true 
or false as they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe 
it’s raining” has no information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe 
it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in 
spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent (which I call 
S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by 
Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical Psychology in 2000) Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non- 
Propositional (Non- Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or abilities) 
of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle to be Mental 
States and hence S1 but again I think one must separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal 
language our prior intentions are the conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, 
type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called 
Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, non-Propositional and non-Attitudinal 
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functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal- 
Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
“The basic form of the game must be one in which we act.” Wittgenstein in Klagge 
Philosophical Occasions p397(1993) 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human b1eh9avior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order thought 
(HOT) is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and 
other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work 
as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the 
later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into 
conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our subcortical, involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, pre-linguistic mental states- our perceptions 
and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of 
Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while 
the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of cortical, 
voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, S2 consists of testable true 
or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the 
dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, 
knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact 
that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, 
make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). UA is my term for what is usually called ‘theory of 
mind” and I think it is a critical distinction as it keeps in front of us the fact that the basis for 
our interaction with other beings is an automatic part of S1 and not an empirically decidable 
or modifiable function of S2. This is the basis for most of what is called “enactivism” or 
“embodiment” and it comes straight from W (though rarely acknowledged). 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other 
disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and 
"biases". Of course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, since HOT cannot 
occur without involving much of the intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference 
engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" --as W and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide 
array of universal cultural deontic relationships (S3) so well described by Searle. I think this 
fairly well abstracts the basic structure of behavior. 
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So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content (i.e. is representational in the W/S sense 
of having public COS) and is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of 
Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would translate the paragraphs from S’s MSW 
p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on p40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are caused by 
the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP (“first self”) as modified by S2 
(‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We 
should see that belief, desire (and imagination-- desires time shifted and decoupled from 
intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved 
“second self”, are totally dependent upon (have their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
originating in) the Causally Self Referential (CSR) rapid automatic primitive true- only 
reflexive S1. In languag1e9 and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases 
such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of the 
COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is 
always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly 
by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that 
dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does 
not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. One refers to 
the true- only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes (including basic speech) 
and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology which are Causally Self Referential 
(CSR)- (called reflexive or intransitive in W’s BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words 
(thinking, understanding, knowing etc.) which can be acted out, and which can become true 
or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are 
not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
Note that COS, CSR, DOF, DIRA, Word to World etc. are all terms introduced or 
standardized by Searle but their division into COS1, COS2 etc. to accommodate the now 
dominant two systems framework is my own, which I regard as indispensable. 
To get S’s framework clear I have picked several quotes from his recent works. 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
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"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose 
that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a 
representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that 
has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can 
analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions 
of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
And a last comment from W—one of his most penetrating and universally relevant to 
thinking about behavior. 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about 
processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know 
more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking 
at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one we thought quite innocent). — And now the analogy which was to make us understand 
our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet 
unexplored medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And 
naturally we don’t want to deny them. W PI p308 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, 
perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, 
and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to 
understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. 
However, since what S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 
and is in turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which S1 is able to become 
propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious activities of S1 must be able to 
become the conscious ones of S2. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because 
the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional 
in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was 
philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. It would 
e.g., mean that truth and falsity and the facts of the world could be decided without 
consciousness. As W stated often and showed so brilliantly in his last book “On Certainty”, 
life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that 
always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-- no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
Another crucial notion clarified by S is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to 
our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent 
Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly  result  sooner or later in  muscle movements  that 
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serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely 
related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generates the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate 
desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these 
are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the 
Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right” but the ultimate cause is a change in their 
brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. Evolution by 
inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1, 
which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural 
extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body 
and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The 
overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank 
Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, 
but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view is not 
credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public truth 
conditions.  Hence  the  comment  from  W:  "  When  I  thin2k0  in  language,  there  aren't 
`meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is 
itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever 
I (honestly) say it is, as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms 
(p132 Budd-Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that wish and 
fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and 
reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here that 
`grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings 
against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher order 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find— beyond even Searle. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes that there 
is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition 
of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which means to speak or write a 
well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act 
and not a mental state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds 
he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what 
gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence 
W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without any 
further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question 
whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have 
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been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"... ”Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I 
long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know." 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He dissects 
hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and 
reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the 
nature/nurture issue explicitly. With an evolutionary perspective, W’s later works are a 
breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. 
Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view 
is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes 
sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
W recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to 
all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not 
to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop 
trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” 
(e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). Incidentally, 
the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is essential to 
understanding W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal Sharrock (DMS) but as far as I know 
nobody else, points out). 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot 
be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the consequences of an S1 
‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and 
elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and 
other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get 
a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false 
propositions. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ 
of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching 
an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and with rare exceptions there is barely 
a mention. 
The authors in this book are, like most philosophers and behavioral scientists, largely in the 
dark regarding subjects that I consider essential to a description of behavior—a good 
understanding of W and S, evolutionary psychology, automaticity of behavior and the two 
systems of thought. Nevertheless, they are generally thought provoking since they have as 
their theme the scintillating works of S. The title of the first article on p35 by Cheng shows 
a basic and just about universal misunderstanding as it proposes to present a Neo- 
Confucian view of S’s philosophy. It should be obvious from the above that the basic 
philosophical issues are always about mistakes in language used to describe our universal 
innate psychology and there is no useful sense in which there can be a Chinese, French, 
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Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. Such views can exist in the broad cultural or non- 
universal sense of philosophy, but that is not what philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me 
what any interesting and substantive philosophy) is about. It would take the whole review 
just to start on a reply to it and S does an excellent job, so I will just comment that re p35 
propositions are S2 and not mental states which are S1, as W made quite clear over ¾ of a 
century ago, and that both Quine and Davidson were equally confused about the basic 
issues involved (both Searle and Hacker have done excellent demolitions of Quine). As often, 
S’s discussion is marred by his failure to carry his understanding of W’s “background” to 
its logical conclusion (a failing of Hacker as well, as DMS has noted), and so he suggests (as 
he has frequently) that we might have to give up the concept of free will—a notion I find 
(with W) is incoherent as it is not something we can decide about. If some description of 
behavior is to have teeth, we should always be asking ourselves what actual impact it has 
on our life if we adopt it. If “choice” is a “meaningless” illusion, then there is really no COS 
at all, or does it have the same COS when our arm goes up when we want to scratch our ear 
as when it is pulled up by a string? 
S himself has countless times used W’s example of the difference between our arm going up 
because someone moves it, and going up because we make it do so. There is no further 
division of its going up to scratch our ear into voluntary and involuntary scratching. This is 
the bedrock or background--as W puts it, explanations and descriptions stop here. 
Philosophy, neuroscience and physics have nothing to add that changes the description in 
any way. Likewise (p62) nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our axiomatic 
EP) as our being able to talk at all presupposes it (as W/S note frequently). “Reduction” 
along with “monism”, “reality”, etc., are complex contextual language games and they do 
not carry meaning along in little backpacks. One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get 
clear and then see how another usage (context) differs. The 20,000 pages of W’s nachlass are 
hands down the best lesson on how this has to be done, but Cheng has no idea and so lapses 
into incoherence many times a page. He can of course take comfort in the fact that he has 
millions for company. 
Fraser’s article (as S notes) is generally excellent as he does a rare thing—he actually 
understands alot of what S has written and gives a clear account of it. If only he had some 
grasp of all the other subjects I outlined above. Regarding his note 5 one needs to remember 
that dispositions (e.g., thinking, knowing) that state a COS are thereby true or false and a 
function of S2 (as opposed to S1 which are true only). And the “radical under- 
determi2n0ation of meaning” was first solved by W who noted that S1 is true only. 
In another recent volume, S comments “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic 
practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our 
representations”, to which I would add “Our life shows a world that does not depend on 
our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” We need to remind ourselves that the 
basic problem of philosophy is that, when the context is not clear—i.e., almost always when 
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philosophizing-- you can say anything, but you cannot mean anything –i.e., only certain 
COS can apply in this context. 
Fraser’s discussion of intention p67-69 is good, but again in my view it is critical to be 
mindful of the difference between S1 (unconscious, involuntary, true only, nonlinguistic 
mental states) and S2 (conscious, voluntary, true or false, often linguistic and not mental 
states). A COS, or mental state or desire independent reason for action in S1 is utterly 
different from one in S2 and as I have often suggested (following W) one ought not to speak 
of them as S1 phenomena at all. As noted in my other reviews, if one insists to use such 
terms for both S1 and S2 then one should use COS1, COS2, DIRA1, DIRA2 etc. and keep 
firmly in mind that COS1 are “internal criteria” (i.e., not really criteria at all) while COS2 
are external public criteria that can be true or false. See Fraser’s notes 10 and 11. Fraser notes 
on p89 that insofar as wu-wei is the idea that life can become entirely automated it must be 
confused— this would mean S2 or our conscious voluntary life disappears and we join the 
bacteria. Regarding note 37 I would comment that “background” is W’s concept long before 
it became S’s and that muscle contraction, though carried out by S1 is often generated by 
S2—the only end result possible for our consciousness is contraction of muscles. S’s 
response mentions “high level” and “low level” which we should interpret as S2 and S1. 
Krueger’s article is a generally good “enactivist” or “embodied” account but we should note 
that W was the first enactivist and that S is one as well as they both insist on the COS as the 
test of meaningful behavior, and on the S1, S2 framework (though they do not use these 
terms). He does however go overboard in suggesting wu-wei is superior to S’s account and 
makes the usual error in suggesting that we “explain” behavior rather than just describing 
it and, like nearly everyone, has no clue that the best description of behavior and of the 
axiomatic functioning of S1 is that of W, especially in his last work “On Certainty”. Again, 
I suggest the recent book by Hutto and Myin for a rigorous account of the S1, S2 orientation 
in “Radicalizing Enactivism” (see my review). Krueger calls this the 
“internalism/externalism” debate. His misunderstandings are nicely summarized on p106 
when he says the wu-wei refers to “inner states” and that its depiction of action without 
representation is at odds with S’s account. But it is clearly not, as it depicts S1 and S perfectly 
well describes S1. At issue here is what S has nicely termed The Phenomenological Illusion 
(TPI), which roughly means that S1 is not available to consciousness and so is not “real”. On 
p122 he indicates that S implies intentionality is solely present in the brain but neither S nor 
W ever says this and constantly show that the basic concept of meaning is COS, which is a 
public act or occurrence. The confusion of his statement of embodiment or enactivism is 
epitomized in the last sentence of section 5 on p123 with “Intentionality is not a logical 
feature of mentality but rather a lived relation that is enacted through our embodied 
engagement with the world.” The cure is to cross out “not” and change “but rather” to 
“and”. S1 and S2 feed back into each other and combine the primitive automatic reflexive 
behaviors with the advanced conscious linguistic dispositions to produce actions with 
public COS. S’s response is a classic description of intentionality and TPI which should be 
memorized by all those interested in human behavior. One should read his article “The 
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Phenomenological Illusion” and my reviews of his books and those by and about W, 
especially that of Johnston’s “Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner.” S condenses a huge cloud 
of philosophy into a few drops of grammar in the first paragraph on p126 when he notes 
that our intentionality (i.e., the S2 part of it) is representational because it can succeed or 
fail--i.e., be true or false—i.e., be propositional as it has external public COS whereas S1 does 
not. 
Allinson makes most of the basic mistakes about how language (mind, behavior) works, as 
most people do when they philosophize, and so it is inevitable that he gets S wrong as well. 
As noted, it would be of great interest to have S’s response to Allinson, but it was not printed 
and nobody was able to help me get it. So there is only a short comment by S who thinks 
these are not Chinese but Western confusions, but it is clear they are universal ones. 
The next few papers had some mildly interesting comments on Chinese philosophy and 
religion but nothing of any substance on S or philosophy in the narrow sense. Martinich is 
a well-known author on language but sadly he has hardly a clue about what S or W have 
done. Regarding Willman there is again nothing about the basic framework for describing 
behavior and so the unconscious true-only S1 gets mixed with conscious dispositional S2 
with the usual disastrous results (see middle of p265), and again S is way too kind. 
Nuyen’s paper brings up the fact that few people understand that in most contexts, if 
behavior varies from one person to another that means it’s cultural and not innate. Every 
normal person enjoys eating but its culture that makes some like raw earthworms. 
Regarding S’s response, the quickest and clearest way I know to understand desire 
independent reasons for action (and how to separate DIRA1 from DIRA2) is to read my 
reviews of S. 
Chong’s paper is mostly about philosophy in the broad sense and I would only comment 
that pretty much all previous notions of morality, ethics and rights seem obsolete. As we 
head for total collapse of what passes for civilization we need to have a long term global 
ecological basis for these, as is commonly noted. One of my favorites in this regard is the 
Wittgensteinian philosopher Rupert Read, who has used this perspective to deconstruct the 
work of Rawls (e.g., “A Theory of Justice”). 
The article by Fraser and Wong shows some grasp of S but (as is almost universal) it is truly 
amazing to see people try to describe (not explain as that takes us in a whole different 
direction—i.e., to a dead end) behavior with little understanding of S1, S2, dispositions, 
evolutionary psychology, automatism, twin studies etc. Only p316-17 were of interest to me 
and I have already commented on this. 
Stroll is a senior scholar and W expert but I see problems in both his remarks and S’s on the 
subject of our certain knowledge. The comments on p345 fail to note the complex and highly 
varied language games subsumed by “knowledge”, “certainty”, “evidence”, “true”, “proof” 
etc. We can speak of “evidence” of water when we see what looks like a pond in the distance 
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but not when we are standing next to it watching the ducks swim around. Only 
philosophers would use it the latter way and it’s not an intelligible use. Hands down the 
best treatment I know of how falsifiable statements become true only and of the axiomatic 
basis of knowledge is W’s “On Certainty”. 
Lum’s paper is pretty good, as we would expect from a former student of S’s, but there is 
some unclarity. Perhaps we see the origin of this in S’s reply p377, where he fails to 
demarcate S1 and S2 and so COS1, COS2 and says unconscious states (i.e., S1) can function 
in virtue of their propositional contents, which needs very careful elaboration describing 
how S1 generates and merges into S2 (as W did so well in ”On Certainty”). 
Zheng is mostly excellent with the paragraph in the middle of p386 being fine, once 
translated into the S1, S2 dispositional language, and most of p392-3 on the background or 
network or bedrock (i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology) being as good a summary 
description of high level behavior as I have seen. 
I have no new comments on the final contribution by Mou, but S felt it showed TPI which 
is a contagious disease in modern philosophy, as it must be, since it is another manifestation 
of what W often referred to as the lack of perspicuity of language. 
This book is invaluable as a synopsis of some of the work of one the greatest philosophers 
of recent times, and in my view one of the very best since Wittgenstein. There is much value 
in analyzing his responses to the many basic confusions manifested here and in the 
generally excellent attempts to connect classical Chinese thought to modern philosophy. It 
is a great pity that it remains a rare expensive volume that nobody reads. 
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Seeing With the Two Systems of Thought—a Review of 
‘Seeing Things As They Are: a Theory of Perception’ by 
John Searle (2015) 
 
ABSTRACT 
As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes the author’s 
biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the language game ‘Seeing 
things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a ‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’ 
(which can only be about how the language of perception works), as opposed to a scientific 
one, which is a theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is classic 
Searle—superb and probably at least as good as anyone else can produce, but lacking a full 
understanding of the fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein and with no grasp of 
the two systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. As in his 
previous work, Searle largely avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses and he does not 
grasp that the issues are always about language games, a failing he shares with nearly 
everyone. After providing a framework consisting of a Table of Intentionality based on the 
two systems of thought and thinking and decision research, I give a detailed analysis of the 
book. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
As with Wittgenstein (hereafter W), everything that Searle (hereafter S) writes is a treasure 
and it is wonderful that he remains sharp as he nears 80. Unlike most, even his early work 
is still relevant and he is working on several other books. I also suggest his 100 or so lectures 
and interviews on YouTube, Vimeo etc., which, though inevitably a bit repetitious, contain 
many statements not in his writings. I have read almost all of his work, and listened to all 
the lectures, most of them 2 or 3 times. These are of special interest as (like Wittgenstein) he 
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does not read from notes, and so each is unique and not a replica of a paper, and he is a 
superb extemporaneous speaker who mostly uses unpretentious language (both so different 
from most others). The recent lectures given at European Universities are superb, but don’t 
miss the old ones such as the BBC lecture “A Changing Reality-the science of human 
behavior”, which gives an excellent account of why the lawful repetitious causality of the 
brain’s fast automatic, nonlinguistic system 1 (S1) is fundamentally different and not 
describable in the same way as the limitless complexity of reasons chara2ct0erizing the slow 
deliberative, linguistic conscious system 2 (S2), which generates a combinatorial explosion 
not usually representable in a useful way by scientific laws. The dual system (S1, S2) method 
of describing thought used in this review, common to reasoning research for some 20 years 
now, is my own and not Searle’s. Since I written a great deal analyzing Searle’s work in 
comparison with that of Wittgenstein (e.g., The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, 
Mind and Language as Revealed by Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd Ed (2019)) I 
will not repeat it and will concentrate on this book only. 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –that all truly 
‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or data gathering) are the 
same— confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions 
are the same— looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth 
conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS, a term not used by W and popularized 
principally by S) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot 
mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very 
specific context. Thus, W in his last masterpiece ‘On Certainty’ (OC) looks at perspicuous 
examples of the varying uses of the words ‘know’, ‘doubt’ and ‘certain’, often from his 3 
typical perspectives of narrator, interlocutor and commentator, leaving the reader to decide 
the best use (clearest COS) of the sentences in each context. One can only describe the uses 
of related sentences and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no metaphysical insights. 
There are no ‘problems’ of ‘perception’, ‘consciousness’, ‘will’, ‘space’, ’time’ etc., but only 
the need to keep the use (COS) of these words clear. It is useful to keep in mind two 
comments by W that summarize scientism. 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young 
science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. 
(Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there 
are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual 
confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method 
pass one another by." Wittgenstein PI p.232 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." BBB p18 
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More than most, S avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses which I have pointed out 
in my many reviews of his work and in spite of his being perhaps the best all-around 
philosopher since W, he does not fully grasp that it is all about language games, a failing he 
shares with nearly everyone. 
As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes the author’s 
biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the language game ‘Seeing 
things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a ‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’, 
which can only be about how the language of perception works, as opposed to a scientific 
one, which is a theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. The subtitle (A 
theory of Perception) is likewise contentious (for Wittgensteinians at least) since W warned 
repeatedly against theorizing and even insisted it was impossible to produce theories about 
behavior, as everyone would agree with them—i.e., they would be truisms about our use of 
language. Anything that looks like a theory of higher order thought (mind, behavior) is 
really just a description of what we do, unless of course they are making the near universal 
mistake of giving a scientific theory of 2h0ow the brain or the world works-a different 
kind of ‘philosophy’ entirely—i.e. ‘Scientism’. Searle is well aware of this and has 
commented on it many times, insisting W is wrong about theories, but I don’t think so. Only 
science has theories, i.e., propositions that can be shown true or false and often new evidence 
leads us to change or even abandon them, while philosophy proper (the elucidation in a 
given context of a language game describing our higher order behavior) will be obviously 
correct and not subject to revision as we all recognize it as true—i.e. as a correct use of 
language. But if S wants to call his generalizations about language use ‘theories’ that’s fine, 
just so long as we are not led astray. I have dealt with these issues at length in my other 
writings and in particular my review of Carruthers’ ‘The Opacity of Mind’. 
It is very useful to read the little volume ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ where Searle, 
Dennett, and Bennett and Hacker have at one another over which language games should 
be played. Bennett and Hacker have given the most detailed exposition of these games in 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’(2003) which is continued in Hacker’s recent 3 
volumes on Human Nature. 
W insisted that there are no new discoveries to be made in philosophy, nor explanations to 
be given, but only clear descriptions of behavior (language) in a particular context. Once 
one understands that all the problems are confusions about how language works, we are at 
peace and philosophy in W’s sense has achieved its purpose. As W and S have noted, there 
is only one reality, so there are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the world that 
can meaningfully be given, and we can only communicate in our one public language. There 
cannot be a private language and any ‘private inner thoughts’ cannot have any role in our 
social life. It should also be very straightforward to solve philosophical problems in this 
sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933). In our 
modern idiom, perception is the automatic, causally self-reflexive (Searle), rapid, true-only 
mental states or presentations (Searle) of System 1 (S1), while most of what we ‘mean’ by 
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the ‘mind’ are the deliberate, slow, reasoned dispositions with public true or false 
representations (conditions of satisfaction-COS) of System 2 (S2). 
 
Searle waits until p45 to present the most recent version of a table he has used before. I have 
been expanding it for some years and as I find it critical to understanding behavior, I begin 
by presenting its most recent version here. In accord with W’s work and Searle’s 
terminology, I categorize the representations of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
and in this sense the ‘phenomena’ of S1 such as perceptions do not have COS. In other 
writings Searle says they do, but as noted in my other reviews, I think it is then essential to 
refer to COS1 (“private” presentations) and COS2 (public representations). Likewise, I have 
changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and his ‘Direction of Causation’ to 
‘Causes Changes In’. 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted this terminology in the table. 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the 
behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and fr2o0m the 50’s to the 
present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, 
Finkelstein etc. 
I have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show 
various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and 
voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure 
of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or 
better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced 
here and in my other very recent writings. 
I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description may consult 
my articles and reviews of books by Wittgenstein, Searle and others on academia.edu, 
philpapers.org, researchgate.net, libgen.is, b-ok.org,vixra.org and abbreviated versions on 
Amazon. 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by 
Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human 
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Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by 
Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
(Involuntary–automated-Rules R1) Thinking (Cognition) (No gaps) (Voluntary- 
deliberative- Rules R2) Willing (Volition) (3 gaps) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 
volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that 
after we have described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that 
there is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in an 
inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct context. 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) 
which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and generally happen in 
less than 500msec, while System 2 is abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are 
represented in conscious deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but 
frequently repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is 
a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness. 
Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term 
memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather 
than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual 
experience-the presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the 
same words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the 
percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically connected. E.g., 
Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be True-Only, will describe 
a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are 
causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have 
a precise duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special 
quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and working memory, 
are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have 
public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) cannot 
precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a 
combinatorial explosion of contexts in sentences and in the brain states), and this is why it’s 
not possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws, which would have to state 
all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. This is a special 
c2as1e of the irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones that has been 
explained many times by Searle, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), P.M.S. Hacker, 
Wittgenstein and others. 
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About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make 
complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events (perceptions, 
memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). 
System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self- 
reflexive, intransitive, informationless, true- only mental states with a precise time and 
location, and over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and often 
hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or 
dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are 
slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truth makers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 
for private S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 
representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions 
having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, 
Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, 
Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions (described by 
Searle as agitated desires), Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in 
the world and not to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are 
slowly developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W- ‘Remarks on the Philosophy 
of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and fast to appear and 
disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts 
typically displaced in space-time. My first-person statements about myself are true-only 
(excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., 
S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and 
memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed 
“inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” 
since Russell but it has often been noted that this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since 
believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, 
as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as opposed to 
presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-Consciousness and 
Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space, while the evolutionarily 
more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. 
This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology 
after System 1—the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them 
as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination 
supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., the use of “thinking” to 
refer to automatic brain processes of System One) are potential or unconscious mental states 
of S1 -- Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
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Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by primary LG’s 
(PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO TESTS possible so they 
can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal reflexes as2W1 and DMS describe. 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and 
must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, 
think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of the well-known books on W 
by Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as 
well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) 
and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a 
unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was 
extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table in his classic book 
Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of 
evolutionary psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully 
laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone 
of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by 
DMS) the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in 
the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive 
partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the 
mind automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible). 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary 
Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit (represent) the 
world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as the 
conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W 
understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of 
language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so 
we use consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves 
or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described 
as thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while 
Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus 
acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle 
e.g., Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. Disposition 
words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as 
verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or might act -‘I think that…) and 
are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. 
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Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, templates, 
inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(believing, knowing, 
understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public acts such as language (thought, 
mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition 
-and there is no language (concept, thought) of private mental states for thinking or willing 
(i.e., no private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to 
that extent they have a public psychology. Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, 
Touch, Temperature Memories, Remembering : (X was true) 
PERCEPTIONS: (X is True): Hear, See, Sme2ll1, Pain, Touch, Temperature MEMORIES: 
Remembering (X was true) 
PREFFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, Judging, Thinking, 
Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing 
(including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, 
Intending, Considering, Desiring, Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), 
Seeing As (Aspects). 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - Dreaming, 
Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. Their 
function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected maximum utility) 
by facilitating information processing of perceptions and memories for rapid action. There 
is some separation between S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, 
disgust and anger. We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): Longing, 
Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, Laughing, 
Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting (Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), 
Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public 
and Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior (The 
Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank Slate or the Standard Social Science Model--SSSM). 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of objects 
nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive 
modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of 
neurons organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to 
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the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only preferences leading to 
actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive 
neurosciences when including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. 
Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, 
development and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the 
axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can 
enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving clear descriptions of how they 
work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive 
psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them fa2st1er and 
more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities 
which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of behavior 
which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and require 
consciousness, will and self, and in normal human adults nearly all except perceptions and 
some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to 
relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or 
Bayesian utility maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This occurs via 
dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire Independent Reasons for 
Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes 
Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the 
world via public acts (muscle movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, 
sports etc. The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911, and with 
refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree 
of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 
1 p895 cf. Z p464. Much of intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As 
W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates 
(functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be 
useful. 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the 
dispositional verb “thinking“)—non-rational without awareness and rational with partial 
awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2. It is useful to 
regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental 
phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, 
hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or 
mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions 
of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act or event such as in speech, 
writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have 
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information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, 
for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2. Developing 
language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced humans to substitute words 
(fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for acts (gross contractions of arm and leg 
muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called UA- Understanding of Agency (my 
term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary 
Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of 
consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting 
muscles— i.e., Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and Knowing. Thus, 
“propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the 
slow deliberative functioning of System 2) or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of 
frequently practiced System 2 functions of speech and action into automatic fast functions). 
We see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by 
studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we already know, 
because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ 
that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string 
theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is compose2d1of atoms which 
“obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As 
W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. Language 
(mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social 
interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely 
confusing when we try to analyze it. This has been explained frequently by Hacker, DMS 
and many others. 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences have multiple 
uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I believe 
and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense first person use of inclinational 
verbs such as “I believe” normally describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on 
knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my 
mental state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my review of the 
book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth but makes 
itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, 
disposition verbs used in first person present tense can be causally self-reflexive--they 
instantiate themselves but then they are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past 
or future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain 
or can be resolved by information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are 
or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from 
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subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are 
potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information 
(or misinformation). 
Non-reflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent (which I call 
S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by 
Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non- 
Propositional (Non- Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or abilities) 
of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle to be Mental 
States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal 
language our prior intentions are the conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, 
type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called 
Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal- 
Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
Thus when Searle introduces some terminology on p6 of STATA we see that VisExp (it is 
raining) is S1 while Bel (it is raining) or Assert(it is raining) is S2. 
We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior (human nature 
or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the bedrock or background and 
reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which S calls the logical structure of rationality 
and I call the descriptive psychology of Higher Order Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue 
from W, the study of the language describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s 
comments on philosophical aspects of human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into 
the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which illuminate the use of language. If 
not, then showing how they have been bewitched by language dispels the confusion. As 
Horwich has noted on the last page of his superb ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my 
review): “What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no 
depths have been plumbed in consolation; 2n1othing has been explained or discovered or 
reconceived. 
How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the 
virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough.” 
Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say “describing”) 
and S states that the logical structure of rationality constitutes various theories, and there is 
no harm in it, provided one realizes they are comprised of a series of examples that let us 
get a general idea of how language (the mind) works and that as his “theories” are 
explicated via examples they become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. 
“A rose by any other name...” When there is a question one has to go back to the examples 
or consider new ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and context 
sensitive (W being the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly unlike 
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physics where one can often derive a formula and dispense with the need for further 
examples. Scientism (the use of scientific language and the causal framework) leads us 
astray in describing HOT. “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.”(BBB p18). Unlike so many others, S has largely avoided and often demolished 
scientism, but there is a residue which evinces itself when he remarks in various writings 
that we can understand consciousness by studying the brain or that he is prepared to give 
up causality, will or mind. W made it abundantly clear that such words are the hinges or 
basic language games and giving them up or even changing them is not a coherent concept. 
As noted in my other reviews, I think the residue of scientism results from the major tragedy 
of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his failure to take the later W 
seriously enough (W died a few years before S went to England to study). 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that 
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. - 
-- Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is connected, I 
believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty 
is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and 
do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” 
BBB p125 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that `will', `self' 
and ` consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the reptilian subcortical System One 
(S1) composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes, and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so 
wonderfully clear, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only 
axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to contribute that other 
students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s above remark on science envy, I 
will quote from P.M.S Hacker (long the leading expert on W) who gives a good start on it 
and a counterblast to scientism. 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further 
condition…, or whether knowledge does not even im2p1ly belief ...What needs to be 
clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways 
in which the various concepts hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and 
incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of 
context dependency. To this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
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psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
 
Before remarking further on ‘STATA’ I will first offer some essential comments on 
philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in 
the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of 
S’s PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the Social World (MSW) and W’s BBB 
(Blue and Brown Books), PI (Philosophical Investigations), OC (On Certainty), and other 
books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, 
not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the W/S framework. 
As noted in my other reviews, philosophical mistakes are of interest since they are the 
universal defaults of our psychology, due the fact that our language lacks perspicuity, as W 
first noted in the BBB (Blue and Brown Books) ¾ of a century ago. 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior 
(HOT) is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and 
other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work 
as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the 
later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into 
conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror 
neuron, true- only, non- propositional, pre-linguistic mental states- our perceptions and 
memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 
1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 
2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 
and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often 
counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which 
can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker 
etc.). 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other 
disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and 
"biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur 
without involving much of the intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference 
engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" --as W and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
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The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide 
array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships so well described by Searle. I 
expect this fairly well abstracts the basic structure of behavior as described in my other 
reviews. 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content (i.e. is representational) and is 
downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical 
Enactivism'), I would translate the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and 
ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are caused by 
the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified by S2 (‘free will’). 
We try to match how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should see that 
belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and 
other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) the Causally 
Self Reflexive (CSR) rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and 
neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) 
or remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, as they 
represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into 
each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations, 
so that our normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This 
vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does 
not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. One refers to 
the true- only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes (including basic speech) 
and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology which are Causally Self 
Reflexive(CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in W’s BBB), and the S2 use as disposition 
words (thinking, understanding, knowing etc.) which can be acted out, and which can 
become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
and are not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about 
processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know 
more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking 
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at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one we thought quite innocent). — And now the analogy which was to make us understand 
our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet 
unexplored medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And 
naturally we don’t want to deny them. W’s PI p308 21 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose 
that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a 
representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that 
has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can 
analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions 
of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, 
perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, 
and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to 
understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. 
However, since what S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 
and is in turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which S1 is able to become 
propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious activities of S2 must be able to 
become the conscious ones of S2. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because 
the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional 
in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was 
philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. It would 
e.g., mean that truth and falsity and the facts of the world could be decided without 
consciousness. As W stated often and showed so brilliantly in his last book On Certainly, 
life must be based on certainty-- automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that 
always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die--no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
Another crucial notion clarified by S is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to 
our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent 
Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that 
serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely 
related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The 
 resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate 
desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are 
very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope 
wish to help the poor because it is “right” but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain 
chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. Evolution by 
inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which 
often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 which generates endless cultural 
extensions, and which produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body 
and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of  the  brain.  
The overall cognitive illusion (called by Searle ` The Phe2n2omenological Illusion', by Pinker 
`The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science  Model')  is 
that S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and  
in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this 
view is not credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public truth 
conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' 
going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the 
vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms 
(p132 Budd-Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that wish and 
fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and 
reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here that 
`grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings 
against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher order 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find—beyond even Searle. 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. 
It is the last interpretation” W’s BBB p34 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes that there 
is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition 
of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which means to speak or write a 
well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act 
and not a mental state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds 
he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what 
gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence 
W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without any 
further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question 
whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have 
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been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long 
for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know." 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He dissects 
hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and 
reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the 
nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a 
breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. 
Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view 
is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes 
sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
W recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to 
all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not 
to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop 
trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” 
(e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is essential to 
understanding W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal Sharrock (DMS) but as far as I know 
nobody else, points out). 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot 
be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the consequences of an S1 
‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and 
elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and 
other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get 
a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false 
propositions. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ 
of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching 
an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts (i.e., philosophy, psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, literature etc.) and with rare exceptions there is barely a mention. 
It should be obvious from the above that the issues are always about mistakes in language 
used to describe our universal innate psychology and there is no useful sense in which there 
can be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. Such views can exist of 
philosophy in the other sense but that is not what philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me 
what any interesting and substantive philosophy) is about. As often occurs, S’s discussion 
is marred by his failure to carry his understanding of W’s “background” to its logical 
conclusion and so he suggests (as he has frequently) that he might have to give up the 
concept of free will, which I find (with W) incoherent. Not that we ought not to give it up 
but there is no sense that can be made of such a suggestion anymore that one can give up 
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running, desiring, intending, hoping etc. Likewise, nobody can give arguments for the 
background (i.e., our axiomatic psychology), as our being able to talk or to live at all 
presupposes it (as W noted frequently). Yes, it’s also true that “reduction” along with 
“monism”, “reality”, etc., are complex language games and they do not carry meaning along 
in little backpacks! One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how 
another usage (context) differs. The 20,000 pages of W’s nachlass are hands down the best 
lesson on how this has to be done. 
One needs to remember that dispositions (e.g., thinking, knowing) that state a COS are 
thereby true or false and a function of S2 (as opposed to S1 which are true only). And the 
“radical underdetermination of meaning” aka “the combinatorial explosion” was first 
solved by W who noted that S1 can be true only. 
In another recent volume, S comments “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic 
practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our 
representations”, to which I would add “Our life shows a world that does not depend on 
our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
Now that we have a framework, we can consider Searle’s comments on the nature of 
perception. 
 
As one expects from any philosophy, we are in deep trouble immediately, for on page 4 we 
have the terms ‘perception’ and ‘object’ as though they we2re2used is some normal sense 
but we are doing philosophy so we are going to be undulating back and forth between 
language games have no chance of keeping our day to day games distinct from the various 
philosophical ones. Again, you can read some of Neuroscience and Philosophy’ or 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ to get a feel for this. Also, a quick review of 
the table of Intentionality above will place his terms, ‘causally self-reflexive’ etc. in context. 
Sadly, like nearly all philosophers, Searle (S) has not adopted the two systems framework, 
so it’s much harder to keep things straight. 
So on p6, Believing and Asserting are part of system 2 which is linguistic, deliberative, slow, 
with no precise time of occurrence and ‘it is raining’ is their public Condition of Satisfaction 
(COS2) (Wittgenstein’s transitive) –i.e., it is propositional and representational and not a 
mental state and we can only intelligibly describe it in terms of reasons , while Visual 
Experience (VisExp) is system 1 and so requires (for intelligibility, for sanity) that it be 
raining (it’s COS1) and has a determinate time of occurrence, is fast (typically under 
500msec ), non-testable (Wittgenstein’s true-only), and nonpublic, automatic and not 
linguistic i.e., not propositional and presentational and only describable in terms of causes 
of a mental state. In spite of this on p7 after crushing the horrific (but still quite popular) 
term ‘propositional attitude’, he says that perception has propositional content, but I agree 
with W that S1 is true-only and hence cannot be propositional in anything like the sense of 
S2 where propositions are public statements (COS) that are true or false. 
47 209  
On p12 keep in mind that he is describing the automaticity of System 1 (S1), and then he 
notes that to describe the world we can only repeat the description which W noted as 
showing the limits of language. The last sentence on to the end of the paragraph middle of 
p13 needs translating (like most of philosophy!) so for “The subjective experience has a 
content, which philosophers call an intentional content and the specification of the 
intentional content is the same as the description of the state of affairs that the intentional 
content presents you with etc.” I would say ‘Perceptions are System 1 mental states that can 
only be described in the public language of System 2.” And when he ends by noting again 
the equivalence of a description of believing with that of a description of our perception, he 
is repeating what W noted long ago and which is due to the fact that S1 is nonlinguistic and 
that describing, believing, knowing, expecting, etc. are all different psychological or 
intentional modes or language games played with the same words. 
On p23 he refers to private ‘experiences’ but words are S2 and describe public events, so 
what warrants our use of the word for ‘private’ S1 ‘experiences’ can only be their public 
manifestations—i.e., language we all use to describe public acts as even for myself I cannot 
have any way to attach language to something internal. This is of course W’s argument 
against the possibility of a private language. He also mentions several times that 
hallucinations of X are the same as seeing X but what can be the test for this except that we 
are inclined to use the same words? In this case, they are the same by definition so this 
argument rings hollow. 
On p33 his ‘basic forms’ of intentionality are S1 while the ‘derivative forms’ are S2 and the 
two modes ‘seeing’ and ‘thinking’ as used here are S1 and S2 but the universal problem is 
that these words can be used for either S1 or S2 and nobody keeps them distinct. 
On p35 top he again correctly attacks the use of ‘propositional attitude’ which is not an 
attitude to a sentence but an attitude (disposition) to its 22 ic COS, i.e., to the fact or truth 
maker. Then he says “For example, if I see a man in front of me, the content is that there is 
a man in front of me. The object is the man himself. If I am having a corresponding 
hallucination, the perceptual experience has a content, but no object. The content can be 
exactly the same in the two cases, but the presence of a content does not imply the presence 
of an object.” The way I see this is that the ‘object’ is normally in the world and creates the 
mental state (S1) and if we put this in words it becomes S2 with COS2 (i.e., a public truth 
maker) and this does entail the public object, but for an hallucination (or direct brain 
stimulation etc.) the ‘object’ is only the similar mental state resulting from brain activation. 
On p37 as usual in describing human behavior it seems to me very useful to try to keep S1 
and S2 separated so here we can refer to the perception of something as P1 but when we 
describe it we can refer to the perception as P2. 
As W showed us, the big mistake is not just about understanding perception but not 
understanding language—all the problems of philosophy proper are exactly the same— 
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failure to look carefully at how the language works in a particular context so as to yield clear 
COS. 
On p53 what exactly is the test (COS2) that shows that the cause of or mental state of an 
hallucination is the ‘same’ as that when there is no hallucination? Even if we ‘see’ our long 
dead mother, with a few possible rare exceptions of insanity, brain damage etc., we know 
it’s not her—i.e., it’s false and we take the failure to distinguish the two as a sign of illness. 
So, the COS2 in hallucination is only that we feel as if she were present, though we (normally) 
know it cannot be, while the COS2 when she was alive is that we can confirm by a public 
test it is her. But he is correct that there is a more or less common percept in the two cases 
so that the presentation or COS1 is similar and conceivably could sometimes be as identical 
as any two mental states, thoughts, feelings etc. ever get—i.e., not very. 
On p59 I believe that the argument from transparency originated with W. "The limit of 
language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds to (is the 
translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." (Wittgenstein CV p10). 
At the bottom of the page, once again the presentation is S1 and the description or 
representation is S2. 
Middle of p61 we see the confusions that arise here and everywhere when we fail to keep 
S1 and S2 separate. Either we must not refer to representations in S1 or we must at least call 
them R1 and realize they have no public COS—i.e., no COS2. 
On p63 nondetachability only means that it is a caused automatic function of S1 and not a 
reasoned, voluntary function of S2. This discussion continues onto the next page, but of 
course is relevant to the whole book and to all of philosophy, and it is so unfortunate that 
Searle, and nearly all in the behavioral sciences, cannot get into the 21st century and use the 
two systems terminology which renders so many opaque issues very clear. Likewise, with 
the failure to grasp that it’s always just a matter of whether it’s a scientific issue or a 
philosophical one and if philosophical then which language game is going to be played and 
what the COS are in the context in question. 
On p64 he says the ‘experience’ is in his head but that is just the issue—as W made so clear 
there is no private language and as Bennett and Hack2e2r take the whole neuroscience 
community to task for, in normal use ‘experience’ can only be a public phenomenon for 
which we share criteria, but what is the test for my having an experience in my head? At the 
least, there is an ambiguity here which will lead to others. Many think these don’t matter, 
many think they do. Something happens in the brain but that’s a scientific 
neurophysiological issue and certainly by ‘experience’ or by ‘I saw a rabbit’ one never means 
the neurophysiology. Clearly this is not a matter for investigation but one of using words 
intelligibly. 
On p65 indexical, nondetachable, and presentational are just more philosophical jargon 
used instead of System 1 by people who have not adopted the two systems framework for 
describing behavior (i.e., nearly everyone). Likewise, for the following pages if we realize 
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that ‘objects and states of affairs’, ‘visual experiences’, ‘fully determinate’ etc., are just 
language games where we have to decide what the COS are and that if we just keep in mind 
the properties of S1 and S2 all of this becomes quite clear and Searle and everyone else could 
stop ‘struggling to express’ it. Thus (p69) ‘reality is determinate’ only means that 
perceptions are S1 and so mental states, here and now, automatic, causal, untestable (true- 
only) etc. while beliefs, like all dispositions are S2 and so not mental states, do not have a 
definite time, have reasons and not causes, are testable with COS etc. On p70 he notes that 
intentions in action of perception (IA1 in my terms) are part of the reflexive acts of S1 (A1 
in my terms) which may originate in S2 acts which have become reflexive (S2A in my 
terminology). 
On the bottom of p74 onto p75, 500 msec is often taken as the approximate dividing line 
between seeing (S1) and seeing as (S2) which means S1 passes the percept to higher cortical 
centers of S2 where they can be deliberated upon and expressed in language. 
Regarding p100, see W’s ‘On Certainty’ and DMS’s papers and books on it or just my brief 
analysis of their efforts in my LSR paper. On p101 we can usually substitute COS for ‘truth 
conditions’. 
On p100-101 the ‘subjective visual field’ is S2 and ‘objective visual field’ is S1 and ‘nothing 
is seen’ in S2 means we don’t play the language game of seeing in the same sense as for S1 
and indeed philosophy and a good chunk of science (e.g., physics) would be different if 
people had realized they were playing language games and not doing science. 
On p107 ‘perception is transparent’ because language is S2 and S1 has no language as it’s 
automatic and reflexive so when saying what I saw or to describe what I saw I can only say 
“I saw a cat”. Once again W pointed this out long ago as showing the limits of language. 
On p108 we can say that deliberate acts (A2) always must happen by activating S1 just as 
must reflexive acts (A1). On p109 we might rephrase ‘…whenever you consciously perceive 
anything, you take the cause of your perceptual experience to be its object’ as ‘perceptions, 
like all functions of S1 are nontestable’. 
P110 middle needs to be translated from SearleSpeak into TwoSystemsSpeak so that 
“Because presentational visual intentionality is a subspecies of representation, and because 
all representation is under aspects, the visual presentations will always present their 
conditions of satisfaction under some aspects and not others.” becomes “Because 2th2e 
percepts of S1 present their data to S2, which has public COS, we can speak of S1 as though 
it also has public COS”. On p111 the ‘condition’ refers to the public COS of S2, i.e., the events 
which make the statement true or false and ‘lower order’ and ‘higher order’ refer to S1 and 
S2. On p112 the basic action and basic perception are isomorphic because S1 feeds its data 
to S2, which can only generate actions by feeding back to S1 to contract muscles, and lower 
level perception and higher level perception can only be described in the same terms due to 
there being only one language to describe S1 and S2. On p117 bottom it would be much less 
mysterious if he would adopt the two systems framework so that instead of “internal 
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connection” with conditions of satisfaction (my COS1), a perception would just be noted as 
the automaticity of S1 which causes a mental state. 
 
On p118 if W did commit the Bad Argument it was in the TLP and not his later work, and 
in any case the ‘fact’ is the COS (the representation) or the truthmaker of S2 stated by a 
sentence which is just the right description. 
On p120 the point is that ‘causal chains’ have no explanatory power because the language 
games of ‘cause’ only make sense in S1 or other non-psychological phenomena of nature, 
whereas semantics is S2 and we can only intelligibly speak of reasons for higher order 
human behavior. One way this manifests is ‘meaning is not in the head’ which enmeshes us 
in other language games. 
On p121 to say it’s essential to a perception (S1) that it has COS1 (‘the experience’) merely 
describes the conditions of the language game of perception—it is an automatic causal 
mental state. 
On p 122 I think “First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective world is for it 
to be capable of causing ontologically subjective visual experiences like this.” is not coherent 
as there is nothing to which we can refer ‘this’ so it should be stated as “First, for something 
to be red is just for it to incline me to call it ‘red’”—as usual, the jargon does not help at all 
and the rest of the paragraph is unnecessary as well. 
On p123 the ‘background disposition” is the automatic, causal, mental state of S1 and as I, 
in agreement with W, DMS and others have said many times these cannot intelligibly be 
called ‘presuppositions’ as they are unconsciously activated ‘hinges’ that are the basis for 
presuppositions. 
Section VII and VIII (or the whole book or most of higher order behavior or most of 
philosophy in the narrow sense) could be titled “The language games describing the 
interaction of the causal, automatic, nonlinguistic transient mental states of S1 with the 
reasoned, conscious, persistent linguistic thinking of S2” and the background is not 
suppositional nor can it be taken for granted but it is our axiomatic true-only psychology 
(the ‘hinges” or ‘ways of acting’ of W’s ‘On Certainty’) that underlie all suppositions. As is 
evident from my comments I think the whole section, lacking the two systems framework 
and W’s insights in OC is confused in supposing it presents an “explanation” of perception 
where it can at best only describe how the language of perception works in various contexts. 
We can only describe how the word ‘red’ is used and that’s the end of it and for the last 
sentence of this section we might say that for something to be a ‘red apple’ is only for it to 
normally result in the same words being used by everyone. 
Speaking of hinges, it is sad and a bit strange that Searle has not incorporated what many 
(e.g., DMS an eminent contemporary philosopher and leading W expert) regard as maybe 
the greatest discovery in modern philosophy— W’s revolutionizing of epistemology in his 
‘On Certainty’ as nobody can do philosophy or psychology in the old way anymore without 
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looking antiquated. And though Searle almost entirely ignored ‘On Certainty’ his whole 
career, in 2009 (i.e., 6 years before publication of this book) he spoke at a symposium on it 
held by the British Wittgenstein Society and hosted by DMS, so he is certainly aware of the 
view that has revolutionized the very topics he is discussing here. I don’t think this meeting 
was published, but his lecture can be downloaded from Vimeo. It seems to be a case of an 
old dog who can’t learn new tricks. Though he has probably pioneered more new territory 
in the descriptive psychology of higher order behavior than anyone since Wittgenstein, once 
he has learned a path he tends to stay on it, as we all do. Like everyone, he uses the French 
word repertoire when there is an easier to pronounce and spell English word ‘repertory’ and 
the awkward ‘he/she’ or reverse sexist ‘she’ when one can always use ‘they’ or ‘them’. In 
spite of their higher intelligence and education, academics are sheep too. 
Section IX to the end of the chapter shows again the very opaque and awkward language 
games one is forced into when trying to describe (not explain as W made clear) the 
properties of S1 (i.e., to play the language games used to describe ’primary qualities’) and 
how these feed data into S2 (i.e., secondary qualities’), which then has to feed back to S1 to 
generate actions. It also shows the errors one commits by failing to grasp Wittgenstein’s 
unique view of ‘hinge epistemology’ presented in “On Certainty”. To show how much 
clearer this is with the dual system terminology I would have to rewrite the whole chapter 
(and much of the book). Since I have rewritten sections here several times, and often in my 
reviews of Searle’s other books, I will only give a couple brief examples. 
The sentence on p129 “Reality is not dependent on experience, but conversely. The concept 
of the reality in question already involves the causal capacity to produce certain sorts of 
experiences. So the reason that these experiences present red objects is that the very fact of 
being a red object involves a capacity to produce this sort of experience. Being a straight line 
involves the capacity to produce this other sort of experience. The upshot is that organisms 
cannot have these experiences without it seeming to them that they are seeing a red object 
or a straight line, and that “seeming to them” marks the intrinsic intentionality of the 
perceptual experience.” Can be rendered as “S1 provides the input for S2 and the way we 
use the word ‘red’ mandates it’s COS in each context, so using these words in a particular 
way is what it means to see red. In the normal case, it does not ‘seem’ to us that we see red, 
we just see red and we use ‘seem to” to describe cases where we are in doubt.” 
On p130 “Our question now is: Is there an essential connection between the character of 
things in the world and the character of our experience?” can be translated as “Are our 
public language games (S2) useful (consistent) in the description of perception (S1)?” 
The first paragraph of Section X ‘The Backward Road’ is perhaps the most important one in 
the book, as it is critical for all of philosophy to understand that there cannot be a precise 
1:1 connection between or reduction of S2 to S1 due to the many ways of describing in 
language a given event (mental state, i.e., percept, memory etc.). Hence the apparent 
impossibility of capturing behavior in algorithms (the hopelessness of ‘strong AI’) or of 
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extrapolating from a given neuronal pattern in the brain to the multitudinous acts (language 
games) we use to describe it. The ‘Backward Road’ is the language (COS) 
of S2 used to describe S1. Again, I think his failure to use the two systems framework renders 
this quite confusing if not opaque. Of course, he shares this failing with nearly everyone. 
Searle has commented on this before and so have others (e.g., Hacker) but it seems to have 
escaped most philosophers and almost all scientists. 
Again, Searle misses the point in Sect XI and X12 –we do not and cannot ‘seem to see’ red 
or ‘seem’ to have a memory or ‘assume’ a relation between the experience and the word, 
but as with all the perceptions and memories that constitute the innate axiomatic true-only 
mental states of System 1, we just have the experience and “it” only becomes ‘red’ etc., when 
described in public language with this word in this context by System 2. We know it’s red 
as this is a hinge—an axiom of our psychology that is our automatic action and is the basis 
for assumptions or judgements or presuppositions and cannot intelligibly be judged, tested 
or altered. As W pointed out so many times, a mistake in S1 is of an entirely different kind 
than one in S2. No explanations are possible—we can only describe how it works and so 
there is no possibility of getting a nontrivial “explanation” of our psychology. As he always 
has, Searle makes the common and fatal mistake of thinking he understands behavior 
(language) better than Wittgenstein. After a decade reading W, S and many others I find 
that W’s ‘perspicuous examples’, aphorisms and trialogues usually provide greater 
illumination than the wordy disquisitions of anyone else. 
“We may not advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything hypothetical in our 
considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its 
place.” (PI 109). 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.” 
(PI 126) “In philosophy we do not draw conclusions” (PI 599) 
“If one tried to advance theses in philosophy it would not be possible to debate them, 
because everyone would agree to them” (PI 128) 
 
On p135, one way to describe perception is that the event or object causes a pattern of 
neuronal activation (mental state) whose self-reflexive COS1 is that we see a red rose in front 
of us, and in appropriate contexts for a normal English speaking person, this leads us to 
activate muscle contractions which produces the words ‘I see a red rose’ whose COS2 is that 
there is a red rose there. Or simply, S1 produces S2 in appropriate contexts. So on p136 we 
can say S1 leads to S2 which we express in this context by the word ‘smooth’ which describes 
(but never ‘explains’) how the language game of ‘smooth’ works in this context and we can 
translate “For basic actions and basic perceptions the intentional content is internally related 
to the conditions of satisfaction, even though it is characterized non-intentionalistically, 
because being the feature F perceived consists in the ability to cause experiences of that type. 
And in the case of action, experiences of that type consists in their ability to cause that sort 
of bodily movement.” as “Basic perceptions (S1) can lead automatically (internally) to basic 
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reflex actions (A1) (i.e., burning a finger leads to withdrawing the arm) which only then 
enters awareness so that it can be reflected upon and described in language (S2). 
On p150, the point is that inferring, like knowing, judging, thinking, is an S2 disposition 
expressed in language with public COS that are inform 22 nal (true or false) while percepts 
are non-informational (see my review of Hutto and Myin’s book) automated responses of 
S1 and there is no meaningful way to play a language game of inferring in S1. Trees and 
everything we see is S1 for a few hundred msec or so and then normally enter S2 where they 
get language attached (aspectual shape or seeing as). 
Regarding p151 et seq., it is sad that S, as part of his lack of attention to the later W, never 
seems to refer to what is probably the most penetrating analysis of color words in W’s 
“Remarks on Colour’, which is missing from nearly every discussion of the subject I have 
seen. The only issue is how do we play the game with color words and with ‘same’, 
‘different’, ‘experience ‘etc. in this public linguistic context (true or false statements—COS2) 
because there is no language and no meaning in a private one (S1). So, it does not matter 
what happens in the mental states of S1 but only what we say about them when they enter 
S2. It’s clear as day that all 7.6 billion on earth have a slightly different pattern of neural 
activation every time they see red and that there is no possibility for a perfect correlation 
between S1 and S2. As I noted above it is absolutely critical for every philosopher and 
scientist to get this clear. 
Regarding the brain in a vat (p157), insofar as we disrupt or eliminate the normal relations 
of S1 and S2, we lose the language games of intentionality. The same applies to intelligent 
machines and W described this situation definitively over 80 years ago. 
"Only of a living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: 
it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” (PI 281) 
It is a sign of Wittgenstein’s unique genius that even though I have spent many years 
reading the best philosophers and psychologists of our times, I always have to resist the 
urge to throw the book down and go back to the master, and when I come to a quote from 
him it is like coming upon a glass of cold water while trudging through the desert. 
Chapter 6: Yes, disjunctivism (like nearly all philosophical theses) is incoherent and the fact 
that this and other absurdities flourish in his own department and even among some of his 
former students who got top marks in his Philosophy of Mind classes shows perhaps that, 
like most, he stopped too soon in his Wittgenstein studies. Also, we all start with default 
language use which is full of confusions or as W likes to say it is not ‘perspicuous’. 
On p188, yes veridical seeing and ‘knowing’ (i.e., K1) are the same since S1 is true-only- i.e., 
it is the fast, axiomatic, causally self-reflexive, automatic mental states which can only be 
described with the slow, deliberative public language games of S2. 
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On p204 -5 we are reminded that the first and maybe best refutation of mind as machine 
was given by W in the 30’s. Representation is always under an aspect since, like thinking, 
knowing etc., it is a disposition of S2 with public COS, which is infinitely variable. 
Once again, I think the use of the two system2s2framework greatly simplifies the discussion. 
If one insists to use ‘representation’ for ‘presentations’ of S1 then one should say that R1 
have COS1 which are transient neurophysiological mental states, and so totally different 
from R2, which have COS2 (aspectual shapes) that are public, linguistically expressible 
states of affairs, and the notion of unconscious mental states is illegitimate since such 
language games lack any clear sense. 
Discussions of blind sight (p209), like those of split brains (commissurotomy) and so much 
else in cognitive science are typically incoherent due to the fact that the phenomena are new 
and the usual language games are not applied in a clear and consistent way. Bennett and 
Hacker, among others, give some excellent discussions of this. Sadly, on p211 Searle for 
maybe the tenth time in his writings (and endlessly in his lectures) says that ‘free will’ may 
be illusory, but as W from the 30’s on noted, one cannot coherently deny or judge the ‘hinges’ 
such as our having choice, nor that we see, hear, sleep, have hands etc., as these words 
express the true-only axioms of our psychology, our automatic behaviors that are the basis 
for action. Libet’s famous experiments have been debunked in various ways by 
philosophers (e.g., Searle) and psychologists (e.g., Kihlstrom) and by other experiments. 
On p214 the reflexes referred to are the formerly deliberative conscious actions of S2 which 
have become automated and part of S1 which I call S2A (automated) as distinct from S2D 
or those which remain deliberative and conscious. 
On p219 bottom and 222 top—it was W in his work, culminating in ‘On Certainty’ who 
pointed out that behavior cannot have an evidentiary basis and that its foundation is our 
animal certainty or way of behaving that is basis of doubt and certainty and cannot be 
doubted (the hinges of S1). He also noted many times that a ‘mistake’ in our basic 
perceptions (S1) which has no public COS and cannot be tested (unlike those of S2), if it is 
major or persists, leads not to further testing but to insanity. 
P222 section II brings us again to the definitive statement on this foundational issue which 
W addressed in ‘On Certainty’. Searle makes further comments in the 5th of his audiotaped 
lectures on the Philosophy of Society (see YouTube). 
Phenomenalism p227 top: See my extensive comments on Searle’s excellent essay ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ in my review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’. There is not 
even any warrant for referring to one’s private experiences as ‘phenomena’, ‘seeing’ or 
anything else. As W famously showed us, language can only be a public testable activity (no 
private language). And on p230 the problem is not that the ‘theory’ ‘seems’ to be inadequate, 
but that (like most if not all philosophical theories) it is incoherent. It uses language that has 
no clear COS. As W insisted, all we can do is describe—it is the scientists who can make 
theories. 
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P233. The most basic of the primary qualities or axioms of our psychology are time, space, 
event, object etc., which following W, we can call the basic hinges, but it does not seem clear 
how to distinguish these from color, shape, size etc. See the excellent recent papers and 
books of DMS on this. 
The bottom line is that this is classic Searle—superb and probably at least as good as anyone 
else can produce, but lacking understanding of the fundamental insights of the later 
Wittgenstein, and with no grasp of the two systems of thought framework, which could 
have made it brilliant 
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Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul 
Horwich 248p (2013) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my 
view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many 
others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one 
could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order 
thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, 
literature, society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a 
sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a 
few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary 
to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. 
First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W 
remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can 
step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a 
profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last  
4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” 
etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. Likewise, the use of the French 
word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is 
the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful 
and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. 
This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially in footnotes 2- 
7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, 
propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the 
outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). 
Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the 
import of W’s anti-theoretical stance on p65. He needs to give more emphasis to ‘On 
Certainty’, recently the subject of much effort by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva and others 
and summarized in my recent articles. 
 
 
Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) 
will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, 
Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. 
Most of their papers are on academia.edu and philpapers.org, but for PMS Hacker see 
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
He gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of Wittgenstein 
leaves us that I have ever seen. 
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“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Frege’s 
reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) 
as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized 
forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s 
error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response 
to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of 
questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center 
of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but 
scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest 
intellectual adventures possible. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my 
view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many 
others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don’t see how one 
could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order 
thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, 
literature, society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a 
sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. 
I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum 
considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young 
science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. 
(Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there 
are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual 
 confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method 
pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds 
to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein 
CV p10 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with 
its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For 
now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, 
which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” BBB p37 
“Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are obviously not 
aware of the many different usages of the word “proof; and that they are not clear about the 
differences between the uses of the word “kind”, when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds 
of proof, as though the word “kind” here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of 
apples.” Or, we may say, they are not aware of the different meanings of the word 
“discovery” when in one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon 
and in the other case of the discovery of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an 
outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive psychologists. In 
considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy is the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought (DPHOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are 
totally overlooked –i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: “Wittgenstein resolved 
many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed 
for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about 
the relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self- 
knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of 
mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of logic and 
language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of 
psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics 
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and mathematical truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed 
us a vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual 
confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker-- 'Gordon Baker's late 
interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively describe the two 
systems of thought -- fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective linguistic 
dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a vast inherited 
background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will 
(choice), consciousness, self, time and space are innate true-only axioms. He discussed many 
times what is now known as Theory of Mind, Framing and cognitive illusions. He frequently 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it generates 
behavior. He described the psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a 
fundamental measure used in EP research decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature 
of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. He examined in thousands of 
pages and hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not describable in 
language, this being possible only for public behavior with a public language (the 
impossibility of private language). Thus, he can be viewed as the first evolutionary 
psychologist. 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to Cambridge 
Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like him). “Not offering the 
chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of physics to 
Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, 
he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the 
same part of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a 
suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early 
version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; 
completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and 
knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional 
lectures and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly 
handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, 
no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that he wrote in a Socratic style with 3 
distinct persons in the dialog (actually his writings should be called trialogues, though I 
seem to be the only one to use this term)—the narrator, the interlocutor and the 
commentator (usually W’s view) whose comments were blended together by most readers, 
thus completely vitiating the whole elucidatory and therapeutic thrust, that these were cut 
and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, under 
linings and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and 
struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which 
were conveying utterly novel views of how the universe works and that they then published 
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this material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that 
contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as 
famous due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense, 
and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of 
thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which 
he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract 
and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then 
virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the 
diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous references to him, 
and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over half a century after his death, 
there were only a handful of people who really grasped the monumental consequences of 
what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle 
(S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in 
a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and 
about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior not found in 
psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. A major theme in all discussion 
of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms from 
the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only 
fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but 
the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how it is based 
on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional 
propositional thinking of S2. 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror 
neuron, true-only, non-propositional, prelinguistic mental states- our perceptions and 
memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 
1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 
2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 
and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often 
counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which 
can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker 
etc.). 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To 
think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because 
it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
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“The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can 
more complicated forms develop. Language--I want to say--is a refinement. ‘In the 
beginning was the deed.’” CV p31 
“Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ meant- so that he 
constantly called different things by that name-but nevertheless used the word in a way 
fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of the word ‘pain’-in short he used 
it as we all do.” PI p271 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. 
Is is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of  general  disease  of thinking which  always  looks  for (and  finds) what 
would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is 
labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no act of insight 
which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that “something must make 
us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion between cause and reason. We 
need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but 
graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct 
perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my 
hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential (CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), 
and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which 
can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) and are not CSR (called transitive in BBB). 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of perceptions 
and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) 
their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for 
judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal 
actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified into 
the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is 
via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the 
brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker 
`The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that 
S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
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control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public truth 
conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' 
going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the 
vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms 
(p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of 
the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as 
EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is 
about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as 
one can find. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes that there 
is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition 
of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which means to speak or write a 
well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act 
and not a mental state. 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have 
been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the 
whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image 
its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation 
(p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, 
he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops 
my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my 
wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? 
If I have learned to talk, then I do know." 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. He shows 
that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see “On Certainty” for his final 
extended treatment of this idea) and that our conscious ratiocination emerges from 
unconscious machinations. His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of 
animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The “must” is 
entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there 
is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all 
higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in 
humans this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) 
that evolved to manipulate others. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider 
W’s work and most of his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking 
(e.g., perceptions vs dispositions-- see below), but nature and nurture. 
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“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions.” PI 126 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between 
it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of 
investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, that we 
can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the matter is that we 
have already got everything, and that we have got it actually present; we need not wait for 
anything. We make our moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and 
this grammar is already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for 
the future.” (said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) 
p183 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that 
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! ….This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” 
BBB p125 
 
“For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that 
the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” PI p133 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the Top Down 
analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of examples of language use 
in context, exposing the many varieties of language games and the relationships between 
the primary games of true-only unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory 
and reflexive emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical 
reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional 
conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false 
propositional secondary language games of slow thinking that include the network of 
cognitive illusions that constitute the basis of our second-self personality. He dissects 
hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and 
reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the 
nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a 
breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. 
Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view 
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is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes 
sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature”) that language is a window on or some sort of 
translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other “Language of 
Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds 
of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is not 
just the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, but speech is 
the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected 
the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology and 
computation (Computational Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, 
functionalism, etc.) could reveal what his analyses of Language Games (LG’s) did. The 
difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture 
vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of representing 
vagueness” LWPP1, 347). 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to 
all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not 
to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop 
trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” 
(e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is essential to 
understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but as far as I know nobody else, points out). 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does 
not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose 
that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a 
representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that 
has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can 
analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions 
of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
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“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.” TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems 
of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this 
itself is the answer.” TLP 6.52 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. 
If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the 
most important facts.” Z 220 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot 
be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the consequences of an S1 
‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and 
elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and 
other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get 
a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false 
propositions. 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics 
(e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like “cognitive illusions”, 
“priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course these too are language games, 
so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions 
will vary from “pure” System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 
thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network 
of “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”,“intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, 
“cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP). One of 
W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UA (Understanding of Agency). Ian Apperly, 
who is carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 in experiments, has recently become aware of 
Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation involved 
in UA1--that being reserved for UA2— see my review of his book with Myin). However, 
like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. 
It is an easily defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, 
automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible 
from W. In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and 
even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly there is 
barely a mention. 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that 
results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a 
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much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits 
usefulness. 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the 
Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought 
(DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has 
no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truth makers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truth makers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is 
only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes 
on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared 
with this one. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle 
and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) 
which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and generally happening 
in less than 500msec, while System 2 are abilities to perform slow deliberative actions tha t 
are represented in consciousness (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but 
frequently repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is 
a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness. 
Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term 
memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather 
than T or F. 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically connected. E.G., 
Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be True only, will describe 
a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are 
causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have 
a precise duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special 
quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and working memory, 
are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have 
public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words cannot precisely match the actual 
complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of 
contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher 
order behavior to a system of laws which would have to state all the possible contexts – 
hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make 
complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events (perceptions, 
memory, reflexive actions and some Primary or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 
 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, 
intransitive, informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location) and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical S2 with the further ability to describe 
displacements in space and time (conditionals, hypotheticals or fictionals) of potential 
events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions -the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of 
System 2 slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public 
Conditions of Satisfaction- Searle’s term for truth makers or meaning which I divide into 
COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational—which I again divide into 
R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) ,true or false propositional attitudinal thinking, with 
all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences 
are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive 
Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, 
Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W RPP2 148) while others are typical 
S1— fast and automatic to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person 
statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person 
statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and 
memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed 
“inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” 
since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W 
and by Searle (e.g., cf. Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer 
independent public representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space 
while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are 
always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance 
in vertebrate psychology after System 1— the ability to represent events and to think of 
them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ are potential or 
unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45- 66 (1991). 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or primary 
LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO TESTS possible so 
they can be True Only. 
 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and 
must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, 
think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ and Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). Note well that 
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Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in other 
ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism 
(Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a 
unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was 
extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table in his classic book 
Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of 
evolutionary psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully 
laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone 
of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or 
Higher Order Thought, and in my view the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive 
actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be 
described in PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits the world (is Causally Self 
Referential--Searle) --the unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over 
which no control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow 
thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind 
tries to fit the world. 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) 
arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The 
Phenomenological Illusion— TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it with 
unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout 
his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of current 
research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match 
the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act 
(Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to match the 
world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. Disposition 
words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as 
verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or might act - ‘I think that…) and 
are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and 
our innate programs (cognitive modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to 
produce Dispositions — (believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or 
potential PUBLIC ACTS (language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) 
of PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or mind). 
Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public psychology. 
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PERCEPTIONS: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature 
Memories: Remembering, Dreaming? 
PREFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL(True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, Judging, Thinking, 
Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing 
(including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, 
Intending, Considering, Desiring, expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), 
Seeing As (Aspects), 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - Dreaming, 
Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. Their 
function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected maximum utility) 
by facilitating information processing of perceptions and memories for rapid action. There 
is some separation between S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, 
disgust and anger. 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): Longing, 
Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do INTENTIONS: (I will 
make “X” True) Intending 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, Laughing, 
Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting(describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), 
Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs –these are Public 
and Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior. 
WORDS EXPRESS POTENTIAL ACTIONS HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR 
LIFE AND ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules— roughly equivalent 
to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which 
lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken 
to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is 
the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including 
neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be 
regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules which 
produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development and individual action 
with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) 
of our psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding by giving clear 
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descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, 
philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus 
making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as 
conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of behavior 
which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and require 
consciousness, will and self and in normal human adults nearly all except perceptions and 
some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to 
relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility--Bayesian 
utility maximization but Bayesianism is highly questionable) via dominance and reciprocal 
altruism (Desire Independent Reasons for Action-Searle- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and impose Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction - 
Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, 
language, art, music, sex, sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by our greatest 
natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle 
beginning in the 1960’s. 
“The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of 
the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (i.e., of our language games) 
admits of degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All 
our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as 
they must to be useful. There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or 
ways of using the dispositional verb “thinking“)— nonrational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness (W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and 
S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 
p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, 
lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, 
thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) lacks 
any test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information until 
it becomes a public act in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions 
and memories can have information (meaning- i.e., a public COS) only when they are 
manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning 
(consequences) even for ourselves. 
(Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon). Developing language means 
manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. TOM (Theory of Mind) is much 
better called UA-Understanding of Agency – my term-and UA1 and UA2 for such functions 
in S1 and S2) –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate 
genetically programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to 
intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles. Thus, “propositional attitude” is a 
confusing term for normal intuitive rational S2D or nonrational automated S2A speech and 
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action. We see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by 
studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the MIND 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the BRAIN works) than we already know, 
because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any phenomena that 
are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string 
theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which 
“obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As 
W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. Language 
(mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social 
interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. It’s grammar 
(i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely 
confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences have multiple uses depending 
on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed 
or I believe and he believes. The present tense first person expressive use of inclinational 
verbs such as “I believe” describe my ability to predict my probable acts and are not 
descriptive of my mental state nor based on knowledge or information in the usual sense of 
those words (W). It does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it -- 
i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person 
present tense are causally self-referential--they instantiate themselves, but as descriptions 
of possible states they are not testable (i.e., not T or F). However past or future tense or third 
person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain information that is true 
or false as they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe 
it’s raining” has no information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe 
it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in 
spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent (which I call 
S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by 
Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non- 
Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or abilities) 
of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle to be Mental 
States and hence S1 but again I think one must separate PI1 and PI2, since in our normal 
language our prior intentions are the conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, 
type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called 
Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON -Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal- 
Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
Now for some comments on Horwich’s “Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy”. After the above 
and my many reviews of books by and about W, S, Hacker, DMS etc., it should be clear what 
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W is doing and what a contemporary account of behavior should include, so I’ll make just 
a few comments. 
 
First, one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W 
remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can 
step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a 
profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last  
4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” 
etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. The major deficiency is the 
complete failure (though nearly universal except for my work) to employ what I see as the 
hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I 
have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. 
(especially in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework 
of automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better 
view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). 
Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the 
import of W’s antitheoretical stance on p65. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Frege’s 
reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) 
as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized 
forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s 
error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response 
to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of 
questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
For me, the high points of all writing on W are nearly always the quotes from the master 
himself and this is again true here. His quote (p101) from TLP shows W’s early grasp of EP 
which he later termed the ‘background’ or ‘bedrock’. 
“Thought is surrounded by a halo. Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori 
order of the world: that is the order of possibilities, which must be common to both world 
and thought. But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, 
must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to 
affect it. It must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an 
abstraction; but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were, the hardest 
thing there is. (TLP # 5, 5563, PI 97).” 
There are many good points in the chapter on Kripke but some confusions as well. The 
discussion of W’s refutation of private language on p165-6 seems a bit unclear but on p 196- 
7 he states it again—and this notion is not only central to W but to all understanding of HOT. 
Stern has perhaps the best discussion of it I have seen in his “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
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Investigations”. Kripke, in spite of all the noise he made, is now generally understood to 
have totally misconstrued W, merely repeating the classic skeptical metaphysical blunders. 
 
Those who want to dig into ‘Kripkenstein’, or philosophy generally, should read “Kripke’s 
Conjuring Trick” by Read and Sharrock—a superb deconstruction of skepticism that, like 
most academic books and papers are now freely available on the net on libgen.is, b-ok.org, 
philpapers.org, academia.edu, arxiv.org and researchgate.net, among others. 
I find the chapter on consciousness very good, especially p190 et. seq. on private language, 
qualia, inverted spectra and the umpteenth refutation of the idea that W is a behaviorist.It 
is worth repeating his final remark. “What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery 
has been removed-- yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been 
explained or discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should 
be found satisfying enough.” 
Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) 
will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, 
Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. 
Most of their papers are on academia.edu but for PMS Hacker see 
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center 
of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but 
scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest 
intellectual adventures possible. 
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Another cartoon portrait of the mind from the 
reductionist metaphysicians--a review of Peter 
Carruthers ‘The Opacity of Mind’ (2011) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and 
computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. 
The study of behavior encompasses all of human life, but behavior is largely automatic and 
unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which 
Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework 
which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). After summarizing the framework worked 
out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as extended by modern reasoning research, I show the 
inadequacies in Carruthers’ views, which pervade most discussions of behavior, including 
contemporary behavioral sciences. I maintain that his book is an amalgam of two books, one 
a summary of cognitive psychology and the other a summary of the standard philosophical 
confusions on the mind with some new jargon added. I suggest that the latter should be 
regarded as incoherent or as a cartoon view of life and that taking Wittgenstein at his word, 
we can practice successful self-therapy by regarding the mind/body issue as a 
language/body issue. 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, 
Politics,and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), 
Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of John Searle (S) and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (W) (jointly WS) as I consider S the successor to W and one must study their 
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work together. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, 
PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these two geniuses, 
who provide a clear description of behavior that I will refer to as the WS framework. Given 
this framework, which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), it is possible to have clear 
descriptions of behavior, but it is entirely missing from nearly all such discussions. 
Even in the works of WS it is not laid out clearly and in virtually all others it is only hinted 
at, with the usual disastrous consequences. I will begin with some quotes from W and S. 
These quotes are not chosen at random but result from a decade of study and together they 
are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive psychologists. 
If one understands them, they penetrate as deeply as it is possible to go into the mind 
(largely coextensive with language as W made clear) and provide as much guidance as one 
needs—it is then just a matter of looking at how language works in each case and by far the 
best place to find perspicuously analyzed examples of language is in the 20,000 pages of 
Wittgenstein’s nachlass. 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young 
science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. 
(Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there 
are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual 
confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method 
pass one another by." Wittgenstein PI p.232 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of 
metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” Wittgenstein The Blue 
Book 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that 
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas 
the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. 
If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314 
 
"The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we 
thought quite innocent." Wittgenstein, PI para.308 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
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"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. 
If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the 
most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything. 
One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and 
inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not curiosities; 
however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted and which have only 
gone unremarked because they are always before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds 
to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence (this has to do 
with the Kantian solution to the problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the 
nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent's desires, 
values, attitudes and evaluations? ... The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it 
tries to pose Hume's guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of 
which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, 
are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations...the forms of the status 
function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic powers...to recognize 
something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action...these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action...The 
general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for action 
presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons for action." Searle 
PNC p34-49 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does 
not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions 
of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation 
to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of 
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satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
"So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by collective 
intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers...With the important exception 
of language itself, all of institutional reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization 
is created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations...all of human 
institutional reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that havethe 
same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech 
acts in the explicit form of Declarations." Searle MSW p11-13 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a 
pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the existence of the 
pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a physical system In sum, the 
fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that 
programs provide causal explanations of cognition There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." Searle 
Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science is at much 
too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of intrinsic 
intentionality. We are blinded to this difference by the fact that the same sentence `I see a 
car coming toward me,' can be used to record both the visual intentionality and the output 
of the computational model of vision in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, 
it is simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104- 
105 
"The   intentional    state    represents    its    conditions of   satisfaction    people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought. but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. 
Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is 
characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of 
satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by 
analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive capacities. It 
requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is essential for the use of 
language. At one level, the speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at 
another level the utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol 
itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it 
represents a type of a state of affairs" MSW p74" 
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...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because there is no 
way you can make explicit speech acts performed according to the conventions of a 
language without creating commitments. This is true not just for statements but for all 
speech acts" MSW p82"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper 
becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is 
an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking (e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions), but the logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
Searle's (S) work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social 
behavior which is due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while 
the later Wittgenstein (W) shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 
which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror 
neuron, true-only, non- propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and 
reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 -- Understanding of Agency 1-- and 
Emotions 1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 
2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 
and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be 
described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms 
of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W for many examples 
and Searle and Hacker ( 3 volumes on Human Nature) for disquisitions). 
One should take seriously W's comment that even if God could look into our mind he could 
not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of Cognitive Psychology. Yes, a 
cognitive psychologist of the future may be able to see what we are perceiving and 
remembering and our reflexive thinking and acting, since these S1 functions are always 
causal mental states (CMS) but S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS and so not realized 
or visible. This is not a theory but description of our language, mind, life, grammar (W). S, 
Carruthers 
 
(C) and others muddy the waters here because they sometimes refer to dispositions as 
mental states as well, but as W did long ago, S, Hacker and others show that the language 
of causality just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 descriptions-- again not a 
theory but a description of how our dispositional states (language, thinking) work. 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non- propositional, true 
only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms of reasons for 
actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are 
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or can become propositional (T or F). It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the 
mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--it is the default 
operation of our evolved psychology (EP) which seeks explanations in terms of what we can 
deliberately think through slowly (S2), rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly 
remain oblivious--called by S in PNC `The Phenomenological Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a 
harmless philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our biology which produces 
the illusion that we control our life and among the consequences are the inexorable collapse 
of what passes for civilization. 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of language 
games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as "dispositions" or 
"inclinations", which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the 
same sense as S1 states), and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. 
But disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W 
discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but 
graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true- only sentences resulting from direct 
perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my 
hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential (CSR)—i.e., to see a cat makes it true and in 
the normal case no test is possible, and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, 
which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')-- i.e., 
they have external, public, testable Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, 
economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so there will be more and 
less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or intentional 
action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", 
"inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", 
"background" or "bedrock" --as W and later Searle call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher 
cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which 
inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A 
huge advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions. 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide 
array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well 
describes the basic structure of behavior. 
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These descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 of MSW, which 
Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended one I have created. In my 
view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern psychological research by using my S1, 
S2, S3 terminology and W's true-only vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, 
CSR references S1 true-only perception, memory and prior intention (cause originates in the 
world), while S2 refers to propositional (true or false testable) dispositions such as belief and 
desire (cause originates in the mind). 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the 
paragraphs from MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of 
satisfaction" as follows. 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are caused by 
the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be with how we think they 
are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled 
from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved 
second self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid 
automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where 
the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the past or 
the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are 
often orchestrated seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our 
normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of 
cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological 
Illusion.' 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd period work 
and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that ` will', `self' and ` consciousness' 
are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no 
possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made 
so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be 
judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
Like Carruthers and others, Searle sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have 
noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and 
it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and 
true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic 
intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it 
would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would 
return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed countless times and 
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biology demonstrates, life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid 
reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, 
no people, no philosophy. 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of vocal 
muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than contractions of other 
muscles and this is on average several orders of magnitude higher for visual information. 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which means that it is 
a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the true-only automatic cognitive 
functions of S1. Or you can say that spontaneous utterances and actions are the primitive 
reflexes or Primary Language Games (PLG) of S1, while conscious representations are the 
dispositional Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial and indeed it is, 
but this is the most basic statement of how behavior works and hardly anyone has ever 
understood it. 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to 
our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent 
Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time, most often for reciprocal 
altruism), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in 
muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves 
and those closely related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out 
DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term 
inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, 
but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal 
actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified into 
the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is 
via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the 
brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker 
`The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that 
S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes (as quoted 
above) that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which is an act 
and not a mental state. This can be seen as another statement of W’s argument against 
private language (personal interpretations vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule 
following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or 
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private interpretations either. And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) miss 
the boat here, being misled by W's frequent referrals to community practice into thinking 
it's just arbitrary public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W makes 
clear many times that such conventions are only possible given an innate shared psychology 
which he often calls the background, and it this which underlies all behavior and which is 
schematized in the table. 
As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any have fully understood the later W and, 
lacking the S1, S2 framework it is not surprising. Thus, one can understand why one cannot 
imagine an object while seeing it as the domination of S2 by S1. There is no test for my inner 
experiences, so whatever comes to mind when I imagine Jack's face is the image of Jack. 
Similarly, with reading and calculation which can refer to S1, S2 or a combination, and there 
is the constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes where the lack of any test makes 
them inapplicable. Two of W's famous examples used for combatting this temptation are 
playing tennis without a ball (`S1 tennis'), and a tribe that had only S2 calculation so 
`calculating in the head (`S1 calculating') was not possible. 
 
`Playing' and `calculating' describe actual or potential acts--i.e., they are disposition words 
but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before one really ought to keep them 
straight by writing `playing1' and `playing2' etc. But we are not taught to do this and so we 
want to either dismiss `calculating1' as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature 
undecided until later. Hence another of W's famous comments--"The decisive movement in 
the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent." That 
is, the first few sentences or often the title commit one to a way of looking at things (a 
language game) which prevents clear use of language in the present context. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, and this means has 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't 
`meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is 
itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever 
I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms 
(p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of 
the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be interpreted as 
the logical structure of language, and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and 
higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
Likewise, with the question "What makes it true that my image of Jack is an image of him?" 
Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the image I have in my head is Jack 
and that's why I will say `YES' if shown his picture and `NO' if shown one of someone else. 
The test here is not that the photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had 
the COS that) to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked 
into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI 
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p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's 
Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says 
its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." 
the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And 
the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know 
what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know." 
Disposition words refer to Potential Events (PE's) which I accept as fulfilling the COS and 
my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way dispositions 
function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, desiring etc. depending on 
the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express. Thinking and intending are S2 
dispositions which can only be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially 
those of speech. 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that 
results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a 
much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of 
description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits 
usefulness. 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the 
Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought 
(DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
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System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has 
no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only 
get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in its context. 
The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human 
Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis 
of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make 
complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events (perceptions, 
memory, reflexive actions that can be described as Primary or Primitive Language Games 
(PLG’s)—i.e., one class of reflexes of the fast associative unconscious automated System 1, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, informationless, true 
only mental stateswith a precise time and location) and gradually developed the further 
ability to encompass displacements in space and time to describe memories, attitudes and 
potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional 
preferences, inclinations or dispositions- the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System 2 slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having 
public COS), representational, true or false propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no 
precise time and are abilities and not mental states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, 
Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, 
Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, 
Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 148). “I believe”, 
“he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in 
spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) while 
third person statements about others are true or false (see my review of Johnston 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and 
memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed 
“inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” 
since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W 
 and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer 
independent mental representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle- C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space 
while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are 
always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 –the major advance in 
vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them 
as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination 
supplementing cognition and volition). S2 dispositions are abilities to act (contract muscles 
producing speech or body movements via S1 at which time they become causal and mental 
states). Sometimes dispositions may be regarded as unconscious since they can become 
conscious later-Searle - Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or Primary 
Language Games (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO TESTS 
possible so they can be True Only. 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and 
must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, 
think, feel until I act—see above quotes from W). Dispositions also become Actions when 
spoken or written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, 
Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and 
his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology 
and its interaction with System 2. Though few have understood it well (and arguably 
nobody fully to this day) it was further developed by a few --above all by John Searle, who 
made a simpler version of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It 
expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed 
from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty 
(OC)(written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and 
ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or DPHOT, and in my view the single 
most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of 
behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Basic Emotions are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world - S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind direction of fit) and 
contentless (lacking representations or information) (is Causally Self Referential—Searle) -- 
the unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is 
possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit the world 
- S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world direction of fit). 
 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) 
arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions with Secondary Language 
Games (SLG’s) which S calls The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI). W understood this and 
described itwith unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
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action throughout his works. Reason has access to working memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but typically incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves of 
current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to 
match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions 
to act (Prior Intentions—PI, and IntentionsIn Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to match 
the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. Inclination 
words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (e.g. belief), or as verbs 
which describe abilities (agents as they act or might act) (e.g., believing) and are often 
incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, templates, 
inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(actual or potential PUBLIC 
ACTS also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition 
-and there is no language (concept, thought) of PRIVATE mental states for thinking or 
willing (i.e., no private language). 
 
 
Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public psychology. 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature MEMORIES: 
Remembering, Dreaming (S1) 
PRFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS (X might become True) (S2) 
 
CLASS 1: Believing, Judging, Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, 
Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, expecting, 
wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-- Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. Their 
function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected maximum utility) 
by facilitating information processing of perceptions and memories for rapid action. There 
is some separation between S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, 
disgust and anger. 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): Longing, 
Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, Laughing, 
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Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting(describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), 
Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public 
and Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior. 
ALL WORDS ARE PARTS OF COMPLEX LANGUAGE GAMES (THOUGHTS LEADING 
TO ACTIONS) HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND ARE NOT THE 
NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
We drive a car but also own it, see it, see its photo, dream about it, imagine it, expect it, 
remember it. The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules— 
roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons 
organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the 
formation of preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only preferences leading to 
actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive 
neurosciences when including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. 
Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, 
development and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the 
axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can 
enlarge our understanding by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend 
them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, 
physics, and computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) 
gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities and they are algorithmatized 
by Spohn etc. 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of behavior 
which are innately programmed into cognitive modules (however defined) which create 
and require consciousness, will and self and in normal human adults all dispositions are 
purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships (called Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action- DIRA by Searle) in order to increase our inclusive fitness 
(maximum expected utility— sometimes called-controversially-Bayesian utility 
maximization) via dominance and reciprocal altruism and impose Conditions of 
Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction - Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the world via 
public acts - muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc.). The basics 
of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 
1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911 (“The general tree of 
psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 
P895 cf Z P464), and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in 
the 1960’s. Much of our S2 intentionality admits of degrees or kinds (principally language 
games). As W noted, inclinations (e.g. thinking) are sometimes conscious and deliberative. 
All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts 
as they must to be useful. There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games 
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or ways of using the dispositional verb ‘thinking’)—non-rational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness (W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and 
S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W RPP2 129). 
Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack 
criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, 
thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) is not 
a mental state, and contains no information until it becomes a public act (realizes a COS) in 
speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have 
information (meaning- COS) when they are manifested in public actions via S2, for only 
then do they have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon. Developing language means 
manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. The common term TOM (Theory 
of Mind) is much better called (UA-Understanding of Agency). 
Intentionality is the innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, self, and 
thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles. Thus, 
“propositional attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive rational or non-rational 
speech and action but I give it as a synonym for dispositions as it’s still widely used by those 
unfamiliar with W and S. The efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions 
etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we already know, 
because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any phenomena that 
are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string 
theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which 
“obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As 
W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. 
Language was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction. Its grammar functions automatically and is extremely confusing 
when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences have multiple uses depending on context. 
I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe 
and he believes. The present tense first person expressive use of inclinational verbs such as 
‘I believe’ describe my ability to predict my probable acts and are not descriptive of my 
mental state nor based on knowledge or information in the usual sense of those words (W). 
“I believe its raining”, “I believed it was raining”, “he believes its raining”, “he will believe 
its raining,”, “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable 
public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation) 
and so have COS which are their truth (or falsity) makers. 
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Non-reflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent have been 
called Words as Deeds by W & then by DMS in her paper in Philosophical Psychology in 
2000) are typical of much of our behavior as they bridge S1 and S2 which interact in both 
directions most of our waking life. 
Perceptions, Memories, some Emotions and many “Type 1 Dispositions” are better called 
Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, non-reflective, NON- Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal- 
Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
 
Now for some comments on “The Opacity of Mind” (OM). 
 
By the time I finished the first page of the preface, I realized this book was just another 
hopeless mess (the norm in philosophy). He made it clear that he had no grasp of the 
subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different uses of ‘I know I’m awake’, ‘I know 
what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’) nor the nature of dispositions (which he calls by 
the misleading and obsolete term ‘propositional attitudes’) and was basing his ideas about 
behavior on such notions as private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and the 
computational description of mind, which were laid to rest by W ¾ of a century ago and by 
S and many others since. But I knew most books on human behavior are just as confused 
and that he was going to give a summary of recent scientific work on the brain functions 
corresponding to higher order thought (HOT), so I kept on. 
Before I read any book in philosophy or cognitive science, I go to the index and bibliography 
to see whom they cite and then try to find some reviews and especially an article in BBS 
since it has peer feedback, which is generally highly informative. As noted above, W and S 
are two of the most famous names in this field but in the index and bibliography I found 
only 3 trivial mentions of W and not one for S or Hacker—surely the most remarkable 
achievement of this volume. As expected, several reviews from philosophical journals were 
useless and the BBS responses to his précis of this book appear devastating--though, 
characteristically (with the exception of one mention of W) -- they too are clueless about WS. 
More remarkable, though he includes many references as recent as 2012, the 2009 BBS article 
is not among them and, so far as I can recall, he does not provide substantive responses to 
its criticisms in this book. Consequently, the powerful WS inspired LSR framework is totally 
absent and all the confusions it has cleared away are abundant on nearly every page. If you 
read the above and my other reviews and then the BBS article (readily available free on the 
net) your view of this book (and most writing in this arena) will likely be quite different. Of 
course, the major defect of BBS is apparent--- the commenters get only a one page comment 
and no reply, while the authors get a long article and a long reply, so it always appears that 
they prevail. It is clear however that C’s ISA theory, like most (all?) philosophical theories 
is a shape shifter which alters to “explain” every objection. Thus, the line between a 
meaningful theory (actually a description) tied to facts, and a vague notion that “explains” 
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nothing, blurs. Of course, C often says that his theory “predicts” such and such observation, 
but this appears to occur after the fact and of course the opposing theories shape shift as 
well. A powerful theory predicts things which nobody was expecting and even the opposite 
of what they were expecting. We are also reminded of W’s constant injunctions to stick to 
describing the facts and avoid otiose “explanations”. 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted in my other 
reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as clear as day—we must have a 
test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only be external and public. He famously 
illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’. If we all have a box that cannot be opened nor x- 
rayed etc. and call what is inside a ‘beetle’ then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, 
for every box could contain a different thing or it could even be empty. So, there is no private 
language that only I can know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not publicly 
demonstrable it cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down Carruthers’ (C’s) ISA 
theory of mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references and a huge 
# of other books and articles. I have explained W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection 
and the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my 
reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of S’s books. Basically, he showed that the causal 
relation and word and object model that works for S1 does not apply to S2. 
Regarding ISA, many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my view 
none better than W in BBB p37 —, “if we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, 
though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the 
sentence and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. 
The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it 
represents.” 
One thing to keep in mind is that philosophical theories have no practical impact 
whatsoever- the real role of philosophy being to clear up confusions about how language is 
being used in particular cases (W). Like various ‘physical theories’ but unlike other cartoon 
views of life (i.e., the standard religious, political, psychological, sociological, biological, 
medical, economic, anthropological and historical views of most people), it is too cerebral 
and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so unrealistic that even its 
adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. Likewise, with other academic ‘theories of 
life’ such as the Standard Social Science or Blank Slate Model widely shared by sociology, 
anthropology, pop psychology, history and literature. However, religions big and small, 
political movements, and sometimes economics often generate or embrace already existing 
cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit forces terrestrial or cosmic 
that reinforce our superstitions (our innately inspired psychological defaults), and help to 
lay waste to the earth (the real purpose of nearly every social practice and institution which 
are there to facilitate replication of genes and consumption of resources). The point is to 
realize that these are on a continuum with philosophical cartoons and have the same source. 
All of us could be said to have various cartoon views of life when young and only a few 
ever grow out of them. 
 Also note that, as W remarked long ago, the prefix “meta” is unnecessary and confusing in 
most (maybe all) contexts, so for ‘metacognition’ in this book, substitute ‘cognition’ or 
‘thinking’, since thinking about what we or others believe or know is thinking like any other 
and does not have to be seen as ‘mindreading’ (UA in my terminology) either. In S’s terms, 
the COS are the test of what is being thought and they are identical for ‘it’s raining’, I believe 
it’s raining’, ‘I believe you believe it’s raining’ and ‘he believes it’s raining’ (likewise for 
‘knows’, wishes, judges, understands, etc.), namely that it’s raining. This is the critical fact 
to keep in mind regarding ‘metacognition’ and ‘mindreading’ of dispositions 
(‘propositional attitudes’) which C promotes. 
One of the responses in BBS was by Dennett (who shares most of C’s illusions), who seems 
to find these ideas quite good, except that C should eliminate the use of ‘I’ since it assumes 
the existence of a higher self (the aim being hard reduction of S2 to S1). Of course, the very 
act of writing, reading and all the language and concepts of anything whatsoever 
presuppose self, consciousness and will (as S often notes), so such an account would be just 
a cartoon of life without any value whatsoever, which one could probably say of most 
philosophical accounts of behavior. The WS framework has long noted that the first person 
point of view is not eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person one, but this is no problem for 
the cartoon view of life. Likewise, with the description of brain function or behavior as 
‘computational’, ‘information processing’ etc, -- all well debunked countless times by WS, 
Hutto, Read, Hacker and many others. Worst of all is the crucial but utterly unclear 
“representation”, for which I think S’s use as a condition of satisfaction (COS) of 
representing (i.e., the same form as for all dispositional nouns and their verbs) is by far the 
best. That is, the ‘representation’ of ‘I think it’s raining’ is the COS that it’s raining. 
Saddest of all is that C (like Dennett) thinks he is an expert on W, having studied him early 
in his career and decided that the private language argument is to be rejected as 
‘behaviorism’! W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work is devoted to 
describing why it cannot serve as a description of behavior. “Are you not really a 
behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human 
behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) 
And one can also point to real behaviorism in C in its modern ‘computationalist’ form. WS 
insist on the indispensability of the first person point of view while C apologizes to D in the 
BBS article for using “I” or “self”. This is in my view the difference between an accurate 
description of language use and the use one can imagine in a cartoon. 
 
Hutto has shown the vast gulf between W and Dennett (D) which will serve to characterize 
C as well, since I take D and C (along with the Churchland’s and many others) to be on the 
same page. S is one of many who have deconstructed D in various writings, and these can 
all be read in opposition to C. And let us recall that W sticks to examples of language in 
action, and once one gets the point he is mostly very easy to follow, while C is captivated 
by ‘theorizing’ (i.e., chaining numerous sentences with no clear COS) and rarely bothers 
with  specific  language  games,  preferring  experiments  and  observations  that  are quite 
difficult to interpret in any definitive way (see the BBS responses), and which in any case 
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 have no relevance to higher level descriptions of behavior (e.g., exactly how do they fit into 
the Intentionality Table). One book C praises as definitive (Memory and the Computational 
Brain) presents the brain as a computational information processor—a sophomoric view 
thoroughly and repeatedly annihilated by S and others. In the last decade, I have read 
thousands of pages by and about W and it is quite clear that C does not have a clue. In this 
he joins a long line of distinguished philosophers and scientists whose reading of W was 
fruitless—Russell, Quine, Godel, Kreisel, Chomsky, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam etc. 
(though Putnam began to see the light later). They just cannot see that most philosophy is 
grammatical jokes and impossible vignettes—a cartoon view of life. 
Books like this that attempt to bridge two levels of description are really two books and not 
one. There is the description (not explanation, as W made clear) of our language and 
nonverbal behavior and then the experiments of cognitive psychology. “The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems that 
trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by."(W PI p232), C et al are 
enthralled by science and just assume that it is a great advance to wed metaphysics to 
neuroscience and experimental psychology, but WS and many others have shown this is a 
mistake. Far from making the description of behavior scientific and clear, it makes it 
incoherent. And it must have been by the grace of God that Locke, Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, 
Sartre, Wittgenstein, Searle et al were able to give such memorable accounts of behavior 
without any experimental science whatsoever. Of course, like politicians, philosophers 
rarely admit mistakes or shut up so this will go on and on for reasons W diagnosed perfectly. 
The bottom line has to be what is useful and what makes sense in our everyday life. I suggest 
the philosophical views of CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), as opposed to those of 
WS, are not useful and their ultimate conclusions that will, self and consciousness are 
illusions make no sense at all—i.e., they are meaningless having no clear COS. Whether the 
CDC comments on cognitive science have any heuristic value remains to be determined. 
This book (like a huge body of other writing) tries to discount the HOT of other animals and 
to reduce behavior to brain functions (to absorb psychology into physiology). The 
philosophy is a disaster but, provided one first reads the many criticisms in the BBS, the 
commentary on recent psychology and physiology may be of interest. Like Dennett, 
Churchland and so many others often do, C does not reveal his real gems til the very end, 
when we are told that self, will, consciousness (in the senses in which these words normally 
function) are illusions (supposedly in the normal sense of this word). Dennett had to be 
unmasked by S, Hutto et al for explaining away these ‘superstitions’ (i.e., not explaining at 
all and in fact not even describing), but amazingly C also admits it at the beginning, though 
of course he thinks he is showing us these words do not mean what we think and that his 
cartoon use is the valid one. 
 
One should also see Hacker’s criticisms of cog sci with replies by S and Dennett in 
"Neuroscience and Philosophy” and well explored in Hacker’s books "Human Nature"(3 
volumes) and "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" (see my reviews of HN V1). It 
is remarkable that virtually nobody in all the behavioral disciplines (in which I include 
41 
 
 
 
262 
 literature, history, politics, religion, law, art etc as well as the obvious ones) ever states either 
their logical framework or what it is that they are trying to accomplish and what role 
language analysis and science play, so all those interested in behavior might consider 
memorizing Hacker’s lovely summary of what philosophy (DPHOT) aims to do and how 
this relates to scientific pursuits. 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further 
condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want to know when 
knowledge does and when it does not require justification. We need to be clear what is 
ascribed to a person when it is said that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, 
an achievement, a performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that 
p be identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say `he believes that p, but it is not the 
case that p', whereas one cannot say `I believe that p, but it is not the case that p'? Why are 
there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, but not 
belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, 
whether and how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, 
hesitantly, foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one 
know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on - 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge and belief, 
but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, noticing, recognising, 
attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to mention the numerous verbs of 
perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be 
answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang 
together, the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and 
purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable 
exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self- 
styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever." (Passing by the naturalistic 
turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac- p15-2005). Of course, I would add that it is the study of our 
evolved psychology, of DPHOT, and the contextual sensitivity of language (W’s language 
games). It is not trivial to state these facts as it is quite rare to find anyone who grasps the 
big picture and even my hero’s such as Searle, Priest, Pinker, Read, etc. fall embarrassingly 
short when they try to define their professions. 
There have long been books on atomic physics and physical chemistry but there is no sign 
that the two will merge (nor is it a coherent idea), nor that chemistry will absorb 
biochemistry nor that it in turn will absorb physiology or genetics, nor that biology will 
disappear nor that it will eliminate psychology, sociology, etc. This is not due to the ‘youth’ 
of these disciplines but to the fact that they are different levels of description with entirely 
different concepts, data and explanatory mechanisms. But physics envy is powerful, and we 
just cannot resist the ‘precision’ of physics, math, information, and computation vs the 
‘vagueness’ of higher levels. It ‘must’ be possible. 
 
Reductionism thrives in spite of the incomprehensibility (lack of application to our normal 
scale of space, time and life) of quantum mechanics, uncertainty, wave/particles, live/dead 
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cats, quantum entanglement, and the incompleteness and algorithmic randomness of math 
(Godel/Chaitin—see my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) and its 
irresistible pull tells us it is due to EP defaults. Again, a breath of badly needed fresh air 
from W: “For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it 
was a requirement.” PI p107. And once again W from the Blue Book- “Philosophers 
constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask 
and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and 
leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” It is hard to resist throwing down most 
books on behavior and rereading W and S. Just jump from anything to e.g. these quotes 
from his PI http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94- 
138_239-309.html. 
I suggest viewing the question of mind as essentially the same as all the ‘deep’ philosophical 
questions. We want to understand the ‘reality’ perceived by S1, but S2 is not programmed 
for it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t know 
but our DNA does courtesy of the death of trillions of organisms over some 3 billion years. 
So, we struggle with science and ever so slowly describe the mechanisms of mind (i.e., of 
brain), knowing that even should we arrive at “complete” knowledge of the brain, we would 
just have a description of what exact neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing red or making 
a choice and an “explanation” of why it is not possible (not intelligible). 
It is obvious to me after reading tens of thousands of pages of philosophy that the attempt 
to do higher level descriptive psychology of this kind, where ordinary language morphs 
into special uses, both deliberately and inadvertently, is essentially impossible (i.e., the 
normal situation in philosophy and other behavioral disciplines). Using special jargon 
words (e.g., intensionality, realism etc.) does not work either as there are no philosophy 
police to enforce a narrow definition and the arguments on what they mean are interminable. 
Hacker is good but his writing so precious and dense it’s often painful. Searle is very good 
but requires some effort to embrace his terminology and I believe he makes a few major 
mistakes, while W is hands down the clearest and most insightful, once you grasp what he 
is doing, and nobody has ever been able to emulate him. His TLP remains the ultimate 
statement of the mechanical reductionist view of life, but he later saw his mistake and 
diagnosed and cured the ‘cartoon disease’, but few get the point and most simply ignore 
him and biology as well, and so there are tens of thousands of books and millions of articles 
and most religious and political organizations (and until recently most of economics) and 
almost all people with cartoon views of life. But the world is not a cartoon, so a great tragedy 
is being played out as the cartoon views of life collide with reality and universal blindness 
and selfishness bring about the collapse of civilization over the next two centuries (or less). 
 
 
I hesitate to recommend C’s writings to anyone, as the experienced ought to have about the 
same perspective I do, and the naïve will be wasting their time. Either read philosophy or 
cognitive science and avoid the amalgams. 
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Among the endless books and articles available, I commend the 3 volumes on Human 
Nature edited by Carruthers (yes, the same), the 3 on Human Nature written by Hacker, the 
Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd Ed, and my reviews of W/S, Hutto, DMS, 
Hacker et al. and their original books. Finally, I suggest that if we accept W’s equation of 
language and mind and regard the ‘mind/body problem’ as the ‘language/body problem’ it 
may help achieve his therapeutic aim. 
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Review of The Stuff of Thought by Steven 
Pinker (2008) 
 
ABSTRACT 
I start with some famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig Wittgenstein 
because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default settings of our evolved innate 
psychology) certain prejudices about the functioning of the mind, and because Wittgenstein 
offers unique and profound insights into the workings of language, thought and reality 
(which he viewed as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. There is only 
reference to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is most unfortunate considering that he was 
the most brilliant and original analyst of language. 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully summarizes 
the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, intentional psychology) – 
a product of blind selfishness, moderated only slightly by automated altruism for close 
relatives carrying copies of our genes (Inclusive Fitness)--works automatically, but tries to 
end on an upbeat note by giving us hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast 
capabilities to cooperate and make the world a decent place to live. 
Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about our psychology 
is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that are left out or given 
minimal attention are math and geometry, music and sounds, images, events and causality, 
ontology (classes of things or what we know), most of epistemology (how we know), 
dispositions (believing, thinking, judging, intending etc.) and the rest of intentional 
psychology of action, neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g, satori and 
enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain damage and behavioral deficits and 
disorders, games and sports, decision theory (incl. game theory and behavioral economics), 
animal behavior (very little language but a billion years of shared genetics). Many books 
have been written about each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in this book 
are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this way or how it is done. 
How do we know to use the sentences in their various way (i.e., know all their meanings)? 
This is evolutionary psychology that operates at a more basic level –the level where 
Wittgenstein is most active. And there is scant attention to the context in which words are 
used = an arena which Wittgenstein pioneered. 
 
 
Nevertheless, this is a classic work and with these cautions is still well worth reading. 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
 Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
“If God looked into our minds he would not be able to see there whom we were thinking 
of.” Wittgenstein PI p217 
 
“Ought the word “infinite” to be avoided in mathematics? Yes: where it appears to confer a 
meaning upon the calculus; instead of getting one from it.” RFM revised edition (1978) p141 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set it in relief— 
but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the very fact that 
language can and only does refer to it. For since language only derives the way in which it 
means, its meaning, from the world, no language is conceivable that does not represent this 
world.” Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks S47 
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” TLP 
 
I start with these famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(W) because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default settings of our evolved 
innate psychology) certain prejudices about the functioning of the mind and because 
Wittgenstein offers unique and profound insights into the workings of language, thought 
and reality (which he viewed as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. The last 
quote is the only reference Pinker makes to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is most 
unfortunate considering that he was the most brilliant and original analysts of language. 
 
Another famous Wittgensteinian dictum is “Nothing is Hidden.” If one dips into his work 
sufficiently, I think he makes it very clear what this means—that our psychology is in front 
of us all the time if we only open our eyes to see it and that no amount of scientific work is 
going to make it clearer (in fact it just gets more and more obscure). This is not antirational 
or antiscientific but it just states what he sees as the facts—a soccer game is out on the field 
–not in our head--and we understand perfectly well the motivations, anxieties, stresses and 
disappointments of the players and what effort is required to play and how the ball moves 
when kicked. Immense advances have been made in sports physiology, anatomy, 
bioenergetics, physics math and chemistry. Whole books full of equations have been written 
about how balls  move  thru the  air and  muscles apply  force  to  move  bones; about how 
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muscle movements originate in part of the cortex, are mirrored in the brains of others; 
mountains of literature on motivation, personality, brain function and modeling. Has this 
given us any more insight into a soccer game or changed our strategy or our experience of 
playing or watching? 
Intentionality (rationality) has been evolved piecemeal from whatever tools (genes) animals 
had to work with and so is full of paradoxes and illusions. Just as we see mirages in the 
desert or read words into sentences that are not there, and see animated blobs on a screen 
“causing” others to move and “helping” or “hindering”’, we look for thinking and believing 
in the head and confuse our innate psychological axioms with empirical facts (e.g., 
regarding math and geometry as things we “discover” in the world, rather than invent). 
In order for the concept and word “reality” to apply to the results we get from the use of 
differential equations, MRI scanners and particle colliders to a greater degree than or in 
place of apples, rocks and thunderstorms, it would be necessary for these recent discoveries 
to have had the same role in natural selection over hundreds of millions of years. It is only 
survival advantage over eons that selected the genes enabling our distant (invertebrate) 
ancestors to begin reacting in useful ways to the sights and sounds of the world and ever so 
slowly to produce brains that could form concepts (thoughts) that eventually were 
verbalized. Science and culture cannot replace or take preference over our ancient 
intentional psychology but merely slightly extends or supplements it. But when 
philosophizing (or doing linguistics!) we are easily misled as context is missing and our 
psychology automatically dissects every situation for the causes and the ultimate or lowest 
level of explanation and we substitute that for the gross higher levels because there is 
nothing in our language rules to prevent it. It comes ever so naturally to say we don’t 
think—our brain does and tables are not solid because physics tells us they are made of 
molecules. 
But W reminded us that our concepts of, and words for, thinking, believing and other 
dispositions are public actions, not processes in the brain, and in what sense are molecules 
solid? Hence, the quote above, which bears repeating, since I see it as one of the most 
fundamental ideas we have to get clear about before we can make any progress in the study 
of behavior. 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set it in relief— 
but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the very fact that 
language can and only does refer to it. For since language only derives the way in which it 
means, its meaning, from the world, no language is conceivable that does not represent this 
world.” 
Much of W’s writing is examples of the common-sense knowledge that is essential to the 
success of all animal behavior and by and large not only the behavioral science but even AI, 
which cannot succeed without it, has been unable to grasp and implement it. Even one of 
the fathers of AI, Marvin 
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Minsky said (in a 2003 Boston Univ. speech) that “AI has been brain dead since the 70’s” 
and lacked common sense reasoning. But his recent book “The Emotion Machine” still 
shows no awareness of the work that W did 75 years ago, and this means no awareness of 
the contextual, intentional, point of view without which one cannot hope to grasp how the 
mind (language) works. 
When talking about behavior (i.e., thought or language or action) it is a nearly universal 
mistake to regard the meaning of a word or sentence as attached to it, ignoring the infinite 
subtleties of context, and thus we go astray. Of course, we cannot include everything about 
context, as that would make discussion difficult, even impossible, but there is a vast 
difference between regarding meaning as something that can be fully given by a dictionary 
entry and meaning as shorthand for a family of complex uses. Even Klein’s classic book 
‘Time in Language’ (not cited by Pinker) regards ‘time’ as a family of loosely connected uses, 
though of course he too has no awareness of W, Searle or intentionality. 
 
 
The point of mentioning this is that Pinker shares the reductionistic biases of most modern 
scientists and that this colors his approach to behavior in ways that will not be obvious to 
most readers. As fascinating as his data are and as masterful as his writing is, it subtly leads 
us to what I think is a mistaken picture of our psychology—a view that is due to the innate 
biases of our evolved psychology and hence is a universal failing. 
Pinker is the Richard Dawkins of psychology—one of the major popularizers of science in 
modern times. Possibly only the late and most unlamented (he was a self-serving egomaniac 
who misled millions with his specious reasoning, Neomarxism and blank slateism) Stephan 
Gould sold more volumes of pop sci. It was Pinker’s masterful refutation of the universal 
delusion that human nature is culturally generated (one of Gould’s many delusions) that 
made his previous book ‘The Blank Slate’ a classic and a top choice for most important books 
of the 21st century. Incidentally, there are many put-downs of Gould, including some by 
Pinker and Dawkins (“he has made tilting at windmills into his own personal art form” –as 
I recall it from a Dawkins review of a Gould tome from the Journal ‘Evolution’ a decade or 
so ago), but I think the best is that of Tooby and Cosmides in a letter to the NY Times (search 
their page or the Times). All of these works are intimately connected by the subject of animal 
behavior, evolutionary psychology, and of course ‘The Stuff of Thought”. 
Following convention, Pinker discusses Putnam’s famous, but badly flawed, twin earth 
thought experiment (bizarre thought expts. in philosophy were essentially invented by 
Wittgenstein), which claims to show that meaning is not in the head, but it was W in the 
30’s—i.e., 40 years earlier-- who showed decisively that all the dispositions or inclinations 
(as he called them, though philosophers, lacking acquaintance with his work commonly call 
them by the incorrect name of propositional attitudes) including meaning, intending, 
thinking, believing, judging etc. function as descriptions of our actions and not as terms for 
mental phenomena. They cannot be in the head for the same reason a soccer game cannot 
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be in the head. Later in life Putnam began to take Wittgenstein seriously and changed his 
tune accordingly. 
He makes almost no reference to the large and fascinating literature on behavioral 
automatisms (i.e., most of our behavior! --see e.g., “Experiments With People’(2004) or 
Bargh’s ‘Social Psychology and the Unconscious’ (2007) for the older work, and “Dual 
Process Theories of the Social Mind’ by Sherman eta al (2014) and the vast and rapidly 
expanding literature on implicit cognition), which shows that the more you look, the clearer 
it becomes that actions which we regard as results of our conscious choice are not. People 
shown pictures or reading stories of old people tend to walk out of the building slower than 
when given those of young people etc. etc. The well- known placebo effect is a variant where 
the info is consciously input—e.g., in a 2008 study eighty-five percent of volunteers who 
thought they were getting a $2.50 sugar pill said they felt less pain after taking it, compared 
with a 61 percent control group. Such effects can be induced subliminally if the price info is 
input via images, text or sound. Presumably the same is true of most of our choices. 
This brings us to one of my major gripes about this book—it’s monomaniacal obsession with 
the “meaning” of words rather than their use-- a distinction made famous by W in his 
lectures and some 20 books beginning in the 1930’s. Like W’s insistence that we do not 
explain behavior (or the rest of nature) but only describe it, this may seem like a pointless 
quibble, but, as usual, I have found as I reflected on these matters over the years that W was 
right on the mark. He said that a formula which will work most of the time is that the 
meaning of a word (far better to say a sentence) is its use in language—and this means its 
public use in a specified context to communicate info from one person to another (and 
sometimes to another higher mammal—dogs share a major portion of our intentional 
psychology). I mention this partly because in a previous book Pinker accused W of denying 
that animals have consciousness (an extraordinary view that is actually defended by some) 
because he noted that a dog can’t think “perhaps it will rain tomorrow”, but W’s point was 
the unexceptional one that there are many thoughts that we cannot have without language 
and that we have no test for interpreting a dog’s behavior as showing that it expected 
something tomorrow. Even if it used an umbrella and invariably got it out of the closet the 
day before a rain, there is no way to connect this to its mental state—same for a deaf mute 
who could not read or write or use sign language. This connects to his famous 
demonstrations of the impossibility of a private language and to the fact that dispositions 
are not in the head. W showed how the absence of any public test means that even the dog 
and the mute cannot know what they are thinking—nor can we, because dispositions are 
public acts and the act is the criterion for what we thought— even for ourself. This is the 
point of the quote above—neither God nor neurophysiologists can see thoughts, beliefs, 
images, hopes in our brain, because they these are terms for acts and neither the vague and 
fleeting epiphenomena we experience, nor the correlates detectable by brain studies, 
function in our life in the same way as do the contextual use of the sentences describing 
these acts. And, regarding animal consciousness, W noted that intentional psychology gets 
a foothold even in a fly—a point marvelously and increasingly supported by modern 
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genetics, which shows that many genes and processes fundamental to primate behavior got 
their start at least as early as nematodes (i.e., C. elegans) some billion years ago. 
 
 
Intentional psychology or intentionality (very roughly our personality or rationality or 
higher order thought (HOT) is a very old philosophical concept that (unknown to most) was 
given its modern formulation by Wittgenstein, who, in the 20,000 pages of his nachlass, now 
mostly translated and published in some 20 books and several CDROM’s, laid the 
foundations for the modern study of human behavior. Sadly, he was mostly a recluse who 
did not publish for the last 30 years of his life, never really finished writing anything of his 
later work and wrote his brilliant and highly original comments on behavior in a style 
variously termed epigrammatic, telegraphic, oracular, Socratic, obscure etc. and all 
published posthumously over a period of more than 50 years (the famous Philosophical 
Investigations (PI) in 1953 and the most recent-but not the last!—The Big Typescript in 2005) 
and thus, though he was recently voted one of the top 5 philosophers of all time, and 
Philosophical Investigations the most important philosophy book of the 20 century, he is 
ignored or misunderstood by nearly everyone. The feeling I often get is that our psychology 
is a coral reef with most people snorkeling on the surface admiring the bumps while 
Wittgenstein is 20 meters below probing the crevices with scuba gear and flashlight. 
Wittgenstein’s literary executors were stuffy academics and his books issued mostly from 
Blackwell with staid academic titles and no explanation whatsoever that they can be seen as 
a major foundation for the modern study of evolutionary psychology, personality, 
rationality, language, consciousness, politics, theology, literature, anthropology, sociology, 
law etc., –in fact everything that we say, think and do since, as he showed, it all depends on 
the innate axioms of our evolved psychology which we share to a large extent with dogs, 
and to some extent even with flies and C. elegans. Had his works been presented with flashy 
covers by popular presses with titles like How the Mind Works, The Language Instinct, and 
The Stuff of Thought, much of the intellectual landscape of the 20 century might have been 
different. As it is, though he is the major subject of at least 200 books and 10,000 papers and 
discussed in countless thousands more (including Pinker’s How the Mind Works), based on 
the hundreds of articles and dozens of books I have read in the last few years, I would say 
there are less than a dozen people who really grasp the significance of his work, as I present 
it in this and my other reviews. However the recent publications of Coliva, DMS and others, 
and perhaps mine, should change this. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis 
of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and 
Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
One result of all this (what one philosopher has called “the collective amnesia regarding 
Wittgenstein”) is that students of language including Pinker take Grice’s notions such as 
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implicature (which seems just a fancy word for implication) and, more recently, relevance 
theory, as a framework for “the relation between words and meaning” (of course W would 
turn in his grave at this phrase, since how can they be separable from their use if one follows 
his meaning is use formula?), but they seem to me feeble substitutes for intentionality as 
described by W and revised and enlarged by Searle and others. In any case, Grice is the 
normal soporific academic, Sperber (a leader in relevance theory) tolerable, Pinker engaging 
and often elegant and even poignant, Searle (see esp. ‘Rationality in Action’) is clear, 
rigorous, and quite original (though owing, I think, a very big debt to W,) but too academic 
for the bestseller lists, while Wittgenstein, once you grasp that he is a natural master 
psychologist describing how the mind works, is very demanding, but brilliantly original 
and often breathtaking. Pinker writes masterful prose while Wittgenstein writes telegrams, 
though often moving and poetic ones and on a few occasions, he wrote beautiful essays. 
Pinker can be mined for some gold, lots of iron and some dross while W is mostly gold, a 
little iron and hardly a speck of dross. Pinker is mostly summarizing the work of others 
(though in impeccable style) while W is so original and so bizarre he’s way over most 
people’s heads. I suggest reading Pinker, Searle and Wittgenstein alternately or 
simultaneously with a dash of Sperber, Grice and a few hundred others from time to time. 
W said that the problem is not to find the answer, but to recognize that which is always 
before us as the answer. That is, our language is (by and large) our thought, which is about 
actual or potential events (including actions by agents such as barking, speaking and 
writing), and that meaning, contra Pinker and a cast of thousands, is use, and nothing is 
hidden (i.e., language is -mostly- thought). 
The ignorance in many quarters is so complete that even in an otherwise marvelous recent 
358 page book by Wiese on a topic virtually created by Wittgenstein (Numbers, Language 
and the Human Mind—which I see is cited by Pinker) there is not a single reference to him! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W mostly emphasizes the different uses of the “same” words” (i.e., a splitter) who originally 
wanted to use the quote “I’ll teach you differences!” as the motto of his book PhilosophicaI 
Investigations. That is, by describing the different uses of sentences (the language games), 
and by modifying the games in thought experiments, we remind ourselves of the different 
roles these games play in life and we see the limits of our psychology. But Pinker, again 
following the seductive defaults of our evolved modules and the egregious examples of 
thousands of others, is a lumper who often blurs these differences. E.G., he speaks 
repeatedly of “reality” as though it was a single thing (rather than a whole family of uses). 
He also speaks of reality as something separate from our experience (i.e., the classic 
idealist/realist confusion). 
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But what test is there for reality? He slips (as do we all) so easily into the reductionistic 
substitution of lower levels for higher ones so we are all inclined to dismiss the thinking that 
we can see (i.e., actions) for processes in the brain, which our language (thought) can not 
possibly be describing, as it evolved long before anyone had any idea of brain functions. If 
Pinker imagines that you are not really reading this page (e.g., your retina is being hit with 
photons bouncing off ink molecules etc.) then I respectfully suggest he needs to reflect 
further on the issue of language, thought and reality and I know of no better antidote to this 
toxic meme than immersion in Wittgenstein. 
Reflecting on Wittgenstein brings to mind a comment attributed to Cambridge Philosophy 
professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like him), which ran something like ‘Not 
offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of 
physics to Einstein!” I think of Wittgenstein as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though 
born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the 
same time and in the same part of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now 
suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who 
published only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but 
became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published 
nothing more, and knowledge of his new work in mostly garbled form diffused slowly from 
occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages 
of mostly handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs 
with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted 
from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings and 
crossed out words so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives 
cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the 
monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly 
novel views of how the universe works and that they then published this material with 
agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real 
explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous due to many 
statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense and that virtually 
nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers 
discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a 
definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and 
condensed form that it was impossible to decide what was being said; that he was then 
virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the 
diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous references to him 
and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, half a century after his death, there 
were only a handful of people who really grasped the monumental consequences of what 
he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
It seems crushingly obvious that our evolved psychology has been selected to match the 
world to the maximal extent compatible with our genetic and energetic resources and that 
is ALL we can say about reality, and we ALL understand this (we LIVE it) but when we 
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stop to think about it, the defaults of our universal psychology take over and we start to use 
the words (concepts) of “reality,” “aspects,” “time,” “space,”, “possible,” etc. out of the 
intentional contexts in which they evolved. The following gem comes from biologists (I take 
it from Shettleworth’s superb but neglected book Cognition, Evolution and Behavior). 
“The role of psychology then is to describe the innate features of the minds of different 
organisms which have evolved to match certain aspects of that physical external universe, 
and the way in which the physical universe interacts with the mind to produce the 
phenomenal world.” O’Keefe and Nadel “The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map” 
Think of it this way—you can look up a word in the dictionary, but you cannot look up a 
use there, unless there was a video which showed before and after the event and all relevant 
facts about it. The dictionary is like a morgue full of dead bodies but we want to study 
physiology. Here lies “rose” and here “run” and here “in” and here “is” and what is missing 
is life. Add a photo and it’s a little better: add a video and lots better: add a long 3D color 
hires video with sound and smell and it’s getting there. 
 
 
Part of Wittgenstein’s description of our public psychology included many detailed 
examples of how the sensations and images in my mind don’t carry any epistemic weight 
even for me. How do I know I am eating an apple? My taste and vision might be wrong and 
how to decide? But if I talk about it or write it down and you say “that’s a tasty looking 
apple” etc. I have an objective test. Right and wrong get a foothold here. 
W was going to use a quote from Goethe as the motto of PI --“In the beginning was the 
deed.” That is, evolutionarily it was perceptions and actions and then memories of them 
and then thoughts about them and then words voicing the thoughts. So, the event is the 
thing Australopithecus thought about, and natural selection for being able to make acoustic 
blasts, which substituted for them, was strong enough to modify our vocal apparatus and 
suitable control circuitry at a fantastic pace, so by early Neanderthal time they were talking 
a blue streak and have not shut up mind or mouth for more than a few minutes since. W 
understood, as few have, the primacy of actions and the irrelevance of our thoughts, feelings 
etc. as the foundations of communication, which is why he is often called a behaviorist (i.e., 
Dennett, Hofstadter, B.F. Skinner style denial of the reality of our mental life, mind, 
consciousness etc.) but this is patently absurd. 
It reminds me of the famous description by Plato of the shadows on the cave wall vs turning 
around to see people actually using language—an analogy that I never thought of in regard 
to W and which I was stunned to see a few hours later in Pinker’s last chapter. In any case 
if one considers carefully any case of language use, we see that much of our intentional 
psychology is called into play. 
One can see the ignorance of Wittgenstein in the articles in EEL2 (the Elsevier Encyclopedia 
of Language and Linguistics-2nd ed. (2005) 12,353p- yes that’s 12 thousand pages in 14 vols 
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and a mere $6000,) which is by far the biggest, and one hopes the most authoritative, 
reference in language studies. 
Curiously, Pinker does not have a single reference to it, but you can find it, along with nearly 
all of Pinker, Searle, Wittgenstein and thousands of others free on the net. 
To get a grasp of the basic necessities for AI you might e.g., find it much more interesting to 
read W’s RFM than Minsky’s ‘The Emotion Machine’. Pinker has referred to Brown’s 
famous list of hundreds of universals of human behavior, but these are nearly all gross 
higher level behaviors such as the possession of religion, reciprocal altruisms etc. and it 
large omits hundreds of other universals which underlie these. Wittgenstein was the first, 
and in some cases perhaps the only one to date, to point out many of the more fundamental 
ones. However, he did not tell you what he was doing and nobody else has either so you 
will have to puzzle it out for yourself. Most people read first (and often nothing else) his 
Philosophical Investigations but I prefer the more strictly mathematical examples in his 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics or his Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics. If you read with the understanding that he is describing the universal axioms 
of our evolutionary psychology which, underlie all our reasoning, then his work makes 
perfect sense and is breathtaking in its ingenuity. 
Pinker illustrates how the mind works with the Barbecue Sauce example. There are of course 
a limitless number of others which illustrate our subjective probability (often called 
Bayesian reasoning—though he does not mention this). My favorites are Doomsday (see 
e.g., Bostrum’s book or web page), Sleeping Beauty and Newcomb’s problem. Unlike 
Barbecue, which has a clear solution, many others have (depending on your viewpoint) one, 
none or many. We may regard these as interesting, as they show gaps in or limits to our 
rationality (a major theme in Wittgenstein) or (what we have known at least since de 
Finetti’s work in the 20’s) that all probability is subjective, or like the famous liar paradox 
or Godel’s theorems (see my reviews of Hofstadter’s ‘I am a Strange Loop and Yanofsky’s 
‘Beyond the Limits of Thought’), as trivial demonstrations of the limits of our primate mind, 
though Pinker does not expand on this issue nor give more than a few hints at the vast 
literature on decision theory, game theory, behavioral economics, Bayesianism etc. 
EEL2 does have a passable short article on W which avoids making too many glaring errors, 
but it totally misses nearly everything of importance, which, if really understood, would 
make the article by far the longest one in the book. Nearly the whole thing is wasted on the 
Tractatus, which everyone knows he totally rejected later and which is extremely confused 
and confusing as well. 
Hardly anything on his later philosophy and not a word about the two searchable CDROM’s 
which are now the starting point for all W scholars (and anyone interested in human 
behavior) which are now becoming widely disseminated freely via the net. There is also 
nothing here nor in the articles about Chomsky, innate ideas , evolution of syntax, evolution 
of semantics, evolution of pragmatics (practically every one of his 20,000 pages has to do 
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with novel ideas and examples on these two), schema theory etc., nor about how he 
anticipated Chomsky in studying “depth grammar”, described the problem of 
underdetermination or combinatorial explosion, nor a word about his discovery (repeatedly 
and in detail—e.g., RPP Vol. 2 p20) some 20 years before Wason of the reasons for “glitches” 
in “if p then q” types of constructions now analyzed by the Wason selection tests (one of the 
standard tools of EP research), nor about how his work can be seen as anticipating many 
ideas in evolutionary psychology, about his founding the modern study of intentionality, of 
dispositions as actions, of the epiphenomenality of our mental life and of the unity of 
language, math, geometry, music, art and games, nor even an explanation of what he meant 
by language games and grammar—two of his most frequently used terms. W made the 
change from trying to understand the mind as a logical, domain general structure to a 
psychological idiosyncratic domain specific one in the late 20’s but Kahneman got the Nobel 
for it in 2002, for numerous reasons, not the least of which is that they did lab work and 
statistical analysis (though W was a superb experimentalist and quite good at math). Of 
course, one cannot fault the EEL2 too much as it merely follows the similar omissions and 
lack of understanding throughout the behavioral sciences. And, I am not bringing this up 
in the way one might complain about the absence of info on ancient Chinese war rockets in 
a book on rocket engines, but because his work is still a virtually untapped mine of 
behavioral science diamonds, and, for my money, some of the most exhilarating and eye 
opening prose I have ever read. Nearly anything he has written could be used as a 
supplementary text or lab manual in any philosophy or psychology class and in much of 
law, mathematics, literature, behavioral economics, history, politics, anthropology, 
sociology and of course linguistics. 
Which brings us back to Pinker. 
 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully summarizes 
the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, intentional psychology) – 
a product of blind selfishness, moderated only slightly by automated altruism for close 
relatives carrying copies of our genes (Inclusive Fitness)--works automatically, but tries to 
end on an upbeat note by giving us hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast 
capabilities to cooperate and make the world a decent place to live. I doubt this very much 
(see my review of his ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature). 
Pinker is certainly aware of, but says little about the fact that far more about our psychology 
is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that are left out or given 
minimal attention are math and geometry, music and sounds, images, events and causality, 
ontology (classes of things), dispositions (believing, thinking, judging, intending etc.) and 
the rest of intentional psychology of action, neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual 
states (e.g., satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain damage and 
behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision theory (including game theory 
and behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language but a billion years of 
shared genetics). Many books have been written about each of these areas of intentional 
psychology. The data in this book are descriptions, not explanations that show why our 
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brains do it this way or how it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their various 
ways (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology that operates at a more 
basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most active. And there is scant attention to 
context which is critical to understanding language and in which Wittgenstein was the 
major pioneer. 
Among the countless books not referred to here are Guerino Mazzola’s excellent tome 
investigating the similarity of math and music ‘The Topos of Music’, Shulgin’s amazing 
work probing the mind with psychochemicals ‘Phikal’ and ‘Tikal’. Many others try to 
represent mental functions with geometrical or mathematical means such as Rott ‘Belief 
Revision’, Gardenfors various books, and of course the massive efforts going on in logic (e.g. 
the 20 or so Vol Handbook of Philosophical Logic) as well as many others edited or written 
by the amazing Dov Gabbay (e.g., ‘Temporal Logic’). Re spatial language-of the numerous 
volumes on the psychology, language or philosophy of space, the recent ‘Handbook of 
Spatial Logic’ (especially fun are Chap 11 on space-time and the last Chap. by Varzi) stands 
out. The point is that these logical, geometrical and mathematical works are extensions of 
our innate axiomatic psychology, and so they show in their equations and graphics 
something about the ‘shape’ or ‘form’ or ‘function’ of our thoughts (modules, templates, 
inference engines), and so also the shape of those of animals and even perhaps of computers 
(though one has to think of what test would be relevant here!). And of course. all the works 
of Wittgenstein, keeping in mind that he is sometimes talking about the most basic 
prelinguistic or even premammalian levels of thought and perception. Of course, many 
books on AI, robot navigation and image processing are relevant as they must mimic our 
psychology. Face recognition is one of our most striking abilities (though even crustaceans 
can do it) and the best recent work I know is ‘Handbook of Face Recognition’. Of the 
numerous books on space/time one can start with Klein’s ‘Language and Time’ or McLure’s 
‘The Philosophy of Time’. Smith’s ‘Language and Time’, Hawley’s ‘How Things Persist’ and 
Sider’s ‘Four- Dimensionalism’, Ludlow’s ‘Semantics, Tense and Time’ , Dainton’s ‘Time 
and Space’.and ‘Unity of Consciousness’, Diek’s ‘The Ontology of Spacetime’ and Sattig’s 
‘The Language and Reality of Time”. But as one would expect, and as detailed by Rupert 
Read, the language games here are all tangled up and most of the discussions of time are 
hopelessly incoherent. 
And also a good but now dated book covering much of relevance with articles by Searle and 
others is Vanderveken’s ‘Logic, Thought and Action’. 
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Review of Are We Hardwired? by Clark & Grunstein 
(2000) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This is an excellent review of gene/environment interactions on behavior and, in spite of 
being a bit dated, is an easy and worthwhile read. They start with twin studies which show 
the overwhelming impact of genetics on behavior. They note the increasingly well known 
studies of Judith Harris which extend and summarize the facts that shared home 
environment has almost no effect on behavior and that adopted children grow up to be as 
different from their stepbrothers and sisters as people chosen at random. One basic point 
that they (and nearly all who discuss behavioral genetics) fail to note is that the hundreds 
(thousands depending on your viewpoint) of human behavioral universals, including all 
the basics of our personalities, are 100% determined by our genes, with no variation in 
normals. Everyone sees a tree as a tree and not a stone, seeks and eats food, gets angry and 
jealous etc. So, what they are mostly talking about here is how much environment (culture) 
can affect the degree to which various traits are shown, rather than their appearance. 
Finally, they discuss eugenics in the usual politically correct fashion, failing to note that we 
and all organisms are the products of nature’s eugenics and that attempts to defeat natural 
selection with medicine, agriculture, and civilization as a whole, are disastrous for any 
society that persists in doing this. As much as 50% of all conceptions, or some 100 
million/year, end in early spontaneous abortion, nearly all without the mother being aware. 
This natural culling of defective genes drives evolution, keeps us relatively genetically 
sound and makes society possible. Dysgenics is sufficient to destroy civilization but 
overpopulation will do it first. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
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Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
This is an excellent review of gene/environment interactions on behavior and, in spite of 
being a bit dated, is an easy and worthwhile read. 
They start with twin studies, which show the overwhelming impact of genetics on behavior. 
They note the increasingly well known studies of Judith Harris which extend and 
summarize the facts that shared home environment has almost no effect on behavior and 
that adopted children grow up to be as different from their stepbrothers and sisters as 
people chosen at random. There is lots of impact on personality (ca 50% of variation) from 
early environment, presumably peer interaction, TV etc., but we really don’t know. 
They summarize the genetics of behavior in the earliest true animals, the protozoa, and note 
that many of the genes and mechanisms underlying our behavior are already present. There 
is strong selective advantage to identifying the genes of one’s potential mates and even 
protozoa have such mechanisms. There is data showing that people tend to pick out mates 
with different HLA types but the mechanism is obscure. They present various lines of 
evidence that we communicate unconsciously with pheromones via the vomeronasal 
organs and this is not mediated by smell neurons. 
One chapter reviews the biology of the nematode C. elegans, noting the fact that it shares 
many mechanisms and genes with protozoa and with us due to 
 
 
 
 
the extreme conservativism of evolution. Some human genes have been inserted into it with 
apparent preservation of their function in us. 
Moreover, they show what seem to be mechanisms of long term and short term memory 
controlled by genes in a fashion similar to that in higher organisms. 
They note the general similarity of the nonvisual cryptochome mediated regulation of 
circadian rhythms in yeasts and fruitflies to those in higher animals and even to those in 
plants. It has been shown that both cry-1 and cry- 2 cryptochrome genes are present in fruit 
flies, mice and humans and that the photoreceptor system is active in many body cells other 
than the retina, and researchers have even been able to trigger circadian rhythms from light 
shined on our leg! 
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After a brief survey of work on the famous slug Aplysia and the cAMP and Calmodulin 
systems, they review the data on human neurotransmitters. The chapter on aggression notes 
the impulsive aggression of low serotonin mice and the effects on aggressive behavior of 
mutations/drugs that affect the chemistry of nitric oxide— recently, to the amazement of all, 
identified as a major neurotransmitter or neuromodulator. 
In a chapter on consumption, they recount the now well known story of leptin and its role 
in regulation of food intake. Then a summary of the genetics of sexual behavior. 
One basic point that they (and nearly all who discuss behavioral genetics) fail to note is that 
the hundreds (thousands depending on your viewpoint) of human behavioral universals, 
including all the basics of our personalities, are 100% determined by our genes, with no 
variation in normals. Everyone sees a tree as a tree and not a stone, seeks and eats food, gets 
angry and jealous etc. So, what they are mostly talking about here is how much environment 
(culture) can affect the degree to which various traits are shown, rather than their 
appearance. 
There are also highly active fields studying human behavior which they barely mention— 
evolutionary psychology, cognitive psychology, parts of sociology, anthropology and 
behavioral economics—which are casting brilliant lights on 
 
 
 
 
behavior and showing that it is to a large extent automatic and unconscious with little 
voluntary awareness or control. The authors bias towards biology is a huge defect. 
Finally, they discuss eugenics in the usual politically correct fashion, failing to note that we 
and all organisms are the products of nature’s eugenics and that attempts to defeat natural 
selection with medicine, agriculture, and civilization as a whole, are disastrous for any 
society that persists in it. As much as 50% of all conceptions, or some 100 million/year, end 
in early spontaneous abortion, nearly all without the mother being aware. This natural 
culling of defective genes drives evolution, keeps us relatively genetically sound and makes 
society possible. However, it is now clear that overpopulation will destroy the world before 
dysgenics has a chance. 
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THE DIGITAL DELUSION --COMPUTERS ARE 
PEOPLE AND LANGUAGE IS MATH AND HI- TECH 
WILL SAVE US 
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Scientism on Steroids: A Review of Freedom Evolves by 
Daniel Dennett (2003) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are still 
occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say 
this don´t understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same 
and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a 
verb ´to be´ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ´to eat and to drink´, as long as 
we still have the adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to 
talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the 
same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation 
seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, 
because, insofar as people think they can see the ‘limits of human understanding´, they 
believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` 
This quote is from Ludwig Wittgenstein who redefined philosophy some 70 years ago (but 
most people have yet to find this out). Dennett, though he has been a philosopher for some 
40 years, is one of them. It is also curious that both he and his prime antagonist, John Searle, 
studied under famous Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) 
but Searle more or less got the point and Dennett did not, (though it is stretching things to 
call Searle or Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett is a hard determinist (though he tries to sneak 
reality in the back door), and perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose famous book ´The Concept 
of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That book did a great job of exorcising the ghost, 
but it left the machine. 
Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others since) have 
exposed in detail. Our use of the words consciousness, choice, freedom, intention, particle, 
thinking, determines, wave, cause, happened, event (and so on endlessly) are rarely a source 
of confusion, but as soon as we leave normal life and enter philosophy (and any discussion 
detached from the environment in which language evolved—i.e., the exact context in which 
the words had meaning) chaos reigns. Like most, Dennett lacks a coherent framework - 
which Searle has called the logical structure of rationality. I have expanded on this 
 
 
considerably since I wrote this review and my recent articles show in detail what is wrong 
with Dennett's approach to philosophy, which one might call Scientism on steroids. Let me 
end with another quote from Wittgenstein--´Ambition is the death of thought´. 
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Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
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``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are still 
occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say 
this don´t understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same 
and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a 
verb ´to be´ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, as long as 
we still have the adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to 
talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the 
same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation 
seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, 
because, insofar as people think they can see `the limits of human understanding´, they 
believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` 
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language”. 
 
 
“Ambition is the death of thought” 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about 
processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know 
more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking 
at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one we thought quite innocent). —And now the analogy which was to make us understand 
our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet 
 unexplored medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And 
naturally we don’t want to deny them. W PI p308 
 
These quotes are from Ludwig Wittgenstein, who redefined philosophy some 70 years ago 
(but most people have yet to find this out). Dennett, though he has been a philosopher for 
some 40 years, is one them. It is also curious that both he and his prime antagonist, John 
Searle, studied under famous Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with 
Gilbert Ryle) but Searle at least partially got the point and Dennett did not. Dennett is a hard 
determinist (though he tries to sneak reality in the back door), and perhaps this is due to 
Ryle, whose famous book ´The Concept of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That book 
did a great job of exorcising the ghost but it left the machine. Dennett enjoys making the 
mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others since) have exposed in detail. By accident, 
just before this book, I had read ´´The Minds I´´, which Dennett coauthored with Douglas 
Hofstadter in 1981. They made some bad mistakes (see my review), and saddest of all, they 
reprinted two famous articles that pointed the way out of the mess--- Nagel´s `What is like 
to be a bat?` and an early version of John Searle´s Chinese Room argument explaining why 
computers don´t think. 
Nagel pointed out that we do not even know how to recognize what a concept of a bat´s 
mind would be like. Searle similarly explained how we lack a way to conceptualize thinking 
and how it differs from what a computer does (e.g., it can translate Chinese without 
understanding it). Likewise, we lack a clear test for recognizing what counts as good vs bad- 
-or just intelligible-- for many philosophical and scientific concepts. Our use of the words 
consciousness, choice, freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, 
happened, event (and so on endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion but as soon as we 
leave normal life and enter philosophy (and any discussion detached from the environment 
in which language evolved—i.e., the exact context in which the words had meaning) chaos 
reigns. Wittgenstein was the first to understand why and to point out how to avoid this. 
Unfortunately, he died in his prime, his works are composed almost entirely of a series of 
examples of how the mind (language) works, and he never wrote any popular books, so 
understanding of his work is restricted to a very few. 
 
Searle is one of the world´s leading philosophers and has written many extremely clear and 
highly regarded articles and books, some of which have pointed out the glaring defects in 
Dennett´s work. His review ``Consciousness Explained Away´´ of Dennett’s 1991 book 
`´Consciousness Explained´´ and his book ´´The Mystery of Consciousness´´ are very well - 
known, and show, in a way that is amazingly clear for philosophical writing, why neither 
Dennett (nor any of the hundreds of philosophers and scientists who have written on this 
topic) have come close to explaining the hard problem—i.e., how do you conceptualize 
consciousness. Of course in my view (and Wittgenstein’s) there is no ‘hard problem’ only 
confusion about the use of language. Many suspect we will never be able to ‘conceptualize’ 
any of the really important things (though I think W made it clear that they are mixing up 
the very hard scientific issue with the very simple issue of how to use the word), but it is 
clear that we are nowhere near it now as a scientific issue. My own view is that the scientific 
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 issue is straightforward as we can see ‘consciousness’ being put together a few neurons at a 
time by evolution and by development. And the ‘concept’ is a language game like any others 
and one just needs to get clear (specify clear COS) about how we will use the word. 
Dennett has mostly ignored his critics but has favored Searle with vituperative personal 
attacks. Searle has been accused by Dennett and others of being out to destroy cognitive 
psychology which is quite funny, as modern philosophy is in the narrow academic sense a 
branch of cognitive psychology (the descriptive psychology of higher order thought), and 
Searle has made it very clear for 30 years that WE are a good example of a biological machine 
that is conscious, thinks, etc. He just points out that we don´t have any idea how this 
happens. 
Searle characterizes as ´´intellectual pathology´´, the views of Dennett and all those who 
deny the existence of the very phenomena they set out to explain. 
Dennett repeats his mistakes here and leaves his reply to his critics to the penultimate page 
of the book, where we are told that they are all mistaken and it is a waste of space to show 
how! Unsurprisingly, there is not one reference to Wittgenstein or Searle in the entire book. 
There are however, many references to other old school philosophers who are as confused 
as he is. It is scientism writ large—the almost universal mistake of mixing together the real 
empirical issue of science with the issues of how the language is to be used (language games) 
of philosophy. 
Like most people, it does not cross his mind that the very inference engines he thinks with 
are forcing him to come to certain conclusions and that these will often be quite unconnected 
with or wrong about the way things are in the world. They are a jumble of evolutionary 
curiosities which do various tasks in organizing behavior that were useful for survival 
hundreds of thousands of years ago. Wittgenstein was a pioneer in doing thought 
experiments in cognitive psychology and began to elucidate the nature of these engines and 
the subtleties of language in the 30´s, and thus he made the sorts of comments that this 
review begins with. 
Dennett says (p98) that his view is compatibilism, i.e., that free will (which I hope, for 
coherence, we can equate with choice) is compatible with determinism (i.e., that ´´there is at 
any instant exactly one physically possible future´´--p25). He wants to show that 
determinism is not the same as inevitability. 
However, the whole book is smoke and mirrors by means of which choice, in the sense we 
normally understand it, disappears and we are left with ``choice``, which is something we 
cannot choose. Naturally, this echoes the fate of consciousness in his earlier book 
``Consciousness Explained``. 
 
It is remarkable that, at a time when we are just beginning to reach the point where we might 
be able to understand the basics of how a single neuron works (or how an atom works for 
that matter), that anyone should think they can make the leap to understanding the whole 
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brain and to explain its most complex phenomena. Please recall the last sentence of 
Wittgenstein from the opening quote: ´´ And what´s more, this satisfies a longing forthe 
transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can see `the limits of human 
understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` The language games 
are highly varied and exquisitely context sensitive so everyone gets lost. If we are very, very 
careful, we can lay out the language games (e.g., specify the Conditions of Satisfaction of 
various statements using the words consciousness, choice, reality, mind etc.) and clarity 
becomes possible, but Dennett throws caution to the winds and we are dragged into the 
quicksand. 
 
 
There are at least 3 different topics here (evolution of our brain, choice and morality) and 
Dennett tries vainly to weld them together into a coherent account of how freedom evolves 
from the deterministic crashing of atoms. There is, however, no compelling reason to accept 
that bouncing atoms (or his favorite example, the game of life running on a computer) are 
isomorphic with reality. It never occurs to him that unless he exactly specifies a context and 
so the COS (Conditions of Satisfaction—i.e., what makes the statements true or false), his 
statements lack meaning. He knows that quantum indeterminacy (or the uncertainty 
principle) is a major obstacle to determinism, however defined (and has been taken by many 
as an escape to freedom), but dismisses it due to the fact that such events are too rare to 
bother with. By extension, it’s unlikely that any such event will happen now or even in our 
whole lifetime in our brain, so we appear to be stuck with a determined brain (whatever 
that may be, i.e., he never specifies the COS). However, the universe is a big place and it’s 
been around a long time (perhaps ‘forever’) and if even one such quantum effect occurs it 
would seem to throw the whole universe into an indeterminate state. The notion ´´there is 
at any instant exactly one physically possible future´´ cannot be true if at any instant, a 
quantum indeterminacy can occur--in this case there would seem to be infinitely many 
possible futures. But again, what exactly are the COS of this statement? This recalls one of 
the escapes from the contradictions of physics—each instant our universe is branching into 
infinitely many universes. 
He correctly rejects the idea that quantum indeterminacy gives us the answer to how we 
can have choice. This obvious idea has been suggested by many, but the problem is that 
nobody has any idea how to specify an exact sequence of steps which starts with the 
equations of physics and ends up with the phenomena of consciousness (or any other 
emergent phenomenon). If so, they will definitely win at least one Nobel Prize, for not only 
will they have ‘explained’ consciousness, they will have ‘explained’ (or much better 
‘described’ as Wittgenstein insisted) the universal phenomenon of emergence (how higher 
order properties emerge from lower ones). So, they would have to solve the ´easy´ problem 
(to determine the exact state of the brain corresponding to some mental state and preferably 
specify the exact position of all the atoms in the brain over time-ignoring uncertainty) and 
the ´hard´ one (what exactly correlates with or produces consciousness or choice etc.?). And 
while they are at it how about also doing the impossible--an exact and full solution to the 
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quantum field equations for a brain. It is very well known that these equations are 
uncomputable, even for one atom or a vacuum, as it would require an infinite amount of 
computer time. But infinite will do for one atom so maybe a brain will take no longer. It 
never crosses his mind (nor anyone I have seen) that nobody can make clear how an atom 
‘emerges’ from electrons, neutrons and protons or a molecule emerges from atoms nor cells 
from molecules etc. Yes, there are some equations but if you look carefully you will see lots 
of hand waving and facts that are just accepted as ‘the way things are’ and so I think it 
clearly is the same with consciousness, color, choice, pain emerging from bunches of cells. 
Of course, after Wittgenstein we realize that mixed up with the scientific questions are the 
philosophical ones—i.e., the different uses (meanings, COS) of the words are not kept clear 
and so the discussions are mostly incoherent. 
He starts off on the first page appealing to the laws of physics for protection against fantastic 
notions such as immaterial souls, but physics is made of notions just as fantastic (uncertainty, 
entanglement, wave/particle duality, 
Schrodinger´s dead/alive cat etc.) and as Feynman said many times ``Nobody understands 
physics!´´ Many think nobody ever will and I am one of many who say there is nothing to 
‘understand’ but rather there is just lots of ‘things’ along with existence, space, time, matter 
etc. to accept. There is a limit to what our tiny brain can do and maybe we are at that limit 
now. 
Even if we create a massive computer that could understand (in some sense) far better than 
we, it is not clear that it could explain to us. Understanding an idea requires a certain level 
of intelligence or power (e.g., holding a certain number of things in mind and performing a 
certain number of calculations/second). Most people will never grasp the abstruse math of 
string theory no matter how long they have to do it. And it is not clear that string theory (or 
any other) makes sense as a mathematical (i.e., real) representation of our world. This 
requires clear COS which I think string theory, the quantum theory of mind etc. etc. lack. 
So, there is good reason to suppose that our supersmart computer, even if we teach it how 
to think in the ‘same’ sense that we do, will never be able to explain really complex things 
to us. But as always, we are need to specify the exact context to be able to see the meanings 
(COS) of the words and most science of this sort has no awareness of the problem. 
On the first page is one of his favorite quotes, which compares the brain to a bunch of tiny 
robots, and on pg2 he says that we are made of mindless robots. But what are the COS for 
an entity having a mind? The way the brain (and any cell) works is nothing at all like the 
way robots work and we don´t even know how to conceptualize the difference (i.e., we 
know how robots work but not how brains work—e.g., how do they make choices, 
understand images and motives etc.). As I noted above, this was pointed out by Searle 30 
years ago but Dennett (and countless others) just does not get it. 
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We are also told on the first page that science will let us understand our freedom and give 
us a better foundation for our morality. So far as I can see, neither science nor philosophy, 
nor religion, has any effect on our understanding of our freedom or morality. Although he 
discusses the biology of altruism and rational choice at length, he never mentions the 
abundant evidence from cognitive psychology that our moral intuitions are built in and 
demonstrable in 4 year old children. Instead, he spends much time trying to show how 
choice and morality come from memories of events and our interaction with others. On pg2 
he says our values have little to do with the ‘goals’ of our cells and on pg2 to 3 that our 
personality differences are due to how our ´´robotic teams are put together, over a lifetime 
of growth and experience.`` This is a bald dismissal of human nature, of the abundant 
evidence that our differences are to a large extent programmed into our genes and fixed in 
early childhood, and is typical of his constant confused wandering back and forth between 
determinism and environmentalism (i.e., his view that we develop morality over time by 
experience and by thinking aboutmoral issues). But again he mixes scientific issues with 
philosophical ones, i.e., exactly what game are we playing with “robot”, “mind”, 
“determined”, “free” etc.? Many other sections of the book show the same confusion. Those 
who don´t know the scientific evidence may wish to read Pinker´s ´´The Blank Slate´´, 
Boyer´s´´Religion Explained´´ and any of the hundred or so recent texts, and tens of 
thousands of articles and web pages on personality development, and evolutionary and 
cognitive psychology. 
On pg4 he says bison don´t know they are bison and that we have known we are mammals 
for only a few hundred years. Both show a fundamental lack of understanding of cognitive 
psychology. The cognitive templates for ontological categories were evolved, in their 
original forms, hundreds of millions of years ago and animals have the inborn ability to 
recognize others of their species and of other species and classes of animals and plants and 
objects without any learning sufficient to establish categories. Bison know they are like other 
bison and our ancestors knew they were like other mammals and that reptiles were different 
but similar to each other etc. Cognitive studies have shown these types of abilities in very 
young children. Again are we using “know” in its System 1 prelinguistic sense or in its 
System 2 linguistic one? See my other writings for the utility of the two systems of thought 
viewpoint. 
Of course, it is true that the words ´bison´ and ´mammal´ are recent, but they have nothing 
to do with how our brains work. 
 
 
On page 5 he attributes postmodernism´s hostility to science as a product of ´fearful 
thinking´ but does not speculate why that is. In spite of his acquaintance with cognitive 
psychology he does not see that this is likely due to the fact that many science results clash 
with the feelings normally produced by the operation of the inference engines for intuitive 
psychology, coalition, social mind, social exchange, etc. as I discuss elsewhere. 
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On page 9 he notes that free will is a problem and our attitudes to it make a difference, but 
for whom? Nobody but philosophers. We make choices. What´s the problem? One has to 
step outside life to experience a problem and then everything becomes a problem. What are 
consciousness, pain, yellow, intention, matter, quarks, gravity etc.? I doubt that any normal 
person has ever experienced a fundamental change in their interactions with people or their 
decision-making processes due to their thinking about choice. This shows that there is 
something strange about such questions. Wittgenstein shows that the language games are 
different. There are games for language connected with the cognitive templates for decisions, 
or seeing colors etc., and thinking philosophically is typically using the words in the wrong 
context or without any clear context (one can call this decoupled), so without clear COS 
(meaning). 
Decoupled modes permit thinking about the past, planning for the future, guessing the 
mental states of others, etc., but if one takes the results in the wrong way and starts to think 
`´John will try to steal my wallet´´, rather than just imagining that John might do it, 
confusion enters and those who cannot turn off the decoupled mode or distinguish it from 
coupled mode, enter the realm of pathology. Some aspects of schizophrenia and other 
mental illness might be seen this way--they lose control of which mode they are in, e.g., not 
being able to see the difference between the motives people have and the motives they might 
have, between one language game and another. 
One can then see much of the philosophizing people do as operating in these decoupled 
(counterfactual) modes, but failing to be able to keep in front of them the differences from 
the normal mode. Normal mode—e.g., what is that lion doing-- was undoubtedly the first 
one evolved and decoupled modes-- what did that lion do last time or what does he intend 
to do next--evolved later. This was probably never a problem for animals--any animal that 
spent too much time worrying about what might happen would not be very successful 
contributing to the gene pool. 
It is interesting to speculate that only when humans developed culture and began 
degenerating genetically, could large numbers of people survive with genes that led them 
to spend alot of time in decoupled modes. Hence, we have philosophy and this book, which 
is mostly about running the decision templates in decoupled mode where there are no real 
consequences except earning royalties for putting the results in a book for other people to 
use to run their engines in decoupled mode. Let us alter Wittgenstein´s quote to read: ´´As 
long as there continues to be a verb ´to decide´ that looks as if it functions in the same way 
as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, as long as we continue to talk of freedom of action, of saying I wish 
I had done otherwise, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling 
difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable 
of clearing up.´´ 
As with most philosophy books, nearly every page, often every paragraph, changes from 
one type of language game to another, without noticing that now one would have to be 
joking or dreaming or acting in a play or reciting a story, etc., and not actually intending 
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anything, nor describing an actual situation in the world. On page 10 he says we count on 
free will for the whole way of thinking about our lives, like we count on food and water, but 
whoever, outside philosophy, standing in front of lunch counter full of food, ever thinks 
how fine it is that they have free will so they can pick coke instead of mineral water? Even 
if I want to be a serious compatibilist and try thinking this in decoupled mode, I have to exit 
and enter nondecoupled mode to make the actual choice. Only then can I go back to 
decoupled mode to wonder what might have happened if I had not had the ability to make 
a real choice. 
Wittgenstein noted how pretend games are parasitic on real ones (this is not a trivial 
observation!). The ability to engage in very complex decoupled scenarios is already evident 
in 4 year old children. So, I would say that normally, nobody counts on having choice, but 
rather we just choose. As Wittgenstein made clear it is action based on certainty that is the 
bedrock of our life. See the recent writings of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock and my other writings. 
On the same page, he shows again that he does not grasp cognitive basics. He says we learn 
to conduct our lives in the conceptual atmosphere of choice, and that `´It appears to be a 
stable and ahistorical construct, as eternal and unchanging as arithmetic, but it is not.´´ And 
on page 13--´´It is an evolved creation of human activity and beliefs´´. The whole thrust of 
cognitive psychology (and Wittgenstein) is that we do NOT (and CANNOT) learn the basics 
of planning, deciding, promising, resenting, etc., but that these are built- in functions of the 
inference engines that work automatically and unconsciously and start running in very 
early childhood. 
 
 
On p 14 he suggests it’s probable that our having free will depends on our believing we 
have it! Do we believe we see an apple, feel a pain, are happy? The language game of belief 
is very different from that of knowing in the words are incoherent (no clear COS) in the way 
that Dennett often uses them. We can believe we have a dollar in our pocket, but if we take 
it out and look at it we can´t meaningfully then say that we still believe it (except as a joke 
etc.). The inference engine can run in decoupled (belief) mode so we can imagine having 
choices or making them, but in life we just make them, and it is only in very odd situations 
we can say that we believe we made a choice. But Dennett is saying this is the universal case. 
If making a choice had any dependence on belief than so would everything else-- 
consciousness, seeing, thinking, etc. If we take this seriously (and he says ´the serious 
problems of free will´) then we are getting into trouble and if we actually try to apply it to 
life, then madness is minutes away. He, like all philosophers until recently, had no clue that 
Wittgenstein showed us the way out of this need to ground our actions on beliefs by 
describing the actual basis of knowing which is the ungrounded ‘hinges’ or automatisms of 
System 1 thinking in his last work ‘On Certainty’. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has explained 
this over the last decade and I have summarized her work and incorporated it in my reviews 
and articles. 
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On page 65 et seq., he discusses causation, intention and the `informal predicates´ that we 
use to describe atoms etc., but cognitive research has shown that we describe all ‘objects’ 
with a limited number of ontological categories, which we analyze with our intuitive 
physics modules, and that when agents (i.e., animals or people or things like them—i.e., 
ghosts or gods) are involved, we use our concepts (engines) for agency, intuitive psychology, 
social minds, etc. to decide how to behave. There is almost certainly no causation module 
but rather it will involve all of these and other inference engines, depending on the precise 
situation. Discussing possibility and necessity is much easier if one talks in terms of the 
output of our modules for intuitive physics, agency, ontological categories etc. Of course, 
there is no mention here of Wittgenstein´s many incisive comments on the language games 
of causation, intention, deciding, nor of Searle´s classic works on Intention and Social Reality. 
He spends much time on Ainslie´s book ´Breakdown of Will´, in which is discussed the 
hyperbolic discounting faculties (i.e., inference engines) by which we evaluate probable 
outcomes. 
He makes much of the excellent work of Robert Frank on altruism, emotion and economics, 
but the book he cites was 15 years old when this book was published. It was Bingham´s idea, 
amplified by Frank and by Boyd and Richardson (1992) that cooperation was greatly 
stimulated by the evolution of means for punishing cheaters. He suggests these as examples 
of Darwinian approaches that are obligatory and promising. Indeed, they are, and in fact 
they are standard parts of economic, evolutionary and cognitive theory, but unfortunately, 
he makes little reference to the other work in these fields. All that work tends to show that 
people do not choose but their brains choose for them (System 1 fast automatic ‘choices’ vs 
System 2 slow deliberative ‘choices’). He does not establish any convincing connection 
between this work and the general problem of choice and like nearly all philosophers has 
no grasp of the powerful two systems of thought framework. 
Philosophers of all stripes have been hypnotized by their ability to decouple the inference 
engines to play `what if´´ games, loving to put counterintuitive tags on ontological 
categories (i.e., if Socrates was immortal etc.). In this respect, they share some elements with 
primitive religion (see Boyer). This is not a joke, nor an insult, but merely points out that 
once one has a grasp of modern cognitive concepts, one sees that they apply thoughout the 
whole spectrum of human activity (and it would be odd if they did not). But as Wittgenstein 
explained so beautifully, the language games and the inference engines of S2 have their 
limits--explanations come to an end--we hit bedrock (S1). But the philosopher thinks he can 
see beyond it and walks out on the water, or as Wittgenstein put it, into absolute darkness. 
On p216 he says that making oneself so that one could not have done otherwise is a key 
innovation in the evolutionary ascent to free will, and that we can only be free if we learn 
how to render ourselves insensitive to opportunities. Again, one can say anything but one 
cannot mean (state clear COS) for anything, and Dennett does not even begin to clarify the 
COS. And how these ‘abilities’ function (i.e., the games of ‘will’, ‘self’, ‘choice’, ‘cause’ etc.) 
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is never made clear. Dennett has a penchant for hiding his ideas in a massive amount of 
rather irrelevant text (i.e., he is a true philosopher!). 
Again, he gets things backwards, as there is a vast body of very good evidence from biology 
and psychology that we get the feelings that we should behave in some way from our 
inference engines, and these are not provided by some part of our conscious self, but by the 
automatic and unconscious operation of the engines. As he notes, hundreds of experiments 
with the Prisoner´s Dilemma and related protocols have shown how easy it is to manipulate 
people´s choices and that their calculations are not conscious and deliberate at all and in fact 
much of modern psychological, sociological and neuroeconomics research is devoted to 
distinguishing the automatisms of S1 from the deliberative thinking of S2 and showing how 
S1 rules. 
When the situation is manipulated to make people conscious, they are much slower and less 
reliable (S2). So, there has been constant pressure of natural selection to make the engines 
fast and automatic and inaccessible to deliberate thought. 
Dennett says `we make ourselves´ so that we could not do otherwise and that this is the 
basis of morality and choice. The evidence is exactly the opposite. Our inference engines 
give us basic moral intuitions and we generally act in accord with the results. If we or others 
do not, we feel guilt, outrage, resentment etc., and then cheater genes will invade the 
population and this is one of the main theories as to how a good part of morality evolved. 
Our genes make us so we can´t (mostly) do otherwise, not our will or whatever Dennett 
thinks can do it. We can often choose to do otherwise, but our own intuitions and the 
knowledge of social disapproval usually serve to limit our choices. These intuitions evolved 
in small groups between 50,000 and some millions of years ago. In the modern world, the 
intuitions are often not to our long-term advantage and the social controls weak. This is a 
prime reason for the inexorable progress into chaos in the world. 
On p225 he finally sneaks in a definition of free will as ´´a complicated snarl of mechanistic 
causes that look like decision making (from certain angles)”. He claims that this plays all the 
valuable roles of free will, but lacks some (unspecified) properties possessed by traditional 
free will. The smoke is thick but I am pretty sure one of those unspecified properties is what 
we understand as choice. He insists (top of pg 226) that his naturalistic account of decision 
making leaves plenty of room for moral responsibility, but making ourselves so we couldn´t 
do otherwise does not describe the way we actually function, nor does it leave any room for 
morality, as that would consist precisely in being able to do otherwise. 
He does not propose any test for deciding if a choice is voluntary or forced and I doubt he 
could do so. Normally if someone asks us to move our hand, we know what counts as 
having a choice, but, typical of philosophers, I expect that regardless of whether it moves or 
not he will count both as evidence for his position and of course if everything counts then 
nothing counts as Wittgenstein so trenchantly remarked many times. 
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At this point he also starts his discussion of Libet´s well known work on conscious attention, 
which is the only part of the book that I felt was worth my time. However, Libet’s claim that 
we make decisions without awareness has been debunked many times, by both 
psychologists and philosophers (e.g., Searle and Kihlstrom). 
 
 
On page 253 et seq., he sneaks in his definition of conscious will—the ´´brains user illusion 
of itself´´´ which has as one of its main roles providing ´´me with the means of interfacing 
with myself at other times``. And ``Illusory or not, conscious will is the persons guide to his 
or her own moral responsibility for action. `` He says the trick we need is to see that ``I`´ 
control what is happening inside the ´´simplification barrier´´... ´´where decision making 
happens´´. 
``Mental events´´ become conscious by ´´entering into memory´´. ´´The process of self 
description... is what we are´´. The crucial thing is that choice is possible because the self is 
distributed over space (the brain) and time (memories). He realizes this is going to leave 
many incredulous (everyone who can follow this and really understands the bizarre 
language games!). ´´I know that many people find it hard to grasp this idea or take it 
seriously. It seems to them to be a trick with mirrors, some kind of verbal slight of hand that 
whisks consciousness, and the real Self, out of the picture just when it was about to be 
introduced.´´ Many will say he took the words out of their mouth, but I would say it´s 
incoherent and that everything we know about consciousness and the whole universe 
(making the obvious extensions of such claims) was gone long before we got this far in his 
tome. And a careful look at the language games shows their lack of coherence (i.e., no clear 
Conditions of Satisfaction as I note in my articles). 
Like most philosophers and nearly all scientists who wax philosophical, he makes fatal 
mistakes in his first sentences – failure to use language in clear (i.e., meaningful) ways and 
all that follows is a house of cards. 
Wittgenstein stated the issue with his usual aphoristic brilliance so I repeat it again. 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about 
processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know 
more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking 
at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one we thought quite innocent). —And now the analogy which was to make us understand 
our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet 
unexplored medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And 
naturally we don’t want to deny them. W PI p308 
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On p259 he says that culture has made us rational animals! This is a stunning denial of 
human (and animal) nature (i.e., genetics and evolution) coming from the person who wrote 
´Darwin´s Dangerous Idea´´! 
 
Presumably he is talking about his idea that it is memories spread over space (the brain and 
other people) and time (much like Dawkins’ memes) that give us choices and morals and 
consciousness (line 6 from bottom). He says consciousness is a user-interface but it is never 
made clear who or where the user is and how it interfaces with the brain (you will have to 
suffer through ´Consciousness Explained’ to find that there is no answer there either). 
Though he makes many references to evolutionary and cognitive psychology, he seldom 
uses any of the terminology that has been current for decades (social mind, intuitive 
psychology, coalitional intuitions etc.) and clearly is not familiar with most of the concepts. 
If he means that we got the fine details of morality from culture, that’s ok, but this is the S2 
icing on the cake and the S1 cake was baked by the genes. 
We are also told here that R&D (by which he means evolution here, but other things 
elsewhere) has given us the self and that language creates a new kind of consciousness and 
morality. I am sure that he will get little agreement on this. It seems quite clear that 
consciousness and the basics of morality evolved in primates (and earlier) long before 
spoken language (though it is very contentious as to how language evolved from extant 
capacities in the brain). 
He continues ``morality memes arose by accident some tens of thousands of years ago`` 
which would be OK if he meant the icing on the cake but he clearly means the cake! And 
then he says the point of morality is not the survival of our genes, which is an amazing (and 
totally incorrect) thing to say, even if he was only referring to memes. 
On p260 he claims that because we do not comprehend our ´´bland dispositions to 
cooperate´´, they mean nothing to us, but it is the operation of our templates (i.e., reciprocal 
altruism promoting inclusive fitness) that is everything to us and to every action of all 
animals. As Dawkins recently noted in his comments on E.O Wilson’s disastrous recent 
work supporting the phantasm of ‘group selection’, natural selection is inclusive fitness (see 
my review of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’). There is ample evidence that if one 
of our many ‘templates’ is damaged, a person cannot function properly as a social being 
(e.g., autism, sociopathy, schizophrenia). I would say it is the operation of the templates for 
intuitive psychology etc., which lead people when philosophizing to the counterintuitive 
views that we do not have consciousness and choice. 
He also says here that it was one of the major evolutionary transitions when we were able 
to change our views and reflect on reasons for them. This again reflects his lack of 
understanding of evolutionary psychology. I know of no evidence that the basic moral 
intuitions, like all the templates, are accessible to consciousness but there is a huge body of 
work showing the opposite. We may decide our cheating was justifiable, or forgive someone 
else´s cheating, but we still know it was cheating (i.e., we cannot change the engine). I 
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suspect my ancestors a million years ago had the same feelings in the same situation, but 
what has happened is that there are now lots of other things that may be taken as relevant, 
and that sometimes these will lead me to act contrary to my feelings. Another issue is that 
as culture developed, one had to make many important or ´moral type` decisions for which 
the engines were not evolved to give a clear answer. 
On p267 he says that we now replace our `free floating rationales´ (probably corresponding 
to what cognitive psychologists call our templates or inference engines) with reflection and 
mutual persuasion. And on p286 he says that it is a child´s upbringing --demanding and 
giving reasons-- that affects moral reasoning. Again, he just has no grasp of what has 
happened in the last 30 years of research--the templates are innate S1 automatisms and 
cannot change with reflection or upbringing. We are then told again that consciousness 
makes moral issues available over time to the self, which takes responsibility. It is not any 
more coherent or credible with repetition. 
 
 
On p289 he has a chapter summary which repeats the mistaken notions that it is culture that 
makes it possible to reflect and that choice depends on education (memory) and sharing. 
It´s clear that it is not culture but the inherited cognitive structures that make it possible to 
reflect and to choose and that culture determines the acceptable actions and their rewards 
or punishments. On pg. 303 he discusses the classic philosophical barrier between ´ought´ 
and ´is´, unaware that our templates solved that problem long ago— i.e., they tell us how to 
feel about situations regarding other people. He also seems to be unaware that there are 
hundreds of ‘cultural’ universals implanted in our genes (e.g. see Pinker’s ´The Blank Slate´) 
and also of Searle’s classic paper “How to derive Ought from Is”. 
He often starts into what looks like it’s going to be a good discussion of some issues in 
evolutionary psychology, but invariably wanders off into philosophical arcana and winds 
up with more confusion. This happens on pg. 261 where he states that concepts like 
´praiseworthy´ were shaped over millennia by culture, while most would say the basis for 
such concepts is in the genes and each culture only determines the details of acceptable 
reactions to the intuitions its members get from their innate mechanisms. On pg 262 he tries 
to explain how an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy) can produce morality. His idea here 
is that genetic `R&D` (i.e., evolution) produces dim understandings of morals and then 
culture (memetics) produces variations and clarifications. I would say that we all know, and 
much research has made clear, that we commonly get very clear results from our inference 
engines and only dimly understand in special cases. Culture merely decides what we can 
do about our feelings. 
The last part of the book is mostly concerned with moral culpability. He refers to the legal 
classic by Hart and Honore, which I started reading 30 years ago, since its authors were 
deeply influenced by Wittgenstein. Dennett tells us that we have control over our own 
morality and that thinking about morality will improve us. But, there seems no justification 
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whatever for this view in this book. There is nothing at all here to help anyone escape from 
the dictates of the monkey mind and I am quite sure that when industrial civilization 
collapses in the 22nd century people will be acting as their ancestors did 200,000 years ago. 
It is a defensible point of view that those who manage to escape do so by traveling a spiritual 
path that has no connection with philosophy - and there is not a hint of spirituality in this 
entire book--another telling point considering that many mystics have fascinating things to 
say about the functioning of the mind. I find more wisdom about how to be free and moral 
in any of Osho´s 200 books and tapes than anywhere in philosophy. 
Unsurprisingly, one rarely finds spiritually and morally advanced people teaching at 
universities. There is no sign here, nor in anything he has done, that Dennett is morally 
superior. After 40 years of thinking about morality he launches personal attacks on his critics 
or arrogantly dismisses them. It seems clear that, like all of us, he is trapped in the limits of 
his inference engines. 
So, how much opportunity is there to improve our morality? It seems clear (e.g., see Pinker´s 
`The Blank Slate`) that most of our behavior is genetic and the rest due to unknown factors 
in our environment, in spite of the vigorous efforts of parents and religions and political 
parties. On average, maybe 5% of the variation in moral behavior (variations are the only 
thing we can study) is due to our own efforts (culture). The moral choices that matter most 
today are those affecting the fate of the world. But our templates were not evolved to deal 
with overpopulation (except by murder) and climate change (except by moving elsewhere 
and killing any opposition). 
 
 
How remarkable it would be if just one of the hundreds of millions of educated people in 
the world managed to figure out what consciousness or choice or any mental phenomenon 
really is (i.e., how to describe its neurophysiological correlates). And if one did, we would 
expect them to be a scientist at the cutting edge of research using some exotic fMRI 
equipment and the latest parallel processing neural networked fuzzy logic computer etc. 
And that would only mean they specify the neural circuits and biochemistry/genetics. 
So, they cannot answer the questions of philosophy (the language games of the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought). But it needs no answer –like the existence of space, 
time, matter, it’s just the way things are and the philosopher’s job is to clarify the language 
games we can play with these words. But, a philosopher or physicist just sitting there 
thinking, coming up with a scientific solution to the greatest scientific puzzle there is! And 
then writing a whole book about it without checking with the sceptics first. To return to the 
quote at the beginning--´Ambition is the death of thought´. 
Indeed--though clearly Wittgenstein was thinking of profound thought! 
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Review of I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas 
Hofstadter (2007) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor Hofstadter. Like 
his much more famous (or infamous for its relentless philosophical errors) work Godel, 
Escher, Bach, it has a superficial plausibility but if one understands that this is rampant 
scientism which mixes real scientific issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues 
are what language games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I provide 
a framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the work of Wittgenstein 
(since updated in my more recent writings). 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
“It might justly be asked what importance Gödel's proof has for our work. For a piece of 
mathematics cannot solve problems of the sort that trouble us. --The answer is that the 
situation, into which such a proof brings us, is of interest to us. 'What are we to say now?'-- 
That is our theme. However, queer it sounds, my task as far as concerns Gödel's proof seems 
merely to consist in making 
 
 
 
 
clear what such a proposition as: ‘Suppose this could be proved’ means in mathematics.” 
Wittgenstein “Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics” p337(1956) (written in 1937). 
“My theorems only show that the mechanization of mathematics, i.e., the elimination of the 
mind and of abstract entities, is impossible, if one wants to have a satisfactory foundation 
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and system of mathematics. I have not proved that there are mathematical questions that 
are undecidable for the human mind, but only that there is no machine (or blind formalism) 
that can decide all number- theoretic questions, (even of a very special kind). It is not the 
structure itself of the deductive systems which is being threatened with a breakdown, but 
only a certain interpretation of it, namely its interpretation as a blind formalism.” Gödel 
"Collected Works" Vol 5, p 176-177. (2003) 
“All inference takes place a priori. The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of 
the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus. The freedom of the will consists in 
the fact that future actions cannot be known now. We could only know them if causality 
were an inner necessity, like that of logical deduction. -- The connexion of knowledge and 
what is known is that of logical necessity. (“A knows that p is the case” is senseless if p is a 
tautology.) If from the fact that a proposition is obvious to us, it does not follow that it is 
true, then obviousness is no justification for belief in its truth.” TLP 5.133-- 5.1363 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book” p6 (1933) 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems 
of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this 
itself is the answer.” Wittgenstein TLP 6.52 (1922) 
I have read some 50 reviews of this book (that by quantum physicist David Deutsch was 
perhaps the best) and none of them provide a satisfying framework, so I will try to give 
novel comments that will be useful, not only for this book but for any book in the behavioral 
sciences (which can include ANY book, if one grasps the ramifications). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like his classic Gödel, Escher, Bach: The Eternal Golden Braid, and many of his other 
writings, this book by Hofstadter (H) tries to find correlations or connections or analogies 
that shed light on consciousness and all of human experience. As in GEB, he spends a great 
deal of time explaining and drawing analogies with the famous “incompleteness” theorems 
of Gödel, the “recursive” art of Escher and the “paradoxes” of language (though, as with 
most people, he does not see the need to put these terms in quotes, and this is the core of the 
problem). The idea is that their seemingly bizarre consequences are due to “strange loops” 
and that such loops are in some way operative in our brain. In particular, they may “give 
rise” to our self, which he seems roughly to equate with consciousness and thinking. As 
with everyone, when he starts to talk about how his mind works, he goes seriously astray. I 
suggest that it is in finding the reasons for this that the interest in this book, and most general 
commentary on behavior lies. 
computers performing some arbitrary calculation. He spends a lot of time explaining 
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I will contrast the ideas of ISL with those of the philosopher (descriptive psychologist of 
higher order thought) Ludwig Wittgenstein (W), whose commentaries on psychology, 
written from 1912 to 1951, have never been surpassed for their depth and clarity. He is an 
unacknowledged pioneer in evolutionary psychology (EP) and developer of the modern 
concept of intentionality. He noted that the fundamental problem in philosophy is that we 
do not see our automatic innate mental processes and how these generate our language 
games. He gave many illustrations (one can regard the entire 20,000 pages of his nachlass as 
an illustration), some of them for words like “is” and “this, and noted that all the really basic 
issues usually slip by without comment. A major point which he developed was that nearly 
all of our intentionality (roughly, our evolutionary psychology (EP), rationality or 
personality) is invisible to us and such parts as enter our consciousness are largely 
epiphenomenal (i.e., irrelevant to our behavior). The fact that nobody can describe their 
mental processes in any satisfying way, that this is universal, that these processes are rapid 
and automatic and very complex, tells us that they are part of the “hidden” cognitive 
modules (templates or inference engines) that have been gradually fixed in animal DNA 
over more than 500 million years. Please see my other writings for details. 
As in virtually all writing which tries to explain behavior (philosophy, psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, history, politics, theology, and even, as with H, math and physics), 
I am a Strange Loop (ISL) commits this kind of error (oblivion to our automaticity) 
continually and this produces the puzzles which it then tries to solve. The title of ISL 
comprises words we all know, but as W noted, word uses can be seen as families of language 
games (grammar) which have many senses (uses or meanings), each with its own contexts. 
We know what these are in practice but if we try describing them or philosophizing 
(theorizing) about them, we nearly always go astray and say things that may appear to have 
sense but lack the context to give them sense. 
It never crosses Hofstadter’s mind that both “strange” and “loop” are out of context and 
lack any clear sense (to say nothing about “I” and “am”!). If you go to Wikipedia, you find 
many uses (games as W often said) for these words and if you look around in ISL you will 
find them referred to as if they were all one. Likewise, for “consciousness”, “reality”, 
“paradox”, “recursive”, “self referential”, etc. So, we are hopelessly adrift from the very first 
page, as I expected from the title. A loop in a rope can have a very clear sense and likewise 
a diagram of a steam engine governor feedback loop, but what about loops in mathematics 
and the mind? H does not see the “strangest loop” of all—that we use our consciousness, 
self and will to deny themselves! 
Regarding Gödel’s famous theorems, in what sense can they be loops? What they are almost 
universally supposed to show is that certain basic kinds of mathematical systems are 
incomplete in the sense that there are “true” theorems of the system whose “truth” (the 
unfortunate word mathematicians commonly substitute for validity) or “falsity (invalidity) 
cannot be proven in the system. Though H does not tell you, these theorems are logically 
equivalent to Turing’s “incompleteness” solution of the famous halting problem for 
definitive summary of W and the foundations of math. He lays to rest the previously 
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Gödel’s original proof, but fails to mention that others subsequently found vastly shorter 
and simpler proofs of “incompleteness” in math and proved many related concepts. The 
one he does briefly mention is that of contemporary mathematician Gregory Chaitin—an 
originator with Kolmogorov and others of Algorithmic Information Theory-- who has 
shown that such “incompleteness” or “randomness” (Chaitin’s term-- though this is another 
game), is much more extensive than long thought, but does not tell you that both Gödel’s 
and Turing’s results are corollaries to Chaitin’s theorem and an instance of “algorithmic 
randomness”. You should refer to Chaitin’s more recent writings such as “The Omega 
Number (2005)”, as Hofstadter’s only ref. to Chaitin is 20 years old (though Chaitin has no 
more grasp of the larger issues here –i.e., innate intentionality as the source of the language 
games in math-- than does H and shares the ‘Universe is a Computer” fantasy as well). 
Hofstadter takes this “incompleteness” (another word (conceptual) game out of context) to 
mean that the system is self referential or “loopy” and “strange”. It is not made clear why 
having theorems that seem to be (or are) true (i.e., valid) in the system, but not provable in 
it, makes it a loop nor why this qualifies as strange nor why this has any relationship to 
anything else. 
It was shown quite convincingly by Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (i.e., shortly after Gödel’s 
proof) that the best way to look at this situation is as a typical language game (though a new 
one for math at the time)—i.e., the “true but unprovable” theorems are “true” in a different 
sense (since they require new axioms to prove them). They belong to a different system, or 
as we ought now to say, to a different intentional context. No incompleteness, no loops, no 
self reference and definitely not strange! W: “Gödel's proposition, which asserts something 
about itself, does not mention itself” and “Could it be said: Gödel says that one must also 
be able to trust a mathematical proof when one wants to conceive it practically, as the proof 
that the propositional pattern can be constructed according to the rules of proof? Or: a 
mathematical proposition must be capable of being conceived as a proposition of a 
geometry which is actually applicable to itself. And if one does this it comes out that in 
certain cases it is not possible to rely on a proof.” (RFM p336). These remarks barely give a 
hint at the depth of W’s insights into mathematical intentionality, which began with his first 
writings in 1912 but was most evident in his writings in the 30’s and 40’s. W is regarded as 
a difficult and opaque writer due to his aphoristic, telegraphic style and constant jumping 
about with seldom and notice that he has changed topics, nor indeed what the topic is, but 
if one starts with his only textbook style work—the Blue and Brown Books --and 
understands that he is explaining how our evolved higher order thought works, it will all 
become clear to the persistent. 
W lectured on these issues in the 1930’s and this has been documented in several of his 
books. There are further comments in German in his nachlass (some of it formerly available 
only on a $1000 cdrom but now, like nearly all his works, on p2p torrents, libgen,io and b- 
ok.org. Canadian philosopher Victor Rodych has recently written two articles on W and 
Gödel in the journal Erkenntnis and 4 others on W and math, which I believe constitute a 
 popular notion that W did not understand incompleteness (and much else concerning the 
psychology of math). In fact, so far as I can see W is one of very few to this day who does 
(and NOT including Gödel! —though see his penetrating comment quoted above). Related 
forms of “paradox” which exercise H (and countless others) so much was extensively 
discussed by W with examples in math and language and seems to me a natural 
consequence of the piecemeal evolution of our symbolic abilities that extends also to music, 
art, games etc. Those who wish contrary views will find them everywhere and regarding W 
and math, they may consult Chihara in Philosophical Review V86, p365-81(1977). I have 
much respect for Chihara (I am one of few who have read his “A Structural Account of 
Mathematics” cover to cover) but he fails on many basic issues such as W’s explanations of 
paradoxes as unavoidable and almost always harmless facets of our EP. 
Years after I did this original review I wrote one on Yanofsky’s ‘Beyond the Limits of 
Thought’ and in the next few paragraphs I repeat here the comments on incompleteness I 
made there. In fact that whole review is relevant, especially the remarks on Wolpert. 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed in symbolic 
systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” and full of tasks or 
situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible (i.e., they have no solution-see 
below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems unavoidable that everything derived from it— 
e.g. physics and math) will be “incomplete” also. Afaik the first of these in what is now 
called Social Choice Theory or Decision Theory (which are continuous with the study of 
logic and reasoning and philosophy) was the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow over 60 
years ago, and there have been many since. Y notes a recent impossibility or incompleteness 
proof in two-person game theory. In these cases, a proof shows that what looks like a simple 
choice stated in plain English has no solution. 
Although one cannot write a book about everything, I would have liked Yanofsky to at least 
mention such famous “paradoxes” as Sleeping Beauty (dissolved by Rupert Read), 
Newcomb’s problem (dissolved by Wolpert) and Doomsday, where what seems to be a very 
simple problem either has no one clear answer, or it proves exceptionally hard to find one. 
A mountain of literature exists on Godel’s two “incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s 
more recent work, but I think that W’s writings in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. 
 
Although Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright and others have 
done insightful work, it is only recently that W’s uniquely penetrating analysis of the 
language games being played in mathematics have been clarified by Floyd (e.g., 
‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a Variation on Cantor and Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s 
Paradox and Wittgenstein’s Reasons , and ‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes 
Paraconsistent Sense’ and the book ‘There’s Something about Godel ‘, and Rodych ( e.g., 
Wittgenstein and Godel: the Newly Published Remarks’, ‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New 
Arguments about Wittgenstein’, ‘New Remarks by Wittgenstein’ and his article in the online 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics’ ). Berto is 
one of the best recent philosophers, and those with time might wish to consult his many 
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other articles and books including the volume he co-edited on paraconsistency (2013). 
Rodych’s work is indispensable, but only two of a dozen or so papers are free online with 
the usual search but of course it’s all free online if one knows where to look (e.g., libgen.is 
and b- ok.org). 
 
 
Berto notes that W also denied the coherence of metamathematics--i.e., the use by Godel of 
a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for his “notorious” interpretation of 
Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept his argument, I think we are forced to deny 
the intelligibility of metalanguages, metatheories and meta anything else. How can it be that 
such concepts (words) as metamathematics and incompleteness, accepted by millions (and 
even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal fundamental truths 
about our mind or the universe) are just simple misunderstandings about how language 
works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical notions 
(e.g., mind and will as illusions –Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no 
practical impact whatsoever? Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not 
possible that the very same sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a 
formal system… and demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency hypothesis) 
in a different system (the meta-system). If, as Wittgenstein maintained, the proof establishes 
the very meaning of the proved sentence, then it is not possible for the same sentence (that 
is, for a sentence with the same meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided 
in a different system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea that a 
formal system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic consequence that no formal 
system proving only arithmetical truths can prove all arithmetical truths. If proofs establish 
the meaning of arithmetical sentences, then there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there 
cannot be incomplete meanings.” And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical 
arithmetics based on a paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a reality. What is more important, 
the theoretical features of such theories match precisely with some of the aforementioned 
Wittgensteinian intuitions…Their inconsistency allows them also to escape from Godel’s 
First Theorem, and from Church’s undecidability result: they are, that is, demonstrably 
complete and decidable. They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to 
which there cannot be mathematical problems that can be meaningfully formulated within 
the system, but which the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the decidability of 
paraconsistent arithmatics harmonizes with an opinion Wittgenstein maintained thoughout 
his philosophical career.” 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our behavior 
in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a motley of pieces assembled 
by the random processes of natural selection. “Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept 
of ‘mathematics’, which is indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” 
and we can say (contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Chaitin show. W 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems derived from 
axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the definitions, and this is utterly 
83 304  
different from empirical matters where one applies a test. W often noted that to be 
acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must 
have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it 
cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for 
Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot be used in the 
real world either. As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a 
mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra- systemic 
application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring 
or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant to apply our normal 
use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to 
a result in the tangle of games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and 
with ‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On 
Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus 
because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is meaning 
[semantics]…” 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real number’ has 
much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, being misled by certain 
analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other comments (see Rodych and Floyd). 
In any case, it would seem that the fact that Gödel’s result has had zero impact on math 
(except to stop people from trying to prove completeness!) should have alerted H to its 
triviality and the “strangeness” of trying to make it a basis for anything. I suggest that it be 
regarded as another conceptual game that shows us the boundaries of our psychology. Of 
course, all of math, physics, and human behavior can usefully be taken this way. 
While on the topic of W, we should note that another work which H spends a lot of time on 
is Whitehead and Russell’s classic of mathematical logic “Principia Mathematica”, primarily 
since it was at least partly responsible for Gödel’s work leading to his theorems. W had gone 
from Russell’s beginning logic student to his teacher in about a year, and Russell had picked 
him to rewrite the Principia. But W had major misgivings about the whole project (and all 
of philosophy as it turned out) and, when he returned to philosophy in the 30’s, he showed 
that the idea of founding math (or rationality) on logic was a profound mistake. W is one of 
the world’s most famous philosophers and made extensive commentaries on Gödel and the 
foundations of mathematics and the mind; is a pioneer in EP (though nobody seems to 
realize this); the discoverer of the basic outline and functioning of higher order thought and 
much else, and it is amazing that Dennett &H, after half a century of study, are completely 
oblivious to the thoughts of the greatest intuitive psychologist of all time (though they have 
almost 8 billion for company). There is, as some have remarked, a collective amnesia 
regarding W not only in psychology (for which his works should be in universal service as 
texts and lab manuals) but in all the behavioral sciences including, amazingly, philosophy. 
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H’s association with Daniel Dennett (D), another famously confused writer on the mind, has 
certainly done nothing to help him learn new perspectives in the nearly 30 years since GEB. 
In spite of the fact that D has written a book on intentionality (a field which, in its modern 
version, was essentially created by W), H seems to have no acquaintance with it at all. 
Perceptions leading to memories, feeding into dispositions (inclinations)(W’s terms, also 
used by Searle, but called “propositional attitudes by others) such as believing and 
supposing, which are not mental states and have no precise duration etc/, are momentous 
advances in understanding how our mind works, which W discovered in the 20’s, but with 
threads going back to his writings before the first world war. 
The Eternal Golden Braid is not realized by H to be our innate Evolutionary Psychology, 
now, 150 years later (i.e., since Darwin), becoming a burgeoning field that is fusing 
psychology, cognitive science, economics, sociology, anthropology, political science, 
religion, music (e.g., G. Mazzola’s “The Topos of Music”—topos are substitutes for sets, one 
of the great science (psychology) books of the 21st century, though he is clueless about W 
and most of the points in this review), art, math, physics and literature. H has ignored or 
rejected many persons one might regard as our greatest teachers in the realm of the mind— 
W, Buddha, John Lilly, John Searle, Osho, Adi Da (see his “The Knee of Listening”), 
Alexander Shulgin and countless others. The vast majority of the insights from philosophy, 
as well as those from quantum physics, probability, meditation, EP, cognitive psychology 
and psychedelics do not rate even a passing reference here (nor in most philosophical 
writings of scientists). 
Though there are some good books in his bibliography, there are many I would regard as 
standard references and hundreds of major works in cognitive science, EP, math and 
probability, and philosophy of mind and science that are not there (nor in his other writings). 
His sniping at Searle is petty and pointless—the frustration of someone who has no grasp 
of the real issues. In my estimation, neither H nor anyone else has provided a convincing 
reason to reject the Chinese room argument (the most famous article in this field) that 
computers don’t think (NOT that they cannot ever do something that we might want to call 
thinking— which Searle admits is possible). And Searle has (in my view) organized and 
extended W’s work in books such as “The Construction of Social Reality” and “Rationality 
in Action’-- brilliant summations of the organization of HOT (higher order thought—i.e., 
intentionality)—rare philosophy books you can even make perfect sense of once you 
translate a little jargon into English! H, D and countless others in cognitive science and AI 
are incensed with Searle because he had the temerity to challenge (destroy- I would say) 
their core philosophy –the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) almost 30 years ago and 
continues to point this out (though one can say that W destroyed it before it existed). Of 
course, they (nearly) all reject the Chinese room or simply ignore it, but the argument is, in 
the view of many, unanswerable. The recent article by Shani (Minds and Machines V15, 
p207- 228(2005)) is a nice summary of the situation with references to the excellent work of 
Bickhard on this issue. Bickhard has also developed a seemingly more realistic theory of 
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mind that uses nonequilibrium thermodynamics, in place of Hofstadter’s concepts of 
intentional psychology used outside the contexts necessary to give them sense. 
 
Few realize that W again anticipated everyone on these issues with numerous comments on 
what we now call CTM, AI or machine intelligence, and even did thought experiments with 
persons doing “translations” into Chinese. I had noticed this (and countless other close 
parallels with Searle’s work) when I came upon Diane Proudfoot’s paper on W and the 
Chinese Room in the book “Views into the Chinese Room” (2005). One can also find many 
gems related to these issues in Cora Diamond’s edition of the notes taken in W’s early 
lectures on math “Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 
1934(1976). W’s own “Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics” covers similar ground. 
One of the very few who has surveyed W’s views on this in detail is Christopher Gefwert, 
whose excellent pioneering book “Wittgenstein on Minds, Machines and Mathematics” 
(1995), is almost universally ignored. Though he was writing before there was any serious 
thought concerning electronic computers or robots, W realized that the basic issue here is 
very simple---computers lack a psychology (and even 70 years later we have barely a clue 
how to give them one), and it is only in the context of a being with a fully developed 
intentionality that dispositional terms like thinking, believing etc. make sense (have a 
meaning or clear COS), and as usual he summed it all up in his unique aphoristic way “But 
a machine surely cannot think! --Is that an empirical statement? No. We only say of a human 
being and what is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no doubt of spirits too. 
Look at the word "to think" as a tool.” (Philosophical Investigations p113). Out of context, 
many of W’s comments may appear insipid or just wrong, but the perspicacious will find 
that they usually repay prolonged reflection—he was nobody’s fool. 
Hofstadter, in all his writings, follows the common trend and makes much of “paradoxes”, 
which he regards as self references, recursions or loops, but there are many “inconsistencies” 
in intentional psychology (math, language, perception, art etc.) and they have no effect, as 
our psychology evolved to ignore them. Thus, “paradoxes” such as “this sentence is false” 
only tell us that “this” does not refer to itself or if you prefer that this is one of infinitely 
many arrangements of words lacking a clear sense. Any symbolic system we have (i.e., 
language, math, art, music, games etc.) will always have areas of conflict, insoluble or 
counterintuitive problems or unclear definitions. Hence, we have Gödel’s theorems, the 
liar’s paradox, inconsistencies in set theory, prisoner’s dilemmas, Schrodinger’s dead/live 
cat, Newcomb’s problem, Anthropic principles, Bayesian statistics, notes you can’t sound 
together or colors you can’t mix together and rules that can’t be used in the same game. A 
set of subindustries within Decision Theory, Behavioral Economics, Game Theory, 
Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology, Law, Political Science etc. and even the Foundations 
of Physics and Math (where it is commonly disguised as Philosophy of Science) has arisen 
which deals with endless variations on “real” (e.g., quantum mechanics) or contrived ((e.g., 
Newcomb’s problem—see Analysis V64, p187- 89(2004)) situations where our psychology – 
evolved only to get food, find mates and avoid becoming lunch—gives ambivalent results, 
or just breaks down. 
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Virtually none of those writing the hundreds of articles and countless books on these issues 
which appear yearly seem aware they are studying the limits of our innate psychology and 
that Wittgenstein usually anticipated them by over half a century. Typically, he took the 
issue of paradox to the limit, pointing to the common occurrence of paradox in our thinking, 
and insisted that even inconsistencies were not a problem (though Turing, attending his 
classes, disagreed), and predicted the appearance of inconsistent logical systems. 
Decades later, dialetheic logics were invented and Priest in his recent book on them has 
called W’s views prescient. If you want a good recent review of some of the many types of 
language paradoxes (though with no awareness that W pioneered this in the 1930’s and 
largely innocent of any grasp of intentional context) see Rosenkranz and Sarkohi’s 
“Platitudes Against Paradox” in Erkenntnis V65, p319-41(2006). Appearance of many W 
related articles in this journal is most appropriate as it was founded in the 30’s by logical 
positivists whose bible was W’s Tractus Logico Philosophicus. Of course, there is also a 
journal devoted to W and named after his most famous work— “Philosophical 
Investigations”. 
H, in line with nearly universal practice, refers often to our “beliefs” for “explanations” of 
behavior, but our shared psychology does not rest on belief— we just have awareness and 
pains and know from infancy that animals are conscious, self-propelled agents that are 
different from trees and rocks. Our mother does not teach us that any more than a dog’s 
mother does and could not teach us! And, if this is something we learn, then we might teach 
a child (or a dog) that a bird and a rock are really the same kind of thing (i.e., to ignore innate 
intentional psychology). 
W clearly and repeatedly noted the underdetermination of all our concepts (e.g., see his 
comments on addition and the completion of series in Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics), which mandated their becoming innate (ie, evolution had to solve this 
problem by sacrificing countless quadrillions of creatures whose genes did not make the 
right choices). 
Nowadays this is commonly called the problem of combinatorial explosion and often 
pointed to by evolutionary psychologists as compelling evidence for innateness, unaware 
that W anticipated them by over 50 years. 
Our innate psychology does not rest on “beliefs” when it is clearly not subject to test or 
doubt or revision (e.g., try to give a sense to “I believe I am reading this review” and mean 
(i.e., find a real use in our normal life for) something different from “I am reading this 
review”). Yes, there are always derivative uses of any sentence including this one, but these 
are parasitic on the normal use. Before any “explanations” (really just clear descriptions, as 
W noted) are possible, it has to be clear that the origins of our behavior lie in the axioms of 
our innate psychology, which are the basis for all understanding, and that philosophy, math, 
literature, science, and society are their cultural extensions. 
87 308  
Dennett (and anyone who is tempted to follow him—i.e., everyone) is forced into even more 
bizarre claims by his skepticism (for I claim it is a thinly veiled secret of all reductionists that 
they are skeptics at heart—i.e., they must deny the “reality” of everything). In his book “The 
Intentional Stance” and other writings he tries to eliminate this bothersome psychology that 
puts animals in a different class from computers and the ‘physical universe’ by including 
our innate evolved intentionality with the derived intentionality of our cultural creations 
(i.e., thermometers, pc’s and airplanes) by noting that it’s our genes, and so ultimately 
nature (i.e., the universe), and not we that “really” has intentionality, and so it’s all 
“derived”. Clearly something is gravely amiss here! One thinks immediately that it must 
then also be true that since nature and genes produce our physiology, there must be no 
substantive difference between our heart and an artificial one we make from plastic. For the 
grandest reductionist comedy in recent years see Wolfram’s “A New Kind of Science” which 
shows us how the universe and all its processes and objects are really just “computers” and 
“computation” (which he does not realize are intentional concepts having no meaning apart 
from our psychology and that he has NO TEST to distinguish a computation from a 
noncomputation—i.e., he eliminates psychology by definition). 
One sees that Dennett does not grasp the basic issues of intentionality by the title of his book. 
Our psychology is not a stance or attribution or posit about ourself, or other being’s mental 
lives, any more than it’s a “stance” that they possess bodies. A young child or a dog does 
not guess or suppose and does not and could not learn that people and animals are agents 
with minds and desires and that they are fundamentally different from trees and rocks and 
lakes. They know (live) these concepts (shared psychology) from birth and if they weaken, 
death or madness supervene. 
This brings us again to W who saw that reductionist attempts to base understanding on 
logic or math or physics were incoherent. We can only see from the standpoint of our innate 
psychology, of which they are all extensions. Our psychology is arbitrary only in the sense 
that one can imagine ways in which it might be different, and this is the point of W inventing 
odd examples of language games (i.e., alternative concepts (grammars) or forms of life). In 
doing so, we see the boundaries of our psychology. The best discussion I have seen on W’s 
imaginary scenarios is that of Andrew Peach in PI 24: p299- 327(2004). 
It seems to me that W was the first one to understand in detail (with due respects to Kant) 
that our life is based on our evolved psychology, which cannot be challenged without losing 
meaning. If one denies the axioms of math, one cannot play the game. One can place a 
question mark after every axiom and every theorem derived from them but what is the point? 
Philosophers, theologians and the common person can play at this game as long as they 
don’t take it seriously. Injury, death, jail or madness will come quickly to those who do. Try 
to deny that you are reading this page or that these are your two hands or there is a world 
outside your window. The attempt to enter into a conceptual game in which these things 
can be doubted presupposes the game of knowing them—and there cannot be a test for the 
axioms of our psychology—anymore than for those of math (derived, as W showed, from 
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our intuitive concepts) -- they just are what they are. In order to jump there must be some 
place to stand. This is the most basic fact of existence, and yet, it is a remarkable consequence 
of our psychology being automated that it is the hardest thing for us to see. 
 
 
It is an amusing sight indeed to watch people (everyone, not just philosophers) trying to use 
their intuitive psychology (the only tool we have) to break out of the bounds of our intuitive 
psychology. How is this going to be possible? How will we find some vantage point that 
lets us see our mind at work and by what test will we know we have it? We think that if we 
just think hard enough or acquire enough facts we can get a view of “reality” that others do 
not have. But there is good reason to think that such attempts are incoherent and only take 
us further away from clarity and sanity. W said many times in many ways that we must 
overcome this craving for “clarity”, the idea of thought underlaid by “crystalline logic”, the 
discovery of which will “explain” our behavior and our world and change our view of what 
it is to be human. 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between 
it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of 
investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 On his return to philosophy in 1930 he said: 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, that we 
can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the matter is that we 
have already got everything, and that we have got it actually present; we need not wait for 
anything. We make our moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and 
this grammar is already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for 
the future.” (Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) p183 and in his 
Zettel P 312-314 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that 
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. ‘We 
have already said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution!” 
“This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. 
If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” 
 
 
 
 
Some might also find it useful to read “Why there is no deductive logic of practical reason” 
in Searle’s superb “Rationality in Action” (2001). Just substitute his infelicitous phrases 
“impose conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” by “relate mental states to 
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the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world” 
and “world to mind directions of fit” by “cause originates in the world” and “cause 
originates in the mind”. 
Another basic flaw in H (and throughout scientific discourse, which includes philosophy, 
since it is armchair psychology) concerns the notions of explanations or causes. We have 
few problems understanding how these concepts work in their normal contexts, but 
philosophy is not a normal context. They are just other families of concepts (often called 
grammar or language games by W and roughly equivalent to cognitive modules, inference 
engines, templates or algorithms) comprising our EP (roughly, our intentionality) but, out 
of context, we feel compelled to project them onto the world and see “cause” as a universal 
law of nature that determines events. As W said, we need to recognize clear descriptions as 
answers which terminate the search for ultimate “explanations”. 
This gets us back to my comment on WHY people go astray when they try to “explain” 
things. Again, this connects intimately with judgements, decision theory, subjective 
probability, logic, quantum mechanics, uncertainty, information theory, Bayesian reasoning, 
the Wason test, the Anthropic principle ((Bostrum “The Anthropic Principle” (2002)) and 
behavioral economics, to name a few. There is no space here to get into this rat’s nest of 
tightly linked aspects of our innate psychology, but one might recall that even in his pre- 
Tractatus writings, Wittgenstein commented that the idea of causal necessity is not a 
superstition but the source of superstition. I suggest that this seemingly trite remark is one 
of his most profound –W was not given to platitude nor to carelessness. What is the “cause” 
of the Big Bang or an electron being at a particular “place” or of “randomness” or chaos or 
the “law” of gravitation? But there are descriptions which can serve as answers. Thus, H 
feels all actions must be caused and “material” and so, with his pal D and the merry band 
of reductionist materialists, denies will, self and consciousness. D denies that he denies them, 
but the facts speak for themselves. His book “Consciousness Explained” is commonly 
referred to as “Consciousness Denied” and was famously reviewed by Searle as 
“Consciousness Explained Away”. 
This is especially odd in H’s case as he started out a physicist and his father won the Nobel 
prize in physics, so one might think he would be aware of the famous papers of Einstein, 
Podolsky and Rosen and of von Neumann in the 20’s and 30’s, in which they explained how 
quantum mechanics did not make sense without human consciousness (and a digital 
abstraction won’t do at all). 
In this same period others including Jeffreys and de Finetti showed that probability only 
made sense as a subjective (i.e., psychological) method and Wittgenstein’s close friends John 
Maynard Keynes and Frank Ramsey first clearly equated logic with rationality, and Popper 
and others noted the equivalence of logic and probability and their common roots in 
rationality. There is a vast literature on interrelationships of these disciplines and the 
gradual growth of understanding that they are all facets of our innate psychology. Those 
interested might start with Ton Sales article in the Handbook of Philosophical Logic 2nd Ed. 
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Vol 9 (2002) since it will also introduce them to this excellent source, now extending to about 
20 Volumes (all on p2p libgen.is and b-ok.org). 
Ramsey was one of the few of his time who was capable of understanding W’s ideas and in 
his seminal papers of 1925-26 not only developed Keynes’ pioneering ideas on subjective 
probability, but also extended W’s ideas from the Tractatus and conversations and letters 
into the first formal statement of what later became known as substitutional semantics or 
the substitutional interpretation of logical quantifiers. (See Leblanc’s article in Handbook of 
Philosophical Logic 2nd Ed. V2, p53- 131(2002)). Ramsey’s premature death, like those of W, 
Von Neumann and Turing, were great tragedies, as each of them alone and certainly 
together would have altered the intellectual climate of the 20th century to an even greater 
degree. Had they lived, they might well have collaborated but as it was, only W realized he 
was discovering facets of our innate psychology. W and Turing were both Cambridge 
professors teaching classes on the Foundations of Mathematics—though W from the 
position that it rested on unstated axioms of our innate psychology and Turing from the 
conventional view that it was a matter of logic that stood by itself. 
Had these two homosexual geniuses become intimately involved, amazing things might 
have ensued. 
I think everyone has these “deflationary” reductionist tendencies, so I suggest this is due to 
the defaults of intuitive psychology modules which are biased to assigning causes in terms 
of properties of objects, and cultural phenomena we can see and to our need for generality. 
Our inference engines compulsively classify and seek the source of all phenomena. When 
we look for causes or explanations, we are inclined to look outward and take the third 
person point of view, for which we have empirical tests or criteria, ignoring the automatic 
invisible workings of our own mind, for which we do not have such tests (another arena 
pioneered by W some 75 years ago). As noted here, one of W’s takes on this universal 
“philosophical” problem was that we lack the ability to recognize our normal intuitive 
explanations as the limits of our understanding, confusing the untestable and 
unchallengeable axioms of our System 1 psychology with facts of the world which we can 
investigate, dissect and explain via System 2. This does not deny science, only the notion 
that it will provide the “true” and “real” meaning of “reality”. 
There is a vast literature on causes and explanations so I will only refer to Jeffrey 
Hershfield’s excellent article “Cognitivism and Explanatory Relativity” in Canadian J. of 
Philosophy V28 p505-26(1998) and to Garfinkel’s book “Forms of Explanation” (1981). This 
literature is rapidly fusing with those on epistemology, probability, logic, game theory, 
behavioral economics, and the philosophy of science, which seem almost completely 
unknown to H. Out of the hundreds of recent books and thousands of articles, one can start 
on this with Nancy Cartwright’s books, which provide a partial antidote to the “Physics and 
Math Rule the Universe” delusion. Or, one can just follow the links between rationality, 
causality, probability, information, laws of nature, quantum mechanics, determinism, etc. 
in Wikipedia and the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for decades (or, with W’s 
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comments in mind, maybe only days) before one realizes he got it right and that we do not 
get clearer about our psychological “reality” by studying nature. One way to look at ISL is 
that its faults remind us that scientific laws and explanations are frail and ambiguous 
extensions of our innate psychology and not, as H would have it, the reverse. 
It is a curious and rarely noticed fact that the severe reductionists first deny psychology, but, 
in order to account for it (since there is clearly something that generates our mental and 
social life), they are forced into camp with the blank slaters (all of us before we get educated), 
who ascribe psychology to culture or to very general aspects of our intelligence (i.e., our 
intentionality is learned) as opposed to an innate set of functions. H and D say that self, 
consciousness, will, etc. are illusions—merely “abstract patterns” (the “spirit” or “soul” of 
the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism). They believe that our “program” can be 
digitized and put into computers, which thereby acquire psychology, and that “believing” 
in “mental phenomena” is just like believing in magic (but our psychology is not composed 
of beliefs—which are only its extensions-- and nature is magical). I suggest it is critical to 
see why they never consider that “patterns” (another lovely language game!) in computers 
are magical or illusory. And, even if we allow that the reductionist program is really 
coherent and not circular (e.g., we are too polite to point out –as do W and Searle and many 
others—that it has NO TEST for it’s most critical assertions and requires the NORMAL 
functioning of will, self, reality, consciousness etc., to be understood), can we not reasonably 
say “well Doug and Dan, a rose by any other name smells as sweet!” I don’t think 
reductionists see that even were it true that we could put our mental life in algorithms 
running in silicon (or--in Searle’s famous example—in a stack of beer cans), we still have the 
same “hard problem of consciousness”: how do mental phenomena emerge from brute 
matter? Nearly always overlooked is that one could regard the existence of everything as a 
‘hard problem’. This would add yet another mystery with no obvious way to recognize an 
answer— what does it mean (why is it possible) to encode “emergent properties” as 
“algorithms”? If we can make sense out of the idea that the mind or the universe is a 
computer (i.e., can say clearly what counts for and against the idea), what will follow if it is 
or it isn’t? 
“Computational” is one of the major buzzwords of modern science, but few stop to think 
what it really means. It’s a classic Wittgensteinian language game or family of concepts (uses) 
that have little or nothing in common. There are analog and digital computers, some made 
of blocks or mechanical gears only (Babbage etc.), we compute by hand (as is well known, 
Turing’s first comments on this referred to humans who computed and only later did he 
think of machines simulating this), and physicists speak of leaves computing “their” 
trajectory as they fall from the tree, etc. etc. Each game has its own use (meaning) but we 
are hypnotized by the word into ignoring these. W has analyzed word games (psychological 
modules) with unsurpassed depth and clarity (see esp. the long discussion of knowing how 
to continue a calculation in the Brown Book), understanding of which should put an end to 
the superstitious awe which generally surrounds this word and all words, thoughts, feelings, 
intuitions etc. 
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It’s dripping with irony that D wrote a book on the EP of religion, but he cannot see his own 
materialism as a religion (i.e., it’s likewise due to innate conceptual biases). Timothy 
O’Connor has written (Metaphilosophy V36, p436- 448 (2005)) a superb article on D’s 
Fundamentalist Naturalism (though he does not really get all the way to the EP point of 
view I take here), noting that simply accepting the emergence of intentionality is the most 
reasonable view to take. But pastors D and H read from the Churchland’s books and the 
other bibles of CTM (Computational Theory of Mind) and exhort one and all to recognize 
their pc’s and toaster ovens as sentient beings (or at least they soon will be). Pastor Kurzweil 
does likewise, but few attend his sermons as he has filled the pews with pc’s having voice 
recognition and speech systems and their chorus of identical synthetic voices shout “Blessed 
be Turing” after every sentence. See my review of his book “Will Hominoids or Androids 
Destroy the Earth? —A Review of How to Create a Mind” by Ray Kurzweil (2012) in the 
next section. 
 
 
Emergence of “higher order properties” from “inert matter” (more language games!) is 
indeed baffling, but it applies to everything in the universe, and not just to psychology. Our 
brains had no reason (i.e., there are no selective forces operative) to evolve an advanced 
level of understanding of themselves or the universe, and it would be too genetically costly 
to do so. What selective advantage could there have been in seeing our own thought 
processes? The brain, like the heart, was selected to function rapidly and automatically and 
only a minute part of its operations are available to awareness and subject to conscious 
control. Many think there is no possibility of an “ultimate understanding” and W tells us 
this idea is nonsense (and if not, then what test will tell us that we have reached it)? 
Perhaps the last word belongs to Wittgenstein. Though his ideas changed greatly, there are 
many indications that he grasped the essentials of his mature philosophy in his earliest 
musings and the Tractatus can be regarded as the most powerful statement of reductionist 
metaphysics ever penned (though few realize it is the ultimate statement of 
computationalism). It is also a defensible thesis that the structure and limits of our 
intentional psychology were behind his early positivism and atomism. So, let us end with 
the famous first and last sentences of his Tractatus, seen as summarizing his view that the 
limits of our innate psychology are the limits of our understanding. “The world is 
everything that is the case.” “Concerning that of which we cannot speak, we must remain 
silent.” 
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Will Hominoids or Androids Destroy the Earth? — A 
Review of How to Create a Mind by Ray Kurzweil 
(2012) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Some years ago, I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of a book, or at 
least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical mistakes will be made and how 
frequently. In the case of nominally scientific works these may be largely restricted to certain 
chapters which wax philosophical or try to draw general conclusions about the meaning or 
long-term significance of the work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact are 
generously interlarded with philosophical gibberish as to what these facts mean. The clear 
distinctions which Wittgenstein described some 80 years ago between scientific matters and 
their descriptions by various language games are rarely taken into consideration, and so one 
is alternately wowed by the science and dismayed by its incoherent analysis. So it is with 
this volume. 
If one is to create a mind more or less like ours, one needs to have a logical structure for 
rationality and an understanding of the two systems of thought (dual process theory). If one 
is to philosophize about this, one needs to understand the distinction between scientific 
issues of fact and the philosophical issue of how language works in the context at issue, and 
of how to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and scientism, but Kurzweil, like most students 
of behavior, is largely clueless. He is enchanted by models, theories, and concepts, and the 
urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed us that we only need to describe, and that 
theories, concepts etc., are just ways of using language (language games) which have value 
only insofar as they have a clear test (clear truthmakers, or as John Searle (AI’s most famous 
critic) likes to say, clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)). I have attempted to provide a 
start on this in my recent writings. 
Also, as usual in ‘factual’ accounts of AI/robotics, he gives no time to the very real threats 
to our privacy, safety and even survival from the increasing ‘androidizing’ of society which 
is prominent in other authors (Bostrum, Hawking, etc.) and frequent in scifi and films, so I 
make a few comments on the quite possibly suicidal utopian delusions of ‘nice’ androids, 
humanoids, artificial intelligence (AI), democracy, diversity, and genetic engineering. 
I take it for granted that technical advances in electronics, robotics and AI will occur, 
resulting in profound changes in society. However, I think the changes coming from genetic 
engineering are at least as great and potentially far greater, as they will enable us to utterly 
change who we are. And it will be feasible to make supersmart/super strong servants by 
modifying our genes or those of other monkeys. As with other technology, any country that 
resists will be left behind. But will it be socially and economically feasible to implement 
biobots or superhumans on a massive scale? And even if so, it does not seem likely, 
economically or socially, to prevent the destruction of industrial civilization by 
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overpopulation, resource depletion, climate change and probably also the tyrannical rule of 
the Seven Sociopaths who rule China. 
So, ignoring the philosophical mistakes in this volume as irrelevant, and directing our 
attention only to the science, what we have here is another suicidal utopian delusion rooted 
in a failure to grasp basic biology, psychology and human ecology, the same delusions that 
are destroying America and the world. I see a remote possibility the world can be saved, 
but not by AI/robotics, CRISPR, nor by Neomarxism, diversity and equality. 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some years ago, I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of a book, or at 
least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical mistakes will be made and how 
frequently. In the case of nominally scientific works these may be largely restricted to certain 
chapters which wax philosophical or try to draw general conclusions about the meaning or 
long-term significance of the work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact are 
generously interlarded with philosophical gibberish as to what these facts mean. The clear 
distinctions which Wittgenstein described some 80 years ago between scientific matters and 
their descriptions by various language games are rarely taken into consideration, and so one 
is alternately wowed by the science and dismayed by its incoherent analysis. So, it is with 
this volume. 
If one is to create a mind more or less like ours, one needs to have a logical structure for 
rationality and an understanding of the two systems of thought (dual process theory). If one 
is to philosophize about this, one needs to understand the distinction between scientific 
issues of fact and the philosophical issue of how language works in the context at issue, and 
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of how to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and scientism, but Kurzweil, like most students 
of behavior, is largely clueless. He, is enchanted by models, theories, and concepts, and the 
urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed us that we only need to describe, and that 
theories, concepts etc., are just ways of using language (language games) which have value 
only insofar as they have a clear test (clear truth makers, or as John Searle (AI’s most famous 
critic) likes to say, clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)). 
Actually, ‘reduction’ is a complex language game or group of games (uses of words with 
various meanings or COS) so its use varies greatly depending on context and often it’s not 
clear what it means. Likewise, with ‘modeling’ or ‘simulating’ or ‘equivalent to’ or ‘the same 
as’ etc. Likewise, with the claims here and everywhere that ‘computation’ of biological or 
mental processes is not done, as it would take too long, but not ‘computabl’e or ’calculable’ 
means many things, or nothing at all depending on context, and this is usually just totally 
ignored. 
Chapter 9 is the typical nightmare one expects. Minsky’s first quote “Minds are simply what 
brains do” is a truism in that in some games one can e.g., say ‘my brain is tired’ etc. but like 
most he has no grasp at all of the line between scientific questions and those about how the 
language games are to be played (how we can use language intelligibly). Descriptions of 
behavior are not the same as descriptions of brain processes. This ‘reductionism’ is a 
hopelessly bankrupt view of life, -- it just does not work, i.e., is not coherent, and this has 
been explained at length, first by Wittgenstein and subsequently by Searle, Hacker and 
many others. For one thing, there are various levels of description (physics, chemistry, 
biochemistry, genetics, neurophysiology, brain, thought/behavior) and the concepts 
(language games) useful and intelligible (having clear meaning or COS) at one level work 
differently at another. Also, one ‘mental state’, ‘disposition’ or ‘thought’ or ‘action’, can be 
described in first person or third person by many statements and vice versa, and one 
statement may describe many different ‘mental states’, ‘dispositions’, ‘thoughts’ or ‘actions’ 
depending intricately on context, so the match between behavior and language is hugely 
underdetermined even for ‘simple’ acts or sentences. and as these become more complex 
there is a combinatorial explosion. Hacker and others have explained this many times. 
There is no clear meaning to describing my desire to see the sun set at the lower levels, and 
their never will be. They are different levels of description, different concepts (different 
language games) and one cannot even make sense of reducing one to the other, of behavior 
into neurophysiology into biochemistry into genetics into chemistry into physics into math 
or computation and like most scientists Kurzweil’s handwaving and claims that it’s not 
done because its inconvenient or impractical totally fails to see that the real issue is that 
‘reduction’ has no clear meaning (COS), or rather many meanings depending acutely on 
context, and in no case can we give a coherent account that eliminates any level. 
Nevertheless, the rotting corpse of reductionism floats to the surface frequently (e.g., p37 
and the Minsky quote on p199) and we are told that chemistry “reduces” to physics and that 
thermodynamics is a separate science because the equations become “unwieldy”, but 
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another way to say this is that reduction is incoherent, the language games (concepts) of one 
level just do not apply (make sense) at higher and lower levels of description, and it is not 
that our science or our language is inadequate. I have discussed this in my other articles and 
it is well known in the philosophy of science, but it is likely never going to penetrate into 
“hard science”. 
The psychology of higher order thought is not describable by causes, but by reasons, and 
one cannot make psychology disappear into physiology nor physiology into biochemistry 
nor it into physics etc. They are just different and indispensable levels of description. 
Wittgenstein famously described it 80 years ago in the Blue Book. 
“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the method of 
science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the 
smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the 
treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the 
method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the 
way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher 
into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to 
anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is “purely descriptive.” 
Like nearly all ‘hard’ scientists and even sadly ‘soft’ ones as well, he has no grasp at all of 
how language works, e.g., of how ‘thinking’ and other psychological verbs work, so misuses 
them constantly throughout his writings (e.g., see his comments on Searle on p170). I won’t 
go into an explanation here as I have written extensively on this (Suicidal Utopian Delusions 
in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019)). So, like most scientists, and even most philosophers, he 
plays one language game (uses the words with one meaning or Condition of Satisfaction) 
but mixes it up with other quite different meanings, all the while insisting that his game is 
the only one that can be played (has any ‘real’ sense). Like most, he also is not clear on the 
distinction between scientific issues of fact and the issues of how language can be used 
intelligibly. Also, he does not have a clear grasp of the distinction between the two systems 
of thought, the automaticities of nonlinguistic system S1 and the conscious deliberations of 
linguistic system S2, but I have described this extensively in my writings and will not do so 
here. 
Another thing that Kurzweil never mentions is the obvious fact that there will be severe and 
probably frequently fatal conflicts with our robots, i.e, with Artifical Intelligence. Just think 
about the continual daily problems we have living with other humans, about the number of 
assaults, abuses and murders every day. Why should these be any less with androids--and 
then who takes the blame? There would not seem to be any reason at all why androids/AI 
should be less in conflict with each other, and with us, than other humans are already. 
And all devices/functions/weapons are being turned over to AI at a rapid pace. Soon all 
weapons systems, communications, power grids, financial activities, medical systems, 
vehicles, electronic devices will be AI controlled. Hundreds of billions of ‘smart’ devices 
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connected to the Internet of Things and only a handful of programmers even possibly able 
to understand or control them. 
Millions of smart missles, ships, subs, tanks, guns, satellites, drones worldwide, 
programmed to automatically eliminate ‘enemies’ and increasingly dominated by a massive 
international Chinese military run by the Seven Sociopaths. One hacker (or rogue AI) could 
paralyze or activate any of them at any time, and once the fireworks start, who could stop 
it? 
Of course, it is the optimists who expect the Chinese sociopaths to rule the world while the 
pessimists (who view themselves as realists) expect AI 
(or as I call it – Artificial Ignorance or Artificial Insanity) to take over. It is the opinion of 
many thoughtful persons- Musk, Gates, Hawking etc., including top AI researchers (e.g., 
Juergen Schmidhuber and many other TED talks on YouTube) that AI will reach explosive 
self-growth (increasing its power thousands or millions of times in days, minutes or 
microseconds) at some time in the next few decades – 2030 is sometimes mentioned, 
escaping through the net and infecting all sufficiently powerful computers. AS will be 
unstoppable, especially since it appears that it will be running on quantum computers 
which will increase its speed more thousands or millions of times, and as a lovely side effect, 
will be able to easily crack all encryption schemes). If you are optimistic, it will keep humans 
and other animals around as pets and the world will become a zoo with a eugenic captive 
breeding program, if a pessimist, it will eliminate humans or even all organic life as an 
annoying competition for resources. The science fiction of today is likely to be the reality of 
tomorrow. 
Asimov’s law of robotics –do not harm humans, is a fantasy that is unattainable in practice 
for androids/AI just as it is for us. I admit (as Searle has many times) that we are ‘androids’ 
too, though designed by natural selection, not having ‘intelligence’ from one viewpoint, but 
having almost limitless ‘intelligence’ from another. 
What is to stop AI having all the mental ailments we have—neuroses, psychoses, 
sociopathies, egomania, greed, selfish desire to produce endless copies of one’s own 
‘genome’ (electrome, digitome, silicome?), racism (programism?), something equivalent to 
drug addiction, homicidal and suicidal tendencies or should we just term these all ‘biocidal 
bugs’? Of course, humans will try to exclude bad behavior from the programs, but this will 
have to be after the fact, i.e., when it’s already dispersed via the net to millions or billions of 
devices, and as they will be self programming and updating, any badness that confers a 
survival advantage should spread almost instantly. This is of course just the AI equivalent 
of human evolution by natural selection (inclusive fitness). 
John Searle killed the idea of strong AI with the Chinese room and other descriptions of the 
incoherence of various language games (as Wittgenstein had done superbly long before 
there were computers, though few have noticed). He is regarded by some as the nemesis of 
AI, but in fact he has just described it accurately, and has no antipathy to it at all. Searle has 
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said repeatedly that of course machines can think and feel, for we are such machines! Made 
of proteins etc., and not metal, but machines in a very fundamental sense nevertheless. And 
machines that took about 4 billion years of experimentation in a lab the size of the earth with 
trillions of trillions of machines being created and only a tiny number of the most successful 
surviving. The efforts of AI seem or at least robotics, so far seem trivial by comparison. And 
as he notes it is possible that much or all of our psychology may be unique to fleshy beings, 
just as much of AI may be to silicon. How much might be ‘true’ overlap and how much 
vague simulation is impossible to say. 
Darwinian selection or survival of the fittest as it applies to AI is a major issue that is never 
addressed by Kurzweil, nor most others, but is the subject of a whole book by philosopher- 
scientist Nik Bostrum and of repeated warnings by black hole physicist and world’s longest 
surviving ALS sufferer Stephen Hawking. Natural selection is mostly equivalent to 
inclusive fitness or favoritism towards close relatives (kin selection). And countervailing 
‘group selection’ for ‘niceness’ is illusory (see my review of Wilson’s The Social of Conquest 
of Earth (2012)). Yes, we do not have DNA and genes in robots (yet), but in what is perhaps 
philosopher Daniel Dennett’s most (only?) substantive contribution to philosophy, it is 
useful to regard inclusive fitness as the ‘universal acid’ which eats through all fantasies 
about evolution, nature and society. So, any self-replicating android or program that has 
even the slightest advantage over others may automatically eliminate them and humans 
and all other lifeforms, protein or metal, that are competitors for resources, or just for 
‘amusement’, as human do with other animals. 
Exactly what will prevent programs from evolving selfishness and replacing all other 
competing machines/programs or biological life forms? If one takes the ‘singularity’ 
seriously, then why not take this just a seriously? I commented on this long ago and of 
course it is a staple of science fiction. So, AI is just the next stage of natural selection with 
humans speeding it up in certain directions until they are replaced by their creations, just 
as the advantages in our ‘program’ resulted in the extinction of all other hominoid 
subspecies and is quickly exterminating all other large lifeforms (except of course those we 
eat and a few degenerate pets, most of which will be eaten as starvation spreads). 
As usual in ‘factual’ accounts of AI/robotics, Kurzweil gives no time to the very real threats 
to our privacy, safety and even survival from the increasing ‘androidizing’ of society, which 
are prominent in other nonfiction authors (Bostrum, Hawking etc.) and frequent in scifi and 
films. It requires little imagination to see this book as just another suicidal utopian delusion 
concentrating on the ‘nice’ aspects of androids, humanoids, democracy, computers, 
technology, ethnic diversity, and genetic engineering. It is however thanks to these that the 
last vestiges of our stability/privacy/security/prosperity/tranquility/sanity are 
rapidly disappearing. Also, drones and autonomous vehicles are rapidly 
increasing in capabilities and dropping in cost, so it will not be long before enhanced AI 
versions are used for crime, surveillance and espionage by all levels of government, 
terrorists, thieves, stalkers, kidnappers and murderers. Given your photo, fingerprints, 
name, workplace, address, mobile phone #, emails and chats, all increasingly easy to get, 
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solar powered or self-charging drones, microbots, and vehicles will be able carry out almost 
any kind of crime. 
Intelligent viruses will continue to invade your phone, pc, tablet, refrigerator, car, TV, music 
player, health monitors, androids and security systems to steal your data, monitor your 
activities, follow you, and if desired, extort, kidnap or kill you. Its crystal clear that if the 
positives will happen then the negatives will also. It’s a toss-up who will do the most evil— 
the jihadists, the Seven Sociopaths, the hackers or our own programs, or perhaps all of them 
in concert. This dark side of AI/Robotics/The Internet of Things goes unmentioned in this 
book, and this is the norm. 
Though the idea of robots taking over has been in scifi for many years, I first started to think 
seriously about it when I read about nanobots in Drexler’s Engines of Creation in 1993. And 
many have worried about the ‘grey goo’ problem—i.e., of nanobots replicating until they 
smother everything else. 
Another singularity that Kurzweil and most in AI do not mention is the possibility that 
genetic engineering will soon lead to DNA displacing silicon as the medium for advanced 
intelligence. CRISPR and other techniques will let us change genes at will, adding whole 
new genes/chromosomes in months or even hours, with superfast development of 
organisms or brains in vats without bothersome bodies to encumber them. Even now, 
without genetic engineering, there are precocious geniuses mastering quantum mechanics 
in their early teens or taking the cube of a 10 digit number in their head. And the 
programming of genes might be done by the same computers and programs being used for 
AI. 
Anyone who takes AI seriously also might find of interest my article on David Wolpert’s 
work on the ultimate law in Turing Machine Theory which suggests some remarkable facets 
of and limits to computation and ‘intelligence’. I wrote it because his work has somehow 
escaped the attention of the entire scientific community. It is readily available on the net and 
in my article “Wolpert, Godel, Chaitin and Wittgenstein on impossibility, incompleteness, 
the liar paradox, theism, the limits of computation, a nonquantum mechanical uncertainty 
principle and the universe as computer—the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory’ 
(2015). 
 
 
To his credit, Kurzweil makes an effort to understand Wittgenstein (p220 etc.), but (like 100 
million other academics) has only a superficial grasp of what he did. 
Before computers existed, Wittgenstein discussed in depth the basic issues of what 
computation was and what makes humans distinct from machines, but his writings on this 
are unknown to most. Gefwert is one of the few to analyze them in detail, but his work has 
been largely ignored. 
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On p222 Kurzweil comments that it is ‘foolish’ to deny the ‘physical world’ (an intricate 
language game), but it is rather that one cannot give any sense to such a denial, as it 
presupposes the intelligibility (reality) of what it denies. This is the ever-present issue of 
how we make sense of (are certain about) anything, which brings us back to Wittgenstein’s 
famous work ‘On Certainty’ (see my review) and the notion of the ‘true only’ proposition. 
Like all discussions of behavior, Kurzweil’s needs a logical structure for rationality 
(intentionality) and (what is more or less equivalent) a thorough understanding of how 
language works, but it is almost totally absent (admittedly the norm for academics). As 
much of my work deals with these issues I won’t go into them here, except to provide the 
summary table of intentionality. 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the 
behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from the 50’s to the 
present by his successors Searle, Moyal- Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, 
Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary 
processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical 
Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), 
of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, 
the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), 
terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by 
Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human 
Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by 
Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has 
no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truth makers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one 
philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, 
and hence only one solution— showing the correct context. 
On p 278 he comments on our improving life and references ‘Abundance’ by his colleague 
Diaminidis – another utopian fantasy, and mentions Pinker’s recent work “The Better 
Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined”, but fails to note that these 
improvements are only temporary, and are bought at the cost of destroying our 
descendant’s futures. As I have reviewed Pinker’s book and commented in detail on the 
coming collapse of America and the world in my book ‘Suicide by Democracy’ 4th ed (2019) 
I will not repeat it here. 
Every day we lose at least 100 million tons of topsoil into the sea (ca. 6kg/person/day) and 
about 20,000 hectares of agricultural land becomes salinified and useless. Fresh water is 
disappearing in many areas and global warming will drastically decrease food production, 
especially in many 3rd world countries. Every day the mothers of the 3rd world (the 1st 
world now decreasing daily) ‘bless’ us with another 300,000 or so babies, leading to a net 
increase of about 200,000—another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los Angeles every 
month. About 4 billion more by 2100, most in Africa, most of the rest in Asia. The famously 
tolerant Muslims will likely rise from about 1/5th to about 1/3 of the earth and control 
numerous H bombs and AI controlled drones. Thanks to the social delusions of the few 
hundred politicians who control it, America’s love affair with ‘diversity’ and ‘democracy’ 
will guarantee its transformation into a 3rd world hellhole and the famously benevolent 
Seven Sociopaths who run China are now taking center stage (look up The Belt and Road 
Initiative, Debt Trap Diplomacy and Crouching Tiger on the net or YouTube). Sea level is 
projected to rise one to three meters by 2100 and some 
projections are ten times higher. There is no doubt at all that it will eventually rise much 
higher and cover much of the world’s prime cropland and most heavily populated areas. 
It’s also clear that the oil and natural gas and good quality easy to get coal will be gone, 
much of the earth stripped of topsoil, all the forests gone, and fishing dramatically reduced. 
I would like to see a plausible account of how AI will fix this. Even if theoretically possible, 
at what cost in money and pollution and social distress to created and maintain them? The 
second law of thermodynamics and the rest of physics, chemistry and economics works for 
androids as well as hominoids. And who is going to force the world to cooperate when its 
obvious life is a zero-sum game in which your gain is my loss? Certainly not the jihadists or 
the Seven Sociopaths. There is no free lunch. Even if robots could do all human tasks soon 
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it would not save the world from constant international conflicts, starvation, disease, crime, 
violence and war. When they cannot be made to cooperate in this limited time of abundance 
(bought by raping the earth) it is hopelessly naïve to suppose that they will do it when 
anarchy is sweeping over the planet. 
I take it for granted that technical advances in electronics, robotics and AI will occur, 
resulting in profound changes in society. However, I think the changes coming from genetic 
engineering are at least as great and potentially far greater, as they will enable us to utterly 
change who we are. And it will be feasible to make supersmart/super strong servants by 
modifying our genes or those of other monkeys. As with other technology, any country that 
resists will be left behind. But will it be socially and economically feasible to implement 
biobots or superhumans on a massive scale? And even if so, it does not seem remotely 
possible, economically or socially to prevent the collapse of industrial civilization. 
So, ignoring the philosophical mistakes in this volume as irrelevant, and directing our 
attention only to the science, what we have here is another suicidal utopian delusion rooted 
in a failure to grasp basic biology, psychology and human ecology, the same delusions that 
are destroying America and the world. I see a remote possibility the world can be saved, 
but not by AI/robotics, CRISPR, nor by democracy, diversity and equality and I think he 
hugely underestimates the danger posed by AI. 
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What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, Computable and 
Incomplete mean? A Review of Godel's Way: Exploits into an 
undecidable world by Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, 
Newton C.A. da Costa 160p (2012) 
 
ABSTRACT 
In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, 
incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these issues 
from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which have completely 
different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the 
world that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to how 
language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), 
which need to be decided by looking at how we actually use words in particular contexts. 
When we get clear about which language game we are playing, these topics are seen to be 
ordinary scientific and mathematical questions like any others. Wittgenstein’s insights have 
seldom been equaled and never surpassed and are as pertinent today as they were 80 years 
ago when he dictated the Blue and Brown Books. In spite of its failings—really a series of 
notes rather than a finished book—this is a unique source of the work of these three famous 
scholars who have been working at the bleeding edges of physics, math and philosophy for 
over half a century. Da Costa and Doria are cited by Wolpert (see below or my articles on 
Wolpert and my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) since they wrote on 
universal computation, and among his many accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer in 
paraconsistency. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
In spite of its failings—really a series of notes rather than a finished book—this is a unique 
source of the work of these three famous scholars who have been working at the bleeding 
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edges of physics, math and philosophy for over half a century. Da Costa and Doria are cited 
by Wolpert (see below or my articles on Wolpert and my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer 
Limits of Reason’) since they wrote on universal computation, and among his many 
accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer in paraconsistency. 
Chaitin’s proof of the algorithmic randomness of math (of which Godel’s results are a 
corollary) and the Omega number are some of the most famous mathematical results in the 
last 50 years and he has documented them in many books and articles. His coauthors from 
Brazil are less well known in spite of their many important contributions. For all the topics 
here, the best way to get free articles and books on the cutting edge is to visit ArXiv.org, 
viXra.org, academia.edu, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu, philpapers.org, libgen.io or b-ok.org, where 
there are millions of preprints/articles/books on every topic (be warned this may use up all 
your spare time for the rest of your life!). 
As readers of my other articles are aware, in my view there are two basic issues running 
throughout philosophy and science which have completely different solutions. There are 
the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated 
observationally, and philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly, which 
need to be decided by looking at how we actually use certain words in particular contexts 
and how these are extended to new uses in new contexts. Unfortunately, there is almost no 
awareness that these are two different tasks and so this work, like all scientific writing that 
has a ‘philosophical’ aspect, mixes the two with unfortunate results. And then there is 
scientism, which we can here take as the attempt to treat all issues as scientific ones and 
reductionism which tries to treat them as physics and/or mathematics. Since I have noted in 
my reviews of books by Wittgenstein (W), Searle and others, how an understanding of the 
language used in what Searle calls the Logical Structure of Reality (LSR) and I call the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), along with the Dual Process 
Fremework (the Two Systems of Thought) helps to clarify philosophical problems, I will not 
repeat the reasons for that view here. 
 
 
Since Godel’s theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic 
randomness (incompleteness) throughout math (which is just another of our symbolic 
systems that may result in public testable actions-i.e., if meaningful it has COS), it seems 
inescapable that thinking (dispositional behavior having COS) is full of impossible, random 
or incomplete statements and situations. Since we can view each of these domains as 
symbolic systems evolved by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be 
regarded as unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says this 
‘randomness’ (another group of language games) shows there are limitless theorems that 
are ‘true’ but unprovable—i.e., ‘true’ for no ‘reason’. One should then be able to say that 
there are limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe 
actual situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers 
W’s views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his 
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work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of language, 
math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the best introduction 
I know of to W’s remarks on the foundations of mathematics and so to philosophy. 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed in symbolic 
systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” and full of tasks or 
situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible (i.e., they have no solution-see 
below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems unavoidable that everything derived from it by 
using higher order thought (system 2 or S2) to extend our innate axiomatic psychology 
(System 1 or S1) into complex social interactions such as games, economics, physics and 
math, will be “incomplete” also. 
The first of these in what is now called Social Choice Theory or Decision Theory (which are 
continuous with the study of logic and reasoning and philosophy) was the famous theorem 
of Kenneth Arrow 63 years ago, and there have been many since such as the recent 
impossibility or incompleteness proof by Brandenburger and Kreisel (2006) in two-person 
game theory. In these cases, a proof shows that what looks like a simple choice stated in 
plain English has no solution. There are also many famous “paradoxes” such as Sleeping 
Beauty (dissolved by Rupert Read), Newcomb’s problem (dissolved by Wolpert) and 
Doomsday, where what seems to be a very simple problem either has no one clear answer, 
or it proves exceptionally hard to find. A mountain of literature exists on Godel’s two 
“incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s more recent work, but I think that W’s writings 
in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. Although Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, 
Gefwert, Wright and others have done insightful work in explaining W, it is only 
 
recently that W’s uniquely penetrating analysis of the language games being played in 
mathematics and logic have been clarified by Floyd (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal 
Argument-a Variation on Cantor and Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and 
Wittgenstein’s Reasons’ , and ‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes Paraconsistent Sense’ , 
and Rodych ( e.g., ‘Wittgenstein and Godel: the Newly Published Remarks’ and 
‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New Arguments about Wittgenstein and New Remarks by 
Wittgenstein’). Berto is one of the best recent philosophers, and those with time might wish 
to consult his many other articles and books including the volume he co- edited on 
paraconsistency. Rodych’s work is indispensable, but only two of a dozen or so papers are 
free online (but see b-ok.org, libgen.is, torrents and also his online Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy articles). 
Berto notes that W also denied the coherence of metamathematics-i.e., the use by Godel of 
a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for W’s “notorious” interpretation 
of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept W’s argument, I think we are forced to 
deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, metatheories and meta anything else. How can it 
be that such concepts (words) as metamathematics, undecidability and incompleteness, 
accepted by millions (and even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to 
reveal fundamental truths about our mind or the universe) are just simple 
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misunderstandings about how language works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding that, like so 
many “revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind and will as illusions a la Dennett, 
Carruthers, the Churchland’s etc.), they have no practical impact whatsoever? Berto sums it 
up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not possible that the very same sentence…turns out 
to be expressible, but undecidable, in a formal system… and demonstrably true (under the 
aforementioned consistency hypothesis) in a different system (the meta- system). If, as 
Wittgenstein maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning of the proved sentence, 
then it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for a sentence with the same meaning) 
to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided in a different system (the meta-system) … 
Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea that a formal system can be syntactically incomplete, 
and the Platonic consequence that no formal system proving only arithmetical truths can 
prove all arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the meaning of arithmetical sentences, then 
there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there cannot be incomplete meanings.” And 
further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics based on a paraconsistent 
logic, are nowadays a reality. What is more important, the theoretical features of such 
theories match precisely with some of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian 
intuitions…Their inconsistency allows them also to escape from Godel’s First Theorem, and 
from Church’s undecidability result: they are, that is, demonstrably complete and decidable. 
They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there cannot be 
mathematical problems that can be meaningfully formulated within the system, but which 
the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the decidability of paraconsistent arithmetics 
harmonizes with an opinion Wittgenstein maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our behavior 
in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a motley of pieces assembled 
by the random processes of natural selection. “Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept 
of ‘mathematics’, which is indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” 
and we can say (contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Chaitin show. W 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems derived from 
axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the definitions (from which 
results follow necessarily and algorithmically), and this is utterly different from empirical 
matters where one applies a test (the results of which are unpredictable and debatable). W 
often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in 
other proofs and it must have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s 
Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but 
a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of Peano 
Arithmetic, it cannot be used in the real world either. As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein 
holds that a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language- 
game) if it has an extra- systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in 
ordinary counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one 
needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, 
‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created with 
‘numbers’ and ‘plus’  and  ‘minus’  signs  etc.,  and  with  ‘Incompleteness’  this  warrant is 
39 331  
lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing 
as an incomplete mathematical calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm 
[and syntax] and nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real number’ has 
much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, being misled by certain 
analogies, are inclined to believe” and makes many other penetrating comments (see 
Rodych and Floyd). Of course, the same remarks apply to all forms of logic and any other 
symbolic system. 
 
 
As Rodych, Berto and Priest (another pioneer in paraconsistency) have noted, W was the 
first (by several decades) to insist on the unavoidability and utility of inconsistency (and 
debated this issue with Turing during his classes on the Foundations of Mathematics). We 
now see that the disparaging comments about W’s remarks on math made by Godel, Kreisel, 
Dummett and many others were misconceived. As usual, it is a very bad idea to bet against 
W. Some may feel we have strayed off the path here—after all in ‘Godel’s Way’ we only 
want to understand ‘science’ and ‘mathematics’ (in quotes because part of the problem is 
regarding them as ‘systems’) and why these ‘paradoxes’ and ‘inconsistencies’ arise and how 
to dispose of them. But I claim that is exactly what I have done by pointing to the work of 
W. Our symbolic systems (language, math, logic, computation) have a clear use in the 
narrow confines of everyday life, in what we can loosely call the mesoscopic realm--the 
space and time of normal events we can observe unaided and with certainty (the innate 
axiomatic bedrock or background as W and later Searle call it). But we leave coherence 
behind when we enter the realms of particle physics or the cosmos, relativity, math beyond 
simple addition and subtraction with whole numbers, and language used out of the 
immediate context of everyday events. The words or whole sentences may be the same, but 
the meaning is lost (i.e., to use Searle’s preferred term, their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
are changed or opaque). It looks to me like the best way to understand philosophy may be 
to enter it via Berto, Rodych and Floyd’s work on W, so as to understand the subtleties of 
language as it is used in math and thereafter “metaphysical” issues of all kinds may be 
dissolved. As Floyd notes “In a sense, Wittgenstein is literalizing Turing’s model, bringing 
it back down to the everyday and drawing out the anthropomorphic command- aspect of 
Turing’s metaphors.” 
W pointed out how in math, we are caught in more LG’s (Language Games) where it is not 
clear what “true”, “complete”, “follows from”, “provable”, “number” ,”infinite”, etc. mean 
(i.e., what are their COS or truthmakers in THIS context), and hence what significance to 
attach to ‘incompleteness’ and likewise for Chaitin’s “algorithmic randomness”. As W noted 
frequently, do the “inconsistencies” of math or the counterintuitive results of metaphysics 
cause any real problems in math, physics or life? The apparently more serious cases of 
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contradictory statements –e.g., in set theory---have long been known but math goes on 
anyway. Likewise for the countless liar (self-referencing) paradoxes in language and in  
the ”incompleteness” and “inconsistency” (groups of complex LG’s) of mathematics as well. 
 
 
It is a constant struggle to keep in mind that different contexts mean different LG’s 
(meanings, COS) for “time”, “space”, “particle” “object” , ”inside”, “outside”, “next”, 
“simultaneous”, ”occur”, “happen”, “event” ,”question”, “answer” ,“infinite”, “past”, 
“future”, “problem”, “logic”, “ontology”, “epistemology”, “solution”, “paradox”,“prove”, 
“strange”, “normal”, “experiment”, ”complete”, “uncountable”, “decidable”, “dimension”, 
“complete”, “formula”, “process”, “algorithm”, “axiom”, ”mathematics”, “number”, 
“physics”, “cause”, “place”, “same”,“moving”, “limit”, “reason”, “still”, “real” 
“assumption”, “belief”, ‘know”, “event”, ”recursive”, “meta—“, “self- referential” 
“continue”, “particle”, “wave”,, “sentence” and even (in some contexts) “and”, “or”, “also”, 
“add” , “divide”, “if…then”, “follows” etc. 
As W noted, most of what people (including many philosophers and most scientists) have 
to say when philosophizing is not philosophy but its raw material. Chaitin, Doria, and Da 
Costa join Yanofsky (Y), Hume, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, 
Wheeler etc. in repeating the mistakes of the Greeks with elegant philosophical jargon 
mixed with science. I suggest quick antidotes via my reviews and some Rupert Read such 
as his books ‘A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes’ and ‘Wittgenstein Among the 
Sciences’, or go to academia.edu and get his articles , especially‘Kripke’s Conjuring Trick’ 
and ‘Against Time Slices’ and then as much of Searle as feasible, but at least his most recent 
such as ‘Philosophy in a New Century’, ‘Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy’, 
‘Making the Social World’ and ‘Thinking About the Real World’ (or at least my reviews) 
and his recent volume on perception. There are also over 100 youtubes of Searle, which 
confirm his reputation as the best standup philosopher since Wittgenstein. 
A major overlap that now exists (and is expanding rapidly) between game theorists, 
physicists, economists, mathematicians, philosophers, decision theorists and others, all of 
whom have been publishing for decades closely related proofs of undecidability, 
impossibility, uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the more bizarre is the recent 
proof by Armando Assis that in the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics one 
can setup a zero-sum game between the universe and an observer using the Nash 
Equilibrium, from which follow the Born rule and the collapse of the wave function. Godel 
was first to demonstrate an impossibility result and (until Chaitin and above all Wolpert— 
see my article on his work) it is the most far reaching (or just trivial/incoherent), but there 
have been an avalanche of others. As noted, one of the earliest in decision theory was the 
famous General Impossibility Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 (for 
which he got the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five of his students are now Nobel 
laureates so this is not fringe science). It states roughly that no reasonably consistent and 
fair voting system (i.e., no method of aggregating individuals’ preferences into group 
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preferences) can give sensible results. The group is either dominated by one person and so 
GIT is often called the “dictator theorem”, or there are intransitive preferences. Arrow’s 
original paper was titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" and can be stated 
like this:” It is impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies all of the 
following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; Unanimity; Freedom From 
Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” Those familiar with modern decision 
theory accept this and the many related constraining theorems as their starting points. Those 
who are not may find it (and all these theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to 
find a career path that has nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow 
Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) among legions 
of publications. 
Another recent famous impossibility result is that of Brandenburger and Keisler (2006) for 
two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and like all these impossibility 
results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind), which shows that any belief model of a 
certain kind leads to contradictions. 
One interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically just logic) are 
available to the players in a game, then there are statements or beliefs that the players can 
write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold. But note W’s characterization of 
‘thinking’ as a potential action with COS, which says they don’t really have a meaning (use), 
like Chaitin’s infinity of apparently well-formed formulas that do not actually belong to our 
system of mathematics. “Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s 
assumption is wrong” seems unexceptionable and multiple layers of ‘recursion’ (another 
LG) have been assumed in argumentation, linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century at least, 
but B&K showed that it is impossible for Ann and Bob to assume these beliefs. And there is 
a rapidly growing body of such impossibility results for one person or multiplayer decision 
situations (e.g., they grade into Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc.). For a good 
technical paper from among the avalanche on the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and 
Zvesper’s paper from arXiv which takes us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as 
its title notes it is about “interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”) and thus 
to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many of these papers quote Yanofsky’s (Y’s) paper 
“A universal approach to self- referential paradoxes and fixed points. Bulletin of Symbolic 
Logic, 9(3):362–386,2003. 
 
 
Abramsky (a polymath who is among other things a pioneer in quantum computing) is a 
friend of Y’s and so Y contributes a paper to the recent Festschrift to him ‘Computation, 
Logic, Games and Quantum Foundations’(2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) 
commentary on the BK and related paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint lecture free on the 
net by Wes Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and Paradoxes about Knowledge and 
Belief’. For a good multi-author survey see ’Collective Decision Making (2010). 
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One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of polymath physicist 
and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some stunning impossibility or 
incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference 
(computation) that are so general they are independent of the device doing the computation, 
and even independent of the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and 
human behavior, which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that 
can be assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe does. 
The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose observation 
apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These 
results do not rely on systems that are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic 
dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with 
computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” He also published what 
seems to be the first serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) which he says 
puts this subject on a sound scientific footing. Although he has published various versions 
of these proofs over two decades in some of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics 
journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news 
items in major science journals, few seem to have noticed, and I have looked in dozens of 
recent books on physics, math, decision theory and computation without finding a reference. 
W’s prescient grasp of these issues, including his embrace of strict finitism and 
paraconsistency, is finally spreading through math, logic and computer science (though 
rarely with any acknowledgement). Bremer has recently suggested the necessity of a 
Paraconsistent Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. “Any mathematical theory presented in first 
order logic has a finite paraconsistent model.” Berto continues: “Of course strict finitism and 
the insistence on the decidability of any meaningful mathematical question go hand in hand. 
As Rodych has remarked, the intermediate Wittgenstein’s view is dominated by his ‘finitism 
and his view […] of mathematical meaningfulness as algorithmic decidability’ according to 
which ‘[only] finite logical sums and products (containing only decidable arithmetic 
predicates) are meaningful because they are algorithmically decidable.’”. In modern terms 
this means they have public conditions of satisfaction (COS)-i.e., can be stated as a 
proposition that is true or false. And this brings us to W’s view that ultimately everything 
in math and logic rests on our innate (though of course extensible) ability to recognize a 
valid proof. Berto again: “Wittgenstein believed that the naïve (i.e., the working 
mathematician’s) notion of proof had to be decidable, for lack of decidability meant to him 
simply lack of mathematical meaning: Wittgenstein believed that everything had to be 
decidable in mathematics…Of course one can speak against the decidability of the naïve 
notion of truth on the basis of Godel’s results themselves. But one may argue that, in the 
context, this would beg the question against paraconsistentists-- and against Wittgenstein 
too. Both Wittgenstein and the paraconsistentists on one side, and the followers of the 
standard view on the other, agree on the following thesis: the decidability of the notion of 
proof and its inconsistency are incompatible. But to infer from this that the naïve notion of 
proof is not decidable invokes the indispensability of consistency, which is exactly what 
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Wittgenstein and the paraconsistent argument call into question...for as Victor Rodych has 
forcefully argued, the consistency of the relevant system is precisely what is called into 
question by Wittgenstein’s reasoning.” And so: “Therefore the Inconsistent arithmetic 
avoids Godel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. It also avoids the Second Theorem in the 
sense that its non-triviality can be established within the theory: and Tarski’s Theorem too— 
including its own predicate is not a problem for an inconsistent theory” [As Graham Priest 
noted over 20 years ago]. 
This brings to mind W’s famous comment. 
 
“What we are ‘tempted to say’ in such a case is, of course, not philosophy, but it is its raw 
material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the objectivity 
and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of mathematics, but something for 
philosophical treatment.” PI 234 
And again, ‘decidability’ comes down to the ability to recognize a valid proof, which rests 
on our innate axiomatic psychology, which math and logic have in common with language. 
And this is not just a remote historical issue but is totally current. I have read much of 
Chaitin and never seen a hint that he has considered these matters. The work of Douglas 
Hofstadter also comes to mind. His Godel, Escher, Bach won a Pulitzer prize and a National 
Book Award for Science, sold millions of copies and continues to get good reviews (e.g. 
almost 400 mostly 5 star reviews on Amazon to date) but he has no clue about the real issues 
and repeats the classical philosophical mistakes on nearly every page. 
His subsequent philosophical writings have not improved (he has chosen Dennett as his 
muse), but, as these views are vacuous and unconnected to real life, he continues to do 
excellent science. 
Once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only have meaning in 
specific human contexts— that is, as Searle has emphasized, they are all observer relative or 
ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe apart from our psychology is neither finite 
nor infinite and cannot compute nor process anything. Only in our language games do our 
laptop or the universe compute. 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem becomes a 
philosophical one, i.e., one of how language can be used intelligibly. Virtually all scientists 
and most philosophers, do not get that there are two distinct kinds of “questions” or 
“assertions” (both families of Language Games). There are those that are matters of fact 
about how the world is—that is, they are publicly observable propositional (True or False ) 
states of affairs having clear meanings (COS)—i.e., scientific statements, and then there are 
those that are issues about how language can coherently be used to describe these states of 
affairs, and these can be answered by any sane, intelligent, literate person with little or no 
resort to the facts of science, though of course there are borderline cases where we have to 
decide. Another poorly understood but critical fact is that, although the thinking, 
representing, inferring, understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of a 
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true or false statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our slow, conscious 
System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are entangled, the star shows a red shift, 
a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part that involves seeing that the symbols are used 
correctly in each line of the proof), is always made by the fast, automatic, unconscious 
System 1 (S1) via seeing, hearing, touching etc. in which there is no information processing, 
no representation (i.e., no COS) and no decisions in the sense in which these happen in S2  
( which receives its inputs from S1). 
This two systems approach is now a standard way to view reasoning or rationality and is a 
crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, of which science and math are special cases. 
There is a huge and rapidly growing literature on reasoning that is indispensable to the 
study of behavior or science. A recent book that digs into the details of how we actually 
reason (i.e., use language to carry out actions—see W and S) is ‘Human Reasoning and 
Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008), which, in spite of its limitations 
(e.g., limited understanding of W/S and the broad structure of intentional psychology), is 
(as of early 2015) the best single source I know. 
There are endless books and papers on reasoning, decision theory, game theory etc. and 
many variants of and some alternatives to the two systems framework, but I am one of a 
rapidly increasing number who find the simple S1/S2 framework the best one for most 
situations. The best recent book on reason from the dual systems approach is Dual-Process 
Theories of the Social Mind (2014) edited by Sherman et al. and Manktelow et al ‘The Science 
of Reason’ (2011) is also indispensable. 
What is only now coming to the fore, after millennia of discussion of reasoning in 
philosophy, psychology, logic, math, economics, sociology etc., is the study of the actual 
way in which we use words like and,’ but, or, means, signifies, implies, not’, and above all 
‘if’ (the conditional being the subject of over 50 papers and a book (‘IF’) by Evans, one of the 
leading researchers in this arena. Of course, Wittgenstein understood the basic issues here, 
likely better than anyone to this day, and laid out the facts beginning most clearly with the 
Blue and Brown Books starting in the 30’s and ending with the superb ‘On Certainty’ (which 
can be viewed as a dissertation on what are now called the two systems of thought), but 
sadly most students of behavior don’t have a clue about his work. 
Yanofsky’s book (The Outer Limits of Reason) is an extended treatment of these issues, but 
with little philosophical insight. He says math is free of contradictions, yet as noted, it has 
been well known for over half a century that logic and math are full of them—just google 
inconsistency in math or search it on Amazon or see the works of Priest, Berto or the article 
by Weber in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. W was the first to predict 
inconsistency or paraconsistency, and if we follow Berto we can interpret this as W’s 
suggestion to avoid incompleteness. In any event, paraconsistency is now a common feature 
and a major research program in geometry, set theory, arithmetic, analysis, logic and 
computer science. Y on p346 says reason must be free of contradictions, but it is clear that 
“free of” has different uses and they arise frequently in everyday life, but we have innate 
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mechanisms to contain them. This is true because it was the case in our everyday life long 
before math and science. Until very recently only W saw that it was unavoidable that our 
life and all our symbolic systems are paraconsistent and that we get along just fine as we 
have mechanisms for encapsulating or avoiding it. W tried to explain this to Turing in his 
lectures on the foundations of mathematics, given at Cambridge at the same time as Turing’s 
course on the same topic. 
Now I will make a few comments on specific items in the book. As noted on p13, Rice’s 
Theorem shows the impossibility of a universal antivirus for computers (and perhaps for 
living organisms as well) and so is, like Turing’s Halting theorem, another alternative 
statement of Godel’s Theorems, but unlike Turing’s, it is rarely mentioned. 
On p33 the discussion of the relation of compressibility, structure, randomness etc. is much 
better stated in Chaitin’s many other books and papers. Also of fundamental importance is 
the comment by Weyl on the fact that one can ‘prove’ or ‘derive’ anything from anything 
else if one permits arbitrarily ‘complex’ ‘equations’ (with arbitrary ‘constants’) but there is 
little awareness of this among scientists or philosophers. As W said we need to look at the 
role which any statement, equation, logical or mathematical proof plays in our life in order 
to discern its meaning since there is no limit on what we can write, say or ‘prove’, but only 
a tiny subset of these has a use. ‘Chaos’, ‘complexity’, ‘law’, ‘structure’, ‘theorem’, ‘equation’, 
‘proof’, ‘result’, ‘randomness’, ‘compressibility’ etc.are all families of language games with 
meanings (COS) that vary greatly, and one must look at their precise role in the given 
context. 
This is rarely done in any systematic deliberate way, with disastrous results. As Searle notes 
repeatedly, these words have intrinsic intentionality only relevant to human action and 
quite different (ascribed) meanings otherwise. It is only ascribed intentionality derived from 
our psychology when we say that a thermometer ‘tells’ the temperature or a computer is 
‘computing’ or an equation is a ‘proof’. 
As is typical in scientific discussion of these topics, the comments on p36 (on omega and 
quasi-empirical mathematics) and in much of the book cross the line between science and 
philosophy. Although there is a large literature on the philosophy of mathematics, so far asI 
know, there is still no better analysis than that of W’s, not only in his comments published 
as ‘Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics’ and ‘Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics’, but throughout the 20,000 pages of his nachlass (awaiting a new edition on 
CDROM from OUP ca. 2020 but much online now -see e.g., Pichler 
http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). Math, like logic, language, art, 
artefacts and music only have a meaning (use or COS in a context) when connected to life 
by words or practices. 
Likewise, on p54 et seq. it was W who has given us the first and best rationale for 
paraconsistency, long before anyone actually worked out a paraconsistent logic. Again, as 
W pointed out many times, it is critical to be aware that not everything is a ‘problem’, 
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‘question’, ‘answer’, ‘proof’ or a ‘solution’ in the same sense and accepting something as one 
or the other commits one to an often confused point of view. 
 
In the discussion of physics on p108-9 we must remind ourselves that ‘point’, ‘energy’, 
‘space’, ‘time’, ‘infinite’, ‘beginning’, ‘end’, ‘particle’, ’wave’, ‘quantum’ etc. are all typical 
language games that seduce us into incoherent views of how things are by applying 
meanings (COS) from one game to a quite different one. So, this book is a flawed diamond 
with much value, and I hope the authors are able to revise and enlarge it. It makes the nearly 
universal and fatal mistake of regarding science, especially mathematics, logic and physics, 
as though they were systems—i.e., domains where “number”, “space”, “time”, “proof”, 
“event”, “point”, “occurs”, “force”, “formula” etc. can be used throughout its “processes” 
and “states” without changes in meaning—i.e., without altering the Conditions of 
Satisfaction, which are publicly observable tests of truth or falsity. And when it’s an almost 
insuperable problem for such truly clever and experienced people as the authors, what 
chance do the rest of us have? Let us recall W’s comment on this fatal mistake. 
“The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and 
leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. 
But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a 
definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement 
in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite 
innocent.)” PI p308 
While writing this article I came upon Dennett’s infamous ‘damning with faint praise’ 
summary of W’s importance, which he was asked to write when Time Magazine, with 
amazing perspicacity, choose Wittgenstein as one of the 100 most important people of the 
20th century. As with his other writings, it shows his complete failure to grasp the nature of 
W’s work (i.e., of philosophy) and reminds me of another famous W comment that is 
pertinent here. 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say--- is not that of finding the solution but rather that 
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! …. This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
Chaitin is an American and his many books and articles are well known and easy to find, 
but Da Costa (who is 89) and Doria (79) are Brazilians and most of Da Costa’s work is only 
in Portuguese, but Doria has many items in English. You can find a partial bibliography for 
Doria here http://www.math.buffalo.edu/mad/PEEPS2/doria_franciscoA.html and of 
course see their Wikis. 
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The best collections of their work are in Chaos, Computers, Games and Time: A quarter 
century of joint work with Newton da Costa by F. Doria 132p(2011), On the Foundations of 
Science by da Costa and Doria 294p(2008), and Metamathematics of science by da Costa and 
Doria 216p(1997), but they were published in Brazil and almost impossible to find. You will 
likely have to get them through interlibrary loan or as digital files from the authors, but as 
always try libgen.is and b-ok.org. 
There is a nice Festschrift in honor of Newton C.A. Da Costa on the occasion of his seventieth 
birthday edited by Décio Krause, Steven French, Francisco Antonio Doria. (2000) which is 
an issue of Synthese (Dordrecht). Vol. 125, no. 1- 2 (2000), also published as a book, but the 
book is in only 5 libraries worldwide and not on Amazon. 
See also Doria (Ed.), "The Limits Of Mathematical Modeling In The Social Sciences: The 
Significance Of Godel's Incompleteness Phenomenon" (2017) and Wuppuluri and Doria 
(Eds.), "The Map and the Territory: Exploring the foundations of science, thought and 
reality" (2018). 
Another relevant item is New trends in the foundations of science : papers dedicated to the 
80th birthday of Patrick Suppes, presented in Florianópolis, Brazil, April 22-23, 2002 by Jean- 
Yves Beziau; Décio Krause; Otávio Bueno; Newton C da Costa; Francisco Antonio Doria; 
Patrick Suppes; (2007), which is vol. 154 # 3 of Synthese, but again the book is in only 2 
libraries and not on Amazon. 
Brazilian studies in philosophy and history of science: an account of recent works by Decio 
Krause; Antônio Augusto Passos Videira; has one article by each of them and is an expensive 
book but cheap on Kindle. Though it is a decade old, some may be interested in “Are the 
Foundations of Computer Science Logic-dependent?” by Carnielli and Doria, which says 
that Turing Machine Theory (TMT) can be seen as ‘arithmetic in disguise’, in particular as 
the theory of Diophantine Equations in which they formalize it, and conclude that 
‘Axiomatized Computer Science is Logic-Dependent’. Of course, as Wittgensteinians, we 
want to look very carefully at the language games (or math games), i.e., the precise 
Conditions of Satisfaction (truthmakers) resulting from using each of these words (i.e., 
‘axiomatized’, ‘computer science’, and ‘logic- dependent’). Carnielli and Agudello also 
formalize TMT in terms of paraconsistent logic, creating a model for paraconsistent Turing 
Machines (PTM’s) which has similarities to quantum computing and so with a quantic 
interpretation of it they create a Quantum Turing Machine model with which they solve the 
Deutsch and Deutsch-Jozsa problems. 
 
 
This permits contradictory instructions to be simultaneously executed and stored and each 
tape cell, when and if halting occurs, may have multiple symbols, each of which represents 
an output, thus permitting control of unicity versus multiplicity conditions, which simulate 
quantum algorithms, preserving efficiency. 
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Doria and Da Costa also proved (1991) that chaos theory is undecidable, and when properly 
axiomatized within classical set theory, is incomplete in Gödel’s sense. 
The articles, and especially the group discussion with Chaitin, Fredkin, Wolfram et al at the 
end of Zenil H. (ed.) ‘Randomness through computation’ (2011) is a stimulating 
continuation of many of the topics here, but again lacking awareness of the philosophical 
issues, and so often missing the point. Chaitin also contributes to ‘Causality, Meaningful 
Complexity and Embodied Cognition’ (2010), replete with articles having the usual mixture 
of scientific insight and philosophical incoherence, and as usual nobody is aware that 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) provided deep and unsurpassed insights into the issues over half 
a century ago, including Embodied Cognition (Enactivism). 
Finally, I would like to mention the work of physicist/philosopher Nancy Cartwright whose 
writings on the meaning of natural ‘laws’ and ‘causation’ are indispensable to anyone 
interested in these topics. 
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Wolpert, Chaitin and Wittgenstein on impossibility, 
incompleteness, the liar paradox, theism, the limits of 
computation, a non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle 
and the universe as computer—the ultimate theorem in Turing 
Machine Theory 
 
ABSTRACT 
I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as 
computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and 
decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this 
very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness 
theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so 
general they are independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent 
of the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior. They 
make use of Cantor's diagonalization, the liar paradox and worldlines to provide what may 
be the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory, and seemingly provide insights into 
impossibility, incompleteness, the limits of computation, and the universe as computer, in 
all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms, generating, among other things, a non- 
quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and a proof of monotheism. There are obvious 
connections to the classic work of Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein and 
to the notion that no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) with 
greater complexity than it possesses. One might say this body of work implies atheism since 
there cannot be any entity more complex than the physical universe and from the 
Wittgensteinian viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless (has no conditions of satisfaction, 
i.e., truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’with limitless time/space and energy) 
cannot determine whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’, nor find a certain way to show that 
a given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ (all these being complex language 
games) is part of a particular ‘system’. 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
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Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as 
computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and 
decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this 
very brief article. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems 
(1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they 
are independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the laws of 
physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, which he 
summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of correctly 
processing information faster than the universe does. 
The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose observation 
apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These 
results do not rely on systems that are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic 
dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with 
computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” He also published what 
seems to be the first serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) which he says 
puts this subject on a sound scientific footing. Although he has published various versions 
of these over two decades in some of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics journals 
(e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news items 
in major science journals, few seem to have noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent 
books on physics, math, decision theory and computation without finding a reference. 
 
 
It is most unfortunate that almost nobody is aware of Wolpert, since his work can be seen 
as the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, incompleteness, and 
undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in Turing machine theory) by 
extending the liar paradox and Cantors diagonalization to include all possible universes and 
all beings or mechanisms and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, 
but on cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by partitioning the 
inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not how it does it) so 
that his mathematical proofs are independent of any particular physical laws or 
computational structures in establishing the physical limits of inference for past, present 
and future and all possible calculation, observation and control. He notes that even in a 
classical universe Laplace was wrong about being able to perfectly predict the future (or 
even perfectly depict the past or present) and that his impossibility results can be viewed as 
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a “non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there cannot be an infallible 
observation or control device). Any universal physical device must be infinite, it can only 
be so at one moment in time, and no reality can have more than one (the “monotheism 
theorem”). Since space and time do not appear in the definition, the device can even be the 
entire universe across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of incompleteness with 
two inference devices rather than one self-referential device. As he says, “either the 
Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction 
complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic information complexity) in that there is one and 
only one version of it that can be applicable throughout our universe.” Another way to say 
this is that one cannot have two physical inference devices (computers) both capable of 
being asked arbitrary questions about the output of the other, or that the universe cannot 
contain a computer to which one can pose any arbitrary computational task, or that for any 
pair of physical inference engines, there are always binary valued questions about the state 
of the universe that cannot even be posed to at least one of them. One cannot build a 
computer that can predict an arbitrary future condition of a physical system before it occurs, 
even if the condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it— that is, it cannot 
process information (though this is a vexed phrase, as many including John Searle and 
Rupert Read note) faster than the universe. 
The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have to be physically 
coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of physics, chaos, quantum mechanics, causality 
or light cones and even for an infinite speed of light. The inference device does not have to 
be spatially localized but can be nonlocal dynamical processes occurring across the entire 
universe. He is well aware that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, 
Lloyd etc., concerning the universe as computer or the limits of ”information processing”, 
in a new light (though the indices of their writings make no reference to him and another 
remarkable omission is that none of the above are mentioned by Yanofsky in his recent 
comprehensive book ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’ (see my review). Wolpert says he shows 
that ‘the universe’ cannot contain an inference device that can ‘process information’ as fast 
as it can, and since he shows you cannot have a perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, 
present or future state can never be perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known 
or copied. He also proved that no combination of computers with error correcting codes can 
overcome these limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the observer (“the 
liar”) and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of physics, math and language. As 
noted in my other articles I think that definitive comments on many relevant issues here 
(completeness, certainty, the nature of computation etc.) were made long ago by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and here is one relevant comment of Juliet Floyd on Wittgenstein: 
”He is articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The argument is 
thus generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to any purported listing or 
rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely on any particular notational device or 
preferred spatial arrangements of signs. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to 
no picture and it is not essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may be 
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diagrammed and insofaras it is a logical argument, its logic may be represented formally). 
Like Turing’s arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. Unlike Turing’s 
arguments, it explicitly invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to (and 
presupposes) an everyday conception of the notions of rules and of the humans who follow 
them. Every line in the diagonal presentation above is conceived as an instruction or 
command, analogous to an order given to a human being...” The parallels to Wolpert are 
obvious. 
However once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only have meaning 
(i.e., are transitive (Wittgenstein) or have COS--Conditions of Satisfaction (Searle)) in 
specific human contexts—that is, as Searle has emphasized, they are all observer relative or 
ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe apart from our psychology is neither finite 
nor infinite and cannot compute nor process anything. Only in our language games do our 
laptop or the universe compute. 
However not everyone is oblivious to Wolpert. Well known econometricians Koppl and 
Rosser in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has already crossed your mind” 
give three theorems on the limits to rationality, prediction and control in economics. The 
first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to computability to show some logical limits to 
forecasting the future. Wolpert notes that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s 
incompleteness theorem and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as its social 
science analog, though Wolpert is well aware of the social implications. Since Godel’s 
theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic randomness 
(incompleteness) throughout math (which is just another of our symbolic systems), it seems 
inescapable that thinking (behavior) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements 
and situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems evolved by 
chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded as unsurprising that 
they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (again a group of 
Language Games in Wittgenstein’s terms) shows there are limitless theorems that are true 
but unprovable—i.e., true for no reason. One should then be able to say that there are 
limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe actual 
situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers W’s 
views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his work 
concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of language, math 
and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the best introduction I know 
of to W’s remarks on the foundations of mathematics and so perhaps to philosophy. 
K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian (probabilistic) 
forecasting in infinite- dimensional space. The third shows the impossibility of a computer 
perfectly forecasting an economy with agents knowing its forecasting program. The astute 
will notice that these theorems can be seen as versions of the liar paradox, and the fact that 
we are caught in impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves 
has been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again we have 
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circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. K&R conclude “Thus, 
economic order is partly the product of something other than calculative rationality”. 
 
Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject of thousands of papers and 
hundreds of books. And this seemingly abstruse work of Wolpert’s may have implications 
for all rationality. Of course, one must keep in mind that (as Wittgenstein noted) math and 
logic are all syntax and no semantics and they have nothing to tell us until connected to our 
life by language (i.e., by psychology) and so it is easy to do this in ways that are useful 
(meaningful or having COS) or not (no clear COS). 
 
 
Finally, one might say that many of Wolpert’s comments are restatements of the idea that 
no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) with greater 
complexity than it possesses. There are obvious connections to the classic work of Chaitin, 
Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein. One might say this body of work implies 
atheism since there cannot be any entity more complex than the physical universe and from 
the Wittgensteinian viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless (i.e., in this context it has no 
conditions of satisfaction, i.e., truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’ with limitless 
time/space and energy) cannot determine whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’ nor can 
find a certain way to show that a given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ (all 
these being complex language games) is part of a particular ‘system’. 
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Review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson 
Yanofsky 403p (2013) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I give a detailed review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson Yanofsky from a unified 
perspective of Wittgenstein and evolutionary psychology. I indicate that the difficulty with 
such issues as paradox in language and math, incompleteness, undecidability, 
computability, the brain and the universe as computers etc., all arise from the failure to look 
carefully at our use of language in the appropriate context and hence the failure to separate 
issues of scientific fact from issues of how language works. I discuss Wittgenstein's views 
on incompleteness, paraconsistency and undecidability and the work of Wolpert on the 
limits to computation. To sum it up: The Universe According to Brooklyn---Good Science, 
Not So Good Philosophy. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
Alvy's Mom responding to his being depressed because the universe is expanding — “What 
has the universe got to do with it? You're here in Brooklyn! Brooklyn is not expanding!” 
This famous Woody Allen joke makes a profound point about the context sensitivity of 
language that applies throughout philosophy and science. It’s funny because it is obvious 
that the meaning of “expanding” in the two cases is quite different. Brooklyn might expand 
if the population increases or the city annexes outlying land, but the universe is said to 
expand due to cosmic telescopes that show a red shift indicating that stars are receding from 
each other or to measurements of matter density etc. Different meanings (language games) 
(LG’s) were famously characterized by the Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (W) as the central problem of philosophy and shown to be a universal default 
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of our psychology. Though he did this beginning with the Blue and Brown Books (BBB) in 
the early 30’s, left a 20,000 page nachlass, and is the most widely discussed philosopher of 
modern times, few understand him. 
To Yanofsky’s (Y’s) credit, he has given much attention to philosophy and even quotes W a 
few times but without any real grasp of the issues. It is the norm among scientists and 
philosophers to mix the scientific questions of fact with the philosophical questions of how 
language is being used and, as W noted, — ‘Problem and answer pass one another by’. 
Yanofsky (a Brooklyn resident like many of his friends and teachers) has read widely and 
does a good job of surveying the bleeding edges of physics, mathematics and computer 
science in a clear and authoritative manner, but when we come to the limits of scientific 
explanation and it’s not clear what to say, we turn to philosophy. 
Philosophy can be seen as the descriptive psychology of higher order thought or as the study 
of the contextual variations of language used to describe cognition or intentionality (my 
characterizations), or the study of the logical structure of rationality (LSR)(Searle). 
Regarding LSR, Berkeley philosopher John Searle (S) is one of the best since W and his work 
can be seen as an extension of W. I have reviewed many books by them and others and 
together these reviews constitute a skeletal outline of higher order thought or intentionality, 
and so of the foundations of science. 
It is common for books and papers to betray their limitations in their titles and that is the 
case here. “Reason” and “limits” are complexes of language games. So, I should stop here 
and spend the whole review showing how Y’s title reveals the deep misunderstanding of 
what the real issues are. I knew we were in for a rough time by p5 where we are told that 
our normal conceptions of time, space etc., are mistaken and this was known even to the 
Greeks. This brings to mind W: “People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really 
progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the 
Greeks… at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up…And what’s 
more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because in so far as people think they can 
see the ‘limits of human understanding’, they believe of course that they can see beyond 
these. - CV (1931)” and also "The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to 
describe a fact which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence…” So, I would say we just have to analyze the different types of 
language games. Looking deeper is essential but surrendering our prior use is incoherent. 
Think about what is implied by “The Outer Limits of Reason”. “Outer”, “Limits” and 
“Reason” all have common uses, but they are frequently used by Y in different ways, and 
they will seem “quite innocent”, but this can only be discussed in some specific context. 
We are using the word “question” (or “assertion”, “statement” etc.) with utterly different 
senses if we ask “Does 777 occur in the decimal expansion of Pi?” than if we ask “Does 777 
occur in the first 1000 digits of the decimal expansion of Pi?” to use one of W’s examples. In 
the latter case it’s clear what counts as a true or false answer but in the former it has only 
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the form of a question. On p10 we find a group of “statements” which have quite different 
meanings. The first three are definitions and one could understand them without knowing 
any facts about their use—e.g., X cannot be Y and not Y. 
Y recommends the documentary “Into the Infinite” but actually it cannot be viewed unless 
you are in the UK. I found it free on the net shortly after it came out and was greatly 
disappointed. Among other things it suggests Godel and Cantor went mad due to working 
on problems of infinity—for which there is not a shred of evidence— and it spends much 
time with Chaitin, who, though a superb mathematician, has only a hazy notion about the 
various philosophical issues discussed here. If you want a lovely whirlwind “deep science” 
documentary I suggest “Are We Real?” on Youtube, though it makes some of the same 
mistakes. 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem becomes a 
philosophical one-i.e., one of how language can be used intelligibly. Yanofsky, like virtually 
all scientists and most philosophers, does not get that there are two distinct kinds of 
“questions” or “assertions” (i.e., Language Games or LG’s) here. There are those that are 
matters of fact about how the world is—that is, they are publicly observable propositional 
(True or False) states of affairs having clear meanings (Conditions of Satisfaction --COS) in 
Searle’s terminology—i.e., scientific statements, and then there are those that are issues 
about how language can coherently be used to describe these states of affairs, and these can 
be answered by any sane, intelligent, literate person with little or no resort to the facts of 
science. Another poorly understood but critical fact is that, although the thinking, 
representing, inferring, understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of a 
true or false statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our slow,conscious 
System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are entangled, the star shows a red shift, 
a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part that involves seeing that the symbols are used 
correctly in each line of the proof), is always made by the fast, automatic, unconscious 
System 1 (S1) via seeing, hearing, touching etc. in which there is no information processing, 
no representation (i.e., no COS) and no decisions in the sense in which these happen in S2  
( which receives its inputs from S1). This two systems approach is now the standard way to 
view reasoning or rationality and is a crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, of 
which science, math and philosophy are special cases. There is a huge and rapidly growing 
literature on reasoning that is indispensable to the study of behavior or science. A recent 
book that digs into the details of how we actually reason (i.e., use language to carry out 
actions—see Wittgenstein and Searle) is ‘Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science’ by 
Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008), which, in spite of its limitations (e.g., limited 
understanding of W/S and the broad structure of intentional psychology), is (as of mid 2016) 
the best single source I know. 
Regarding “incompleteness” or “randomness” in math, Y’s failure to mention the work of 
Gregory Chaitin is truly amazing, as he must know of his work, and Chaitin’s proof of the 
algorithmic randomness of math (of which Godel’s results are a corollary) and the Omega 
number are some of the most famous mathematical results in the last 50 years. 
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Likewise, one sees nothing about unconventional computing such as those with membranes, 
DNA etc., that have no logic gates and follow the biological patterns of “information 
processing”. The best way to get free articles and books on the cutting edge is to visit 
ArXiv.org, viXra.org, academia.edu, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu, researchgate.net, or 
philpapers.org, libgen.io and b-ok.org where there are millions of free preprints, papers and 
books on every topic (be warned this may use up all your spare time for the rest of your 
life!). 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed in symbolic 
systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” and full of tasks or 
situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible (i.e., they have no solution-see 
below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems unavoidable that everything derived from it— 
e.g. physics and math) will be “incomplete” also. Afaik the first of these in what is now 
called Social Choice Theory or Decision Theory (which are continuous with the study of 
logic and reasoning and philosophy) was the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow 65 years 
ago, and there have been many since. Y notes a recent impossibility or incompleteness proof 
in two-person game theory. In these cases, a proof shows that what looks like a simple choice 
stated in plain English has no solution. 
Although one cannot write a book about everything, I would have liked Y to at least mention 
such famous “paradoxes” as Sleeping Beauty (dissolved by Read), Newcomb’s problem 
(dissolved by Wolpert) and Doomsday, where what seems to be a very simple problem 
either has no one clear answer, or it proves exceptionally hard to find one. A mountain of 
literature exists on Godel’s two “incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s more recent work, 
but I think that W’s writings in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. Although Shanker, Mancosu, 
Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright and others have done insightful work, it is only 
recently that W’s uniquely penetrating analysis of the language games being played in 
mathematics have been clarified by Floyd (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a 
Variation on Cantor and Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and Wittgenstein’s Reasons , 
and ‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes Paraconsistent Sense’ and the book ‘There’s 
Something about Godel ‘, and Rodych ( e.g., Wittgenstein and Godel: the Newly Published 
Remarks’, ‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New Arguments about Wittgenstein’, ‘New Remarks 
by Wittgenstein’ and his article in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics’ ). Berto is one of the best recent philosophers, 
and those with time might wish to consult his many other articles and books including the 
volume he co-edited on paraconsistency (2013). Rodych’s work is indispensable, but only 
two of a dozen or so papers are free online with the usual search but it’s probably all free 
online if one knows where to look (e.g. libgen.is, b-ok.org, torrents). 
Berto notes that W also denied the coherence of metamathematics--i.e., the use by Godel of 
a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for his “notorious” interpretation of 
Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept his argument, I think we are forced to deny 
the intelligibility of metalanguages, metatheories and meta anything else. How can it be that 
such concepts (words) as metamathematics and incompleteness, accepted by millions (and 
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even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal fundamental truths 
about our mind or the universe) are just simple misunderstandings about how language 
works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical notions 
(e.g., mind and will as illusions –Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no 
practical impact whatsoever? Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not 
possible that the very same sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a 
formal 
system… and demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency hypothesis) in a 
different system (the meta-system). If, as Wittgenstein maintained, the proof establishes the 
very meaning of the proved sentence, then it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, 
for a sentence with the same meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided in 
a different system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea that a formal 
system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic consequence that no formal system 
proving only arithmetical truths can prove all arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the 
meaning of arithmetical sentences, then there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there 
cannot be incomplete meanings.” And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical 
arithmetics based on a paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a reality. What is more important, 
the theoretical features of such theories match precisely with some of the aforementioned 
Wittgensteinian intuitions…Their inconsistency allows them also to escape from Godel’s 
First Theorem, and from Church’s undecidability result: there are, that is, demonstrably 
complete and decidable. They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to 
which there cannot be mathematical problems that can be meaningfully formulated within 
the system, but which the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the decidability of 
paraconsistent arithmatics harmonizes with an opinion Wittgenstein maintained thoughout 
his philosophical career.” 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our behavior 
in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a motley of pieces assembled 
by the random processes of natural selection. “Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept 
of ‘mathematics’, which is indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” 
and we can say (contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Chaitin show. W 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems derived from 
axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the definitions, and this is utterly 
different from empirical matters where one applies a test. W often noted that to be 
acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must 
have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it 
cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for 
Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot be used in the 
real world either. As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a 
mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra- systemic 
application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring 
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or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant to apply our normal 
use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, 
‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created with‘numbers’ and 
‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with ‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych 
sums it up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete 
mathematical calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and 
nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real number’ has 
much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, being misled by certain 
analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other comments (see Rodych and Floyd). 
As Rodych, Berto and Priest (another pioneer in paraconsistency) have noted, W was the 
first (by several decades) to insist on the unavoidability and utility of inconsistency (and 
debated this issue with Turing during his classes on the Foundations of Mathematics). We 
now see that the disparaging comments about W’s remarks on math made by Godel, Kreisel, 
Dummett and many others were misconceived. As usual, it is a very bad idea to bet against 
W. Some may feel we have strayed off the path here—after all in “The Limits of Reason” we 
only want to understand science and math and why these paradoxes and inconsistencies 
arise and how to dispose of them. But I claim that is exactly what I have done by pointing 
to the work of W and his intellectual heirs. Our symbolic systems (language, math, logic, 
computation) have a clear use in the narrow confines of everyday life, of what we can 
loosely call the mesoscopic realm-- the space and time of normal events we can observe 
unaided and with certainty (the innate axiomatic bedrock or background). But we leave 
coherence behind when we enter the realms of particle physics or the cosmos, relativity, 
math beyond simple addition and subtraction with whole numbers, and language used out 
of the immediate context of everyday events. The words or whole sentences may be the 
same, but the meaning is lost. It looks to me like the best way to understand philosophy is 
enter it via Berto, Rodych and Floyd’s work on W, so as to understand the subtleties of 
language as it is used in math and thereafter “metaphysical” issues of all kinds may be 
dissolved. As Floyd notes “In a sense, Wittgenstein is literalizing Turing’s model, bringing 
it back down to the everyday and drawing out the anthropomorphic command-aspect of 
Turing’s metaphors.” 
W pointed out how in math, we are caught in more LG’s (Language Games) where it is not 
clear what “true”, “complete”, “follows from”, “provable”, “number”, ”infinite”, etc. mean 
(i.e., what are their COS or truthmakers in THIS context), and hence what significance to 
attach to ‘incompleteness’ and likewise for Chaitin’s “algorithmic randomness”. As W noted 
frequently, do the “inconsistencies” of math or the counterintuitive results of metaphysics 
cause any real problems in math, physics or life? The apparently more serious cases of 
contradictory statements –e.g., in set theory---have long been known but math goes on 
 anyway. Likewise for the countless liar (self-referencing) paradoxes in language which Y 
discusses, but he does not really understand their basis, and fails to make clear that self- 
referencing is involved in the ”incompleteness” and “inconsistency” (groups of complex 
LG’s) of mathematics as well. 
Another interesting work is “Godel’s Way” (2012) by Chaitin, Da Costa and Doria (see my 
review). In spite of its many failings—really a series of notes rather than a finished book— 
it is a unique source of the work of these three famous scholars who have been working at 
the bleeding edges of physics, math and philosophy for over half a century. Da Costa and 
Doria are cited by Wolpert (see below) since they wrote on universal computation and 
among his many accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer on paraconsistency. Chaitin also 
contributes to ‘Causality, Meaningful Complexity and Embodied Cognition’ (2010), replete 
with articles having the usual mixture of insight and incoherence and as usual, nobody is 
aware that W can be regarded as the originator of the position current as Embodied 
Cognition or Enactivism. Many will find the articles and especially the group discussion 
with Chaitin, Fredkin, Wolfram et al at the end of Zenil H. (ed.) ‘Randomness through 
computation’ (2011) a stimulating continuation of many of the topics here, but lacking 
awareness of the philosophical issues and so mixing science (fact finding) with philosophy 
(language games). See also Doria (Ed.), "The Limits Of Mathematical Modeling In The Social 
Sciences: The Significance Of Godel's Incompleteness Phenomenon" (2017) and Wuppuluri 
and Doria (Eds.), "The Map and the Territory: Exploring the foundations of science, thought 
and reality" (2018). 
It is a constant struggle to keep in mind that different contexts mean different LG’s 
(meanings,  COS)  for  “time”,  “space”,  “particle”,  “object”,  ”inside”,  “outside”,  “next”, 
“simultaneous”, ”occur”, “happen”, “event” ,”question”, “answer” ,“infinite”, “past”, 
“future”, “problem”, “logic”, “ontology”, “epistemology”, “solution”, “paradox”, “prove”, 
“strange”, “normal”, “experiment”, ”complete”, “uncountable”, “decidable”, “dimension”, 
“complete”, “formula”, “process”, “algorithm”, “axiom”, ”mathematics”, “physics”, 
“cause”, “place”, “same”,“moving”, “limit”, “reason”, “still”, “real” “assumption”, “belief”, 
‘know”, “event”, ”recursive”, “meta—“, “self- referential” “continue”, “particle”, “wave”,, 
“sentence” and even (in some contexts) “and”, “or”, “also”, “add” , “divide”, “if…then”, 
“follows” etc. 
 
To paraphrase W, most of what people (including many philosophers and most scientists) 
have to say when philosophizing is not philosophy but its raw material. Yanofsky joins 
Hume, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler etc. in 
repeating the mistakes of the Greeks with elegant philosophical jargon mixed with science. 
As antidotes, I suggest my reviews and some Rupert Read, such as his books ‘A 
Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes’ and ‘Wittgenstein Among the Sciences’, or go to 
academia.edu and get his articles , especially ‘Kripke’s Conjuring Trick’ and ‘Against Time 
Slices’ and then as much of S as feasible, but at least his most recent such as ‘Philosophy in 
a New Century’, ‘Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy’,‘Making the Social World’ 
and ‘Thinking About the Real World’ (or my reviews if time is short) and his recent volume 
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on perception. There are also over 100 youtubes of Searle which confirm his reputation as 
the best standup philosopher since Wittgenstein. 
Y does not make clear the major overlap that now exists (and is expanding rapidly) between 
game theorists, physicists, economists, mathematicians, philosophers, decision theorists 
and others, all of whom have been publishing for decades closely related proofs of 
undecidability, impossibility, uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the more 
‘bizarre’ (i.e., not so if we clarify the language games) is the recent proof by Armando Assis 
that in the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics one can setup a zero-sum game 
between the universe and an observer using the Nash Equilibrium, from which follow the 
Born rule and the collapse of the wave function. Godel was first to demonstrate an 
impossibility result and (until Wolpert) it is the most far reaching (or just trivial/incoherent) 
but there have been an avalanche of others. As noted, one of the earliest in decision theory 
was the famous General Impossibility Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 
(for which he got the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five of his students are now 
Nobel laureates so this is not fringe science). It states roughly that no reasonably consistent 
and fair voting system (i.e., no method of aggregating individuals’ preferences into group 
preferences) can give sensible results. The group is either dominated by one person and so 
GIT is often called the “dictator theorem”, or there are intransitive preferences. Arrow’s 
original paper was titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" and can be stated 
like this:” It is impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies all of the 
following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; Unanimity; Freedom From 
Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” Those familiar with modern decision 
theory accept this and the many related constraining theorems as their starting points. Those 
who are not may find it (and all these theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to 
find a career path that has nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow 
Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) among legions 
of publications. 
Y mentions the famous impossibility result of Brandenburger and Keisler (2006) for two 
person games (but of course not limited to “games” and like all these impossibility results 
it applies broadly to decisions of any kind) which shows that any belief model of a certain 
kind leads to contradictions. One interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s 
tools (basically just logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or 
beliefs that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold. “Ann 
believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong” seems 
unexceptionable and ‘recursion’ (another LG) has been assumed in argumentation, 
linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century at least, but they showed that it is impossible for 
Ann and Bob to assume these beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing body of such 
impossibility results for 1 or multiplayer decision situations (e.g., it grades into Arrow, 
Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc). For a good technical paper from among the avalanche on 
the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper from arXiv which takes us back to the 
liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its title notes it is about “interactive forms of 
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diagonalization and self-reference”) and thus to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many 
of these papers quote Y’s paper “A universal approach to self- referential paradoxes and 
fixed points. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386, 2003. Abramsky (a polymath who is 
among other things a pioneer in quantum computing) is a friend of Y’s and so Y contributes 
a paper to the recent Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum 
Foundations’ (2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) commentary on the BK and related 
paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes Holliday and  Eric 
Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and Paradoxes about Knowledge and Belief’. For a good multi-author 
survey see ’Collective Decision Making (2010). 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of polymath physicist 
and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some stunning impossibility or 
incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference 
(computation) that are so general they are independent of the device doing the computation, 
and even independent of the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and 
human behavior, which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that 
can be assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe does. 
The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose observation 
apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These 
results do not rely on systems that are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic 
dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with 
computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” 
He also published what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective intelligence 
(COIN) which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific footing. Although he has 
published various versions of these over two decades in some of the most prestigious peer 
reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257- 81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals 
and has gotten news items in major science journals, few seem to have noticed and I have 
looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, decision theory and computation 
without finding a reference. 
It is most unfortunate that Yanofsky and others have no awareness of Wolpert, since his 
work is the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, incompleteness, and 
undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in Turing machine theory) by 
extending the liar paradox and Cantors diagonalization to include all possible universes and 
all beings or mechanisms and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, 
but on cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by partitioning the 
inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not how it does it) so 
that his mathematical proofs are independent of any particular physical laws or 
computational structures in establishing the physical limits of inference for past, present 
and future and all possible calculation, observation and control. He notes that even in a 
classical universe Laplace was wrong about being able to perfectly predict the future (or 
even perfectly depict the past or present) and that his impossibility results can be viewed as 
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a “non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there cannot be an infallible 
observation or control device). Any universal physical device must be infinite, it can only 
be so at one moment in time, and no reality can have more than one (the “monotheism 
theorem”). 
Since space and time do not appear in the definition, the device can even be the entire 
universe across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of incompleteness with two 
inference devices rather than one self-referential device. As he says, “either the Hamiltonian 
of our universe proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique 
(unlike algorithmic information complexity) in that there is one and only one version of it 
that can be applicable throughout our universe.” Another way to say this is that one cannot 
have two physical inference devices (computers) both capable of being asked arbitrary 
questions about the output of the other, or that the universe cannot contain a computer to 
which one can pose any arbitrary computational task, or that for any pair of physical 
inference engines, there are always binary valued questions about the state of the universe 
that cannot even be posed to at least one of them. One cannot build a computer that can 
predict an arbitrary future condition of a physical system before it occurs, even if the 
condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it— that is, it cannot process 
information (though this is a vexed phrase as S and Read and others note) faster than the 
universe. The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have to be 
physically coupled and it holds regardless of thelaws of physics, chaos, quantum mechanics, 
causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed of light. The inference device does not 
have to be spatially localized but can be nonlocal dynamical processes occurring across the 
entire universe. He is well aware that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, 
Fredkin, Lloyd etc., concerning the universe as computer or the limits of ”information 
processing”, in a new light (though the indices of their writings make no reference to him 
and another remarkable omission is that none of the above are mentioned by Yanofsky 
either). 
Wolpert says it shows that the universe cannot contain an inference device that can process 
information as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot have a perfect memory nor 
perfect control, its past, present or future state can never be perfectly or completely depicted, 
characterized, known or copied. He also proved that no combination of computers with 
error correcting codes can overcome these limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical 
importance of the observer (“the liar”) and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of 
physics, math and language that concern Y. Again cf. Floyd on W: ”He is articulating in 
other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The argument is thus generally 
applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to any purported listing or rule-governed 
expression of them; it does not rely on any particular notational device or preferred spatial 
arrangements of signs. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it 
is not essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may be diagrammed and 
insofar as it is a logical argument, its logic may be represented formally). Like Turing’s 
arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. 
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[The parallels to Wolpert are obvious.] Unlike Turing’s arguments, it explicitly invokes the 
notion of a language-game and applies to (and presupposes) an everyday conception of the 
notions of rules and of the humans who follow them. Every line in the diagonal presentation 
above is conceived as an 
instruction or command, analogous to an order given to a human being...” 
 
W’s prescient viewpoint of these issues, including his embrace of strict finitism and 
paraconsistency, is finally spreading through math, logic and computer science (though 
rarely with any acknowledgement). Bremer has recently suggested the necessity of a 
Paraconsistent Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. “Any mathematical theory presented in first 
order logic has a finite paraconsistent model.” Berto continues: “Of course strict finitism and 
the insistence on the decidability of any meaningful mathematical question go hand in hand. 
As Rodych has remarked, the intermediate Wittgenstein’s view is dominated by his ‘finitism 
and his view […] of mathematical meaningfulness as algorithmic decidability’ according to 
which ‘[only] finite logical sums and products (containing only decidable arithmetic 
predicates) are meaningful because they are algorithmically decidable.’” In modern terms 
this means they have public conditions of satisfaction-i.e., can be stated as a proposition that 
is true or false. And this brings us to W’s view that ultimately everything in math and logic 
rests on our innate (though of course extensible) ability to recognize a valid proof. Berto 
again: “Wittgenstein believed that the naïve (i.e., the working mathematicians) notion of 
proof had to be decidable, for lack of decidability meant to him simply lack of mathematical 
meaning: Wittgenstein believed that everything had to be decidable in mathematics…Of 
course one can speak against the decidability of the naïve notion of truth on the basis of 
Godel’s results themselves. But one may argue that, in the context, this would beg the 
question against paraconsistentists-- and against Wittgenstein too. Both Wittgenstein and 
the paraconsistentists on one side, and the followers of the standard view on the other, agree 
on the following thesis: the decidability of the notion of proof and its inconsistency are 
incompatible. But to infer from this that the naïve notion of proof is not decidable invokes 
the indispensability of consistency, which is exactly what Wittgenstein and the 
paraconsistent argument call into question...for as Victor Rodych has forcefully argued, the 
consistency of the relevant system is precisely what is called into question by Wittgenstein’s 
reasoning.” And so: “Therefore the Inconsistent arithmetic avoids Godel’s First 
Incompleteness Theorem. It also avoids the Second Theorem in the sense that its non- 
triviality can be established within the theory: and Tarski’s Theorem too—including its own 
predicate is not a problem for an inconsistent theory “[As Priest noted over 20 years ago]. 
Prof. Rodych thinks my comments reasonably represent his views, but notes that the issues 
are quite complex and there are many differences between he, Berto and Floyd. 
 
 
And again, ‘decidability’ comes down to the ability to recognize a valid proof, which rests 
on our innate axiomatic psychology, which math and logic have in common with language. 
And this is not just a remote historical issue but is otally current. I have read much of Chaitin 
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and never seen a hint that he has considered these matters. The work of Douglas Hofstadter 
also comes to mind. His Godel, Escher, Bach won a Pulitzer prize and a National Book 
Award for Science, sold millions of copies and continues to get good reviews (e.g. almost 
400 mostly 5 star reviews on Amazon to date) but he has no clue about the real issues and 
repeats the classical philosophical mistakes on nearly every page. 
His subsequent philosophical writings have not improved (he has chosen Dennett as his 
muse), but, as these views are vacuous and unconnected to real life, he continues to do 
excellent science. 
However once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only have meaning 
in specific human contexts—that is, as Searle has emphasized, they are all observer relative 
or ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe apart from our psychology is neither 
finite nor infinite and cannot compute nor process anything. Only in our language games 
do our laptop or the universe compute. 
However not everyone is oblivious to Wolpert. Well known econometricians Koppl and 
Rosser in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has already crossed your mind” 
give three theorems on the limits to rationality, prediction and control in economics. The 
first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to computability to show some logical limits to 
forecasting the future. Wolpert notes that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s 
incompleteness theorem and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as its social 
science analog, though Wolpert is well aware of the social implications. Since Godel’s are 
corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic randomness (incompleteness) 
throughout math (which is just another of our symbolic systems), it seems inescapable that 
thinking (behavior) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements and situations. 
Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems evolved by chance to make 
our psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded as unsurprising that they are not 
“complete”. For math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (again a group of LG’s) shows there 
are limitless theorems that are true but unprovable—i.e., true for no reason. One should 
then be able to say that there are limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense 
that do not describe actual situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go 
away if one considers W’s views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, 
and the whole of his work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context 
sensitivity of language, math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto 
are the best introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the foundations of mathematics and 
so to philosophy. 
K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian (probabilistic) 
forecasting in infinite- dimensional space. The third shows the impossibility of a computer 
perfectly forecasting an economy with agents knowing its forecasting program. The astute 
will notice that these theorems can be seen as versions of the liar paradox and the fact that 
we are caught in impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves 
has been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again we have 
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circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. K&R conclude “Thus, 
economic order is partly the product of something other than calculative rationality”. 
Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject of thousands of papers and 
hundreds of books. 
On p19 Yanofsky says math is free of contradictions, yet as noted, it has been well known 
for over half a century that logic and math (and physics) are full of them—just google 
inconsistency in math or search it on Amazon or see the works of Priest, Berto or the article 
by Weber in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. W was the first to predict 
inconsistency or paraconsistency, and if we follow Berto we can interpret this as W’s 
suggestion to avoid incompleteness. In any event, paraconsistency is now a common feature 
and a major research program in geometry, set theory, arithmetic, analysis, logic and 
computer science. Y returns to this issue other places such as on p346 where he says reason 
must be free of contradictions, but it is clear that “free of” has different uses and they arise 
frequently in everyday life but we have innate mechanisms to contain them. This is true 
because it was the case in our everyday life long before math and science 
Regarding time travel (p49), I suggest Rupert Read’s “Against Time Slices” in his free online 
papers or “Time Travel-the very idea” in his book “A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes.” 
Regarding the discussion of famous philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn on p248, those 
interested can see the work of Rupert Read and his colleagues, most recently in his book 
“Wittgenstein Among the Sciences” and while there, you may make a start at eliminating 
the hard problem of consciousness by reading “Dissolving the hard problem of 
consciousness back into ordinary life” (or his earlier essay on this which is free on the net). 
 
 
It is in the last chapter “Beyond Reason” that philosophical failings are most acute as we 
return to the mistakes suggested by my comments on the title. Reasoning is another word 
for thinking, which is a disposition like knowing, understanding, judging etc. As 
Wittgenstein was the first to explain, these dispositional verbs describe propositions 
(sentences which can be true or false) and thus have what Searle calls Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS). That is, there are public states of affairs that we recognize as showing 
their truth or falsity. “Beyond reason” would mean a sentence whose truth conditions are 
not clear, and the reason would be that it does not have a clear context. It is a matter of fact 
if we have clear COS (i.e., meaning) but we just cannot make the observation--this is not 
beyond reason but beyond our ability to achieve, but it’s a philosophical (linguistic) matter 
if we don’t know the COS. “Are the mind and the universe computers?” sounds like it needs 
scientific or mathematical investigation, but it is only necessary to clarify the context in 
which this language will be used since these are ordinary and unproblematic terms and it 
is only their (lack of a clear) context which is puzzling. E.g, the “self- referential” paradoxes 
on p344 arise because the context and so the COS are unclear. 
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On p140 we might note that 1936 was not actually “long” before computers since Zeus in 
Germany and Berry and Atanasoff in Iowa both made primitive machines in the 30’s, 
though these pioneers are quite unknown to many in the field. I saw some of Zeus’s in the 
Deutsches Museum in Munich while the B & A machine was reconstructed from his design 
recently at Iowa State University, where they worked. 
Wittgenstein discussed the philosophical aspects of computers some years before they 
existed (see Gefwert, Proudfoot etc.). 
On p347, what we discovered about irrational numbers that gave them a meaning is that 
they can be given a use or clear COS in certain contexts and at the bottom of the page our 
“intuitions” about objects, places, times, length are not mistaken- rather we began using 
these words in new contexts where the COS of sentences in which they are used were utterly 
different. This may seem a small point to some, but I suggest it is the whole point. Some 
“particle” which can “be in two places” at once is just not an object and/or is not “being in 
places” in the same sense as a soccer ball, i.e., like so many terms its language games have 
clear COS in our mesoscopic realm but lack them (or have different and commonly unstated 
ones) in the macro or micro realms. 
Regarding his reference on p366 to the famous experiments of Libet, which have been taken 
to show that acts occur before our awareness of them and hence negate will, this has been 
carefully debunked by many including Searle and Kihlstrom. 
It is noteworthy that on the last page of the book he comments on the fact that many of the 
basic words he uses do not have clear definitions, but does not say that this is because it 
requires much of our innate psychology to provide meaning, and here again is the 
fundamental mistake of philosophy. “Limit” or “exist” has many uses but the important 
point is-- what is its use in this context. “Limit of reason” or “the world exists” do not 
(without further context) have a clear meaning (COS) but “speed limit on US 15” and “a life 
insurance policy exists for him” are perfectly clear. 
Regarding solipsism on p369, this and other classical philosophical ‘positions’ were shown 
by W to be incoherent. 
And finally, why exactly is it that quantum entanglement is more paradoxical than making 
a brain out of proteins and other goop and having it feel and see and remember and predict 
the future? 
Is it not just that the former is new and not directly present to our senses (i.e., we need subtle 
instruments to detect it) while animal nervous systems have been evolved to do the latter 
hundreds of millions of years ago and we find it natural since birth? I don’t see the hard 
problem of consciousness to be a problem at all, or if one insists then ok, but it’s on all fours 
with endless others –why there is (or what exactly is) space, time, red, apples, pain, the 
universe, causes, effects, or anything at all. 
Overall an excellent book provided it is read with this review in mind. 
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Review of Religion Explained-- The Evolutionary 
Origins of Religious Thought by Pascal Boyer 
(2002) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
You can get a quick summary of this book on p 135 or 326. If you are not up to speed on 
evolutionary psychology, you should first read one of the numerous recent texts with this 
term in the title. One of the best is "The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology" 2nd ed by 
Buss. Until about 15 years ago,´explanations´ of behavior have not really been explanations 
of mental processes at all, but rather vague and largely useless descriptions of what people 
did and what they said, with no insight into why. We might say that people gather to 
commemorate an event, praise god, receive his (or her or their) blessings, etc., but none of 
this describes the relevant mental processes, so we might say they are explanations in much 
the same way that it explains why an apple drops to the ground if we say its because we 
released it, and it's heavy- there is no mechanism and no explanatory or predictive power. 
This book continues the elucidation of the genetic basis of human behavior which has been 
almost universally ignored and denied by academia, religion, politics and the public (see 
Pinker´s excellent book ``The Blank Slatè`). His statement (p3) that it is meaningless to ask 
if religion is genetic is mistaken as the percentage of variation of any behavior due to genes 
and environment can be studied, just as they are for all other behaviors (see e.g., Pinker). 
The title should be "Preliminary Attempts to Explain Some Aspects of Primitive Religion", 
since he does not treat higher consciousness at all (e.g., satori, enlightenment etc.) which are 
by far the most interesting phenomena and the only part of religion of personal interest to 
intelligent, educated people in the 21st century. Reading this entire book, you would never 
guess such things exist. Likewise, for the immense field of drugs and religion. It lacks a 
framework for rationality and does not mention the dual systems of thought view which is 
now so productive. For this I suggest my own recent papers. 
Nevertheless, the book has much of interest, and in spite of being dated is still worth reading. 
 
 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
 Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
“God is dead and man is free” Nietzsche 
 
“This very body the Buddha, this very earth the lotus paradise” Osho 
 
´´I can well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrines, so that nothing is spoken. 
Clearly, then, the essence of religion can have nothing to do with what is sayable´´ 
Wittgenstein 
When this book appeared, it was a pioneering effort, but now there are endless discussions 
of this topic and so I will give a sufficiently detailed and accurate summary that only 
specialists will need to read it. You can get a quick summary of this book on p 135 or 326. If 
you are not up to speed on evolutionary psychology you should first read one of the 
numerous recent texts with this term in the title. The best are “The Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology” 2nd ed (2015) and The 5th ed. of Evolutionary Psychology by 
Buss, readily available free on the net. 
Until about 15 years ago, ´explanations´´ of behavior have not really been explanations of 
mental processes at all, but rather vague and largely useless descriptions of what people did 
and what they said, with no insight into why. 
We might say that people gather to commemorate an event, praise god, receive their 
blessings, etc., but none of this describes the relevant mental processes, so we might say they 
are explanations in much the same way that it explains why an apple drops to the ground 
if we say it’s because we released it and it’s heavy--there is no mechanism and no 
explanatory or predictive power. 
This book continues the elucidation of the genetic basis of human behavior which has been 
almost univerally ignored and denied by academia, religion, politics and the public (see 
Pinker´s excellent book ``The Blank Slate``). His statement (p3) that it is meaningless to ask 
if religion is genetic is mistaken as the percentage of variation in any behavior due to genes 
and environment can be studied, just as they are for all other behaviors (see e.g., Pinker). 
 
The title should be ´´Preliminary Attempts to Explain Some Aspects of Primitive Religion´´ 
since he does not treat higher consciousness at all (e.g., satori, enlightenment etc.) which are 
by far the most interesting phenomena and the only part of religion of personal interest to 
intelligent, educated people in the 21st century. Reading this entire book, you would never 
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 guess such things exist. Likewise, for the immense field of drugs and religion. How and 
why do entheogens trigger the inference engines and what role have they played in religion 
and life for the last million years? There is a huge mine of info on drugs and behavioral 
templates, but you won´t find even a clue here. You can start with the recent books 
´´Entheogens and the Future of Religion” and ´´Buddhism and Psychedelics´´ or you can 
read my friend Alexander Shulgin’s amazing probing of the ´cognitive templates in 
PHIKAL and TIKAL, available, as almost everything now, free on the net. One of the most 
unusual of the drug probes is ketamine, described by many, most notably in “Journeys into 
the Bright World” by Altounian and Moore, Jansen in “Ketamine” and in probably the most 
detailed account of a single entheogenic drug by a single user in the last two chapters of 
John Lilly´s ´´The Scientist``. Lilly, almost single handedly the founder of dolphin research, 
was a generation or more ahead of nearly everyone on many topics and he also probed his 
own mind with LSD and isolation tanks. See his `Simulations of God` (1975 and my review 
of it) for his speculations on Mind, God and Brain and more aspects of the spiritual and 
mental not touched upon by Boyer. Also for recent heroic self therapy with entheogens see 
‘Xenolinguistics’ by Slattery and ‘DMT & My Occult Mind’ by Khan. 
 
 
There is also virtually nothing here about the relation between physical and mental states. 
The practice of the many forms of yoga was highly advanced thousands of years ago. Its 
primary aim was to trigger spiritual states with body energy and the reverse. There is an 
immense literature and hundreds of millions have practiced it. The best personal account I 
know of by a mystic detailing the interaction of the mental and physical via yoga is found 
in `The Knee of Listening` by Adi Da (see my review). Interwoven with the spellbinding 
account of his spiritual progress are the details of his work with the shakti energy of yoga 
(e.g., p95-9, 214-21, 249,281-3, 439-40 of the 1995 edition-- preferable to the later ones). These 
few pages are worth more than a whole shelf of yoga books if you want to get to the heart 
of the mind/body relation in spirituality. 
 
Zen and other practices probe the brain´s templates with meditation and tricks. Boyer does 
not understand that the major religions (and countless minor ones) were started by persons 
who broke the mold—i.e., somehow blocked or evaded some templates to destroy much of 
the ego and to discover aspects of their mind normally hidden. It is not hard to see why full 
blown enlightenment is rare, as those who have it stop behaving like monkeys (i.e., fighting, 
deceiving, reproducing, accumulating) and this would be heavily selected against. One 
might say those who achieved it are the only ones who became fully human (i.e., Jesus, Adi 
Da, Mohammed, Buddha, Mahavira, Rumi, Osho and 1000 or so others we know of). It 
seems Boyer has no personal experience with meditation, entheogens and higher 
consciousness (e.g., see pages 317, 320-324) so he clearly does not treat all of religion. This is 
again evident (p32) when he says religion has no origin or clear explanation which is curious 
as he provides exactly this. Of course, this is true in a sense of the primitive religions he 
discusses, but Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, etc., have very clear origins and explanations 
in the enlightenment of Jesus, Buddha, Mohammed etc. He is mistaken (p308) in his  belief 
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that Eastern religion is mostly about ritual, rather than personal experience and inner states 
and that it got such ideas from Western philosophy (3000 years ago!). 
Amazingly, he rejects William James´s notion that religion is a result of the experiences of 
exceptional individuals that are subsequently degraded by the masses (p310). James is 
clearly right and Boyer is again, only thinking of primitive religion. Perhaps the best 
personal account of the various states of samadhi, enlightenment, etc. is Adi Da´s book-- 
`The Knee of Listening` but by far the best source for personal accounts by an enlightened 
master are the numerous books, audios and videos by Osho, all free on the net. 
 
 
Witnessing one´s thoughts is one of the commonest techniques of beginning meditators in 
many different traditions. Further progress fuses the perceiver and perceived (all is one). 
One wonders how this relates to the templates—do they enter consciousness, does spiritual 
change open new neural connections or close some? Cognitive psychology has barely 
started on this, but is would be interesting to see PET or fMRI on an enlightened person or 
one in a samadhi state with good controls and has been done. Though he is right that many 
experiences are of some agent, advanced states have been described in a vast literature 
which shows they typically have no thoughts, no mind, no person, no god. This would seem 
to be the ultimate in decoupling System 2 templates in a functional person. 
For supernatural types of religious concepts to evolve and survive, they should belong to 
one of the basic ontological categories or templates (plant, tool, natural object, animal, 
person etc.) which the brain uses to organize perception and thought. These are commonly 
given counterintuitive properties such as prescience, telepathy, immortality, abilility to hear 
one’s words or read one’s thoughts, ability to heal or confer great power etc. Good 
supernatural concepts usually allow all inferences not specifically barred by the violation of 
intuition—i.e., a god will have all human properties but does not age or die. 
The huge number of religious concepts is contained in this short list of templates. It is the 
counterintuitive nature of the concepts that makes them easy to remember and to transmit 
to others and this seems to by one reason why supernatural concepts are a central part of 
nearly all religions. 
Supernatural concepts interact with other types of templates such as intuitive psychology, 
intuitive physics, structure function and goal detection. If it activates physics, goal detection, 
intuitive psychology and intentional use, then it will be a human-like being with 
superhuman properties. This is standard cognitive psychology and counterintuitive parts 
are added on for religious use. There is abundant evidence that brain areas that are activated 
when we do something are also activated when we see someone else doing a similar thing 
(mirror neurons). It is feasible that this is correlated with the need to join in and the 
satisfaction from participating in the rituals integral to society (sports, politics, music etc.) 
and religion. 
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There is also evidence that seeing other people’s emotions activates the same areas as our 
own. Our theory of mind (i.e., of other people’s mental life-- intuitive psychology which I 
prefer to call Understandingof Agency -UA) seems not to be one inference engine, but the 
sum of many and, as more research is done, more modules will be discovered. Another 
critical feature of inference engines is that they often run in decoupled (counterfactual or 
imaginary) mode while we consider the past or the future. This starts quite early as shown 
by the common presence of imaginary playmates in children, their ability to grasp stories 
and TV, and he notes that research seems to show that children who create playmates seem 
to be better at grasping other people’s mental states and emotions. The point in this context 
is that it seems quite natural to ascribe humanlike characteristics to spirits, ghosts, gods, etc. 
when there is no evidence at all for their actual presence. 
The innate inference engines are automatic as they have to be fast and not distract us (i.e., 
they are System 1 but sadly he fails to use the two systems framework here—see my papers 
for this). The mind was not evolved as an explanation machine and before the recent rise of 
science, nobody ever tried to explain why our foot moves when we walk, an apple falls to 
the ground, we get hungry or angry or why we experience or do anything. Only bizarre or 
cosmic occurrences like lightning or sunrise needed a cause. Our intuitive psychology and 
agency templates also prompted us to ascribe good and bad luck to some agent. Much of 
this may sound speculative but now that EP (evolutionary psychology) is a major paradigm, 
the evidence of such innate S1 functions in early childhood and infancy is mounting rapidly. 
Supernatural agents (including deceased ancestors) are treated by intuitive psychology as 
intentional agents, by the social exchange system (a part of or variant on the cost/benefit 
systems) by the moral system as witnesses to moral actions, and by the person-file system 
as individuals. Since all these systems can operate in decoupled mode, there is no need to 
consider whether these agents really exist. They are driven by relevance, by the richness of 
inferences that result and by the ease with which they can be remembered and 
communicated. The templates are highly tuned to gather info, get cooperation and calculate 
benefits in a very rapid, subconscious and normally error-free way, while conscious reason 
is slow and fallible. In modern times, the ego has time to waste on debate, explanation, and 
interpretation in endless attempts to deceive and manipulate others for personal gain. With 
large, mobile populations and fast communication the results of our social exchange, 
evaluation of trust, cheater detection and other templates are often useless and self- 
destructive. Strategic info (that which passes the relevance filters) activates the engines 
related to social interaction and our knowledge of what info others have is a critical part of 
the social mind. The supernatural agents typically have perfect knowledge. Though he does 
not seem to mention it, powerful people often come to have some of the characteristics of 
supernatural agents and so people will start to respond to them as to gods. Aliens, UFO´s, 
new age mysticism, astrology, fantasy and sci-fi draw great attention due to activation, and 
often possess agents with strategic info. However, hundreds of millions have followed 
charismatic leaders with false strategic info (i.e., quasi- supernatural agents) to their deaths 
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(The Branch Davidians of Waco, Communism, Nazism, Vietnam, Jonestown, George Bush, 
Comet Kahoutek etc.). 
Social interactions require a social mind—i.e., mental systems that organize them. Like most 
behavior, it is only recently that it was generally realized that we needed built-in 
mechanisms to do this. Strategic information is whatever activates the social mind. Our 
theory of mind (UA) tells us to what agents this info is also available. It is common to 
attribute to supernatural agents the ability to fully access info that would normally be partly 
or totally unavailable to others. 
All the engines must have some kind of relevance filter so that they are not constantly 
activated by trivia. We have taxonomies that tell us how to group things in ways relevant 
to their behavior or properties in the world now called System 1 (S1), and we then use our 
more recently evolved slow deliberate linguistic System 2 (S2) when there is time. We expect 
large catlike things with big teeth and claws to be predators and not herbivores. Spirits fit 
human taxonomy and automatically have needs and desires, likes and dislikes and will thus 
give rewards and punishments and all any culture has to do is specify what these are. Those 
concepts giving the richest inferences with the least effort have been selected into S1. 
A common viewpoint is given by relevance theory, which tries to determine how and why 
some ‘concepts’ (i.e., the language games of System 2) are more easily transmitted. 
Presumably, concepts which trigger engines (S1 ‘concepts’) more intensely or frequently, or 
more different engines, will be superior. So, we may have many language games that are 
easier to remember and apply, rather than because they make sense or are more useful in 
some way than others. This may help to explain the existence of many concepts or practices 
that seem arbitrary or stupid, or which make life more difficult and applies to all of culture, 
not just to religion. 
Nearly all religions have full access agents—i.e., they know all or nearly all about us and 
Boyer distinguishes 3 classes--divine brutes with little or no access but which nevertheless 
have power, Aquinas agents which know everything and full strategic agents which have 
access to all the strategic or important info. He says that this may account for our interest in 
knowing other person’s religious ideas or in converting them to ours. Only in this way can 
we understand how they may behave and interact. 
Agents that are aware of and able to affect our social interaction are richer in inferences, and 
so are easier to mentally represent and remember and thus enjoy a great advantage in 
cultural transmission. Thus, we can now say that religion does not create or even support 
morality, but that our built in moral intuitions (i.e., the fast automatic prelinguistic mental 
reflexes of S1) make religion plausible and useful. Likewise, our mechanisms to explain 
good and bad luck makes their connection with supernatural agents simple. And since we 
share our moral system and our information with them, it is natural to expect they will 
enforce our attitudes. 
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Reciprocal altruism and cheating are central parts of human behavior. To show passionate 
feelings and honesty that are genuine (difficult to fake) is of great social (and genetic) value. 
This can be reinforced by religion as one would choose to cooperate with such persons 
rather than with rational calculators who may change their mind or cheat anytime their 
inference engines calculate that it is in their best interests. This system also requires that 
cheaters be punished, even when the cheating has minimal social cost. One common group 
of religious concepts are those that make cheating immoral. The mechanism is feelings (e.g., 
the rapid S1 reflexes of anger, jealousy, resentment, confusion) rather than the slow rational 
cogitation of S2. This may sound strange but it has been shown not only in monkeys but in 
lower animals. Yes there are endless elaborations of cheating in modern society but like all 
our behavior it is built on genetics and S1..We feel that it is wrong for someone to steal 
another’s money rather than needing to sit down and think--well if he takes that money, 
then maybe he will take mine or he will have some future advantage over me etc. Perhaps 
here is one place that guilt enters in order to make the socially (genetically) destructive 
practice of cheating less appealing. This takes us into the huge literature on cheaters and 
cooperators, hawks and doves and pretenders and into reciprocal altruism and game theory. 
Keep in mind that ‘true altruism’ or group selection is clearly a fantasy as I have detailed in 
my review of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’. So, like all behavior, religion evolved 
because it had survival value for individuals. 
Many types of commitment gadgets have evolved which tend to ensure cooperation-- 
keeping track of reputation, legal or quasi-legal binds (contracts), strong passions, 
compulsive honesty, resentment and need to punish cheaters. Cooperation gadgets are built 
in also--moral intuitions, guilt, pride, gratefulness, hostility. In contrast to the nearly 
universal idea that moral realism (that behavior itself has a specific moral value that does 
not depend on one’s viewpoint) is only developed by adults or is given by religion, it is now 
clear that this appears in 3 and 4 year olds and changes little with age. Methods have now 
been developed to study infants and in late 2007 a study appeared in Nature which showed 
that they can distinguish helper from non- helper objects and there has been lots of work on 
humans and other animals since. Of course, intuitive morality will often give the wrong 
results for adults in the modern world, as may all of our S1 reflexes in many contexts. 
Most of the basics of what has formerly been regarded as culture, is now known or 
suspected to be inherited. Pinker lists hundreds of different aspects of human societies that 
are universal and thus good candidates. One can compile a very long list of religious 
concepts that we don´t need to be taught--- spirits understand human thoughts, emotions 
and intentions and differentiate between wishes or images and reality etc. 
It seems that the only feature of humans that is always projected onto gods, spirits, ghosts, 
etc, is a mind much like our own. Intuitive psychology applies to intentional agents in 
general (i.e., persons, animals and anything that appears to move in pursuit of its own goals). 
Intuitive physics is probably also composed of many subsegments and must be connected 
with the intentionality module –e.g., when a lion is chasing an antelope, we know that if it 
changes course, the lion will probably do so. One would expect that detecting such agents 
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was a very ancient evolutionary priority and even 500 million years ago a trilobite that 
lacked such genes would soon be lunch. As more behavioral genes are mapped we are 
finding the same or similar ones in fruitflies, just as we have for other genes such as the ones 
controlling body segmentation and immunity, and great strides in this direction have been 
made since this book appeared. Just search Drosophila behavior. 
Like our other concepts, religious ones are often vague and their use idiosyncratic due to 
the fact that they result from the unconscious functioning of inference engines (S1) as 
elaborated upon by the vagaries of culture. We cannot say precisely even what simple words 
mean, but we know how to use them. Just as Chomsky discovered depth grammar, one 
might say that Wittgenstein discovered depth semantics. 
Wittgenstein was the first (and still one of the few) who understood that what philosophy— 
which I term the descriptive psychology of higher order thought- (and all attempts to 
understand behavior) was struggling with was first and foremost these built-in S1 functions 
that are inaccessible to conscious thought. Though I have never seen it stated, it seems 
reasonable to regard him as a pioneer in cognitive and evolutionary psychology. 
 
 
Boyer takes a new view of death also. Corpses have properties that make supernatural 
concepts relevant apart from our need for comfort and this part of religion may be less about 
death than about dead bodies. They produce a dissociation between the animacy, intuitive 
psychology and person ‘file systems’. We see such dissociation in autism and odd 
neurological states such as Capgras syndrome. 
He sees this as another way that culture makes use of salient gadgets (events, objects etc.) 
which are highly relevant and grab the attention of the inference engines. And since this 
book appeared, evidence continues to accumulate that genes create culture to a much 
greater extent than most people (including scholars) ever imagined. It has its own field— 
implicit cognition. 
Nobody ever thinks to inquire as to the motives if a rock that falls and hits us, but we always 
do if it comes from the hand of a person. Even a very young child knows this, due to its 
intuitive psychology, agency, animism and other engines. These engines (genes, reflexive 
behaviors) must, in their orginal forms, be hundreds of millions of years old. A 
carboniferous era dragonfly differentiated between animate and inanimate objects and 
calculated the trajectory of its prey. 
Religion originally worked in an atmosphere of perpetual fear. Inference engines evolved 
to find mates and food and shelter and avoid death, hence the approach to the gods as a 
powerless supplicant and the use of appeasement rituals and offerings (as we would to a 
person). Our danger avoidance is highly imperfect in the modern world due to guns, drugs 
and fast transport (cars, skis). 
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Everywhere in the world you can see people walking or riding bicycles in the streets just a 
step away from speeding vehicles, even though at least a million a year are run down. 
He says (p40) that memes (Dawkins famous cultural analog of the gene) are not a very good 
concept for cultural transmission since ideas are changed by each person, while genes 
remain the same. However, what about media—i.e., film, TV, print, email? They can 
replicate more precisely than genes. These are now the prime means for transmitting and 
checking the validity of memes, not just what someone says. In any case, genes are not 
perfect either. Just as there is a phenotype corresponding to the genotype, there is a phene 
corresponding to the meme. 
Why do we invoke supernatural agents for good and bad luck? They activate our social 
exchange systems and since we regard them as having strategic info they can control what 
happens. 
It occurs to me that perhaps there is such great opposition to genetic explanations for 
behavior because people feel anyone who accepts this will automatically reject the social 
exchange and other templates and will always cheat. Or perhaps they fear the intuitive 
psychology will no longer work. And it calls their attention to The Phenomenological 
Illusion (the illusory feeling we have that our behavior is due to conscious decisions- see my 
other writings). 
Social rituals are examples of what psychologists have termed precautionary rules and these 
commonly include concerns about pollution, purification rituals (activation of the contagion 
system), contact avoidance, special types of touching, special attention to boundaries and 
thresholds, rule violations, use of certain numbers of bright colors, symmetrical arrays and 
precise patterns, special sounds or music, special dance and other movements, etc. All these 
trigger certain groups of templates, create satisfying feelings, and are commonly coupled to 
religious concepts, and to politics, sports, hunting and agriculture, marriage, child rearing, 
music, art, folklore, literature etc. 
The agency detecting systems (e.g., predator and prey detection) are biased for over- 
detection—i.e., they do not need to see a lion or a person to be activated, but only a footprint 
or a sound of the right kind. Based on very little info, these systems then produce feelings 
and expectations about the agents’ nature and intentions. In the case of supernatural 
agencies our intuitive psychology templates are also activated and generally produce a 
person-like entity plus the counterintuitive features, but their precise characteristics are 
generally left vague. 
The attaching of a counterintuitive tag (e.g., rising from the dead) to an agent (e.g., Jesus) or 
other ontological category makes it easy to remember and a good candidate for religion. 
All these modules are inherited but of course a baby does not have them fully developed 
and only with time and a `normal` environment will they emerge. 
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I read this shortly before reading Ken Wilber´s ´´Sex, Ecology and Spirituality´´ and could 
see on nearly every page how outdated and empty are most of the works which Wilber is 
discussing. A large part of Wilbur´s book and of the hundreds he analyzes on religion, 
psychology and philosophy are now archaic. 
However, Wilbur has written many books of great interest on spirituality and it is sad that 
Boyer does not even reference him-- but neither does he reference drugs, Wittgenstein, 
meditation, yoga, satori or enlightenment in his index! 
One might say that the Nobel peace prize is given to those who are best at encouraging us 
to extend coalitions to include other outgroups or even other countries or the whole world. 
Or, one might say they get the prize for efforts to turn off the `cheater detector` or social 
exchange templates which require that only those who reciprocate are included in one´s 
group and given access to resources (which most of the world´s poor clearly cannot do). 
He gives a brief summary of some of the self-deceptive inferences which play a role in 
religion as in all of life--consensus, false consensus, generation effect, memory illusions, 
source monitoring defects, confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance. Like the other 
templates, these gave very good results 100,000 years ago, but with life in the fast lane, they 
can now prove fatal for individuals and for the world. Coalitional intuitions and essence 
concepts are delineated as critical parts of human behavior. Humans automatically form 
groups and show hostility to persons not in the group and wholly undeserved friendship to 
those in the group (coalitional intuitions), even when the group is composed of total 
strangers. This relates to operation engines such as cost/benefit and calculation of reliability 
mentioned before. Essences are the concepts we use to describe our feelings (intuitions) 
about coalitions and other social categories (e.g., hierarchies and dominance). Although 
these mechanisms evolved in small groups, nowadays these are commonly operating with 
people to whom we are not closely related, so they often give false results. Stereotyping, 
racism and its accompaniments (i.e., arbitrary (or not so arbitrary) set distinctions) are 
probably the results of the operation of coalitional intuitions built into our brains, rather 
than stereotyping being an S2 psychological function and the coalitions with their exclusion, 
dominance, and antipathy being the results. 
These engines may well explain the `social magic` that forms and guides societies. 
 
He suggests that one might explain fundamentalism as a natural reaction to the common 
violation of coalitional thinking in modern societies. Freedom to act as one chooses and in 
direct opposition to others in the same community creates strong and often violent feelings 
in those without the education or experience to deal with diversity and change. They often 
want public and spectacular punishment to assuage their feelings. Fundamentalism may 
best be explained as attempts to preserve hierarchies based on coalitions, when these are 
threatened by easy defection or inattention. These are functioning in all people all the time, 
but they come to the surface mainly when there is a situation that creates some special threat 
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(i.e., modern life). Of course, as always, we need to keep in mind that the ultimate source 
and payoff for all behavior is in the genes. 
Though he says little about it, the notions of ontological S1 categories and counterintuitive 
tags that `stick´ to them also go far to explain magic, the paranormal, folklore, mythology, 
folk medicine, astrology, theology, miracle workers, demonic and angelic possession, the 
arts, and formerly even much of science. Rituals act as snares for thought. Our contagion 
templates are powerful activators of behavior and it is natural to include many purification 
rituals in religion. They also make use of our planning systems, which we can see in extreme 
form in obsessive compulsive disorder. There is preoccupation with colors, spaces, 
boundaries, movements and contact. Salient gadgets are incorporated. We have a powerful 
need to imitate others. 
Rituals activate our undetected hazard systems. Sacrificial offerings to the unseen agents 
make use of our social exchange systems. Our coalitional intuitions are satisfied by group 
rites and marriage. The ` naive sociology` of the common man extends into much philosophy, 
sociology, theology, anthropology, psychology, economics, politics and is the result of our 
attempts to make sense of our own behavior but this is the result of the automatic and 
unconscious functioning of our templates. Thus, much of culture seems magical-- hence the 
term `social magic`. Inevitably, naive sociology is weak, so rituals and belief systems 
emphasize the benefits of cooperation and the costs of cheating or defection. The rituals and 
gadgets stimulate memory and satisfy the contagion system. Participation signals 
cooperation and the gods and spirits are optional. So, templates lead to religion which leads 
to doctrines and not the reverse. 
I think he goes seriously astray when discussing science vs. religion (p320). He says it is 
wrong to talk about religion as a real object in the world (whatever that might be), but of 
course the external and internal (mental) phenomena can be studied as well as any other, 
and he shows in this book that religion is a branch of cognitive psychology. He says there is 
no science as such, and we know that he means it´s complex, but then there is no religion, 
law, sports, auto racing or anything at all, as such. He objects to `pop theology` which says 
religion makes the world more beautiful or meaningful or that it addresses ultimate 
questions, but all religion addresses the ultimate questions and tries to make the world 
meaningful and less ugly. In addition, what I call `advanced religion` --i.e., the way it starts 
in the no-minds of Jesus, Buddha, Osho etc.-- has a quite different take on the world than 
the primitive religion he discusses in this book (e.g., see the 200 books and DVD´s of Osho 
at Oshoworld.com or on p2p etc., or see Wilber, Adi Da etc.). Again, on p 327 he thinks there 
is no religious center in the brain and though this is probably true for primitive religion, it 
seems more likely that there are centers (networks of connections) for the experiences of 
satori and enlightenment and maybe for entheogens too. He also thinks (p321) that science 
is less natural and more difficult than religion, but in view of the huge number of scientists 
and the facts that nearly everyone is able to absorb science in grade school, and that there 
have probably been less than 1000 enlightened persons in all of human history, it seems 
clear that the situation is quite the reverse for advanced spirituality. It is vastly less difficult 
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to become a botanist or a chemist than to dissolve one´s ego! Natural selection will clearly 
eliminate higher consciousness genes, but the rational calculus of science is quite consistent 
with gathering resources and producing children. Of course, the problem is that he is again 
fixated on primitive religion. 
He sums it up by saying (p 135) that religious activities activate inference systems that 
‘govern our most intense emotions, shape our interaction with other people, give us moral 
feelings and organize social groups`. Of course, these have nothing to do with satori or 
enlightenment! He notes that religious ideas are parasitic upon our intuitive ontology (i.e., 
they are relevant). They are transmitted successfully due to mental capacities that evolution 
has already created. As with other behaviors, religion is a result of aggregate relevance— 
i.e., the sum of the operation of all the inference engines. Thus, religious concepts and 
behavior are present not because they are necessary or even useful, but because they easily 
activate our templates, are easy to remember and transmit, and so they survive over time. 
He gives a final summary (p326) of ``The Full History of all Religion (ever)`` as follows (of 
course it leaves out `advanced religion (spirituality, mysticism)`). Among the millions of 
things people discussed were some which violated our intuitions and this made them easier 
to remember and transmit. Those that were about agents were especially salient as they 
activated rich domains of possible inferences such as those about predators and intuitive 
psychology. Agents with counterintuitive properties, especially ability to understand and 
affect human behavior or the world were strongly transmitted. They became connected with 
other strange and somewhat counterintuitive events such as death and feelings about the 
continued presence of the dead. Somehow rituals arise and become associated with the 
powerful supernatural agents. Some persons will be more skilled at conducting such rituals 
and guiding the interactions with the spirits. Inevitably they will create more abstract 
versions and start to acquire power and wealth. However, people will continue to have their 
own inferences about religion. 
He notes that religion owes much to the probably recent (in hominoid evolution) 
appearance of the decoupling ability and it occurs to me that one might regard entheogenic 
drug experiences, satori and enlightenment as the ultimate in decoupling--no past, no 
future, and not even a present-- no here, no there, no me, no you and all is one thing and 
illusory. The other key transition in evolution is posited to be the ability to accept the 
violation of intuitive expectations at the level of ontological domains (i.e., the classes of 
things--plants, people, moving things etc.). He regards these capacities as leading to the 
invention of religion (and of course much else) but it´s clear that Buddha, Jesus and Osho 
went quite a bit further. He rejects the idea that religious thoughts made minds more flexible 
and open (rather they became susceptible to certain concepts that activated the inferences 
of agency, predation, morality, social exchange, death etc.), but something made us 
susceptible also to the entheogens, satori and enlightenment and this is as flexible and open 
as people can be and remain sane. So it is clear that much remains to be discovered about 
spirituality and religion and the progress in understanding behavior will bring this about. 
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Review of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality by Ken 
Wilber 2nd ed 851p (2001) 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is both amazing and fitting that this huge, jargon-laden (this book really needs a glossary!), 
heavily academic work has become a best seller in the world of the educated. One has to be 
dedicated to learn the jargon and then plow through 551 pages of text and 238 pages of 
notes. Meanwhile, we are told time and again that this is just an outline of what is to come! 
 
Though he severely criticizes the excesses of the three movements, this is a deconstructive 
and New Age Mystical and postmodern interpretation of religion, philosophy and the 
behavioral sciences from a very liberal, spiritual point of view—i.e., without the worst of 
decon, pm and NAM jargon, rabid egalitarianism and anti-scientific anti-intellectualism. 
 
He analyzes in some detail the various world views of philosophy, psychology, sociology 
and religion, exposing their fatal reductionistic flaws with (mostly) care and brilliance, but 
most of the sources he analyzes are of almost no relevance today. They use terminology 
and concepts that were already outdated when he was researching and writing 20 years ago. 
One has to slog thru endless pages of jargon –laden discussion of Habermas, Kant, 
Emerson, Jung et.al. to get to the pearls. 
 
You get a terrific sampling of bad writing, confused and outdated ideas and obsolete jargon. 
 
If one has a good current education, it is doubly painful to read this book (and most writing 
on human behavior). Painful because it´s so tortured and confusing, and then again when 
you realize how simple it is with modern psychology and philosophy. The terminology and 
ideas are horrifically confused and dated (but less so in Wilber´s own analysis than in his 
sources). 
 
This book and most of its sources are would-be psychology texts, though most of the authors 
did not realize it. It is about human behavior and reasoning-about why we think and act the 
way we do and how we might change in the future. But (like all such discussion until 
recently) none of the explanations are really explanations, and so they give no insight into 
human behavior. Nobody discusses the mental mechanisms involved. It is like describing 
how a car works by discussing the steering wheel and metal and paint without any 
knowledge of the engine, fuel or drive train. In fact, like most older ´explanations` of 
behavior, the texts quoted here and the comments by Wilber are often more interesting for 
what kinds of things they accept (and omit!) as explanations, and the kind of reasoning they 
use, than for the actual content. 
If one is up on philosophy and cognitive and evolutionary psychology, most of this is 
archaic. Like nearly everyone (scholars and public alike—e.g., see my review of Dennett´s 
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Freedom Evolves and other books), he does not understand that the basics of religion and 
ethics-- in fact all human behavior, are programmed into our genes. A revolution in 
understanding ourselves was taking place while he was writing his many books and it 
passed him by. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
´Anything that can be said can be said clearly` Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
`Heaven and Earth are inhumane--they view the myriad creatures as straw dogs` TaoTe 
Ching 
It is both amazing and fitting that this huge, jargon-laden (this book really needs a glossary!), 
heavily academic work has become a best seller in the world of the educated. One has to be 
dedicated to learn the jargon and then plow through 551 pages of text and 238 pages of notes. 
Meanwhile, we are told time and again that this is just an outline of what is to come! 
This book and most of its sources are would-be psychology texts, though most of the authors 
did not realize it. It is about human behavior and reasoning- about why we think and act 
the way we do and how we might change in the future. But (like all such discussion until 
recently) none of the explanations are really explanations and so they gave no insight into 
human behavior. Nobody discusses the mental mechanisms involved. It is like describing 
how a car works by discussing the steering wheel and metal and paint and the wheels 
without any knowledge of the engine or drive train. In fact, like most older ´explanations` 
of behavior, the texts quoted here and the comments by Wilber are often more interesting 
for what kinds of things they accept (and omit!) as explanations, and the kind of reasoning 
they use, than for the actual content. 
As with all reasoning and explaining one now wants to know which of the brains inference 
engines are activated to produce the results and how fast thinking automated prelinguistic 
system 1 (S1) and slow thinking deliberative linguistic system 2 (S2) are involved and what 
is the Logical Structure of Rationality that explains (or rather describes as Wittgenstein 
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insisted) behavior. It is the relevance filters (the reflexive processes) of S1 which determine 
what sorts of things that can be input as appropriate data for each engine and their 
automatic and unconscious operation and interaction that determines what our brain will 
pass on to S2 for higher order expression in language. 
Cognitive and evolutionary psychology are still not evolved enough to provide full 
explanations (descriptions) but an interesting start has been made. Boyer´s `Religion 
Explained` is a good place to see what a modern scientific explanation of human behavior 
looks like as of 2002 (though it completely misses enlightenment!). Pinker´s `How the mind 
Works` is a good general survey and his `The Blank Slate` (see my reviews) by far the best 
discussion of the heredity- environment issue in human behavior. They do not ‘explain’ all 
of intelligence or thinking but summarize what is known. See several of the recent texts (i.e., 
2004 onwards) with evolutionary psychology in the title (above all "The Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology" 2nd ed by Buss) or the web for further info. 
We now recognize that the bases for art, music, math, philosophy, psychology, sociology, 
language and religion are found in the automatic functioning of templates or inference 
engines of S1. This is why we can expect similarities and puzzles and inconsistencies or 
incompleteness and often, dead ends as without careful probing by experiments or 
philosophical (linguistic) analysis it is invisible to us (‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ of 
Searle). The brain has no general intelligence but numerous specialized modules, each of 
which works on certain aspects of some problem and the results are then added, resulting 
in the feelings which lead to behavior. Wilber, like everyone, can only generate or recognize 
explanations that are consistent with the operations of his own inference engines, which 
were evolved to deal with such things as resource accumulation, coalitions in small groups, 
social exchanges and the evaluation of the intentions of other persons. It is amazing they 
can produce philosophy and science, and not surprising that figuring out how they work 
together to produce consciousness or choice or spirituality is way beyond reach. 
Wilber is a bookworm and he has spent decades analyzing classic and modern texts. He is 
extremely bright, has clearly had his own awakening, and also knows the minutiae of 
Eastern religion as well as anyone. I doubt there are more than a handful in the world who 
could write this book. However, this is a classic case of being too smart for your own good 
and his fascination with intellectual history and his ability to read, analyze and write about 
hundreds of difficult books has bogged him down in the dead past. 
Though he severely criticizes the excesses of the three movements, this is a deconstructive 
and New Age Mystical and postmodern interpretation of religion, philosophy and the 
behavioral sciences from a very liberal, spiritual point of view—i.e., without the worst of 
deconstruction, postmodernism, new age mysticism jargon, anti- scientific anti- 
intellectualism, and the oppressive rabid Neomarxist Third World Supremacist 
Egalitarianism that is destroying America and the world by handing power over to the low 
class rabble in the West and to the Jihadists and the Seven Sociopaths who run China. 
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Boyer points out (p20), when fear and poverty give way to security and wealth, the results 
of the inference engines change and you find religion changing from appeasement rituals 
for the powerful gods in a hostile universe to self empowerment and control in a benevolent 
one (i.e., New Age Mysticism etc.). 
He analyzes in some detail the various world views of philosophy, psychology, sociology 
and religion, exposing their fatal reductionistic flaws with (mostly) care and brilliance, but 
most of the sources he analyzes are of questionable relevance today. They use terminology 
and concepts that were already outdated when he was researching and writing 20 years ago. 
One has to slog thru endless pages of jargon –laden discussion of Habermas, Kant, Emerson, 
Jung et.al. to get to the pearls. He immerses himself in Freud and the psychoanalytic 
interpretation of dreams (eg, p92), though most now regard these as merely quaint artifacts 
of intellectual history. 
If one is up to date on philosophy and cognitive and evolutionary psychology, most of this 
is archaic. Like nearly everyone (scholars and public alike--eg, see my review of Dennett´s 
Freedom Evolves and other books), he does not understand that the basics of religion and 
ethics-- in fact all human behavior, are programmed into our genes. A revolution in 
understanding ourselves was taking place while he was writing his many books and it 
largely passed him by, though I have not read his latest works. 
If one has a good current education, it is doubly painful to read this book (and most writing 
on human behavior). Painful because it´s so tortured and confusing and then again when 
you realized how simple it is with modern psychology and philosophy. The terminology 
and ideas are horrifically confused and dated (but less so in Wilber´s own analysis than in 
his sources). We now think in terms of cognitive templates which evolved about 100,000 
years ago (in most cases several hundreds of millions of years earlier in their original forms). 
They operate automatically, are not accessible to consciousness and there is abundant 
evidence that they severely limit the behaviorial options for individuals and for society. His 
new preface notes one such study, but the book needs a total rewriting. 
There is an enormous resistance in us to accepting ourselves as part of nature, and in 
particular, any gene based explanations of behavior, in spite of the fact that all our behavior, 
like all of our physiology, is at its roots gene based. Like all our thinking, these feelings are 
due to the operation of the cognitive templates, so perhaps it is the conflict between 
biological explanations and our automatic intuitive psychology or social mind systems that 
is responsible (the obviousness of our linguistic conventions and culture and the opacity of 
our automatisms which Searle has called ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’). These genetic 
systems have operated for hundreds of thousands or millions of years and the new data 
from science is telling us the results of their operations (our feelings about what to do) are 
often wrong in our complex modern world. There is a huge research program in social, 
economic and political behavior from this new viewpoint. 
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Some jargon you will need is on page X of the new preface where you find that the 
constantly used vision-logic is postformal cognition or network-logic or integral- 
aperspectival (all points of view are equal and must be considered). He also states the 
postmodern manifesto here: all views equal, dependent on limitless contexts, and merely 
interpretations. As he notes in great detail, this puts one on the slippery slope leading to 
much irrational and incoherent rant and there are very basic flaws in it. Nevertheless, it 
virtually took over US and European universities for several decades and is far from dead, 
having transformed itself into Neomarxist Third World Supremacist Egalitarianism. You 
will also need his definition of eros from p528. 
You get a terrific sampling of bad writing, confused and outdated ideas and obsolete jargon. 
On p52 there is a quote from Jakobson which can be replaced by `the inference engines for 
psychology and language develop as we mature´; and paragraphs from Jantsch (p58) which 
say that evolution is evolution and cells are cells and (p71) the environment changes as 
organisms evolve. There is a quote from Foucault to open Book Two (p327) which, 
translated from deconstructese, says `knowledge helps to understand the world`. 
There is a long quote (p60-61) from Rupert Sheldrake which, when it is intelligible at all, 
says things that translate as ´proteins are proteins´ and ´cells are cells´. There are numerous 
linguistic disasters from Habermas (e.g., if you have time to waste, try figuring out the 
quotes on p77 or 150), but some are actually translatable, such as those on p153-4, which say 
that people have morals, so society has laws and language evolved so society evolved. And 
lots of this from Wilber himself, as on p109 where he spends most of the page to say m2o4s6t 
mutations and recombinations fail and the surviviors are compatible with their evirons. In 
spite of his acquaintance with Searle´s work, he is often confused about consciousness. He 
says (p117-8) that we can regard whatever we want as conscious, but clearly, once we leave 
the realm of animals that have eyes and a brain and walk around, it becomes a joke. Likewise, 
he is on very thin ice when discussing our interior and the need to interpret the minds of 
others. This is very far off the mark if one knows some Searle, Wittgenstein and cognitive 
psychology (see my other writings). Likwise with the `explanations´ of Wolf on p742 which 
are wrong for the same reasons that ´explanations´ of consciousness are wrong. It must be 
true that mind and spirit are based in physics (at least there is no intelligible alternative) but 
we don´t know how to conceptualize this or even how to recognize such a concept (i.e., the 
language games or Conditions of Satisfaction are unclear). Many suspect we will never 
understand this but rather it’s just a matter of accepting how things are and likewise with 
the fundamentals of the universe (e.g., see my review of Kaku´s `Hyperspace` and Dennett). 
His notes (p129) that cultural studies have made little headway but neither he nor his 
sources understand that they lacked any framework to do so and typically because they 
embraced the sterile idea of the blank slate. They want to be factual, even scientific, but they 
constantly veer off into fantasy. He delineates the integration of art, science and morality as 
the great task of postmodernism and he and others go to immense lengths to make 
connections and organize it all into a coherent plan for thinking and living. However, I 
cannot see any really useful sense in which this is possible. Life is not a game of chess. Even 
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in the limited realm of art or morality it is not at all clear that there is anything other than 
that these are parts of human experience which draws them together, i.e., genes make brains 
and unconscious automatic System 1 rules. One can put paintings and sculpture and 
clothing and buildings and stick figures in an art book but is this really getting us anywhere? 
Please see my reviews for details on how to describe behavior using the modern two 
systems of thought and a logical structure for rationality. Boyer (see my review) shows in 
detail how religion is due to a complex of brain systems that serve many different functions 
which evolved long before there was anything like religion. 
The brain has numerous templates that take in data, organize it and relate it realtime to 
other data, but they each serve a specific purpose and those purposes are not ART, 
MORALITY, RELIGION, and SCIENCE. 
Cognitive psychology shows that we have many modules working simultaneously to 
produce any behavior and that we relate to people in many ways for many reasons. One 
basic function is coalitional intuition. This gives us feelings that guide our entrance into 
groups and our interactions with other groups. We automatically and immediately 
overestimate the qualities of those in our group even if it´s composed of randomly chosen 
total strangers we met five minutes before. Likewise, we immediately underestimate the 
good qualities of those in other groups, and always we heavily favor those who closely 
genetically related (kin selection or inclusive fitness which are other names for natural 
selection). 
This and many other automatisms guide and commonly rule individual behavior, groups, 
nations and the world, but hardly anyone had a real understanding of this until quite 
recently. So, it is not surprising that almost all of his sources from Plato to Kant to Habermas 
have been wandering around in the dark and that Wilber is frantically running from one to 
the other with a flashlight trying to help them find their way out of the woods. 
He notes (p199) that the only serious global social movement to date was Marxism but 
thinks its fatal flaw was reductionism. It seems far more c2o4g7ent to note that, like virtually 
all of modern society (and most of his sources and to a significant extent this book), it denied 
(or ignored or failed to understand) human nature and basic biology. Nobody seems to 
notice that most social institutions and ideals, (including equality and democracy) have this 
same flaw. Debate on human nature, the environment and the future is endless, but reality 
is an acid that will eat through all fantasy. To paraphrase Lincoln, you can fool some of the 
people all of the time and all of the people some of the time but you can´t fool mother nature 
anytime. The mob is programmed to accumulate resources and replicate their genes, and 
this means the collapse of civilization. Neomarxism, Diversity, Democracy, Islam, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Social Justice, and Human Rights are the means to this 
end and nothing can resist. 
He details intellectual history (philosophy, psychology, religion, ecology, feminism, 
sociology, etc.) and shows where nearly everyone went too far in the direction of Ascent (to 
87 379  
the spirit or religious life only) or Descent (to science, materialism, reductionism or Flatland). 
He trys to show how to heal the rifts by combining sense and soul (spiritual and material 
life, science and religion, internal and external, individual and social). Everything is related 
to everything else (holons in holarchies—i.e., things in nested hierarchies—see p26,135 for 
his definition). 
The Age of Enlightenment denied the the spirit, the individual and the interior life, but 
developed art, morals and science and led to democracy, feminism, equality and ecology. 
This reductionism compressed the intellect and the spirit into the Flatland of science, 
rationality and materialism. He sees the loss of the spiritual point of view with the Age of 
Enlightenment as the major factor responsible for the malaise of modern times, but `true 
spirituality` or`advanced religion`--my terms-- (i.e., the quest for enlightenment), as 
opposed to `primitive religion` (everything else-see Boyer) was always rare. It is advanced 
religion he sees as the panacea, but it is primitive religion that the masses understand, and 
it too has only materialistic goals (money, power and all else serving to replicate genes). 
He understands that Jesus was a mystic in the same sense as Buddha and many others, and 
that what was to become the Catholic church largely destroyed his mystical aspects and the 
personal search for enlightenment- e.g., Gnosticism, in favor of primitive religion, priests, 
tithes and a structure seemingly modeled on the Roman army (p363). But, for the early 
Christian church, as for most religion, the cognitive templates were servants of the genes 
and enlightenment was not on the menu. Jesus was not a Christian, he had no bible, and he 
did not believe in a god any more than did Buddha. We have Christianity without the real 
intelligence of Jesus and this, as he explains in detail, is one cause of the West´s extended 
stay in Flatland. I am not a Christian nor even a theist but it is one of the saddest things in 
history that the enlightened master who was to serve as the model of spirituality for the 
West had his vision of personal enlightenment destroyed and distorted by his own followers 
(but of course they are not really HIS followers). See the Gnostics and the Nag Hammadi 
manuscripts and above all Osho’s discourses on the Gospel of Thomas from these. 
Like everyone until recently, the many authors he discusses lacked any real explanation for 
human behavior. It rarely occurred to them to ask why we have such ideas and behavior 
and the few who did had no coherent solution. 
 
 
Though he has read some of John Searle´s superb philosophy, and has passing references to 
research in cognitive psychology, it is amazing that he could do 20 years research in 
philosophy without studying Wittgenstein, religion without reading Osho and watching his 
videos, and psychology without Buss, Tooby, Cosmides et al. Much of cognitive and 
evolutionary psychology was only published in journals at the time he was wr2i4ti8ng and 
Wilber has almost no references to journals. But Wittgenstein is the most famous 
philosopher of modern times, and Osho the most famous spiritual teacher. It is remarkable 
that although he spends much time in his books discussing the intellectual aspects of 
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therapy (Freud, Beck, Maslow etc) and clearly understands that the spiritual path is the 
ultimate therapy, he totally ignores Osho, who had the most advanced therapeutic 
community in history functioning worldwide for the last 30 years. Osho never wrote a thick 
book containing a theory of human behavior, though his 200 books and many videos,all free 
online, explain it as beautifully and clearly as has ever been done. 
Though he tries hard to heal the world, Wilber spends too much time in the airy realms of 
intellectual debate. As a postmodernist, and holist new age mystic, he wants to unite art, 
morality and science, but science gets the short straw. As in some of his other books (e.g., A 
Brief History of Everything- see my review), by far the worst mistakes he makes (along with 
nearly all his sources and most of the planet) are ignoring and misunderstanding basic 
biology. This is apparent thoughout the book. He starts chapter 7 with a quote from 
Aurobindo, who had the same failing. They have no grasp of the fact that the eugenic effects 
of evolution are driven by natural selection and when society became firmly established, 
this ceased and it´s been totally dysgenic ever since. Genetic engineers have been at work 
and they have released on a helpless world the most horrifically destructive mutant 
imaginable. Society is the engineer and we are that mutant. If one gets the big picture, 
preoccupation with the possible destructive effects of GMOs (genetically modified 
organisms) -- other than ourselves-- is simply stupid and is perhaps a result of the operation 
of the contagion templates discussed by Boyer. That is, the potential destructive effect of all 
the GMOs we will ever make is unlikely to approach what humans have already done 
themselves. 
He says (p 508, p519) that Darwin does not explain evolution, supposedly well known 
before him, and accuses him of ` massive obscurantism´ (he should be saying this about most 
of his sources!). The truth is that nothing in human behaviour or the world or the universe 
makes sense except in the light of evolution and no person did more to make this clear than 
Darwin. The work before him was little more than idle speculation and did not even 
approach a serious scientific treatment. This is why it had NO EFFECT on science or society, 
as opposed to Darwin’s complete transformation of them. 
Of course, Darwin did not know genetics nor plate tectonics, and modern Neodarwinism 
adds many refinements, but it shows a total misunderstanding of science and history to say 
that this invalidates or diminishes his contributions. Wilber is clearly sliding sideways into 
the Creationist camp and one can only speculate as to which of his inference engines 
produce this. He shows in many places that he has a poor grasp of genetics and evolution. 
E.g., on p561--as Dawkins has so patiently explained, the unit of evolution is the gene, and 
none of the other things Wilber mentions work as a genetic unit. Though he lists `The Selfish 
Gene` in his bibliography, it´s clear he has not understood it, and it´s over 40 years old. 
Dawkins has written half a dozen superb works since and there are hundreds of others. 
Wilber seems to have an allergy to good biology books--most of those he quotes are very 
old and others are classics of confusion. He wastes a page (p51) on the idea (mostly due to 
the Neomarxist pseudoscientist Gould and his coauthor Eldredge) of punctuated evolution, 
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which is of very little interest. Gould loved to make a big fuss about his `discoveries` and 
his energy got him alot of airtime, but when all was said and done, he had nothing new to 
say and dragged millions into his own confusions (as Dawkins, Conway Morris and many 
others have noted). Yes, evolution is sometimes faster but so what? Sometimes it rains a 
little, sometimes a lot. If you zoom in, in time or space, you always see more detail, and if 
you zoom ou2t4i9t starts to look the same. Gould was also responsible for the `spandrels of 
San Marcos` debacle and, with his Neomarxist colleagues Lewontin and Rose, for endless 
insipid attacks on `determinist biology`, including the scandalous verbal and physical 
assaults on E.O Wilson (who, unlike themselves, made numerous major contributions to 
biology, though he recently disgraced himself—see my review of his ‘The Social Conquest 
of Earth’). Modern research (e.g., see Pinker and Boyer) makes it clear that Wilson was right 
on the money regarding evolution, except for his unfortunate recent embrace of ‘group 
selection’. 
It is quite careless to say (p775) that there is no single pregiven world. Perhaps he only 
means we ought to be multicultural, egalitarian etc., but if there really were none, then how 
can we live and communicate? This is the ugliness of postmodernism creeping in. A large 
dose of Wittgenstein and cognitive psychology is an appropriate cure. Neither Wilber nor 
Derrida nor Foucault (nor most people) understand that there MUST be a single point of 
view or life would be impossible. This single point of view, resident in our genes, is integral 
to how we think and behave and largely dictates the vagaries of philosophy, politics and 
religion. The cognitive templates of S1 that underlie language, thought and our perception 
of reality logically must be the same and the evidence for this is overwhelming. Even the 
smallest changes, even one gene gone wrong, and you have autism, imbecility or 
schizophrenia. 
The brute fact that Wilber (and most of the world) largely ignores, is that there are 8 billion 
(11 billion or so by 2100) sets of selfish genes carrying out their programs to destroy the 
earth. They are an acid that will eat through any intellectual conclusions, egalitarian 
fanatasies and spiritual rebirths. Selfishness, dishonesty, tribalism and shortsightedness are 
not due to accidents of intellectual or spiritual history. He says that the lack of spirit is 
destroying the earth, and though there is this aspect to things, it is much more to the point 
to say that it is selfish genes that are responsible. Likewise, he says `Biology is no longer 
Destiny`, but it is an easily defensible point of view that the reverse is far more likely. The 
attempt to understand history in terms of ideas ignores biology and denies human nature. 
Selfish genes always live in Flatland and less than 1000 people in all of human history have 
escaped the tyranny of the monkey mind into enlightenment. 
Most of chapter 6 on myth and magic is outdated, confused or just wrong. To give just a few 
examples, we now understand that most of a child´s psychological and social development 
is built in and does not have to be learned (eg, p233-4). The child does not have to 
deconstruct anything--the inferences engines do it all (p260). Joseph Campbell is quoted 
extensively and he too was clueless about how we develop and how to explain the 
differences and similarities in cultures (p245-50). E.g., Campbell says mythology can only 
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lay claim to childhood, but a look around the world shows how false this is and a reading 
of Boyer’s ‘Religion Explained’ (see my review) tells why. His discussion of thinking about 
the nonfactual on p279 to 80 is now often referred to as running the inference engines in 
decoupled or counterfactual mode. To his contorted comments in the middle of p560 (and 
finally…) I want to say `explanation ends with the templates! Page 580-4 and 591-3 are so 
full of dubious and plain wrong statements I don´t even want to begin but suggest that 
Wilber and the reader start with Searle´s `The Mystery of Consciousness` or better with 
almost any one of my reviews of Searle or Wittgenstein. Time and again, it is clear he shares 
the lack of a scientific viewpoint with most of his sources. What info or procedures can solve 
the questions of consciousness or of any social science and philosophical theories? How do 
you recognize an answer when you see it? He and they go on for pages and whole books 
without ever having any idea (e.g., see my review of Dennett´s Freedom Evolves). 
 
 
On p702- bottom- he talks about the fulcrum driving development, but if one understands 
templates, the logical structure of rationality and the two systems of thought (and I mean 
here and elsewhere the entire corpus of cognitive and evolutio2n5ar0y psychology) then 
one either needs to rewrite this or eliminate it. Ditto for most of p770-77. The tortured prose 
on p771-2 is only saying that the templates (S1 reflexes) are probed by drugs or other input 
but not changed and that nobody knows (in a way they can clearly convey) what these are. 
The background or intersubjective worldspace is the templates and they develop very early 
in children and then stay fixed for life. The deliberate destruction of Jesus` mysticism has 
created a powerful bias against higher consciousness in the West. Though he does not 
understand or discuss enlightenment, Boyer gives the basis for understanding how and why 
this happened. 
Wilber embraces a simple utilitarianism (greatest good for greatest number)— i.e., the 
greatest depth for he greatest span (p334). This basic principle of much philosophy, religion 
and economics has serious problems and is probably unworkable. Which people should we 
make happy and how happy and when (i.e., now or in the future)? On what basis do we 
distribute resources now and how much do we save for the future population, and who 
decides and how to enforce this? He calls upon our Basic Moral Intuition (ie, the operation 
of our templates, as we now know), but our BMI is not really to help others but to help 
ourselves and our close relatives (inclusive fitness), and the few thousand (or let´s be very 
optomistic and say few million) who are spritually advanced do not run the world and 
never will. The BMI-- eg, social exchange, coalitional intuitions, intuitive psychology, etc, 
evolved to serve our own interests (not those of the group--if, like Wilber, you think this 
way please read some of Dawkin´s books or my recent review of Wilson’s ‘The Social 
Conquest of Earth’) and in any case is hopelessly at sea in the modern world with it´s 
advanced education, instant communications, firearms, mood altering drugs, clothes and 
cosmetics, a huge and mobile population and vanishing resources. 
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Instead of the intellectual or spiritual approach Wilber takes to history, others take 
ecological, genetic or technogical approaches (e.g., Diamond’s ´Guns, Germs and Steel´ or 
Pinkers ´The Blank Slate´). In the long run, it appears that only biology really matters and 
we see daily how overpopulation is overwhelming all attempts to civilize the masses. The 
democracy and equality which Wilber values so highly are means created by selfish genes 
to facilitate their destruction of the planet. In spite of the hope that a new age is dawning 
and we will see the biological and psychic evolution of a new human, the fact is that we are 
the most degenerate species there ever was and the planet is nearing collapse. The billions 
of years of eugenics (natural selection) that thrust life up out of the slime and gave us the 
amazing ability to write and read books like this is now over. There is no longer selection 
for the healthier and more intelligent and in fact they produce a smaller percentage of the 
children every year. Nature does not tolerate physical and mental aberrations but society 
encourages them. 
Our physical and mental peak was probably CroMagnon man or maybe even Neanderthals 
or Denisovans (who had larger brains - yes, I know they seem not to have contributed more 
than a few percent of our DNA) about 100,000 years ago. It seems plausible that only genetic 
engineering and an enlightened oligarchy can save us. See my essay Suicide by Democracy. 
He thinks (e.g., p12 etc.) that it is our fractured world view (i.e., denial of the spirit) that is 
responsible for our ecological catastrophes and preoccupation with material goods, but this 
is another example of the denial of human nature. Nobody views heart conditions or 
Alzheimer disease as due to a fractured world view, but few seem to have any problem 
thinking you can change the fundamentals of behavior just by education or psychological 
manipulation. Modern science refutes this view conclusively (see Pinker, Boyer etc). The 
intuitive psychology templates tell us that we can manipulate the behavior of others, but 
these templates were evolved hundreds of thousands to millions of years ago, and they 
often fail to give correct results in modern contexts. Nearly everyparent thinks they can 
profoundly influenc2e5t1he adult character (patience, honesty, irritability, depression, 
persistence, compulsiveness etc.) of their children in spite of clear evidence to the contrary 
(e.g., Pinker). 
He thinks that animal rights people are illogical and excessive when they value animals over 
humans and likewise with those who value the environment over people´s needs. This may 
be logical in his system but of course humans are typically (and often reasonably) illogical. 
In any case, if we always put human needs first, then it is surely the end of peace, tranquility, 
beauty and sanity. 
Wilber defends Piaget, but like him he shows many places that he does not understand that 
the child does not have to learn the important things--they are built in and it only has to 
grow up. There seems to be no evidence that any of our templates, i.e., S1 change with time 
one we mature. The things that we learn are mostly trivial in comparison (i.e., even a 
computer can learn them!). 
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His sources are mostly lost in confusion and jargon but he is brilliant and if one bothers to 
read his explanations and translate Wilberspeak into English, it usually makes sense. On pg 
545- 7 he explains holonic ecology. Here is a translation. All organisms have value in 
themselves and are related to all others in the ecosystem and we must wake up spiritually. 
There is a web of life (i.e., Gaia or ecosystem) and all have intrinsic value, but higher 
organisms have more value, which requires a spiritual point of view. Neither the spiritual 
or scientific approach works alone (i.e., dualism is bad). 
Translated, it loses most of it´s appeal but it is not fair to deny the poetry and majesty of his 
vision. But, this does not excuse him from writing clearly. Opacity is a nearly universal 
characteristic of the books he treats here. However, when Katz wrote a book denigrating 
mysticism Wilber took the time to do a `Searleian` analysis to show how incoherence has 
passed for scholarship (p629- 31). 
Unfortunately, he does not continue this throughout the book and uses the jargon-laden 
incoherence of Habermas and others to explain other vague or incoherent texts (e.g., using 
Habermas instead of Searle or Wittgenstein or cognitive psychology to explicate Emerson 
p633). 
In the USA, some 120 million (about 250 million by 2100) third world refugees from 
unrestrained motherhood are now the most powerful single force for destruction, having 
easily displaced fundamentalist European Christians. But all low class people are united in 
being against (or at least unwilling/unable to practice) population control and for 
environmental devastation in order to maximize the number of and resource use by their 
genes (though lacking any insight into this of course). This was a rational survival strategy 
when it was fixed in the genes millions of years ago, but it is suicidal now. The spiritual 
rebirth he talks about is not that of the “diverse” or the lower classes anywhere. 
His view is that it is the poor and ignorant who are the major environmental problem and 
that this is somehow due to our Flatland approach, so if we just wake up, get spritual and 
help them out this will solve it. However, the rich destroy as much as 20 times more than 
the poor per capita and the third world will pass the first in C02 production about 2025. But 
there is nothing noble about the poor—they are only the rich in waiting. 
Everyone is part of the problem and if one does the math (vanishing resources divided by 
increasing population) it´s clear that the worldwide collapse of industrial society and a 
drastic reduction in population will happen and its only a matter of how and when (2150 is 
a good guess). Like so many, he suggests living lightly on the earth, but to live (and above 
all, to reproduce), is to do harm and if reproduction remains a right then it´s hard to see any 
hope for the future. As is politically correct, he emphasizes rights and says little about 
resp2o5n2sibilities. It is a reasonable view that if society is to accept anyone as human, they 
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must take responsibility for the world and this must take precedence over their personal 
needs. It is unlikely that any government will implement this, and equally unlikely that the 
world will continue to be a place any civilized person will wish to live in (or be able to). 
I present here a table of rationality which I have worked out over the last 10 years. The rows 
show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes 
and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind(LSM), of language 
(LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought 
(DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms 
introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by 
Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human 
Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by 
Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has 
no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
 
I have made detailed explanations of this table in my other writings. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
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Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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The most profound spiritual autobiography of all 
time? - a review of "The Knee of Listening" by Adi 
Da (Franklin Jones) (1995) 
 
ABSTRACT 
A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American mystic Adi 
Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says `The most profound 
spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well be true. I am in my 70´s and have 
read many books by spiritual teachers and on spirituality, and this is one of the greatest. 
Certainly, it is by far the fullest and clearest account of the process of enlightenment I have 
ever seen. Even if you have no interest at all in the most fascinating of all human 
psychological processes, it is an amazing document that reveals a great deal about religion, 
yoga, and human psychology and probes the depths and limits of human possibilities. I 
describe it in some detail and compare his teaching with that of the Contemporary Indian 
mystic Osho. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are many editions of the spiritual autobiography of the unique American mystic Adi 
Da (Franklin Jones). The first edition was 1972 and new editions with more material and 
much advertising about the group continue to appear. The latest one I have seen (2004) is 
about 3 times the size and weight of the 1995 editon I prefer, as the hundreds of pages of 
new material are opaque prose and advertising. So, I recommend one of the earlier 
paperpack editions such as the 1995 one to which my page citations refer. 
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A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American mystic Adi 
Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says `The most profound 
spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well be true. I am almost 80 and have 
read many books by spiritual teachers and on spirituality, and this is one of the greatest 
ones. Certainly, it is by far the fullest and clearest account of the process of enlightenment I 
have ever seen. Even if you have no interest at all in the most fascinating of all human 
psychological processes, it is an amazing document that reveals a great deal about religion, 
yoga, and human psychology and probes the depths and limits of human possibilities. 
As I have read and experienced alot in various religious traditions, I naturally compare his 
writings with those of others, particularly with the great Indian mystic Osho. Though they 
clearly agree on the major points of how to proceed on the path, letting go of the attachment 
to the spiritual quest etc, their styles are vastly different. Both are highly intelligent and well 
read (Osho could speed read and read a huge number of books) and were at home in the 
spiritual literature of the major religious traditions. However, like so much of the spiritual 
literature, most of Da´s books are essentially unreadable as he struggles to express in 
language the ineffable realms of the enlightened mind. Even in this, by far his most readable 
book, he often veers off into pages of opacity as he tries to explain the unexplainable. A great 
pity he seems never to have read Wittgenstein –the greatest natural psychologist of all 
time—who showed that we must abandon the attempts at explanation and accept 
descriptions of our innate psychological functions in language, which is the mind. 
Osho by contrast is the clearest, most jargon free expositor of the spiritual life who has ever 
lived. He wrote very little and nearly all of his more than 200 books are transcriptions of 
spontaneous talks he gave-- with no notes or preparation. They are nonetheless unexcelled 
masterpieces of spiritual literature. His amazing àutobiography` (actually compiled after 
his death) has been published by St. Martins and the full version, as well as all his books 
(many also available on DVD), are available online many places. 
 
 
Unfortunately, he has very little to say about the exact details of his spiritual progress. 
 
As Da lived most of his later life in seclusion on an island in Fiji, it was not easy to get to 
hear him but the Dawn Horse Press sells a few videos on their web page. Da is not a very 
engaging or facile speaker, unlike Osho who is by turns amusing, shattering and hypnotic. 
But, as both of them understand, it´s what the master is and not he says that is important. 
Both of them were utterly honest and uncompromising in their life and teachings and Da 
omits nothing of relevance, including his youthful adventures with sex and drugs as well 
as his exposure to LSD, psilocybin and mescaline as a volunteer in government experiments. 
However, as with many or perhaps all of those destined to become enlightened, he was 
different from birth and experienced the Shakti energy (which he calls the Bright) from 
childhood. And, when he entered college, he said his primary interest was to discover what 
living beings are and what is living consciousness. Clearly not your typical freshman. 
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A major problem in describing advanced spiritual states is that no criteria or language for 
them exists in common discourse so mystics have to try to bend language in mostly vain 
attempts to capture their experiences. It is far worse than trying to describe seeing to a 
congenitally blind person since they at least have the cognitive structures and experience of 
the world. But mystics are quite rare and most of them have left little or no description of 
their mental states. 
Unlike Osho, who rejected miracles, paranormal phenomena and all the other nonsense that 
commonly accompanies religion, Da seems to lack any science background at all and 
embraces precognition (p120), reincarnation (p555),`meditating` other persons, living on air 
(p287) etc., and regards the phenomena that I would say are happening in his brain as being 
`out there`. From comments included in newer editions it is clear that many of his disciples 
believe he can perform miracles like stopping a raging forest fire at their California retreat. 
Nevertheless, most of the time he is amazingly levelheaded, going thru over a decade of 
stress and psychic terrors that would drive most from the spiritual path. Millions of years 
of evolution have solidified the ego and it does not leave peacefully. 
Interwoven with the spellbinding account of his spiritual progress are the details of the 
mind’s interaction with the body, described in the East in terms of various forms of Yoga 
(eg., p95-9, 214-21, 249,281-3, 439-40 in the 1995 edition I recommend). These few pages are 
worth more than a whole shelf of yoga books if you want to get to the heart of the mind/body 
relation in spirituality. 
Unlike most who have become enlightened, he had a thorough grounding in Christian 
practice and made a major effort to become a protestant, and then Greek Orthodox minister. 
Even years later, after he was far along the path with Muktananda, he had an amazing and 
totally unexpected series of visitations from Mary and Jesus that went on for weeks (p 301- 
3 et seq.). 
Regarding drugs, as is nearly universal among spiritual teachers, he notes that although 
they may remove certain barriers at times, they do not provide a shortcut to understanding. 
However, nearly everyone is now aware that they put many on the path to higher 
consciousness throughout human history, especially in the last few decades. 
He describes in detail the many stages in his ego death or self-realization (e.g., p72-4, 198- 
200, 219,20, 238-9, 245, 249, 258-9, 281, 355-65, 368-72, 406). Along the way, he realized the 
ultimate disutility of all practices and all traditions (337-9) including yoga (281-3), which are 
all attached to seeking and goals, ultimately winding up in the present. He discovered, as 
have many others, that seeking and meditation became obstacles and gave them up for 
devotion to his guru Muktananda (p420-22). His detailed accounts of his interactions with 
the famous Swami Muktananda and his ultimate realization of his limitations are of rare 
insight and honesty. He constantly encounters his attachment to his ego (Narcissus—e.g., 
p108-110) and asks himself--`Avoiding Relationship? ` by which he seems to mean avoiding 
the divine or ego death by preoccupation with spiritual seeking. 
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After enlightenment, he teaches the ´only by me revealed and given Way of the heart`, 
finding all other paths to be ` remedial` and ´ egoic´ and merely pursuing God or reality (p359 
+), but after a careful reading of this and several other books I never got any idea what that 
way consists in. Undoubtedly being in his presence helps alot but in other places he has 
complained about the fact that his disciples just won´t let it happen and one wonders if even 
one has been able to follow him. Of course, the same considerations apply to all traditions 
and teachers and though some of Osho´s friends (he disavowed the master/disciple 
relationship) have claimed enlightenment, nobody of his status has emerged. It looks like 
you have to have the right genes and the right environment and a very advanced and 
preferably enlightened guru to stimulate you. I suspect that the time has passed when an 
enlightened one could start a movement that transforms much of the world. The world 
desperately needs higher consciousness and I hope that someone comes up with an easier 
way very soon, but I think it’s quite unlikely. 
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Do our automated unconscious behaviors reveal our real 
selves and hidden truths about the universe? -- A review 
of David Hawkins ‘Power vs Force--the hidden 
determinants of human behavior –author’s official 
authoritative edition’ 412p (2012) (original edition 1995) 
 
ABSTRACT 
I am very used to strange books and special people, but Hawkins stands out due to his use 
of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the “truth” of any kind of 
statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the person being tested believes it, but 
whether it is really true! What is well known is that people will show automatic, 
unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about anything they are 
exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, ideas, people. So, muscle reading to find out 
their true feelings is not radical at all, unlike using it as a dousing stick (more muscle reading) 
to do “paranormal science”. 
Hawkins describes the use of decreasing tension in the muscles of an arm in response to 
increases in cognitive load thus causing the arm to drop in response to the constant pressure 
of someone’s fingers. He seems unaware that there is a long established and vast ongoing 
research effort in social psychology referred to by such phrases as ‘implicit cognition’, 
‘automaticity’ etc., and that his use of ‘kinesiology’ is one tiny section. In addition to muscle 
tone (infrequently used) social psychologists measure EEG, galvanic skin response and most 
frequently verbal responses to words, sentences, images or situations at times varying from 
seconds to months after the stimulus. Many, such as Bargh and Wegner, take the results to 
mean we are automatons who learn and act largely without awareness via S1 (automated 
System 1) and many others such as Kihlstrom and Shanks say these studies are flawed and 
we are creatures of S2 (deliberative System 2). Though Hawkins seems to have no idea, as 
in other areas of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought, the situation regarding 
“automaticity” is still as chaotic as it was 
 
 
 
 
when Wittgenstein described the reasons for the sterility and barrenness of psychology in 
the 30’s. Nevertheless, this book is an easy read and some therapists and spiritual teachers 
may find it of use. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
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and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
I am very used to strange books and special people, but Hawkins stands out due to his use 
of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the “truth” of any kind of 
statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the person being tested believes it but, 
whether it is really true! How could any sane person believe this? As a person with over 50 
years adult experience with science, psychology, philosophy, religion and life I do not find 
it at all credible that it is even highly reliable about the person’s beliefs and there is no chance 
of getting to know reality this way. What is well known is that people will show automatic, 
unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about anything they are 
exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, ideas, people. So, muscle reading to find out 
their true feelings is not radical at all, unlike using it as a dousing stick (more muscle reading) 
to do “paranormal science”. 
Kinesiology, also known as human kinetics, is the study of human movement. Kinesiology 
studies physiological, mechanical (muscle tone), and psychological mechanisms as indices 
of people’s mental and physical status and often uses movement exercises as therapy. 
However, Hawkins (without saying so) is using the term to refer to a very narrow 
application of kinesiology—the use of decreasing tension in the muscles of an arm in 
response to increases in cognitive load (i.e., mention of some person, event or object), which 
causes the subject to be distracted by intellectual or emotional issues, thus decreasing the 
muscle tension and causing the arm to drop in response to the constant pressure of 
someone’s fingers. Hawkins seems unaware that there is a long established and vast 
ongoing research effort in social psychology referred to by such phrases as ‘implicit 
cognition’, ‘automaticity’ etc., and that his use of ‘kinesiology’ is one tiny section. In addition 
to muscle tone (actually infrequently used) social psychologists measure EEG, galvanic skin 
response and most frequently verbal responses to words, sentences, images or situations at 
times varying from seconds to months after the stimulus. 
It was just by chance that I read Hawkins book after reading several books and dozens of 
recent papers on implicit cognition and was greatly surprised that he uses it as a key to the 
universe--i.e., the ‘ultimate nature of reality’ and I am sure the hundreds of active 
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researchers would be equally amazed. I relate his spiritual practice to contemporary work 
on implicit cognition. 
A major issue in most contemporary research on implicit social cognition is the degree to 
which it is automatic (‘unconscious’) and what constitutes ‘evidence’ for this. Hundreds of 
papers and dozens of books have appeared in just the last few years with massive confusion 
and often acrimonious debates. Many, such as Bargh and Wegner, take the results to mean 
we are automatons who learn and act largely without awareness via S1 and many others 
such as Kihlstrom and Shanks say these studies are flawed and we are creatures of S2. 
Though Hawkins seems to have no idea, as in other areas of the descriptive psychology of 
higher order thought, the situation regarding “automaticity” is still as chaotic as it was when 
Wittgenstein described the reasons for the sterility and barrenness of psychology in the 30’s. 
Often the issue is stated by researchers and philosophers in terms of System 1 and System 2 
functioning --a very useful, even indispensable division of behavior (intentionality) into our 
primitive reptilian automated, nonreflective S1 and our higher cortical primate conscious 
deliberative functions of S2. As noted in my other reviews, this division was pioneered by 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s, though nobody has realized it. 
I am quite familiar with mediation and the phenomena of enlightenment (see my review of 
Adi Da’s autobiography ‘The Knee of Listening’) and am willing to accept Hawkins’ claim 
to be in this rarefied group (it is often said that we know of less than 1000 enlightened 
persons in all of human history). I can also accept that he may have been a very effective 
‘therapist’ who helped many persons and clearly, he is highly intelligent. This does not 
make me accept his many questionable or clearly false statements about the facts of the 
world. I am also (on the basis of a lifetime of study of science and philosophy) very skeptical 
about the relevance of chaos, attractors, complexity theory, computation, etc. to the study of 
human behavior (see my reviews and books on academia.edu, philpapers.org, 
researchgate.net, vixra.org, libgen.io, b- ok.org, Amazon etc.), claims which are often made 
by scientists as well. 
Implicit cognition research involves the usual horrific mixing of factual true or false 
scientific issues about causal brain functions (the S1 mind), with those about how language 
works (i.e., the mind, which as Wittgenstein showed us ¾ of a century ago, is public 
behavior --the S2 mind)—other topics I have covered extensively in my reviews. 
So, Hawkins makes much of his muscle reading and I’m sure it often works well but there 
is a major logical error here. Regardless of what it says about the beliefs of the person being 
tested, it clearly says nothing whatever about the world itself. So, I respect Hawkins and his 
therapeutic work but, with the vast array of approaches to spiritual and emotional healing, 
there are lots of choices. And it is one thing to be treated by an enlightened master-whose 
very presence (or even the thought of them) can be galvanizing, and quite another to be 
treated by an ordinary person. By far the best source of books, audios and videos of an 
enlightened master at work are those of Osho (Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh) which are available 
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to buy or free on the net on various sites. He therapized thousands at a time on occasion and 
created the most remarkable therapeutic community of all time around him. Though he is 
gone, his therapists still practice worldwide, and his works can be transformative. 
 
 
Hawkins has other books which have many favorable reviews so those deeply interested 
may consult them. 
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THE ONE BIG HAPPY FAMILY DELUSION-- 
DEMOCRACY, DIVERSITY AND EQUALITY WILL 
SAVE US 
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Is JK Rowling More Evil Than Me? 
 
ABSTRACT 
How about a different take on the rich and famous? First the obvious—the Harry Potter 
novels are primitive superstition that encourages children to believe in fantasy rather than 
take responsibility for the world-- the norm of course. JKR is just as clueless about herself 
and the world as most people, but about 200 times as destructive as the average American 
and about 800 times more than the average Chinese. She has been responsible for the 
destruction of maybe 30,000 hectares of forest to produce these trash novels and all the 
erosion ensuing (not trivial as it’s at least 6 and maybe 12 tons/year soil into the ocean for 
everyone on earth or maybe 100 tons per American, and so about 5000 tons/year for 
Rowling’s books and movies and her 3 children). The earth loses at least 1% of its topsoil 
every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing capacity will be gone. Then there is 
the huge amount of fuel burned and waste made to make and distribute the books and films, 
plastic dolls etc. 
She shows her lack of social responsibility by producing children rather than using her 
millions to encourage family planning or buy up the rain forest, and by promoting the 
conventional liberal stupidity of 3rd world supremacy that is destroying Britain, America, 
the world and her descendant’s future. Of course, she's not that different from the other 8 
billion clueless - just noisier and more destructive. 
It is the no free lunch problem writ large. The mob just can’t see that there is no such thing 
as helping one person without harming others. Rights or privileges given to new entrants 
into an overcrowded world can only diminish those of others. In spite of the massive 
ecological disasters happening in front of them everywhere everyday, they can’t pin them 
to the unrestrained motherhood of “the diverse”, which accounts for most of the population 
increase of the last century and all of that in this one. They lack some combination of 
intelligence, education, experience and sanity required to extrapolate the daily assaults on 
the resources and functioning of society to the eventual collapse of industrial civilization. 
Each meal, each trip by car or bus, each pair of shoes is another nail in the earth’s coffin. It 
has likely never crossed her mind that one seat on a plane from London to San Francisco 
produces about one ton of carbon which melts about 3 square meters of sea ice and as one 
of the overprivileged she has probably flown hundreds of such flights. 
Not only the rich and famous, but nearly any public figure at all, including virtually all 
teachers, are pressured to be politically correct, which in the Western Democracies, now 
means social democratic (Neomarxist—i.e., diluted communist) third world supremacists 
working for the destruction of their own societies and their own descendants. So, those 
whose lack of education, experience, intelligence (and basic common sense), which should 
prohibit them from making any public statements at all, totally dominate all the media, 
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creating the impression that the intelligent and civilized must favor democracy, diversity 
and equality, while the truth is that these are the problems and not the solutions, and that 
they themselves are the prime enemies of civilization. See my Suicide by Democracy 4th ed 
(2019). 
 
 
 
 
How about a different take on the rich and famous? First the obvious—the Harry Potter 
novels are primitive superstition that encourages children to believe in fantasy rather than 
take responsibility for the world-- the norm of course. JKR is just as clueless about herself 
and the world as all the other monkeys, but about 200 times as destructive as the average 
American and about 800 times more than the average Chinese. She has been responsible for 
the destruction of maybe 30,000 hectares of forest to produce these trash novels and all the 
erosion ensuing (not trivial as it’s 6 to 12 tons/year soil into the ocean for everyone on earth 
or maybe 100 tons per American, and so about 5000 tons/year for Rowling’s books and 
movies and her 3 children). The earth loses at least 1% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 
2100, most of its food growing capacity will be gone. Then there is the huge amount of fuel 
burned and waste made to make and distribute the books and films, plastic dolls etc. She 
shows her lack of social responsibility by producing children rather than using her millions 
to encourage family planning or buy up the rain forest, and by promoting the conventional 
liberal stupidity of 3rd world supremacy that is destroying Britain, America, the world and 
her descendant’s future. Of course, she's not that different from the other 8 billion clueless - 
just noisier and more destructive. 
Like all the rich, she is able to multiply her destruction by causing others to destroy on her 
behalf. Each child she produced results in about 50 tons of topsoil into the ocean, 300 lbs of 
toxic chemicals produced, 1 acre of forest/wetland/ gone forever, every year. Like all people, 
her family steals from all people on the earth and from their own descendants (no human 
rights without human wrongs), and, like the vast majority, she is poorly educated, 
egomaniacal, and lacking self-awareness, so these issues never cross her mind. In addition 
to the material destruction to make and distribute her books and movies, there is the vast 
amount of time wasted in reading and viewing them. In addition, the extreme immaturity 
shown by the characters in them and their preoccupation with infantile superstitious 
fantasies can only do harm to impressionable minds. The world would be a better place if 
she had never been born, but one can say it of nearly everyone. 
It has long been the understanding of spiritually aware people that all but a tiny number of 
us spend their whole lives asleep, and this view is powerfully supported by modern 
psychological research, which shows that nearly all our actions are done mechanically, for 
reasons of which we are not aware and over which we have no control. Our personality is 
an illusion produced by evolution to ensure reproduction. We are only a package for selfish 
genes carrying out their blind programs and, like all organisms, we live to replicate our 
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genes and to accumulate and consume resources to that end. In our case that means we live 
to destroy the earth and our own descendants. It is essential to this game that we remain 
unaware of it, for, to the extent we become aware and live our lives as conscious beings, we 
diminish our reproduction and the genes which produce this behavior are selected against. 
Rowling is a typical example of a seemingly intelligent aware person who will walk through 
their whole life sound asleep—just like nearly all of the other 11 billion (I extrapolate to 2100) 
—and like them, lives only to destroy the earth and to leave her toxic offspring behind to 
continue the destruction. Like so many, she, with Obama and the Pope, share the common 
delusion that the poor are more noble and deserving, but the rich differ only in having the 
chance to be more destructive. The poor are the rich in waiting. So, 800 Chinese or Indians 
do about as much damage as JKR and her family. Rich or poor they do the only things 
monkeys can do - consume resources and replicate their genes until the collapse of industrial 
civilization about the middle of the next century (or the middle of this one for some). In the 
blink of an eye, centuries and millennia will pass and, in the hellish world of starvation, 
disease, war and violence that their ancestors created, nobody will know or care that any of 
them existed. She is no more inherently evil than others, but also no better and, due to the 
accidents of history, she is high on the list of Enemies of Life on Earth. 
It is the no free lunch problem writ large. The mob just can’t see that there is no such thing 
as helping one person without harming others. Rights or privileges given to new entrants 
into an overcrowded world can only diminish those of others. In spite of the massive 
ecological disasters happening in front of them everywhere everyday, they can’t pin them 
to the unrestrained motherhood of “the diverse”, which accounts for most of the population 
increase of the last century and all of that in this one. They lack some combination of 
intelligence, education, experience and sanity required to extrapolate the daily assaults on 
the resources and functioning of society now to the eventual collapse of industrial 
civilization, as well as the courage to say so even if they do realize it. Each meal, each trip 
by car or bus, each pair of shoes is another nail in the earth’s coffin. It has likely never 
crossed her mind that one seat on a plane from London to San Francisco produces about 
one ton of carbon which melts about 3 square meters of sea ice and as one of the 
overprivileged she has probably flown hundreds of such flights. 
It never crosses most people’s minds that what the average American lower class family of 
4 take out in goods, services, and infrastructure costs perhaps $50,000 more every year than 
they contribute, and in 100 years (when it will have expanded to perhaps 10 people) will 
have cost the country about $15 million, and immeasurably more in long term ecological 
and social costs (what is the value for the collapse of civilization?). 
Not only the rich and famous, but nearly any public figure at all, including virtually all 
teachers, are pressured to be politically correct, which in the Western Democracies, now 
means social democratic (diluted communist) third world supremacists working for the 
destruction of their own societies and their own descendants. So, those whose lack of free 
speech (and basic common sense), which should prohibit them from making any public 
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statements at all, totally dominate all the media, creating the impression that the intelligent 
and civilized must favor democracy, diversity and equality, while the truth is that these are 
the problems and not the solutions, and that they themselves are the prime enemies of 
civilization. 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, 
most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of 
resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and 
bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and 
nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive 
immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by 
democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and 
diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America 
and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root 
cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, 
which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. I have 
termed this the Inclusive Fitness Delusion. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and 
psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control 
democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else— 
there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond 
repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all 
societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. 
Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of 
America, or any country that follows a democratic system. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
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The Transient Suppression of the Worst Devils of our 
Nature—a review of Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better Angels 
of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’(2012) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This is not a perfect book, but it is unique, and if you skim the first 400 or so pages, the last 
300 (of some 700) are a pretty good attempt to apply what's known about behavior to social 
changes in violence and manners over time. The basic topic is: how does our genetics control 
and limit social change? 
Surprisingly he fails to describe the nature of kin selection (inclusive fitness) which explains 
much of animal and human social life. He also (like nearly everyone) lacks a clear 
framework for describing the logical structure of rationality (LSR—John Searle’s preferred 
term) which I prefer to call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). 
He should have said something about the many other ways of abusing and exploiting 
people and the planet, since these are now so much more severe as to render other forms of 
violence nearly irrelevant. Extending the concept of violence to include the global long-term 
consequences of replication of someone’s genes, and having a grasp of the nature of how 
evolution works (i.e., kin selection) will provide a very different perspective on history, 
current events, and how things are likely to go in the next few hundred years. One might 
start by noting that the decrease in physical violence over history has been matched (and 
made possible) by the constantly increasing merciless rape of the planet (i.e., by people's 
destruction of their own descendant’s future). Pinker (like most people most of the time) is 
often distracted by the superficialities of culture when it’s biology that matters. See my 
recent reviews of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’ and Nowak and Highfield’s 
‘SuperCooperators’ here and on the net for a brief summary of the vacuity of ‘true altruism’ 
(group selection), and the operation of kin selection and the uselessness and superficiality 
of describing behavior in cultural terms. 
 
 
 
 
This is the classic nature/nurture issue and nature trumps nurture --infinitely. What really 
matters is the violence done to the earth by the relentless increase in population and resource 
destruction (due to medicine and technology and conflict suppression by police and 
military). About 200,000 more people a day (another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los 
Angeles every month), the 6 tons or so of topsoil going into the sea/person/year –about 1% 
of the world’s total disappearing yearly, etc. mean that unless some miracle happens the 
biosphere and civilization will largely collapse during next two centuries, and there will be 
starvation, misery and violence of every kind on a staggering scale. People's manners, 
opinions and tendencies to commit violent acts are of no relevance unless they can do 
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something to avoid this catastrophe, and I don't see how that is going to happen. There is 
no space for arguments, and no point either (yes I'm a fatalist), so I'll just make a few 
comments as though they were facts. Don't imagine I have a personal stake in promoting 
one group at the expense of others. I am 78, have no descendants and no close relatives and 
do not identify with any political, national or religious group and regard the ones I belong 
to by default as just as repulsive as all the rest. 
Parents are the worst Enemies of Life on Earth and, taking the broad view of things, women 
are as violent as men when one considers the fact that women's violence (like most of that 
done by men) is largely done in slow motion, at a distance in time and space and mostly 
carried out by proxy -by their descendants and by men. Increasingly, women bear children 
regardless of whether they have a mate and the effect of stopping one woman from breeding 
is on average much greater than stopping one man, since they are the reproductive 
bottleneck. One can take the view that people and their offspring richly deserve whatever 
misery comes their way and (with rare exceptions) the rich and famous are the worst 
offenders. Meryl Streep or Bill Gates or J.K Rowling and each of their kids may destroy 50 
tons of topsoil each per year for generations into the future, while an Indian farmer and his 
may destroy 1 ton. If someone denies it that's fine, and to their descendants I say "Welcome 
to Hell on Earth"(WTHOE). 
The emphasis nowadays is always on Human Rights, but it is clear that if civilization is to 
stand a chance, Human Responsibilities must replace Human Rights. Nobody gets rights 
without being a responsible citizen and the first thing this means is minimal environmental 
destruction. The most basic responsibility is no children unless your society asks you to 
produce them. A society or a world that lets people breed at random will always be 
exploited by selfish genes until it collapses (or reaches a point where life is so horrific it's 
not worth living). If society continues to maintain Human Rights as primary, to their 
descendants one can say with confidence "WTHOE". 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
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This is not a perfect book, but it is unique, and if you skim the first 400 or so pages, the last 
300 (of some 700) are a pretty good attempt to apply what's known about behavior to social 
changes in violence and manners over time. The basic topic is: how does our genetics control 
and limit social change? 
Surprisingly he fails to describe the nature of kin selection (inclusive fitness) which explains 
much of animal and human social life. He also (like nearly everyone) lacks a clear 
framework for describing the logical structure of rationality (LSR—John Searle’s preferred 
term) which I prefer to call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). 
Mostly the criticisms given by others are nit-picking and irrelevant and, as Pinker has said, 
he could not write a coherent book about "bad things", nor could he give every possible 
reference and point of view, but he should have said at least something about the many 
other ways of abusing and exploiting people and the planet, since these are now so much 
more severe as to render other forms of violence irrelevant. 
Extending the concept of violence to include the global long-term 
 
consequences of replication of someone’s genes, and having a grasp of the nature of how 
evolution works (i.e., kin selection) will provide a very different perspective on history, 
current events, and how things are likely to go in the next few hundred years. One might 
start by noting that the decrease in physical violence over history has been matched (and 
made possible) by the constantly increasing merciless rape of the planet (i.e., by people's 
destruction of their own descendant’s future). Pinker (like most people most of the time) is 
often distracted by the superficialities of culture when it’s biology that matters. See my 
recent reviews of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’ and Nowak and Highfield’s 
‘SuperCooperators’ for a brief summary of the vacuity of altruism and the operation of kin 
selection and the uselessness and superficiality of describing behavior in cultural terms. 
This is the classic nature/nurture issue and nature trumps nurture --infinitely. What really 
matters is the violence done to the earth by the relentless increase in population and resource 
destruction (due to medicine and technology and conflict suppression by police and 
military). About 200,000 more people a day (another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los 
Angeles every month), the 6 tons or so of topsoil going into the sea/person/year etc. mean 
that unless some miracle happens the biosphere and civilization will largely collapse in the 
next two centuries and there will be starvation, misery and violence of every kind on a 
staggering scale. 
People's manners, opinions and tendencies to commit violent acts are of no relevance unless 
they can do something to avoid this catastrophe, and I don't see how that is going to happen. 
There is no space for arguments, and no point either (yes, I'm a fatalist), so I'll just make a 
few comments as though they were facts. Don't imagine I have a personal stake in 
promoting one group at the expense of others. I am 75, have no descendants and no close 
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relatives and do not identify with any political, national or religious group and regard the 
ones I belong to by default as just as repulsive as all the rest. 
Parents are the worst Enemies of Life on Earth and, taking the broad view of things, women 
are as violent as men when one considers the fact that women's violence (like most of that 
done by men) is largely done in slow motion, at a distance in time and space and mostly 
carried out by proxy -by their descendants and by men. Increasingly, women bear children 
regardless of whether they have a mate and the effect of stopping one woman from breeding 
is on average much greater than stopping one man, since they are the reproductive 
bottleneck. One can take the view that people and their offspring richly deserve whatever 
misery comes their way and (with rare exceptions) the rich and famous are the worst 
offenders. Meryl Streep or Bill Gates or J.K.Rowling and each of their kids may destroy 50 
tons of topsoil each per year for generations into the future, while an Indian farmer and his 
may destroy 1 ton. If someone denies it that's fine, and to their descendants I say "Welcome 
to Hell on Earth"(WTHOE). 
 
 
The emphasis nowadays is always on Human Rights, but it is clear that if civilization is to 
stand a chance, Human Responsibilities must replace Human Rights. Nobody gets rights 
(i.e., privileges) without being a responsible citizen and the first thing this means is minimal 
environmental destruction. The most basic responsibility is no children unless your society 
asks you to produce them. A society or a world that lets people breed at random will always 
be exploited by selfish genes until it collapses (or reaches a point where life is so horrific it's 
not worth living). If society continues to maintain Human Rights as primary, that's fine and 
to their descendants one can say with confidence "WTHOE". 
"Helping" has to be seen from a global long-term perspective. Almost all "help" that's given 
by individuals, organizations or countries harms others and the world in the long run and 
must only be given after very careful consideration. If you want to hand out money, food, 
medicine, etc., you need to ask what the long-term environmental consequences are. If you 
want to please everyone all the time, again to your descendants I say "WTHOE". 
Dysgenics: endless trillions of creatures beginning with bacteria-like forms over 3 billion 
years ago have died to create us and all current life and this is called eugenics, evolution by 
natural selection or kin selection (inclusive fitness). We all have "bad genes" but some are 
worse than others. It is estimated that up to 50% of all human conceptions end in 
spontaneous abortion due to "bad genes". Civilization is dysgenic. This problem is currently 
trivial compared to overpopulation but getting worse by the day. Medicine, welfare, 
democracy, equality, justice, human rights and "helping" of all kinds have global long term 
environmental and dysgenic consequences which will collapse society even if population 
growth stops. Again, if the world refuses to believe it or doesn't want to deal with it that's 
fine and to their (and everyone’s) descendants we can say "WTHOE". 
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Beware the utopian scenarios that suggest doomsday can be avoided by judicious 
application of technologies. As they say you can fool some of the people all of the time and 
all of the people some of the time but you can't fool mother nature any of the time. I leave 
you with just one example. Famous scientist Raymond Kurzweil (see my review of ‘How to 
create a Mind’) proposed nanobots as the saviors of humankind. They would make anything 
we needed and clean every mess. They would even make ever better versions of themselves. 
They would keep us as pets. But think of how many people treat their pets, and pets are 
overpopulating and destroying and becoming dysgenic almost as fast as humans (e.g. 
domestic and feral cats alone kill perhaps 100 billion wild animals a year). Pets only exist 
because we destroy the earth to feed them and we have spay and neuter clinics and 
euthanize the sick and unwanted ones. We practice rigorous population control and 
eugenics on them deliberately and by omission, and no form of life can evolve or exist 
without these two controls—not even bots. And what's to stop nanobots from evolving? 
Any change that facilitated reproduction would automatically be selected for and any 
behavior that wasted time or energy (i.e., taking care of humans) would be heavily selected 
against. What would stop theAI controlled bots program from mutating into a homicidal 
form and exploiting all earth's resources causing global collapse? There is no free lunch for 
bots either and to them too we can confidently say "WTHOE". 
 
 
This is where any thoughts about the world and human behavior must lead an educated 
person but Pinker says nothing about it. So, the first 400 pages of this book can be skipped 
and the last 300 read as a nice summary of EP (evolutionary psychology) as of 2011. 
However, as in his other books and nearly universally in the behavioral sciences, there is no 
clear broad framework for intentionality as pioneered by Wittgenstein, Searle and many 
others. I have presented such a framework in my many reviews of works by and about these 
two natural psychological geniuses and will not repeat it here. 
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A Review of The Murderer Next Door by David 
Buss (2005) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Though this volume is a bit dated, there are few recent popular books dealing specifically 
with the psychology of murder and it’s a quick overview available for a few dollars, so still 
well worth the effort. It makes no attempt to be comprehensive and is somewhat superficial 
in places, with the reader expected to fill in the blanks from his many other books and the 
vast literature on violence. For an update see e.g., Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology 2nd ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 and Buss, 
Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) p 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 309–312, 410 and 
Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014). He has been among the top 
evolutionary psychologists for several decades and covers a wide range of behavior in his 
works, but here he concentrates almost entirely on the psychological mechanisms that cause 
individual people to murder and their possible evolutionary function in the EEA 
(Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., the plains of Africa during the last million 
years or so). 
Buss starts by noting that as with other behaviors, ‘alternative’ explanations such as 
psychopathology, jealousy, social environment, group pressures, drugs and alcohol etc. do 
not really explain, since the question still remains as to why these produce homicidal 
impulses, i.e., they are the proximate causes and not the ultimate evolutionary (genetic) ones. 
As always, it inevitably boils down to inclusive fitness (kin selection), and so to the struggle 
for access to mates and resources, which is the ultimate explanation for all behavior in all 
organisms. Sociological data (and common sense) make it clear that younger poorer males 
are the most likely to kill. He presents his own and others homicide data from industrialized 
nations, and tribal cultures, conspecific killing in animals, archeology, FBI data and his own 
research into normal people's homicidal fantasies. Much archeological evidence continues 
to accumulate of murders, including that of whole groups, or of groups minus young 
females, in prehistoric times. 
After surveying Buss’s comments, I present a very brief summary of intentional psychology 
(the logical structure of rationality), which is covered extensively in my many other articles 
and books. 
 
 
Those with a lot of time who want a detailed history of homicidal violence from an 
evolutionary perspective may consult Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature 
Why Violence Has Declined’(2012), and my review of it, easily available on the net and in 
two of my recent books. Briefly, Pinker notes that murder has decreased steadily and 
dramatically by a factor of about 30 since our days as foragers. So, even though guns now 
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make it extremely easy for anyone to kill, homicide is much less common. Pinker thinks this 
is due to various social mechanisms that bring out our ‘better angels’, but I think it’s due 
mainly to the temporary abundance of resources from the merciless rape of our planet, 
coupled with increased police presence, with communication and surveillance and legal 
systems that make it far more likely to be punished. This becomes clear every time there is 
even a brief and local absence of the police. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
Buss starts by noting that as with other behaviors, ‘alternative’ explanations such as 
psychopathology, jealousy, social environment, group pressures, drugs and alcohol etc. do 
not really explain, since the question still remains as to why these produce homicidal 
impulses, i.e., they are the proximate causes and not the ultimate evolutionary (genetic) ones. 
As always, it inevitably boils down to inclusive fitness (kin selection), and so to the struggle 
for access to mates and resources, which is the ultimate explanation for all behavior in all 
organisms. Sociological data (and common sense) make it clear that younger poorer males 
are the most likely to kill. He presents his own and others homicide data from industrialized 
nations, and tribal cultures, conspecific killing in animals, archeology, FBI data and his own 
research into normal people's homicidal fantasies. Much archeological evidence continues 
to accumulate of murders, including that of whole groups, or of groups minus young 
females, in prehistoric times. 
On p 12 he notes that the war between each individual and the world over resources begins 
at conception, when it begins growing by robbing its mother of food and stressing her body, 
and when her system fights back with frequently fatal consequences for the conceptus. He 
does not tell us that estimates of spontaneous abortion are in the range of up to about 30% 
of all conceptions, so that as many as 80 million a year die, most so early that the mother 
does not even know she is pregnant, and perhaps her period is a bit late. This is part of 
nature’s eugenics which we have not succeeded in defeating, though the overall dysgenic 
effect of civilization continues and each day the approx. 300,000 who are born are on average 
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just slightly less mentally a physically fit than the approx. 100,000 who die, with a net 
increase in world population of ca. 200,000 and an ever larger ‘unfit’ population to destroy 
the earth (while being partly or wholly supported by their ‘fit’ neighbors). 
On p13 he says that we don’t know for sure that OJ Simpson was guilty but I would say that 
regardless of the trial we do know he was, as it’s the only reasonable interpretation of the 
facts of the case, which include his bizarre behavior. Also, in the subsequent civil trial, where 
his multimillion dollar defense attorneys were not present to subvert justice, he was quickly 
convicted, which led to the attachment of his assets, which led to his armed robbery 
conviction and imprisonment. 
He notes on p20 that there were about 100 million known murders worldwide in the last 
100 years, with maybe as many as 300 million if all the unreported were included. I don’t 
think he counts the approx. 40 million by the Chinese Communist Party (which does not 
count the approximately 60 million who starved), nor the tens of millions by Stalin. It is also 
to be kept in mind that America’s murder rate is decreased by about 75% due to the world 
class medical system which saves most victims of attempts. I will add that Mexico has about 
5X the murder rate of the USA and Honduras about 20X, and your descendants can certainly 
look forward to our rate moving in that direction due to America’s fatal embrace of 
Diversity. Ann Coulter in ‘Adios America’ (2015) notes that Hispanics have committed 
about 23,000 murders here in the last few decades. For now, nothing will be done, and crime 
here will reach the levels in Mexico as the border continues to dissolve and environmental 
collapse and approaching bankruptcy dissolve the economy. Inside Mexico in 2014 alone, 
100 U.S. citizens were known to have been murdered and more than 130 kidnapped and 
others just disappeared, and if you add other foreigners and Mexicans it runs into the 
thousands. See my ‘Suicide by Democracy’ 2nd ed (2019) for further details. 
Even a tiny lightly traveled country like Honduras manages some 10 murders and 2 
kidnappings a year of US citizens. And these are the best of times—it is getting steadily 
worse as unrestrained motherhood and resource depletion bring collapse ever closer. In 
addition to continued increases in crime of all kinds we will see the percentage of crimes 
solved drop to the extremely low levels of the third world. More resources are devoted to 
the solution of murders than any other crime and about 65% are solved in the USA, but in 
Mexico less than 2% are solved and as you get further from Mexico City the rate drops to 
near zero. Also note that the rate here used to be about 80%, but it has dropped in parallel 
with the increase in the Diverse. Also 65% is the average but if you could get statistics I am 
sure it would rise with the percent of Euro’s in a city and drop as the percent of Diverse 
increases. In Detroit (83% black) only 30% are solved. If you keep track of who robs, rapes 
and murders, it’s obvious that black lives matter lots more to Euros (those of European 
descent) than they do to other blacks. These are my observations. 
Throughout history women have been at a major disadvantage when it came to murdering, 
but with the ready availability of guns we would expect this to change, but on p22 we find 
that about 87% of USA murderers are men and for same sex killing this rises to 95% and is 
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about the same worldwide. Clearly something in the male psyche encourages violence as a 
route to fitness that is largely absent in women. Also relevant is that murders by 
acquaintances are more common than those by strangers. 
On p37 he notes that with high likelihood of conviction (and I would say the higher 
likelihood the intended victim or others will be armed), murder is now a more costly 
strategy than formerly, but I think this depends entirely on who you are. In a largely Euro 
USA city, or among middle and upper class people, over 95% of murders might be solved, 
but in lower class areas maybe 20% might be, and for gang dominated areas even less than 
that. And in 3rd world countries the chances of justice are even lower, especially when 
committed by gang members, so it is a highly viable strategy, especially if planned ahead of 
time. 
Next, he deals with violence and murder as a part of mating strategies, which they have 
clearly been throughout our evolution, and remain so especially among the lower classes 
and in third world countries. He notes the frequent murder of wives or lovers by men 
during or after breakups. He comments in passing on mate selection and infidelity, but there 
is minimal discussion as these topics are treated in great detail in his other writings and 
edited volumes. It is now well known that women tend to have affairs with sexy men that 
they would not select as a permanent partner (the sexy son theory) and to mate with them 
on their most fertile days. All these phenomena are viewed from an evolutionary 
perspective (i.e., what would the fitness advantage have been formerly). 
There is very strong selection for behaviors that prevent a man from raising children 
fathered by someone else for the same reasons that ‘group selection’ is strongly selected 
against (see my essay on group selection ‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World…’). 
However modern life provides ample opportunities for affairs, and genetic studies have 
shown that a high percentage of children are fathered by other than the putative partner of 
their mother, with the percentage increasing from a few percent to as much as 30% as one 
descends from upper to lower classes in various modern Western countries at various 
periods and undoubtedly higher than that in many 3rd world countries. In his book Sperm 
Wars: The Science of Sex (2006) Robin Baker summarizes: ‘Actual figures range from 1 
percent in high-status areas of the United States and Switzerland, to 5 to 6 percent for 
moderate-status males in the United States and Great Britain, to 10 to 30 percent for lower- 
status males in the United States, Great Britain and France’. One might suppose that in 
societies where both men and women are highly concentrated in cities and have mobile 
phones, this percentage is rising, especially in the third world where use of birth control and 
abortion is erratic. 
He finds that most men and women who murder their mates are young and the younger 
their mates are, the more likely they will be murdered. Like all behavior, this is hard to 
explain without an evolutionary perspective. One study found men in their 40’s constituted 
23% of mate murderers but men in their 50’s only 7.7%, and 79% of female mate killers were 
between 16 and 39. It makes sense that the younger they are, the bigger the potential fitness 
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loss to the male (decreased reproduction) and so the more intense the emotional response. 
As Buss puts it: “From Australia to Zimbabwe, the younger the woman, the higher the 
likelihood that she will be killed as a result of a sexual infidelity or leaving a romantic 
relationship. Women in the 15 to 24 year old bracket are at the greatest risk.” A high 
percentage are killed within two months of separation and most in the first year. One study 
found that 88% of them had been stalked prior to being killed. In some chapters there are 
quotes from people giving their feelings about their unfaithful mates and these typically 
include homicidal fantasies, which were more intense and went on for longer periods for 
men than for women. 
He devotes some time to the increased risk of abuse and murder from having a stepparent 
with e.g., the risk to a girl of rape increasing about 10X if her father is a stepfather. It is now 
very well known that in a wide range of mammals, a new male encountering a female with 
young will attempt to kill them. One USA study found that if one or both parents are 
surrogates, this raises the child’s chance of being murdered in the home between 40 and 
100X (p174). A Canadian study found the beating death rate rose by 27X if one parent in a 
registered marriage was a stepparent while it rose over 200X if the surrogate was a live-in 
boyfriend. Child abuse rates in Canada rose 40X when there was a stepparent. 
In humans, being without resources is a strong stimulus for women to eliminate their 
existing children in order to attract a new mate. A Canadian study found that even though 
single women were only 12% of all mothers, they committed over 50% of infanticides (p169). 
Since younger women lose less fitness from an infant death than older ones, it is not 
surprising that a cross-cultural study found that teenagers killed their infants at rates about 
30X that of women in their twenties (p170). 
He then briefly discusses serial killers and serial rapists, the most successful of all time being 
the Mongols of Genghis Khan, whose Y chromosomes are represented in about 8% of all the 
men in the territories they controlled, or some 20 million men (and an equal number of 
women) or about half a percent of all the people on earth, which makes them easily the most 
genetically fit of all the people who have ever lived in historical times. 
Though this volume is a bit dated, there are few recent popular books dealing specifically 
with the psychology of murder and it’s a quick overview available for a few dollars, so still 
well worth the effort. It makes no attempt to be comprehensive and is somewhat superficial 
in places, with the reader expected to fill in the blanks from his many other books and the 
vast literature on violence. For an update see e.g., Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology 2nd ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 and Buss, 
Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) p 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 309–312, 410 and 
Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014) He has been among the top 
evolutionary psychologists for several decades and covers a wide range of behavior in his 
works, but here he concentrates almost entirely on the psychological mechanisms that cause 
individual  people  to   murder   and  their   possible  evolutionary   function   in  the   EEA 
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(Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., the plains of Africa during the last million 
years or so). 
Those with a lot of time who want a detailed history of homicidal violence from an 
evolutionary perspective may consult Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature- 
Why Violence Has Declined’(2012) and my review of it easily available on the net and in 
two of my recent books. Briefly, Pinker notes that murder has decreased steadily and 
dramatically by a factor of about 30 since our days as foragers. So, even though guns now 
make it extremely easy for anyone to kill, homicide is much less common. Pinker thinks this 
is due to various social mechanisms that bring out our ‘better angels’, but I think it’s due 
mainly to the temporary abundance of resources from the merciless rape of our planet, 
coupled with increased police presence, with communication and surveillance and legal 
systems that make it far more likely to be punished. This becomes clear every time there is 
even a brief and local absence of the police. 
Others also take the view that we have a ‘nice side’ that is genetically innate and supports 
the favorable treatment of even those not closely related to us (‘group selection’). This is 
hopelessly confused and I have done my small part to lay it to rest in ‘Altruism, Jesus and 
the End of the World—how the Templeton Foundation bought a Harvard Professorship and 
attacked Evolution, Rationality and Civilization. A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social 
Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012)’. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
I now present a very brief summary of intentional psychology (the logical structure of 
rationality) which is covered extensively in my many other articles and books. Impulsive 
violence will involve the automated subcortical functions of System 1, but is sometimes 
deliberated upon ahead of time via cortical System 2. 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make 
complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 years ago had evolved to 
describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions with basic utterances that 
can be described as Primary Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast 
unconscious automated System One, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
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location). We gradually developed the further ability to encompass displacements in space 
and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential events (the past and future and often 
counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the 
Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false 
propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not 
mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. 
Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (Wittgenstein RPP2 p148). “I believe”, “he loves”, “they 
think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first- 
person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying), while third person 
statements about others are true or false (see my review of Johnston - ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’). 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out, we can look at the table of Intentionality 
that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on 
a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also 
incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any 
other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to 
be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of Social Reality 
(the title of Searle’s well known book) and from many other viewpoints as well. 
 
 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and 
Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, 
Read, Baker, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein, Coliva etc., I have created the 
following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or 
ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors 
comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness 
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(LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), of behavior 
(LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of 
Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the 
Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in 
my other very recent writings. 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
I have made detailed explanations of this table in my other writings. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations 
by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
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systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 
volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that 
after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we 
have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further 
away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical problem—the use 
of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— 
showing the correct context. 
A detailed explanation of this table is given in my other writings. 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the 
possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only 
get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in its context. 
The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human 
Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
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The Dead Hands of Group Selection and 
Phenomenology – A Review of Individuality and 
Entanglement by Herbert Gintis 357p (2017) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books with interest, 
I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly, he makes the dead hands of group 
selection and phenomenology into the centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this 
largely invalidates the work. Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into 
question all his previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at 
Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a few years ago was one of the major scandals in biology in 
the last decade, and I have recounted the sad story in my article ‘Altruism, Jesus and the 
End of the World—how the Templeton Foundation bought a Harvard Professorship and 
attacked Evolution, Rationality and Civilization -- A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social 
Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012).’ Unlike 
Nowak, Gintis does not seem to be motivated by religious fanaticism, but by the strong 
desire to generate an alternative to the grim realities of human nature, made easy by the 
(near universal) lack of understanding of basic human biology and blank slateism of 
behavioral scientists, other academics, and the general public. 
Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists and other 
behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to describe behavior. Of course, 
the framework needed to understand behavior is an evolutionary one. Unfortunately, he 
fails to provide one himself (according to his many critics and I concur), and the attempt to 
graft the rotten corpse of group selection onto whatever economic and psychological 
theories he has generated in his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project. 
Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the genetics, like Wilson 
and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the math just blinds him to the biological 
impossibilities and of course this is the norm in science. As Wittgenstein famously noted on 
the first page of Culture and Value “There is no religious denomination in which the misuse 
of metaphysical expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.” 
It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which decreases its own 
frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the notion of group selection. Furthermore, 
it has been well known and often demonstrated that group selection just reduces to inclusive 
fitness (kin selection), which, as Dawkins has noted, is just anoth2er70name for evolution 
by natural selection. Like Wilson, Gintis has worked in this arena for about 50 years and still 
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has not grasped it, but after the scandal broke, it took me only 3 days to find, read and 
understand the most relevant professional work, as detailed in my article. It is mind 
boggling to realize that Gintis and Wilson were unable to accomplish this in nearly half a 
century. 
I discuss the errors of group selection and phenomenology that are the norm in academia 
as special cases of the near universal failure to understand human nature that are destroying 
America and the world. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books with interest, 
I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly, he makes the dead hands of group 
selection and phenomenology into the centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this 
largely invalidates the work. Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into 
question all his previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at 
Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a few years ago was one of the major scandals in biology in 
the last decade, and I have recounted the sad story in my article ‘Altruism, Jesus and the 
End of the World—how the Templeton Foundation bought a Harvard Professorship and 
attacked Evolution, Rationality and Civilization -- A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social 
Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012).’ Unlike 
Nowak, Gintis does not seem to be motivated by religious fanaticism, but by the strong 
desire to generate an alternative to the grim realities of human nature, made easy by the 
(near universal) lack of understanding of basic human biology and blank slateism of 
behavioral scientists, other academics, and the general public. 
Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists and other 
behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to describe behavior. Of course, 
the framework needed to understand behavior is an evolutionary one. Unfortunately, he 
fails to provide one himself (according to his many critics and I concur), and the attempt to 
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graft the rotten corpse of group selection onto whatever economic and psychological 
theories he has generated in his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project. 
Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the genetics, like Wilson 
and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the math just blinds him to the biological 
impossibilities and of course this is the norm in science. As Wittgenstein famously noted on 
the first page of Culture and Value “There is no religious denomination in which the misuse 
of metaphysical expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.” 
It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which decreases its own 
frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the n 271 of group selection. Furthermore, it 
has been well known and often demonstrated that group selection just reduces to inclusive 
fitness (kin selection), which, as Dawkins has noted, is just another name for evolution by 
natural selection. Like Wilson, Gintis has worked in this arena for about 50 years and still 
has not grasped it, but after the Wilson scandal broke, it took me only 3 days to find, read 
and understand the most relevant professional work, as detailed in my article. It is mind 
boggling to realize that Gintis and Wilson were unable to accomplish this in nearly half a 
century. 
In the years after the Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita paper was published in Nature, several 
population geneticists recounted chapter and verse on the subject, again showing 
conclusively that it is all a storm in a teacup. It is most unfortunate that Gintis, like his 
friends, failed to ask a competent biologist about this and regards as misguided the 140 some 
well known biologists who a signed a letter protesting the publication of this nonsense in 
Nature. I refer those who want the gory details to my paper, as it’s the best account of the 
melee that I am aware of. For a summary of the tech details see Dawkins Article ‘The Descent 
of Edward Wilson’ http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/edward- wilson-social- 
conquest-earth-evolutionary- errors-origin-species. As Dawkins wrote ‘For Wilson not to 
acknowledge that he speaks for himself against the great majority of his professional 
colleagues is—it pains me to say this of a lifelong hero—an act of wanton arrogance’. Sadly, 
Gintis has assimilated himself to such inglorious company. 
There are also some nice Dawkins YouTubes such as 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBweDk4ZzZ4. 
Gintis has also failed to provide the behavioral framework lacking in all the social sciences. 
One needs to have a logical structure for rationality, an understanding of the two systems 
of thought (dual process theory), of the division between scientific issues of fact and 
philosophical issues of how language works in the context at issue, and of how to avoid 
reductionism and scientism, but he, like nearly all students of behavior, is largely clueless. 
He, like them, is enchanted by models, theories, and concepts, and the urge to explain, while 
Wittgenstein showed us that we only need to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are 
just ways of using language (language games) which have value only insofar as they have 
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a clear test (clear truth makers, or as eminent philosopher John Searle likes to say, clear 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)). 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion 
and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, 
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, 
and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology (2019), Remarks on 
Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, 
Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and 
Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness (intentionality, behavior) is now 
the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from 
the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, 
Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for 
furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns 
show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual 
processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as 
the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR- Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of 
Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical 
philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive 
Psychology of Thought (DPT) 2–o7r2better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by 
Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human 
Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by 
Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has 
no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose conditions of 
satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”— i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and 
“world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world” S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
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representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to 
world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
I have made detailed explanations of this table in my other writings. 
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FROM THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+ 
T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA 
*** 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/ 
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle 
and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 
by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as 
presentations by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, 
possible actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
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***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle 
formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s recent 
3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery 
that after we have described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and 
attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He 
showed us that there is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language 
games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
Gintis starts making dubious, vague or downright bizarre claims early in the book. It 
begins on the first page of the overview with meaningless quotes from Einstein and Ryle. 
On pxii the paragraph beginning ‘Third Theme’ about entangled minds needs rewriting 
to specify that language games are functions of System 2 and that’s how thinking, 
believing etc. work (what they are), while the Fourth Theme which tries to explain 
behavior as due to what people 
‘consciously believe’ is right. That is, with ‘nonconsequentialism’ he’s trying to ‘explain’ 
behavior as ‘altruistic’ group selection mediated by conscious linguistic System 2. But if 
we take an evolutionary long term view, it’s clearly due to reciprocal altruism, attempting 
to serve inclusive fitness, which is mediated by the unconscious operation of System 1. 
Likewise, for the Fifth Theme and the rest of the Overview. He favors Rational Choice 
but has no idea this is a language game for which the exact context must be specified, nor 
that both System 1 and System 2 are ‘rational’ but in quite different ways. This is the 
classic error of most descriptions of behavior, which Searle has called The 
Phenomenological Illusion, Pinker the Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides 
‘The Standard Social Science Model’ and I have discussed it extensively in my other 
reviews and articles. As long as one does not grasp that most of our behavior is automated 
by nonlinguistic System 1, and that our conscious linguistic System 2 is mostly for 
rationalization of our compulsive and unconscious choices, it is not possible to have more 
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than a very superficial view of behavior, i.e., the one that is nearly universal not only 
among academics but politicians, billionaire owners of high tech companies, movie stars 
and the general public. Consequently, the consequences reach far beyond academia, 
producing delusional social policies that are bringing about the inexorable collapse of 
industrial civilization. See my ‘Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the 
World’. It is breathtaking to see America and the European democracies helping citizens 
of the third world destroy everyone’s future. 
On pxiii one can describe the ‘nonconsequentialist’ (i.e., apparently ‘true’ altruistic or self- 
destructive behavior) as actually performing reciprocal altruism, serving inclusive fitness 
due to genes evolved in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., that of 
our very distant ancestors), which stimulates the dopaminergic circuits in the ventral 
tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens, with the resulting release of dopamine which 
makes us feel good—the same mechanism that appears to be involved in all addictive 
behavior from drug abuse to soccer moms. 
And more incoherent babble such as “In the context of such environments, there is a 
fitness benefit to the ‘epigenetic transmission’ of such ‘information’ concerning the 
‘current state’ of the ‘environment’, i.e., transmission through non-genetic ‘channels’. 
This is called ‘cultural transmission’” [scare quotes mine]. Also, that ‘culture’ is ‘directly 
encoded’ in the brain (p7), which he says is the main tenet of gene-culture coevolution, 
and that democratic institutions and voting are altruistic and cannot be explained in 
terms of self-interest (p17- 18). The major reason for these peculiar views does not really 
come out until p186 when he finally makes it clear that he is a group selectionist. Since 
there is no such thing as group selection apart from inclusive fitness, it’s no surprise that 
this is just another incoherent account of behavior—i.e., more or less what Tooby and 
Cosmides famously termed The Standard Social Science Model or Pinker ‘The Blank 
Slate’. 
What he calls ‘altruistic genes’ on p188 should be called ‘inclusive fitness genes’ or ‘kin 
selection genes’. Gintis is also much impressed with the idea of gene- culture coevolution, 
which only means that culture may itself be an agent of natural selection, but he fails to 
grasp that this can only happen within the context of natural selection (inclusive fitness). 
Like nearly all social scientists (and scientists, philosophers etc.), it never crosses his mind 
that ‘culture’, ‘coevolution’,’ symbolic’,’ ‘epigenetic’, ‘information’, ‘representation’ etc., 
are all families of complex language games, whose COS (Conditions Of Satisfaction, tests 
for truth) are exquisitely sensitive to context. Without a specific context, they don’t mean 
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anything. So, in this book, as in most of the literature on behavior, there is much talk that 
has the appearance of sense without sense (meaning or clear COS). 
His claim on pxv, that most of our genes are the result of culture, is clearly preposterous 
as e.g., it is well known that we are about 98% chimpanzee. Only if he means those 
relating to language can we accept the possibility that some of our genes have been 
subject to cultural selection and even these merely modified ones that already existed— 
i.e., a few base pairs were changed out of hundreds of thousands or millions in each gene. 
He is much taken with the ‘rational actor’ model of economic behavior. but again, is 
unaware that the automaticities of S1 underlie all ‘rational’ behavior and the conscious 
linguistic deliberations of S2 cannot take place without them. Like many, perhaps the vast 
majority of current younger students of behavior, I see all human activities as easily 
comprehensible results of the working of selfish genetics in a contemporary context in 
which police surveillance and a temporary abundance of resources, gotten by raping the 
earth and robbing our own descendants, leads to relative temporary tranquility. In this 
connection, I suggest my review of Pinker’s recent book— The Transient Suppression of 
the Worst Devils of Our Nature—A Review of The Better Angels of Our Nature’. 
Many behaviors look like true altruism, and some are (i.e., they will decrease the 
frequency of the genes that bring them about – i.e, lead to the extinction of their own 
descendants), but the point which Gintis misses is that these are due to a psychology 
which evolved long ago in small groups on the African plains in the EEA and made sense 
then (i.e., it was inclusive fitness, when everyone in our group of a few dozen to a few 
hundred were our close relatives), and so we often continue with these behaviors even 
though they no longer make sense (i.e., they serve the interests of unrelated or distantly 
related persons which decreases our genetic fitness by decreasing the frequency of the 
genes that made it possible). This accounts for his promoting the notion that many 
behaviors are ‘truly altruistic’, rather than selfish in origin (such as in sect. 3.2). 
He even notes this and calls it ‘distributed effectivity’ (p60-63) in which people behave in 
big elections as though they were small ones, but he fails to see this is not due to any 
genes for ‘true altruism’ but to genes for reciprocal altruism (inclusive fitness), which is 
of course selfish. Thus, people behave as though their actions (e.g., their votes) were 
consequential, even though it is clear that they are not. E.g., one can find on the net that 
the chances of any one person’s vote deciding the outcome of an American presidential 
election is in the range of millions to tens of millions to one. And of course, the same is 
true of our chances of winning a lottery, yet our malfunctioning EEA psychology makes 
lotteries and voting hugely popular activities. 
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He also seems unaware of the standard terminology and ways of describing behavior 
used in evolutionary psychology (EP). E.g., on pg. 75 Arrow’s description of norms of 
social behavior are described in economic terms rather than as EP from the EEA trying to 
operate in current environments, and at the bottom of the page, people act not as 
‘altruistic’ punishers (i.e., as ‘group selectionists’) but as inclusive fitness punishers. On 
p 78, to say that subjects act ‘morally’ or in accord with a norm ‘for its own sake’, is again 
to embrace the group selectionist/phenomenological illusion, and clearly it is groups of 
genes that are trying to increase their inclusive fitness via well-known EP mechanisms 
like cheater detection and punishment. Again, on p88, what he describes as other- 
regarding unselfish actions can just as easily be described as self- regarding attempts at 
reciprocal altruism which go astray in a large society. 
Naturally, he often uses standard economics jargon such as ‘the subjective prior must be 
interpreted as a conditional probability’, which just means a belief in the likelihood of a 
particular outcome (p90-91), and ‘common subjective priors’ (shared beliefs) p122. Much 
of the book and of behavior concerns what is often called ‘we intentionality’ or the 
construction of social reality, but the most eminent theorist in this arena, John Searle, is 
not discussed, his now standard terminology such as COS and DIRA (desire independent 
reasons for action) does not appear, he is not in the index, and only one of his many works, 
and that over 20 years old, is found in the bibliography. 
On p97 he comments favorably on Bayesian updating without mentioning that it is 
notorious for lacking any meaningful test for success (i.e., clear COS), and commonly fails 
to make any clear predictions, so that no matter what people do, it can be made to 
describe their behavior after the fact. 
However, the main problem with chapter 5 is that ‘rational’ and other terms are complex 
language games that have no meaning apart from very specific contexts, which are 
typically lacking here. Of course, as Wittgenstein showed us, this is the core problem of 
all discussion of behavior and Gintis has most of the behavioral science community (or at 
least most of those over 40) as coconspirators. Likewise, throughout the book, such as 
chapter 6, where he discusses ‘complexity theory’, ‘emergent properties’, ‘macro and 
micro levels’, and ‘nonlinear dynamical systems’ and the generation of ‘models’ (which 
can mean almost anything and ‘describe’ almost anything), but it’s only prediction that 
counts (i.e., clear COS). 
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In spite of his phenomenological illusion (i.e., the near universal assumption that our 
conscious deliberations describe and control behavior—at odds with almost all the 
research in social psychology for the last 40 years), he also shares the reductionist 
delusion, wondering why the social sciences have not got a core analytical theory and 
have not coalesced. This of course is a frequent subject in the social sciences and 
philosophy and the reason is that psychology of higher order thought is not describable 
by causes, but by reasons, and one cannot make psychology disappear into physiology 
nor physiology into biochemistry nor it into physics etc. They are just different and 
indispensable levels of description. Searle writes about it often and Wittgenstein 
famously described it 80 years ago in the Blue Book. 
“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the method of 
science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the 
smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the 
treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the 
method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the 
way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to 
reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is “purely 
descriptive.” 
He is also quite out of touch with the contemporary world, thinking that people are going 
to be nice because they have internalized altruism (i.e., group selection), and with 
demographic realities, when he opines that population growth is under control, when in 
fact predictions are for another 4 billion by 2100 (p133), violence is increasing and the 
outlook is grim indeed. 
He sees a need to “carve an academic niche for sociology” (p148), but the whole 
discussion is typical gibberish (no clear COS), and all one really needs (or can give) is a 
clear description of the language games (the mind at work) we play in social situations, 
and how they show how our attempts at inclusive fitness work or go astray in 
contemporary contexts. Over and over he pushes his fantasy that “inherently ethical 
behavior” (i.e., group selectionist altruism) explains our social behavior, ignoring the 
obvious facts that it’s due to temporary abundance of resources, police and surveillance, 
and that always when you take these away, savagery quickly emerges (e.g., p151). It’s 
easy to maintain such delusions when one lives in the ivory tower world of abstruse 
theories, inattentive to the millions of scams, robberies, rapes, assaults, thefts and 
murders taking place every day. 
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Again, and again, (e.g., top p170) he ignores the obvious explanations for our ‘rationality’, 
which is natural selection –i.e., inclusive fitness in the EEA leading to ESS (Evolutionarily 
Stable Strategies), or at least they were more or less stable in small groups 100,000 to 3 
million years ago. 
Chapter 9 on the Sociology of the Genome is inevitably full of mistakes and incoherence— 
e.g., there are not special ‘altruistic genes’, rather, all genes serve inclusive fitness or they 
disappear (p188). The problem is that the only way to really get selfish genetics and 
inclusive fitness across is to have Gintis in a room for a day with Dawkins, Franks, Coyne 
etc., explaining why it is wrong. But as always, one has to have a certain level of education, 
intelligence, rationality and honesty for this to work, and if one is just a little bit short in 
several categories, it will not succeed. The same of course is true for much of human 
understanding, and so the vast majority will never get anything that is at all subtle. As 
with the Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita paper, I am sure that Dawkins, Franks and others would 
have been willing to go over this chapter and explain where it goes astray. 
 
 
The major problem is that people just do not grasp the concept of natural selection by 
inclusive fitness, nor of subconscious motivations, and that many have ‘religious’ 
motivations for rejecting them. This includes not just the general public and non-science 
academics, but a large percentage of biologists and behavioral scientists. I recently came 
across a lovely review by Dawkins of a discussion of the selfish gene idea by top level 
professional biologists, in which he had to go over their work line by line to explain that 
they just did not grasp how it all works. But only a small number of people like him could 
do this, and the sea of confusion is vast, and so these delusions about human nature that 
destroy this book, and are destroying America and the world will, as the Queen said to 
Alice in a slightly different context, go on until they come to the end and then stop. 
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Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the Templeton 
Foundation bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked 
Evolution, Rationality and Civilization. A review of E.O. 
Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) and 
Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Famous ant-man E.O. Wilson has always been one of my heroes --not only an outstanding 
biologist, but one of the tiny and vanishing minority of intellectuals who at least dares to 
hint at the truth about our nature that others fail to grasp, or insofar as they do grasp, 
studiously avoid for political expedience. Sadly, he is ending his long career in a most 
sordid fashion as a party to an ignorant and arrogant attack on science motivated at least 
in part by the religious fervor of his Harvard colleagues. It shows the vile consequences 
when universities accept money from religious groups, science journals are so awed by 
big names that they avoid proper peer review, and when egos are permitted to get out of 
control. It takes us into the nature of evolution, the basics of scientific methodology, how 
math relates to science, what constitutes a theory, and even what attitudes to religion and 
generosity are appropriate as we inexorably approach the collapse of industrial 
civilization. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my books Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, 
Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet 3rd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 
4th ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (2019, Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, 
Psychology, Religion, Politics, and Economics, Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as 
Psychology (2019), Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, 
Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, and Uncertainty (2019), Remarks 
on the Biology, Psychology and Politics of Religion (2019), and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). 
 
 
48 
435  
 
Famous ant-man E.O. Wilson has always been one of my heroes--not only an outstanding 
biologist, but one of the tiny and vanishing minority of intellectuals who at least dares to 
hint at the truth about our nature that others fail to grasp, or insofar as they do grasp, 
studiously avoid for of political expedience. Sadly, he is ending his long career in a most 
sordid fashion as a party to an ignorant and arrogant attack on science motivated at least 
in part by the religious fervor of his Harvard colleagues. It shows the vile consequences 
when universities accept money from religious groups, science journals are so awed by 
big names that they avoid proper peer review, and when egos are permitted to get out of 
control. It takes us into the nature of evolution, the basics of scientific methodology, how 
math relates to science, what constitutes a theory, and even what attitudes to religion and 
generosity are appropriate as we inexorably approach the collapse of industrial 
civilization. 
I found sections in ‘Conquest’ with the usual incisive commentary (though nothing really 
new or interesting if you have read his other works and are up on biology in general) in 
the often-stilted prose that is his hallmark, but was quite surprised that the core of the 
book is his rejection of inclusive fitness (which has been a mainstay of evolutionary 
biology for over 50 years) in favor of group selection. One assumes that coming from him 
and with the articles he refers to published by himself and Harvard mathematics 
colleague Nowak in major peer reviewed journals like Nature, it must be a substantial 
advance, in spite of the fact that I knew group selection was nearly universally rejected 
as having any major role in evolution. 
I have read numerous reviews on the net and many have good comments but the one I 
most wanted to see was that by renowned science writer and evolutionary biologist 
Richard Dawkins. Unlike most by professionals, which are in journals only available to 
those with access to a university, it is readily available on the net, though apparently, he 
decided not to publish it in a journal as it is suitably scathing. Sadly, one finds a 
devastating rejection of the book and the most acerbic commentary on a scientific 
colleague I have ever seen from Dawkins-- exceeding anything in his many exchanges 
with late and unlamented demagogue and pseudoscientist Stephan Jay Gould. Although 
Gould was infamous for his personal attacks on his Harvard colleague Wilson, Dawkins 
notes that much of ‘Conquest’ reminds one uncomfortably of Gould’s frequent lapses into 
"bland, unfocussed ecumenicalism". The same is more or less true of all Wilson’s popular 
writing including his most recent book ‘The Meaning of Human Existence’—another 
shameless self-promotion of his discredited ideas on Inclusive Fitness (IF). 
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Dawkins points out that the notorious 2010 paper by Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson in 
Nature was almost universally rejected by over 140 biologists who signed a letter and 
that there is not one word about this in Wilson's book. Nor have they corrected this in the 
subsequent 4 years of articles, lectures and several books. There is no choice but to agree 
with Dawkin's trenchant comment "For Wilson not to acknowledge that he speaks for 
himself against the great majority of his professional colleagues is--it pains me to say this 
of a lifelong hero --an act of wanton arrogance." In view of Nowak’s subsequent behavior 
one must include him as well. I feel like one of the stunned people one sees on TV being 
interviewed after the nice man next door, who has been babysitting everyone's children 
for 30 years, is exposed as a serial killer. 
Dawkins also points out (as he and others have done for many years) that inclusive fitness 
is entailed by (i.e., logically follows from) neo- Darwinism and cannot be rejected without 
rejecting evolution itself. Wilson again reminds us of Gould, who denounced creationists 
from one side of his mouth while giving them comfort by spewing endless ultraliberal 
Marxist-tinged gibberish about spandrels, punctuated equilibrium and evolutionary 
psychology from the other. The vagueness and mathematical opacity (to most of us) of 
the mathematics of group or multilevel selection is just what the soft-minded want to 
enable them to escape rational thinking in their endless antiscientific rants, and (in 
academia) postmodernist word salads. 
Worse yet, Wilson's ‘Conquest’ is a poorly thought out and sloppily written mess full of 
nonsequiturs, vague ramblings, confusions and incoherence. A good review that details 
some of these is that by graduate student Gerry Carter which you can find on the net. 
Wilson is also out of touch with our current understanding of evolutionary psychology 
(EP) (see e.g., the last 300 pages of Pinker's ‘The Better Angels of our Nature’). If you want 
a serious book length account of social evolution and some relevant EP from an expert 
see ‘Principles of Social Evolution’ by Andrew F.G. Bourke, or a not quite so serious and 
admittedly flawed and rambling account but a must read nevertheless by Robert 
Trivers—'The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life’ and 
older but still current and penetrating works such as ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’: 
Revised Edition by Robert Axelrod and ‘The Biology of Moral Systems’ by Richard 
Alexander. 
After reading this book and its reviews, I dug into some of the scientific articles which 
responded to Nowak and Wilson and to Van Veelen’s critiques of the Price equation upon 
which they heavily relied. The reviews noted that it has always been clear that the math 
of group or multilevel selection reduces to that of inclusive fitness (kin selection) and that 
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it is not logically possible to select for behavior that does not benefit the genes that are 
unique to the actor and its immediate relatives. To put it bluntly, ‘altruistic’ behavior is 
always selfish in the end in the sense that it increases survival of the genes in the altruist. 
This to me is obvious from daily life and any scientists who claim otherwise have clearly 
lost their way. Yes, it does happen in the weirdness of modern life (i.e., so unlike the stone 
age society in which we evolved) that one sometimes sees a person give their life to 
protect a nonrelated person, but clearly, they will not do it again and (provided its done 
before they replicate) any tendency to do it will not be inherited either. Even if they have 
already replicated they will on average leave behind fewer descendants than if they held 
back. This guarantees that any genetic tendency for ‘true altruism’- i.e., behavior that 
decreases one’s genes in the population-- will be selected against and no more than this 
very basic logic is needed to grasp evolution by natural selection, kin selection and 
inclusive fitness—all the mathematical niceties serving only to quantitate things and to 
clarify strange living arrangements in some of our relatives (e.g., ants, termites and mole 
rats). 
The major focus of the group selectionist’s (‘groupies’) attack was the famous Extended 
Price Equation that has been used to model inclusive fitness, published by Price about 40 
years ago. The best papers debunking these attacks that I have found are those of Frank 
and Bourke and I will start with a few quotes from Frank ‘Natural selection. IV. The Price 
equation’ J. EVOL. BIOL. 25 (2012) 1002–1019. 
“The critics confuse the distinct roles of general abstract theory and concrete dynamical 
models for particular cases. The enduring power of the Price equation arises from the 
discovery of essential invariances in natural selection. For example, kin selection theory 
expresses biological problems in terms of relatedness coefficients. Relatedness measures 
the association between social partners. The proper measure of relatedness identifies 
distinct biological scenarios with the same (invariant) evolutionary outcome. Invariance 
relations provide the deepest insights of scientific thought…Essentially, all modern 
discussions of multilevel selection and group selection derive from Price (1972a), as 
developed by Hamilton (1975). Price and Hamilton noted that the Price equation can be 
expanded recursively to represent nested levels of analysis, for example individuals 
living in groups… All modern conceptual insights about group selection derive from 
Price’s recursive expansion of his abstract expression of selection… A criticism of these 
Price equation applications is a criticism of the central approach of evolutionary 
quantitative 
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genetics. Such criticisms may be valid for certain applications, but they must be evaluated 
in the broader context of quantitative genetics theory…[and in a quote from Price … 
‘Gene frequency change is the basic event in biological evolution. The following 
equation…which gives frequency change under selection from one generation to the next 
for a single gene or for any linear function of any number of genes at any number of loci, 
holds for any sort of dominance or epistasis, for sexual or asexual reproduction, for 
random or nonrandom mating, for diploid, haploid or polyploid species, and even for 
imaginary species with more than two sexes’…]… Path (contextual) analysis follows as a 
natural extension of the Price equation, in which one makes specific models of fitness 
expressed by regression. It does not make sense to discuss the Price equation and path 
analysis as alternatives… Critiques of the Price equation rarely distinguish the costs and 
benefits of particular assumptions in relation to particular goals. I use van Veelen’s recent 
series of papers as a proxy for those critiques. That series repeats some of the common 
misunderstandings and adds some new ones. 
Nowak recently repeated van Veelen’s critique as the basis for his commentary on the 
Price equation (van Veelen, 2005; Nowak et al., 2010; van Veelen et al., 2010; Nowak& 
Highfield, 2011; van Veelen, 2011; van Veelen et al., 2012… This quote from van Veelen 
et al. (2012) demonstrates an interesting approach to scholarship. They first cite Frank as 
stating that dynamic insufficiency is a drawback of the Price equation. They then disagree 
with that point of view and present as their own interpretation an argument that is nearly 
identical in concept and phrasing to my own statement in the very paper that they cited 
as the foundation for their disagreement… The recursive form of the full Price equation 
provides the foundation for all modern studies of group selection and multilevel analysis. 
The Price equation helped in discovering those various connections, although there are 
many other ways in which to derive the same relations… Kin selection theory derives 
much of its power by identifying an invariant informational quantity sufficient to unify 
a wide variety of seemingly disparate processes (Frank, 1998, Chapter 6). The 
interpretation of kin selection as an informational invariance has not been fully 
developed and remains an open problem. Invariances provide the foundation of scientific 
understanding: ‘It is only slightly overstating the case to say that physics is the study of 
symmetry’ (Anderson, 1972). Invariance and symmetry mean the same thing (Weyl, 1983). 
Feynman (1967) emphasized that invariance is The Character of Physical Law. The 
commonly observed patterns of probability can be unified by the study of invariance and 
its association with measurement (Frank & Smith, 2010, 2011). There has been little effort 
in biology to pursue similar understanding of invariance and measurement (Frank, 2011; 
Houle et al.,2011).” 
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I hope it is becoming clear why I chose the title I did for this article. To attack the Price 
equation and inclusive fitness is to attack not only quantitative genetics and evolution by 
natural selection, but the universally used concepts of covariance, invariance and 
symmetry, which are basic to science and to rationality. Furthermore, the clearly voiced 
religious motivation of Nowak invites us to consider to what extent such Christian virtues 
as true (permanently genetically self-diminishing) altruism and the brotherhood of man 
(woman, child, dog etc.) can be part of a rational program for survival in the near future. 
My take is that true altruism is a luxury for those who don’t mind being evolutionary 
dead ends and that even in it’s ‘make believe’ inclusive fitness version, one will be hard 
pressed to find it when the wolf is at the door (i.e., the likely universal scenario for the 11 
billion in the next century). 
There is much more in this gem, which goes into exquisite logical and mathematical detail 
(and likewise his many other papers-you can get all 7 in this series in one pdf) but this 
will give the flavor. Another amusing episode concerns tautology in math. Frank again: 
‘Nowak & Highfield (2011) and van Veelen et al. (2012) believe their arguments 
demonstrate that the Price equation is true in the same trivial sense, and they call that 
trivial type of truth a mathematical tautology. Interestingly, magazines, online articles 
and the scientific literature have for several years been using the phrase mathematical 
tautology for the Price equation, although Nowak & Highfield (2011) and van Veelen et 
al. (2012) do not provide citations to previous literature. As far as I know, the first 
description of the Price equation as a mathematical tautology was in the study of Frank 
(1995).’ 
Unlike Frank, Lamm and others, the ‘groupies’ have not shown any understanding of the 
philosophy of science (the descriptive psychology of higher order thought, as I like to call 
it) in these recent books and articles, nor in any of Wilson’s numerous popular books and 
articles over the last half century, so I would not expect them to have studied Wittgenstein 
(the most penetrating philosopher of mathematics) who famously remarked that in math 
‘everything is syntax, nothing is semantics’. Wittgenstein exposes a nearly universal 
misunderstanding of the role of math in science. All math (and logic) is a tautology that 
has no meaning or use until it is connected to our life with words. Every equation is a 
tautology until numbers and words and the system of conventions we call evolutionary 
psychology are employed. Amazingly Lamm in his recent excellent article ‘A Gentle 
Introduction to The Price Equation’ (2011) notes this: 
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“The Price equation deals with any selection process. Indeed, we can define selection 
using it. It says nothing in particular about biological or genetic evolution, and is not tied 
to any particular biological scenario. This gives it immense power, but also means that it 
is quite possible to apply it incorrectly to the real world. This leads us to the second and 
final observation. The Price equation is analytic [true by definition or tautologous]. It is 
not a synthetic proposition [an empirical issue as to its truth or falsity]. We derived it 
based on straightforward definitions, and universal mathematical principles. The 
equation simply provides a useful way of interpreting the meaning of the straightforward 
definitions we started from. This however is not the case once you put the equation into 
words, thereby interpreting the mathematical relationships. If you merely say: _I define 
'selection' to be the covariance blah blah blah, you might be safe. If you say: _the 
covariance blah blah blah is selection, you are making a claim with empirical content. 
More fundamentally, the belief that the rules of probability theory and statistics, or any 
other mathematical manipulation, describe the actual world is synthetic.” 
In this regard, also recommended is Helantera and Uller’s ‘The Price Equation and 
Extended Inheritance’ Philos Theor Biol (2010) 2: e101. 
“Here we use the Price Equation as a starting point for a discussion of the differences 
between four recently proposed categories of inheritance systems; genetic, epigenetic, 
behavioral and symbolic. Specifically, we address how the components of the Price 
Equation encompass different non-genetic systems of inheritance in an attempt to clarify 
how the different systems are conceptually related. We conclude that the four classes of 
inheritance systems do not form distinct clusters with respect to their effect on the rate 
and direction of phenotypic change from one generation to the next in the absence or 
presence of selection. Instead, our analyses suggest that different inheritance systems can 
share features that are conceptually very similar, but that their implications for adaptive 
evolution nevertheless differ substantially as a result of differences in their ability to 
couple selection and inheritance.” 
So, it should be clear that there is no such thing as sidestepping the Price equation and 
that like any equation, it has limitless applications if one only connects it to the world 
with suitable words. 
As Andy Gardner put it in his article on Price (Current Biology 18#5 R198) (Also see his 
‘Adaptation and Inclusive Fitness’ Current Biology 23, R577– R584, July 8, 2013) 
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“Such ideas were rather confused until Price, and later Hamilton, showed that the Price 
equation can be expanded to encompass multiple levels of selection acting 
simultaneously (Box 2). This allows selection at the various levels to be explicitly defined 
and separated, and provides the formal basis of group selection theory. Importantly, it 
allows the quantification of these separate forces and yields precise predictions for when 
group-beneficial behavior will be favoured. It turns out that these predictions are always 
consistent with Hamilton’s rule, rb – c > 0. 
Furthermore, because kin selection and group selection theory are both based upon the 
same Price equation, it is easy to show that the two approaches are mathematically 
exactly equivalent, and are simply alternative ways of carving up the total selection 
operating upon the social character. Irrespective of the approach taken, individual 
organisms are expected to maximize their inclusive fitness — though this result follows 
more easily from a kin selection analysis, as it makes the key element of relatedness more 
explicit.” 
Consequently, to have the ‘groupies’ attacking the Price equation is bizarre. And here is 
Bourke’s recent summary of inclusive fitness vs ‘groupism’: (haplodiploid and eusocial 
refer to the social insects which provide some of the best tests). 
“Recent critiques have questioned the validity of the leading theory for explaining social 
evolution and eusociality, namely inclusive fitness (kin selection) theory. I review recent 
and past literature to argue that these critiques do not succeed. Inclusive fitness theory 
has added fundamental insights to natural selection theory. These are the realization that 
selection on a gene for social behaviour depends on its effects on co-bearers, the 
explanation of social behaviours as unalike as altruism and selfishness using the same 
underlying parameters, and the explanation of within-group conflict in terms of non- 
coinciding inclusive fitness optima. A proposed alternative theory for eusocial evolution 
assumes mistakenly that workers’ interests are subordinate to the queen’s, contains no 
new elements and fails to make novel predictions. The haplodiploidy hypothesis has yet 
to be rigorously tested and positive relatedness within diploid eusocial societies supports 
inclusive fitness theory. The theory has made unique, falsifiable predictions that have 
been confirmed, and its evidence base is extensive and robust. Hence, inclusive fitness 
theory deserves to keep its position as the leading theory for social evolution.” 
However inclusive fitness (especially via the Extended Price Equation) explains much 
more than ant society, it explains how multicellular organisms came into being. 
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“The third insight of inclusive fitness theory is the demonstration that conflict between 
members of a society is potentially present if they are unequally related to group 
offspring, since differential relatedness leads to unequal inclusive fitness optima. From 
this has sprung an understanding of an immense range of kin-selected conflicts, including 
conflicts within families and eusocial societies and intragenomic conflicts that follow the 
same underlying logic. The corollary of this insight is that societies are stable to the extent 
that the inclusive fitness optima of their members coincide. This in turn provides the 
rationale for the entire ‘major transitions’ view of evolution, whereby the origin of novel 
types of group in the history of life (e.g. genomes within cells, multicellular organisms 
and eusocial societies) can be explained as the result of their previously independent 
constituent units achieving a coincidence of inclusive fitness optima through grouping. 
From this standpoint, a multicellular organism is a eusocial society of cells in which the 
members of the society happen to be physically stuck together; the more fundamental 
glue, however, is the clonal relatedness that (barring mutations) gives each somatic cell 
within the organism a common interest in promoting the production of gametes…Nowak 
et al. argued that their perspective assumes a ‘gene-centred approach’ that ‘makes 
inclusive fitness theory unnecessary’. This is puzzling, because entirely lacking from their 
perspective is the idea, which underpins each of inclusive fitness theory’s insights, of the 
gene as a self-promoting strategist whose evolutionary interests are conditional on the 
kin class in which it resides…In their model of the evolution of eusociality, Nowak et al. 
deduced that the problem of altruism is illusory. They wrote that ‘There is no paradoxical 
altruism that needs to be explained’ because they assumed that potential workers 
(daughters of a colony-founding female or queen) are ‘not independent agents’ but rather 
can be seen ‘as “robots” that are built by the queen’ or the ‘extrasomatic projection of [the 
queen’s] personal genome’. If this claim were correct, then only the queen’s interests 
would need to be addressed and one could conclude that worker altruism is more 
apparent than real. But it is incorrect, for two reasons. One is that, as has repeatedly been 
argued in response to previous ‘parental manipulation’ theories of the origin of 
eusociality, the inclusive fitness interests of workers and the mother queen do not 
coincide, because the two parties are differentially related to group offspring. The second 
is that worker behaviours such as eating of the queen’s eggs, egg-laying in response to 
perceived declines in queen fecundity, sex-ratio manipulation by destruction of the 
queen’s offspring and lethal aggression towards the queen all demonstrate that workers 
can act in their own interests and against those of the queen. In the light of this proven 
lack of worker passivity, workers’ reproductive self-sacrifice is paradoxical at first sight 
and this is the genuine problem of altruism that inclusive fitness theory has solved. 
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(c) Alternative theory of eusocial evolution Nowak et al. [38] presented an ‘alternative 
theory of eusocial evolution’ (as alluded to in §2b), backed up by a ‘mathematical model 
for the origin of eusociality’. However, these do not represent true alternative theories, 
either alone or in combination, because they do not make any points or predictions that 
have not been made within inclusive fitness theory” 
Speaking of various steps in a scheme suggested by Nowak et al, Bourke says: 
 
“These steps constitute a reasonable scenario for the origin and elaboration of insect 
eusociality, but neither the sequence of steps nor the individual elements differ 
substantially from those that have been proposed to occur within the inclusive fitness 
framework…The alternative theory of eusocial evolution of Nowak et al. also exhibits 
two important weaknesses. To begin with, by allowing groups to form in multiple ways 
in step (i) (e.g. subsocially through parent–offspring associations but also by any other 
means, including ‘randomly by mutual local attraction’), their scenario ignores two 
critical points that are inconsistent with it but consistent with inclusive fitness theory. 
First, the evidence is that, in almost all eusocial lineages, eusociality has originated in 
social groups that were ancestrally subsocial and therefore characterized by high within- 
group relatedness. Second, the evidence is that the origin of obligate or complex 
eusociality, defined as involving adult workers irreversibly committed to a worker 
phenotype, is associated with ancestral lifetime parental monogamy and hence, again, 
with predictably high within- group relatedness…In sum, Nowak et al. make a case for 
considering the effect of the population-dynamic context in which eusocial evolution 
occurs. But their alternative theory and its associated model add no fundamentally new 
elements on top of those identified within the inclusive fitness framework and, relative 
to this framework, exhibit substantial shortcomings…More fundamentally, as has long 
been recognized and repeatedly stressed , the haplodiploidy hypothesis is not an essential 
component of inclusive fitness theory, since Hamilton’s rule for altruism can hold 
without the relatedness asymmetries caused by haplodiploidy being present. 
Highlighting the status of the haplodiploidy hypothesis to criticize inclusive fitness 
theory therefore misses the target. It also overlooks the fact that all diploid eusocial 
societies identified since the haplodiploidy hypothesis was proposed have turned out to 
be either clonal or family groups and so, as predicted by inclusive fitness theory, to 
exhibit positive relatedness. This is true of ambrosia beetle, social aphids, polyembryonic 
wasps, social shrimps and mole-rats. It is even true of a newly discovered eusocial 
flatworm. In short, the diploid eusocial societies, far from weakening inclusive fitness 
theory, serve to strengthen it…More broadly, the theory uniquely predicts the absence of 
altruism (involving lifetime costs to direct fitness) between non-relatives, and indeed no 
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such cases have been found except in systems clearly derived from ancestral societies of 
relatives. 
Finally, inclusive fitness theory is unique in the range of social phenomena that it has 
successfully elucidated, including phenomena as superficially dissimilar as the origin of 
multicellularity and the origin of eusociality, or intragenomic conflicts and conflicts 
within eusocial societies. Overall, no other theory comes close to matching inclusive 
fitness theory’s record of successful explanation and prediction across such a range of 
phenomena within the field of social evolution. The challenge to any approach 
purporting to replace inclusive fitness theory is to explain the same phenomena without 
using the insights or concepts of the theory…Recent critiques of inclusive fitness theory 
have proved ineffective on multiple fronts. They do not demonstrate fatal or 
unrecognized difficulties with inclusive fitness theory. They do not provide a distinct 
replacement theory or offer a similarly unifying approach. They do not explain 
previously unexplained data or show that explanations from inclusive fitness theory are 
invalid. And they do not make new and unique predictions. The latest and most 
comprehensive critique of inclusive fitness theory, though broad-ranging in the scope of 
its criticism, suffers from the same faults. 
Certainly, relatedness does not explain all variation in social traits. In addition, the long- 
standing message from inclusive fitness theory is that particular combinations of non- 
genetic (e.g. ecological) and genetic factors are required for the origin of eusociality. 
Nonetheless, relatedness retains a unique status in the analysis of eusocial evolution 
because no amount of ecological benefit can bring about altruism if relatedness is zero.” 
Andrew F. G. Bourke ‘The validity and value of inclusive fitness theory’ Proc. R. Soc. B 
2011 278, doi: 10.1098/rspb.2011.1465 14 September (2011) 
One thing rarely mentioned by the groupies is the fact that, even were ‘group selection’ 
possible, selfishness is at least as likely (probably far more likely in most contexts) to be 
group selected for as altruism. Just try to find examples of true altruism in nature –the 
fact that we can’t (which we know is not possible if we understand evolution) tells us that 
its apparent presence in humans is an artefact of modern life, concealing the facts, and 
that it can no more be selected for than the tendency to suicide (which in fact it is). One 
might also benefit from considering a phenomenon never (in my experience) mentioned 
by groupies-- cancer. No group has as much in common as the (originally) genetically 
identical cells in our own bodies-a 100 trillion cell clone-- but we all born with thousands 
and perhaps millions of cells that have already taken the first step on the path to cancer 
and generate millions to billions of cancer cells in our life. If we did not die of other things 
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first, we (and perhaps all multicellular organisms) would all die of cancer. Only a massive 
and hugely complex mechanism built into our genome that represses or derepresses 
trillions of genes in trillions of cells, and kills and creates billions of cells a second, keeps 
the majority of us alive long enough to reproduce. One might take this to imply that a 
just, democratic and enduring society for any kind of entity on any planet in any universe 
is only a dream, and that no being or power could make it otherwise. It is not only ‘the 
laws’ of physics that are universal and inescapable, or perhaps we should say that 
inclusive fitness is a law of physics. 
In a bizarre twist, it was apparently such thoughts that drove Price (creator of the Price 
equation and a devout Christian) to suicide. 
Regarding the notion of ‘theory’, it is a classic Wittgensteinian language game—a group 
of uses loosely linked but having critical differences. 
When it was first proposed, evolution by natural selection was indeed highly theoretical, 
but as time passed it became inextricably linked to so many observations and experiments 
that its basic ideas were no longer any more theoretical than that vitamins play critical 
roles in human nutrition. For the ‘Theory of Deity’ however it is not clear what would 
count as a definitive test. 
Perhaps the same is true of String Theory. 
 
Many besides groupies note the pleasant nature of much human interaction and see a 
rosy future ahead-- but they are blind. It is crushingly obvious that the pleasantry is a 
transient phase due to abundant resources produced by the merciless rape of the planet, 
and as they are exhausted in the next two centuries or so, there will be misery and 
savagery worldwide as the (likely) permanent condition. Not just movie stars, politicians 
and the religious are oblivious to this, but even very bright academics who should know 
better. In his recent book ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature’ one of my most admired 
scholars Steven Pinker spends half the book showing how we have gotten more and more 
civilized, but he seems never to mention the obvious reasons why--the temporary 
abundance of resources coupled with massive police and military presence facilitated by 
surveillance and communication technologies. As industrial civilization collapses, it is 
inevitable that the Worst Devils of Our Nature will reappear. One sees it in the current 
chaos in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, and even the world wars were 
Sunday picnics compared to what’s coming. Perhaps half of the 12 billion then alive will 
die of starvation, disease and violence, and it could be many more. See my ‘Suicide by 
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Democracy’ for a brief summary of doomsday or my Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 
21st Century for a longer one. 
Another unpleasant fact about altruism, generosity and helping, virtually never 
mentioned, is that if you take a global long-term view, in an overcrowded world with 
vanishing resources, helping one person hurts everyone else in some small way. Each 
meal, each pair of shoes create pollution and erosion and use up resources, and when you 
add 7.8 billion of them together (soon to be 11) it is clear that one person’s gain is everyone 
else’s loss. Every dollar earned or spent damages the world and if countries cared about 
the future they would reduce their GDP (gross destructive product) every year. Even 
were groupism true this would not change. 
The facts that Wilson, Nowak et al have, for four years, persisted in publishing and 
making extravagant claims for grossly inadequate work is not the worst of this scandal. 
It turns out that Nowak’s professorship at Harvard was purchased by the Templeton 
Foundation—well known for its pervasive sponsorship of lectures, conferences and 
publications attempting to reconcile religion and science. Nowak is a devout Catholic and 
it appears that a large gift to Harvard was contingent on Nowak’s appointment. This 
made him Wilson’s colleague and the rest is history. 
However, Wilson was only too willing, as he had long shown a failure to grasp 
Evolutionary theory—e.g., regarding kin selection as a division of group selection rather 
than the other way around. I noticed years ago that he co- published with David Wilson, 
a longtime supporter of group selection, and had written other papers demonstrating his 
lack of understanding. Any of the groupies could have gone to the experts to learn the 
error of their ways (or just read their papers). The grand old men of kin selection such as 
Hamilton, Williams and Trivers, and younger bloods like Frank, Bourke and many others, 
would have been happy to teach them. But Nowak has received something like $14 
million in Templeton grants in a few years (for mathematics!) and who wants to give that 
up? He is quite outspoken in his intent to prove that the gentleness and kindness of Jesus 
is built into us and all the universe. Jesus is conveniently absent, but one can guess from 
the qualities of other enlightened ones and the history of the church that the real story of 
early Christianity would come as a shock. Recall that the bible was expurgated of 
anything that did not meet the party line (e.g., Gnosticism -check out the Nag-Hammadi 
manuscripts). And in any case, who would record the harsh realities of daily life? 
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Almost certainly, the Nowak, Tarnita, Wilson paper would never have been published 
(at least not by Nature) if it had been presented by two average biologists, but coming 
from two famous Harvard professors it clearly did not get the peer review that it should 
have. 
Regarding Nowak and Highland’s book ‘SuperCooperators’ I will let Dawkins do the 
honors: 
I have read the book by Nowak and Highfield. Parts of it are quite good, but the quality 
abruptly, and embarrassingly, plummets in the chapter on kin selection, possibly under 
the influence of E O Wilson (who has been consistently misunderstanding kin selection 
ever since Sociobiology, mistakenly regarding it as a subset of group selection). Nowak 
misses the whole point of kin selection theory, which is that it is not something additional, 
not something over and- above ‘classical individual selection’ theory. Kin selection is not 
something EXTRA, not something to be resorted to only if‘classical individual selection’ 
theory fails. Rather, it is an inevitable consequence of neo-Darwinism, which follows from 
it deductively. To talk about Darwinian selection MINUS kin selection is like talking 
about Euclidean geometry minus Pythagoras’ theorem. It is just that this logical 
consequence of neo-Darwinism was historically overlooked, which gave people a false 
impression that it was something additional and extra. Nowak’s otherwise good book is 
tragically marred by this elementary blunder. As a mathematician, he really should have 
known better. It seems doubtful that he has ever read Hamilton’s classic papers on 
inclusive fitness, or he couldn’t have misunderstood the idea so comprehensively. The 
chapter on kin selection will discredit the book and stop it being taken seriously by those 
qualified to judge it, which is a pity. 
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/03/16/new-book-shows-that- humans- 
are-genetically-nice-ergo-jesus/ 
A scathing review of ‘SuperCooperators’ also appeared from eminent game 
theorist/economist/political scientist (and Harvard alumnus) Herbert Gintis (who 
recounts the Templeton scandal therein), which is quite surprising considering his own 
love affair with group selection— see the review of his book with Bowles by Price 
www.epjournal.net – 2012. 10(1): 45-49 and my review of his most recent volume 
‘Individuality and Entanglement’(2017) here. 
Regarding Wilson’s subsequent books, ‘The Meaning of Human Existence’ is bland and 
likewise confused and dishonest, repeating several times the groupies party line four 
years after its thorough debunking, and ‘A Window on Eternity’- is a meagre travel 
journal about the establishing of a national park in Mozambique. He carefully avoids 
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mentioning that Africa will add 3 billion in the near future (the official UN projection), 
eliminating all of nature along with peace, beauty, decency, sanity and hope. 
In the end, it is clear that this whole sad affair will be only the tiniest bump on the road 
and, like all things which exercise our attention now, will soon be forgotten as the horrors 
of unrestrained motherhood and the subjugation of the world by the Seven Sociopaths 
who rule China will bring society crashing down. But one can be sure that even when 
global warming has put Harvard beneath the sea and starvation, disease and violence are 
the daily norm, there will be those who insist that it is not due to human activities (the 
opinion of half the American public currently) and that overpopulation is not a problem 
(the view of 40%), there will be billions praying to their chosen deity for a rain of Big Macs 
from the sky, and that (assuming the enterprise of science has not collapsed, which is 
assuming a lot) someone somewhere will be writing a paper embracing group selection. 
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Suicide by Democracy - an Obituary for 
America and the World 
Abstract 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, 
most of it for the last century, and now all of it, due to 3rd world people. Consumption 
of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization 
and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The earth 
loses at least 1% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing 
capacity will be gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this 
is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, 
combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably 
turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China 
will continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the 
dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our 
innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated 
persons as though they had common interests. The idea of human rights is an evil fantasy 
promoted by leftists to draw attention away from the merciless destruction of the earth 
by unrestrained 3rd world motherhood. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and 
psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who 
control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm 
someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys 
the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and 
one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy 
or dictatorship. The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not 
enough resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out 
of poverty and keep them there. The attempt to do this is bankrupting America and 
destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our 
genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor 
and not the rich. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for 
preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. 
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The saddest day in US history. President Johnson, with two 
Kennedys and ex-President Hoover, gives America to Mexico - 
Oct 3rd 1965 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
451  
 
 
 
PERCENT OF AMERICANS WHO ARE FOREIGN BORN -- the 
result of the “no significant demographic impact” immigration 
act of 1965—non- Europeans (the Diverse) were a 16% share, are 
now (2019) about 38% and will be about 60% by 2100, since they 
are now 100% of the population increase of about 2.4 million 
every year. Suicide by democracy. 
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PART OF THE COST OF DIVERSITY and of aging, being the 
world’s unpaid policeman, etc., (not counting future 
liabilities which are 5 to 10 times as much, barring 
major social changes). 
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Useful definitions for understanding American politics 
DIVERSITY: 1. USA government program for handing over control to Mexico. 
2. USA government program for providing free or heavily subsidized goods 
and services to those from other countries. 3. A means for turning America 
into a 3rd world Hellhole. 4. Multiculturalism, multiethnicism, 
multipartisanism, inclusivity, third world supremacy. 
RACIST: 1. Person opposed to diversity in above sense. 2. Person of different 
ethnicity who disagrees with me on any issue. 3. Person of any ethnicity who 
disagrees with me on anything. Also, called ‘bigot’ ‘hater’ or ‘nativist’. 
WHITE SUPREMACIST: Anyone opposed to diversity in the above sense, i.e., 
anyone trying to prevent the collapse of America and of industrial civilization 
worldwide. 
THIRD WORLD SUPREMACIST: Anyone in favor of diversity in above 
senses. Anyone working to destroy their descendant’s future. AKA Democrats, 
Socialists, Neomarxists, Democratic Socialists, Marxists, Leftists, Liberals, 
Progressives, Communists, Maternalists, Leftist Fascists, Multiculturalists, 
Inclusivists, Human Rightists. 
HATE: 1. Any opposition to diversity in the above sense. 2. Expression of a 
desire to prevent the collapse of America and the world. 
EURO: White or Caucasian or European: one whose ancestors left Africa over 
50,000 years ago. 
BLACK: African or Afro-American: one whose ancestors stayed in Africa or 
left in the last few hundred years (so there has not been time for evolution of 
any significant differences from Euros). 
DIVERSE: Anyone who is not EURO (European, white, Caucasian). 
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HUMAN RIGHTS: An evil fantasy created by leftists to draw attention away 
from the merciless destruction of the earth by unrestrained third world 
reproduction. Thus, temporary anomalies, such as democracy, equality, labor 
unions, women’s rights, child rights, animal rights, etc. are due to high 
standards of living created by the rape of the planet and will disappear as 
civilization collapses and China rules the world. 
 
 
I should first note that I have no investment in the outcome of any social or political 
movement. I am old, without kids or close relatives, and in the blink of an eye I will be 
gone (of course the most important thing to remember is that very soon we will all be 
gone and our descendants will face the horrific consequences of our stupidity and 
selfishness). I offer these comments in hope they will give perspective, since concise 
rational competent analyses of the perilous situation in America and the world are almost 
nonexistent. I have close friends of various ethnicities, several times given my only assets 
to an impoverished third world person (no I did not inherit anything significant, did not 
have rich relatives, a trust fund or a cushy job), have had third world friends, colleagues, 
girlfriends, wives and business partners, and helped anyone in any way I could 
regardless of race, age, creed, sexual preferences or national origin or position on the 
autism spectrum, and am still doing so. I have not voted in any kind of election, belonged 
to any religious, social or political group, listened to a political speech or read a book on 
politics in over 50 years, as I considered it pointless and demeaning to have my views 
carry the same weight as those of morons, lunatics, criminals and merely uneducated (i.e., 
about 95% of the population). I find nearly all political dialog to be superficial, mistaken 
and useless. This is my first and last social/political commentary. 
The millions of daily articles, speeches, tweets and newsbites rarely mention it, but what 
is happening in America and worldwide are not some transient and unconnected events, 
but the infinitely sad story of the inexorable collapse of industrial civilization and of 
freedom due to overpopulation and to the malignant dictatorships that are the CCP 
(Chinese Communist Party) and Islam. Though these are the only important issues, they 
seldom are stated clearly in the endless debates and daily social convulsions, and few 
things in this article are ever discussed in any clear and intelligent way, in large part 
because the Diverse (i.e., those not of European ancestry) have a strangle hold on 
American and most Western media which make it impossible. Politics in democratic 
countries is dedicated almost entirely to providing the opportunity for every special 
interest group to get an ever- bigger share of the rapidly diminishing resources. The    
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problem is that nearly all people are short- sighted, selfish, poorly educated, lacking 
experience and stupid and this creates an insoluble problem when there are 10 billion (by 
century’s end), or when they constitute a majority of any electorate in a democratic 
system. It’s one thing to make mistakes when there are time and resources to correct them, 
but quite another when it’s impossible. The USA is the worst case as it seems to have vast 
resources and a resilient economy, and what I and most people grew up regarding as the 
wonderful traditions of democracy, diversity and equality, but I now see that these are 
invitations to exploitation by every special interest group and that giving privileges to 
everyone born, without imposing duties, has fatal consequences. Also, a system that 
operates this way cannot compete with ones that do not- Asia and above all China is 
eating America’s lunch (and that of all non-Asian countries), and nothing is likely to stop 
it, but of course overpopulation dooms everyone (the minority who will survive after the 
great 22nd/23rd century die-off) to a hellish life. A world where everyone is free to 
replicate their genes and consume resources as they wish will soon have a hard landing. 
The fact is that democracy has become a license to steal -- from the government—i.e., 
from the shrinking minority who pay significant taxes, from the earth, from everyone 
everywhere, and from one’s own descendants, and that diversity (multiculturalism, 
multipartisanism, etc.) in an overcrowded world leads to insoluble conflict and collapse. 
9/11 was a direct result of the this. 
The history in America is clear enough. In what can now be seen as the first major disaster 
stemming from the lunatic Christian idea of innate human rights, the politicians of the 
Northern states decided it was inappropriate for the South to have slaves. Slavery was 
certainly an outmoded and evil idea and was disappearing worldwide, and it would have 
been eliminated with economic and political pressures after emancipation via the 13th 
amendment. But then as now, the utopian delusions prevailed, and so they attacked the 
South, killing and crippling millions and creating poverty and dysgenic chaos (the death 
and debility of a large percentage of able-bodied Euro males) whose effects are still with 
us. The Africans replicated their genes at a higher rate, resulting in their coming to 
comprise an ever- increasing percentage of the country. Nobody realized it at the time 
and most still do not, but this was the beginning of the collapse of America and the defects 
in psychology which led the North to persecute the South were a continuation of the 
Christian fanaticisms which produced the murder and torture of millions during the 
middle ages, the Inquisition, the genocide of the new world Indians by the Europeans, 
the Crusades and the Jihads of the Muslims for the last 1200 years. ISIS, Al-Queda, the 
Crusaders and the Army of the North have a great deal in common. 
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Without asking the voters, a few thousand statesmen and congressmen and President 
Lincoln made ex-slaves citizens and gave them the right to vote via the 14th and 15th 
amendments. Gradually there came to be vast ghettos composed of ex slaves, where 
crime and poverty flourished, and where drugs (imported mostly by Hispanics) 
generated a vast criminal empire, whose users committed hundreds of millions of crimes 
every year. Then came the Democrats led by the Kennedys, who, raised in privilege and 
disconnected from the real world, and having like nearly all politicians no clue about 
biology, psychology, human ecology or history, decided in 1965 that it was only 
democratic and just that the country should change the immigration laws to decrease 
influx of Europeans in favor of 3rd world people (the Diverse). They passed the law and 
in 1965 president Lyndon Johnson signed it (see cover photo). There were misgivings 
from some quarters that this would destroy America, but they were assured that there 
would be “no significant demographic impact”! The American public never (to this day 
in 2019) had a chance to express their views (i.e., to vote), unless you count the Trump 
election as that chance, and congress and various presidents changed our democracy into 
a “Socialist Democracy”, i.e., into a Neomarxist, third world supremacist fascist state. The 
Chinese are delighted as they do not have to fight the USA and other democracies for 
dominance, but only to wait for them to collapse. 
A few decades ago, William Brennen, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suggested that 
a law passed a century before, to guarantee citizenship to former slaves (the first fatal 
legislative mistake, the second giving them the vote), should apply to anyone who 
happened to be born in America. Subsequently, other rulings of the court (not the people, 
who have never been asked) decided all those born in the USA, regardless of parental 
status (e.g., even if they were aliens from another solar system) had a right to US 
citizenship (anchor babies) and were subsequently permitted to make citizens of all their 
relatives – (the third and fourth fatal mistakes). Again, it never crossed the minds of 
congress or the courts that the constitution did not give any such rights, nor that the 
American public should be permitted to vote on this. In addition to the millions of 3rd 
world people here ‘’legally” (i.e., with the permission of a few hundred in congress, but 
not the people) millions began entering illegally and all produced children at about 3 
times the rate of existing Americans and generated ever increasing social problems. Most 
of the Diverse pay little or no taxes, and so they live partly or wholly on government 
handouts (i.e., taxes paid by the ever shrinking minority of Americans who pay any, as 
well as money borrowed from future generations to the tune of $2.5 billion a day, added 
to the $18 trillion in debt and the $90 trillion or more of unfunded future obligations— 
medicare, social security etc.), while the agricultural system, housing, streets and 
highways, sewers, water and electrical systems, parks, schools, hospitals, courts, public 
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transportation, government, police, fire, emergency services and the huge defense 
spending needed to ensure the continued existence of our country and most others, were 
created, administered and largely paid for by Euros (i.e., those of European ancestry). 
The fact that the Diverse owe their well- being (relative to the Diverse still in the 3rd 
world) and their very existence (medicine, technology, agriculture, suppression of war 
and slavery) to Euros is never mentioned by anyone (see below). 
Naturally, the Euros (and a minority of tax paying Diverse) are outraged to have to spend 
ever more of their working lives to support the legions of newly arrived Diverse, to be 
unsafe in their own homes and streets and to see their towns, schools, hospitals, parks 
etc. being taken over and destroyed. They try to protest, but the media are now controlled 
by the Diverse (with the help of deluded Euros who are dedicated to destroying their 
own descendants), and it is now almost impossible to state any opposition to the collapse 
of America and the world without being attacked as “racist”, “white supremacist” or “a 
hater”, and often losing one’s job for exercising free speech. Words referring to the 
Diverse are almost banned, unless it’s to praise them and assist their genuine racism (i.e., 
living at the expense of and exploiting and abusing in every way possible the Euro’s, and 
their Diverse tax paying neighbors), so one cannot mention blacks, immigrants, Hispanics, 
Muslims etc. in the same discussion with the words rapist, terrorist, thief, murderer, child 
molester, convict, criminal, welfare etc., without being accused of “hatred” or “racism” 
or “white supremacy”. They are of course oblivious to their own racism and third world 
supremacy. Keep in mind there is not and almost certainly will never be any evidence of 
a significant genetic difference between Euros and Diverse in psychology, or IQ, and that 
their tendency to excessive reproduction and other shortcomings is wholly due to culture. 
Gradually, every kind of special interest group has succeeded in eliminating any negative 
reference to them in any easily identifiable way, so there has almost vanished from public 
discourse not only words referring to the Diverse, but to the short, tall, fat, thin, mentally 
ill, handicapped, genetically defective, disadvantaged, abnormal, schizophrenic, 
depressed, stupid, dishonest, crazy, lazy , cowardly, selfish, dull etc. until nothing but 
pleasant platitudes are heard and one is left puzzled as to who fills the jails, hospitals and 
mental wards to overflowing, litters the streets with garbage, destroys the parks, beaches 
and public lands, robs, riots, assaults, rapes and murders, and uses up all the tax money, 
plus an extra 2.5 billion dollars a day, added to the 18 trillion national debt (or over 90 
trillion if you extend the real liabilities into the near future). Of course, it’s not due all to 
the Diverse, but every passing day a larger percentage is as their numbers swell and those 
of the Euros decline. 
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It is now over fifty years after passing the new immigration act and about 16% of the 
population is Hispanic (up from less than 1% earlier), who have been reproducing at 
about 3X the rate of Euros , so that about half of children under 6 are now Hispanic, while 
some 13% of the country are blacks, rapidly being displaced and marginalized by 
Hispanics (though few blacks realize it, so they continue to support the politicians 
favoring further immigration and handouts and promising short term gains). Virtually 
nobody grasps the eventual collapse of America and the whole world, in spite of the fact 
that you can see it in front of your eyes everywhere. In America and worldwide, the Euros 
(and all the “rich” generally) are producing less than two kids per couple, so their 
populations are shrinking, and in America in 2014, for the first time since Euros came 
here in the 16th century, more of them died than were born, so their marginalization is 
certain. And, showing the “success” of the Neomarxist, third world supremacist 
immigration and welfare policies, the population of Hispanics in California passed 50%, 
so within a decade, the 6th largest economy in the world will be part of Mexico. 
The Diverse will, in, this century, eliminate all American “racism” (i.e., any opposition or 
legal hindrance to takeover of all political power, and the appropriation of as much of 
their neighbor’s money and property as they can manage,) except their own racism (e.g., 
graduated income tax which forces the Euro’s to support them). Soon they will largely 
eliminate legal differences between citizens of Mexico and California and then Texas, 
who then will have full ‘rights’ (privileges) anywhere in the USA, so that citizenship will 
became increasingly meaningless (and an ever-lower percentage of the Diverse will pay 
any significant taxes or serve in the military, and a far higher percentage will continue to 
receive welfare and to commit crimes, and to get free or heavily subsidized schooling, 
medical care etc.). One cannot mention in the media that the predominant racism in the 
USA is the extortion by the Diverse of anyone with money (mainly Euros but also any 
Diverse who have money), the elimination of free speech (except their own), the biasing 
of all laws to favor this extortion, and their rapid takeover of all political and financial 
power, i.e., total discrimination against Euros and anyone belonging to the “upper 
classes”, i.e., anyone who pays any significant taxes. 
Gradually the poverty, drugs, gangs, environmental destruction and the corruption of 
police, army and government endemic in Mexico and most other 3rd world countries is 
spreading across America, so we will be able to cross over the increasingly porous border 
with Mexico without noticing we are in a different country –probably within a few 
decades, but certainly by the end of the century. The population continues to increase, 
and here as everywhere in the world, the increase is now 100% Diverse and, as we enter 
the next century (much sooner in some countries), resources will diminish and starvation, 
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disease, crime and war will rage out of control. The rich and the corporations will mostly 
still be rich (as always, as things get worse they will take their money and leave), the poor 
will be poorer and more numerous, and life everywhere, with the possible exception of a 
few countries or parts of countries where population growth is prevented, will be 
unbearable and unsurvivable. 
The cooperation among the Diverse to wrest control of society from Euros will crumble 
as society disintegrates and they will split into blacks, Hispanics, Muslims, Chinese, 
Filipinos, gays, seniors, disabled, and further where possible into endless subgroups. The 
rich will increasingly hire bodyguards, carry guns, drive bulletproof cars and use private 
police to protect them in their gated communities and offices, as is already commonplace 
in 3rd world countries. With much reduced quality of life and high crime, some will think 
of returning to their countries of origin, but there also overpopulation will exhaust 
resources and produce collapse even more severe than in the USA and Europe, and the 
racism in the 3rd world, temporarily suppressed by a relative abundance of resources 
and police and military presence, will become ever worse, so life will be hellish nearly 
everywhere. The population in the 22nd century will shrink as billions die of starvation, 
disease, drugs, suicide, and civil and international war. As third world nuclear countries 
collapse (Pakistan, India and maybe Iran by then, thanks to Obama) and are taken over 
by radicals, nuclear conflicts will eventually occur. Still, perhaps nobody will dare to 
suggest publicly that the prime cause of chaos was unrestricted motherhood. 
Of course, much of this story has already played out in America, the U.K. and elsewhere, 
and the rest is inevitable, even without climate change and the ravenous appetites of 
China, which just make it happen faster. It’s only a matter of how bad it will get where 
and when. Anyone who doubts this is out of touch with reality, but you can’t fool mother 
nature, and their descendants will no longer debate it as they will be forced to live it. 
The poor, and apparently, Obama, Krugman, Zuckerberg and most Democrats 
(Neomarxists), don’t understand the most basic operating principle of civilization— there 
is no Free Lunch. You can only give to one by taking from another, now or in the future. 
No such thing as helping without hurting. Every dollar and every item has value because 
somewhere, someone destroyed the earth. And leftists have the delusion that they can 
solve all problems by stealing from the rich. To get some idea of the absurdity of this, all 
US taxpayers earning over a million dollars have a total after tax profit of about 800 billion, 
while the annual deficit is about 1.5 trillion, and even taking it all does nothing to pay off 
the existing 18 trillion debt or the approximately 90 trillion in near term unfunded 
liabilities (e.g., medicare and social security). Of course, you cannot increase their tax or 
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corporate tax very much more or it will greatly depress the economy and produce a 
recession, job losses and the flight of capital, and they already pay the highest taxes, 
relative to what they earn as a % of the nation’s income, of any industrialized country. 
And once again, the top 1% of earners pay about 50% of total personal federal income tax 
while the bottom 47% (mostly Diverse) pay nothing. So the fact is we only have a sort of 
democracy, as we have almost nothing to say about what the govt. does, and a sort of 
fascism, as the ever expanding govt. spies on our every move, controls ever more 
minutely our every action, and forces us at gunpoint to do whatever they decide, and a 
sort of communism as they steal whatever they want from whomever they want and use 
it to support anyone they like, here and all over the world, most of whom have no interest 
in democracy, justice, or equality, except as means to take advantage of our fatally flawed 
system to get as much money and services as they can in order to support replicating 
their genes and destroying the earth. 
Speaking of Obama, Trump says that he is the worst president ever, and of course Obama, 
totally arrogant, dishonest and lacking any real grasp of the situation (or unwilling to be 
honest) just laughs, and babbles platitudes, but as I reflect a bit it’s clearly true. Like 
Roosevelt, who gave us the first giant step into fascism and government waste and 
oppression with an illegal and unconstitutional tax (social security), Obamacare let the 
govt. swallow 1/6 of the economy and created his own illegal tax (called ‘penalties’ of 
Obamacare, where FDR called them ‘benefits’ and ‘contributions’). He tried to force the 
US to accept another 8 to 10 million illegals (nobody seems quite sure) which will 
‘birthright’ into about 50 million by 2100. In the first 3 years of his office (2009 to 2012) 
the federal operating deficit increased about 44% from 10 to 15 trillion, the largest percent 
increase since WW2, while by mid 2015 it had increased to over 71% of fiscal operating 
budget -- over $18 trillion or about $57,000 for every person in the USA, including 
children. His deferral of the deportation of millions of illegals, all of whom now receive 
social security, tax credits, medicare etc., is estimated to have a lifetime cost to the govt. 
(i.e., to the minority of us who pay any significant taxes) of ca. $1.3 trillion. Of course, this 
does not include free school, use of judicial system, jails and police, free ‘emergency’ care 
(i.e., just going to emergency for any problem whatsoever), degradation of all public 
facilities etc. so it’s likely at least twice as much. And we have seen 8 years of incompetent 
handling of the Iraq, Afghan and Syrian wars and the cancerous growth of the CCP and 
Islam. He probably gave the ability to make nuclear weapons to Iran, which is highly 
likely to lead to a nuclear war by 2100 or much sooner. He was clearly elected for classist, 
racist, third world supremacist reasons-- because he had visible African genes, while the 
Euros, having left Africa some 50,000 years earlier have invisible ones. He, and most of 
the people he appointed, had little competence or experience in running a country and 
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they were picked, like himself, on the basis of Diverse genes and Neomarxist, third world 
supremacist sympathies. If he is not a traitor (giving aid and comfort to the enemy) then 
who is? It is clear as day that, like nearly everyone, he operates totally on automatic 
primitive psychology, with his coalitional sympathies (biases) favoring those who look 
and act more like him. He (like most Diverse) is in fact doing his best to destroy the 
country and system that made his exalted life possible. In an interview near the end of 
his term he said that the major reason for the backwardness of the third world was 
colonialism. As with all leftist third world supremacists, it has never crossed his mind 
that about 95% of all the third world people owe their existence and their relatively high 
standard of living to Euros and colonialism (i.e., medicine, agriculture, technology, 
science, trade, education, police and judicial system, communications, elimination of war 
and crime etc.), nor that the real enemies of the poor are other poor, who are just as 
repulsive as the rich, whom it is their greatest desire to emulate. I agree that, with the 
possible exception of Lincoln, he is the worst (i.e., most destructive to American quality 
of life and survival as a nation) for his lack of honesty, arrogance and assault on freedom 
and longterm survivability —a stunning achievement when his competition includes 
Nixon, Johnson, the Bushes and the Clintons, and which makes even Reagan look good. 
When considering bad presidents, we should start with Abraham Lincoln, who is revered 
as a saint, but he (with the help of congress) destroyed much of the country and the lives 
of millions of people fighting the totally unnecessary Civil War, and in many ways, the 
country will never recover as it led to the civil rights movement, the 1965 immigration act 
and the 1982 supreme court anchor baby ruling. Slavery would have come to an end soon 
without the war, as it did everywhere and of course it was Euros who provided the main 
impetus to bring it to an end here and everywhere. After the war the slaves could have 
been repatriated to Africa, or just given residence, instead of making them citizens (14th 
amendment) and then giving them the vote (15th amendment). He and his collaborators, 
like so many liberal upper class Euros then and now, was blinded by the utopian social 
delusions embodied in Christianity and democracy, which result from the inclusive 
fitness psychology of coalitional intuitions and reciprocal altruism, that was eugenic and 
adaptive in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation-i.e., from ca. 50,000 to 
several million years ago) but is fatally dysgenic and maladaptive in modern times. 
Note the great irony of the quote from him that begins this book, which shows that even 
the brightest are victims of their own limits, and have no grasp of human biology, 
psychology or ecology. It never crossed his mind that the world would become 
horrifically overpopulated and that the Africans would grow to become a giant social 
problem, at home and for themselves and the world as Africa expands to over 4 billion. 
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Likewise, in spite of the now clear disaster, it seems not to cross Obama’s that the Diverse 
at home and abroad will destroy America and the world, though any bright ten year old 
can see it. 
President Truman could have let McArthur use the atom bomb to end the Korean war, 
destroy communism and to avoid the continuing horror of China run by 25 sociopaths 
(the Politburo) or really just seven sociopaths (the Politburo Standing Committee) or 
perhaps actually just one sociopath (Xi Jinping). Johnson could have done likewise in 
Vietnam, Bush in Iraq and Obama in Afghanistan, Syria and Libya. China and probably 
many 3rd world countries would have used nuclear weapons if the situations were 
reversed. Once a radical Muslim country gets the bomb a preemptive strike by them or 
on them will likely ensue, and this is probable by 2100 and near certain by 2200. If Gaddafi 
had succeeded in his efforts to get the bomb it would very likely have happened. The US 
could have forced Japan, China and Korea, Iraq and Libya and all the countries of Europe 
(and the whole world for that matter) to pay for the costs of our military efforts in all the 
recent wars, and between wars, instead of taking on most of the cost and then helping 
them take over most of America’s manufacturing. Of course, these decisions, critical to 
the country’s survival, were made by a handful of politicians without consulting the 
voters. The Kennedy’s were an important part of changing the immigration laws in the 
mid 60’s, so they have to count as traitors and major enemies of America on a par with 
Obama, G.W Bush and the Clintons. We could have followed the universal pleas of US 
industry and refused to sign the GATT, which gave free access to all our patents years 
before they are granted, though of course the Chinese now hack and steal everything with 
impunity anyway. Eisenhower could have let the UK keep possession of the Suez canal, 
instead of blackmailing them into leaving Egypt, and on and on. 
Some may be interested in a few statistics to give an idea of where we currently are on 
the road to hell. See the tables at the beginning. In the USA, the population of Hispanics 
will swell from about 55 million in 2016 (or as much as 80 million if you accept some 
estimates of 25 million illegals—it’s a mark of how far the govt. has let things go that we 
don’t really know) to perhaps 140 million midcentury and 200 million as we enter the 
22nd century, at which time the US population will be soaring past 500 million, and the 
world population will be about 11 billion, 3 billion of that added from now to then in 
Africa and 1 billion in Asia (the official UN estimates at the moment). The Hispanics are 
reproducing so fast that Euros, now a 63% majority, will be a minority by midcentury 
and about 40% by 2100. Most of the increase in the USA from now on will be Hispanics, 
with the rest blacks, Asians and Muslims, and all the increase here and in the world will 
be 100% Diverse. About 500,000 people are naturalized yearly and since they are mostly 
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from the 3rd world and produce children at about twice the rate of Euros, that will add 
perhaps 2 million midcentury and 5 million by 2100 for every year it continues. 
To show how fast things got out of control after the “no demographic impact” TKO 
(technical knock out or Ted Kennedy Outrage, though we could equally call it the LBJ 
outrage, the Neomarxist outrage, the Liberal outrage etc.) immigration act of 1965, there 
are now more Hispanics in California than there are people in 46 other states. In 1970 just 
after the TKO, there were about 4 million Hispanics and now there are over 55 million 
“legals” (i.e., not made legal by the voters but by a handful of politicians and the 
Supremely Stupid court) and perhaps 80 million counting illegals. It never crosses the 
minds of the Democratic block-voting poor Diverse that the ones who will suffer by far 
the most from the “Diversification” of America are themselves. The U.S. has gone from 
84 percent white, 11 percent black, 4 percent Hispanic and 1 percent Asian in 1965, to 62 
percent white, 11 percent black, 18 percent Hispanic and 6 percent Asian now, according 
to a recent Pew report. By 2055, no one group is expected to have a majority--a perfect 
scenario for chaos, but you can see countless idiots from academia (now a paradise for 
state funded Neomarxist third world supremacism) praising multipartisanism. The 
Asians are predicted to increase faster than any group, doubling their percentage in the 
next few decades, but at least they will have gone thru a minimal immigration procedure, 
except of course for anchor baby families (producing which is now a major industry as 
Asians fly here to give birth, though they are greatly surpassed by Hispanics who only 
have to walk across the border at night). Of course, the Asians are by and large a blessing 
for America as they are more productive and less trouble than any group, including Euros. 
The US government (alone of major countries) pushes “diversity” but in countries all over 
the world and throughout history attempts to weld different races and cultures into one 
have been an utter disaster. Many groups have lived among or alongside others for 
thousands of years without notably assimilating. Chinese and Koreans and Japanese in 
Asia, Jews and gentiles in thousands of places, Turks, Kurds and Armenians etc., have 
lived together for millennia without assimilating and go for each other’s throats at the 
slightest provocation. After over 300 years of racial mixing, the USA is still about 97% 
monoracial (i.e., white, Hispanic, black etc.) with only about 3% describing themselves as 
mixed race (and most of them were mixed when they came here). The Native Americans 
(to whom the whole New World really belongs if one is going to rectify past injustices 
against the Diverse, a fact which is never mentioned by the third world supremacists) are 
mostly still living isolated and (before the casinos) impoverished, as are the blacks who, 
150 years after emancipation, largely still live in crime ridden, impoverished ghettos. And 
these have been the best of times, with lots of cheap land and natural resources, major 
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welfare and affirmative action programs (largely unique to ‘racist’ America), a mostly 
healthy economy and a government which extorts over 30% of their money (i.e., 30% of 
their working lives, counting income tax, sales tax, real estate tax etc.), earned by the tax 
paying part of the middle and upper class, to give the poor massive handouts -- not only 
food stamps and other welfare, but police and emergency services, streets and parks, the 
government, the justice system, hospitals, national defense, schools, roads, bridges, 
power grid, etc., and the costs of environmental degradation, and the financial and 
emotional costs of crime and it’s threat, etc., most of these never counted by anyone (and 
never mentioned by the Neomarxist third world supremacists) when considering the 
‘costs of welfare’ or the huge downside to diversity. 
In any case, the liberal, democratic delusion is that such largesse and social policies will 
weld our ‘diverse’ (i.e., fatally fragmented) society into one happy family. But 
government handouts need to continually increase (for social security, wars, health care, 
schools, welfare, infrastructure, etc.) while the relative tax base shrinks, and our debt and 
unfunded entitlements grow by trillions a year, so the economy is in the process of 
collapse. The average family has less real net earnings and savings now than two decades 
ago and could survive about 3 months without income, about 40% of retired Americans 
have less than $25,000 savings etc. And again, these are the best of times with lots of ‘free’ 
resources (i.e., stolen from others and from our descendants) worldwide and about 4 
billion less people than there will be by the next century. As economies fail and starvation, 
disease, crime and war spread, people will split down racial and religious lines as always, 
and in the USA Hispanics and Blacks will still dominate the bottom. It rarely occurs to 
those who want to continue (and increase) the numbers of and the subsidization of the 
Diverse that the money for this is ultimately stolen from their own descendants, on whom 
falls the burden of over $90 trillion debt if one counts the current entitlements (or up to 
$220 trillion if liabilities continued without reduction of handouts and no tax increase), 
and a society and a world collapsing into anarchy. 
As noted, one of the many evil side effects of diversity (e.g., massive increases in crime, 
environmental degradation, traffic gridlock, decreasing quality of schools, coming 
bankruptcy of local, state and federal governments, corruption of police and border 
officials, rising prices of everything, overloading of the medical system, etc.) is that our 
right to free speech has disappeared on any issue of possible political relevance and of 
course that means just about any issue. Even in private, if any negative comment on 
‘diversity’ is recorded or witnessed by anyone credible, the racist, third world 
supremacist Diverse and their Euro servants will try to take away your job 
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and damage your business or your person. This is certain when it involves public figures 
and racial or immigration issues, but nothing is off limits. Dozens of books in the last two 
decades address the issue including ‘The New Thought Police: Inside the Left's Assault 
on Free Speech and Free Minds’, ‘End of Discussion: How the Left's Outrage Industry 
Shuts Down Debate, Manipulates Voters, and Makes America Less Free (and Fun)’ and 
‘The Silencing: how the left is killing free speech’, but nothing will dissuade the 
Democratic Socialists (i.e., closet communists) and the lunatic fringe liberals. As noted, I 
am writing this book because nobody in Academia, nor any public figure, dares to do it. 
Another ‘side effect’ is the loss of much of our freedom and privacy as the government 
continues to expand its war on terror. There was never a compelling reason for admitting 
any serious number of Muslims (or any more Diverse for that matter). In any case, it 
seems a no-brainer to not admit and to expel single unmarried male Muslims aged 15 to 
50, but even such obvious simple moves are beyond the capabilities of the retards who 
control congress and of course our beloved presidents, all of whom, with the members of 
congress, who voted for the immigration law changes starting in 1965, could be held 
personally responsible for 9/11, the Boston Marathon Bombing etc. Of course, Trump is 
trying to change this but it’s too little, too late and barring his declaring martial law, 
running the country with the army, and deporting or quarantining 100 million of the least 
useful residents, America’s date with destiny is certain. 
A lovely example of how suppression of free speech leads to ever more insanity is the 
case of Major Hasan (courtesy Mark Steyn’s “After America”). An army psychiatrist at 
Fort Hood who had SoA (Soldier of Allah) on his business card, he was frequently 
reprimanded when a student army intern for trying to convert patients to Islam, and 
many complaints were filed for his constant anti-American comments--one day he gave 
a Power Point lecture to a room full of army doctors justifying his radicalism. Free speech 
and common sense being no more available in the military than civilian life, he was then 
promoted to Major and sent to Fort Hood, where he commented to his superior officer 
on a recent murder of two soldiers in Little Rock: “this is what Muslims should do—stand 
up to the aggressors” and “people should strap bombs on themselves and go into Times 
Square”, but the army did nothing for fear of being accused of bias. One day he walked 
out of his office with an assault rifle and murdered 13 soldiers. It turned out two different 
anti- terrorism task forces were aware that he had been in frequent email contact with top 
radical Islamist terrorists. The Army Chief of Staff General George Casey remarked: 
“What happened at Fort Hood was a tragedy, but I believe it would be an even greater 
tragedy if our diversity becomes a casualty here”!! Is it losing the 70 million on welfare 
or the 1.7 million in prison or the 3 million drug addicts that is more tragic? 
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The invasion of the Southwest by Hispanics gives the flavor of what is coming and 
Coulter in her book “Adios America” tells of trashed parks, schools that dropped from A 
to D grade, billions for ‘free’ (i.e., paid for by the upper middle and upper class and 
businesses) medical care and other services in Los Angeles alone etc. Anyone living there 
who remembers what Texas or California were like 30 years ago has no doubts about the 
catastrophic consequences of diversity as they see it every day. In California, which I 
know personally, the urban areas (and even most parks and beaches) that I used to enjoy 
are now crowded with Hispanics and often full of trash and spray painted with gang 
signs, while the highways are horrifically crowded and the cities and towns overrun with 
drugs and crime, so most of it is now uninhabitable and the world’s 6th largest economy 
is headed for bankruptcy as it tries to move 20 million mostly lower class Hispanics into 
the upper middle class by using tax money from the Euros. One of the latest lunacies was 
to try to put all illegals on Obamacare. Some persons I know have had their annual 
medical coverage increase from under $1000 before Obamacare to about $4000 (2017 
estimate) and the extra $3000 is what the Democrats are stealing from anyone they can to 
cover the costs of free or very low cost care for those who pay little or no taxes, and who 
already are bankrupting hospitals forced to give them free “emergency” care. Of course, 
the Republicans are trying to kill it, but like the whole government, it is already in a death 
spiral that only a huge increase in fees can fix. 
One of the most flagrant violations of US law by the left-wing lunatics who support 
immigration is the creation of ‘sanctuary cities’. The cities do not allow municipal funds 
or resources to be used to enforce federal immigration laws, usually by not allowing 
police or municipal employees to inquire about an individual's immigration status. This 
began with Los Angeles in 1979 (thus becoming the first large city donated to Mexico) 
and now includes at least 31 major American cities. Presumably, the President could 
order the army or the FBI to arrest the city officials who passed these regulations for 
obstruction of justice etc., but it’s a murky legal area as (in another indication of the total 
ineptness of congress and the courts and the hopelessness of the democratic system as 
currently practiced) immigration violations are civil offenses and not federal or state 
felonies which they clearly should be. After I wrote this the courts (predictably) blocked 
Trump’s attempt to cut off funds to sanctuary cities, forgetting that their purpose is to 
protect the citizens of America, and not those of other countries here illegally. And 
recently California declared itself a sanctuary state, i.e., it’s now part of Mexico. 
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A competent government (maybe we could import one from Sweden, China or even 
Cuba?) could pass such legislation in a few weeks. Also, it could force compliance by 
cutting off most or all federal funds to any city or state that failed to comply with federal 
immigration laws, and at least one such bill has been introduced into congress recently, 
but the Democrats prevented its passage, and of course Obama or Clinton would have 
vetoed any attempt at giving American back to Americans. Trump of course has a 
different view, though he cannot save America via democratic means. 
As long as the Democrats (soon to return to power and, rumor has it, to change their 
name to Neomarxist Third World Supremacist Party of Latin America, Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East) are in power, nothing will be done, and more cities and states will cease 
to be a part of America until Hispanics take over completely sometime in the second half 
of the century. Only a military coup can save America now and it’s very unlikely the 
generals have the courage. 
For this review, I read a few politically oriented books and articles in print and on the 
web of the kind that I have avoided for over 50 years, and in them and the comments on 
them saw repeated accusations of ‘racist’ against people who were only stating their 
desire to have the USA remain a prosperous and safe country. This claim is now almost 
always false in the normal meaning, but of course true in the new meaning—i.e., one 
opposed to letting Mexico and Africa annex America. So, I wrote a reply to this slander, 
since I have never seen a good one. 
Actually, it’s not ‘racism’ but self-defense –the Diverse in America are the racists, as on 
the average, your life here is largely an exploitation of other races, notably Europeans and 
Asians who actually pay taxes. For genuine racism look at how different groups native 
to your own country (or immigrants) are treated there. The vast majority of immigrants 
in the USA would not even be permitted to enter your countries, much less permitted 
citizenship, the privilege of voting, free or low cost housing, food, free or subsidized 
medical care, free school, affirmative action programs, the same privileges as natives etc. 
And in the USA, it is the Diverse who have taken away the tranquility, beauty, safety and 
free speech that existed here before a handful of stupid politicians and supreme court 
justices let you in. We never voted to let you enter or become citizens--it was forced on 
us by halfwits in our government, beginning with Lincoln and his partners in crime. If 
we had a chance to vote on it, few foreigners except medical, scientific and tech experts 
and some teachers would have been admitted and perhaps 75% of the Diverse would be 
deported. In many cases, you have an alien religion (some of which demand the murder 
of anyone you take a dislike to) and culture (honor killings of your daughters etc.), do not 
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pay a fair share of taxes (typically none) and commit far more crimes per capita (e.g., 2.5x 
for Hispanics, 4.5x for blacks). 
Furthermore, the middle class American pays about 30% of their income to the govt. This 
is about 66 days/year of their working life and maybe 20 days of that goes to support the 
poor, now mostly Diverse. And all the ‘free’ things such as welfare, food stamps, medical 
care and hospitals, schools, parks, streets, sanitation, police, firemen, power grid, postal 
system, roads and airports, national defense etc. exist largely because the ‘racist’ upper 
middle and upper class created, maintain and pay for them. Maybe another 4 working 
days goes to support the police, FBI, justice system, DHS, Border Patrol and other govt. 
agencies that have to deal with aliens. Add another 10 or so days to support the military, 
which is mostly needed to deal with the results of 3rd world overpopulation (the real 
major cause of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Yemen 
and the major cause of most of the wars, social unrest and conflicts past, present and 
future), and this cost, added to welfare, medicare, social security and environmental 
degradation (an ever increasing percentage for immigrants and their descendants) is 
bankrupting the country, with the only possible solution being to decrease the benefits 
and increase the taxes, the burden of which will fall on everyone’s descendants. You take 
advantage of the freedom of speech we created to tell malicious lies about us and prevent 
rational discussion! Most of you, if doing this in your country of origin, would wind up 
in prison or dead! Shameless liars! What is your problem? --poor education, no gratitude, 
malicious, stupid, no experience with civilized society? (pick 5). And anyone who doubts 
any of this just does not know how to use their brain or the net as it's all there. These 
comments are just the facts that anyone can see, along with simple extrapolations into the 
future. 
Also, please let me ask the Diverse--do people in your country of origin work 30 days a 
year to support tens of millions of aliens who commit crimes at several times the rate of 
natives, overcrowd your schools, highways, cities and jails, trash your parks and beaches, 
spray paint graffiti on buildings and import and sell drugs to addicts who commit over a 
hundred million crimes a year (added to the 100 million or so they commit themselves)? 
And have you had a 9/11 and many bombings and murders at home? Do immigrants 
control the media so that you cannot even discuss these issues that are destroying your 
country and the world? Will your country be totally in their control in a few generations 
and be another impoverished, crime ridden, starving, corrupt 3rd world hellhole? Of 
course, for most of you it already is, and you came to America to escape it. But your 
descendants won't have to be homesick for the hellhole, as they will have re-created it 
here. The Diverse here (and their Euro servants) never tire of complaining in all the media 
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every day about how they are not treated fairly and not given enough (i.e., the Euros and 
the relatively rich Diverse don't work hard enough to support them), and it never crosses 
their minds that if it were not for taxes paid mostly by Euros now and for over a century 
previous, there would be little or no police or fire or medical or school services or parks 
or public transport or streets or sewers in their communities, and of course there would 
not even be a country here, as it is mainly Euros who created, and support it and who 
serve in the military in all the wars. And it was primarily Euros and their descendants 
who created the net and the pc's that was used to create this and the electronic or print 
media you are reading this on, the tech that produces the food you eat and the medicine 
that keeps you alive. If not for the Euros technology and security, at least 90% of all the 
Diverse in the world would not exist. Everyone condemns colonialism, but it was the way 
that the Diverse were brought out of the dark ages into modern times via communications, 
medicine, agriculture, and enforcement of democratic government. Otherwise all their 
populations would have stayed very small, backwards, starving, disease ridden, 
impoverished, isolated and living in the dark ages (including slavery and its equivalents) 
to this day. To sum it up, the Euro’s antipathy to Diversity (‘racism’) is due to a desire 
that their children have a country and a world worth living in. Again, this is for 
everyone’s benefit, not just Euros or the rich. 
Likewise, all my life I have been hearing third world people saying that their 
disproportionate problems with drugs, crime and welfare are due to racism, and certainly 
there is some truth to that, but I wonder why Asians, who must be subject to racism as 
well ( insofar as it exists—and relative to most Diverse counties, it’s quite minimal here), 
and most of whom came here much more recently, spoke little or no English, had no 
relatives here and few skills, have a fraction of the crime, drugs and welfare (all less than 
Euros and so way less than blacks or Hispanics) and average about $10,000 more income 
per family than Euros. Also, blacks never consider that they would not exist if their 
ancestors were not brought to the new world and they would never have been born or 
survived in Africa, that those who captured and sold them were usually African, that to 
this day Africans in Africa almost universally treat those of different tribes as subhuman 
(Idi Amin, Rwanda, Gaddafi etc. and far worse is soon to come as the population of Africa 
swells by 3 billion by 2100), and that if they want to see real racism and economic 
exploitation and police maltreatment, they should go live almost anywhere in Africa or 
the 3rd world. Returning to Africa or Mexico etc. has always been an option, but except 
for criminals escaping justice, nobody goes back. And it was the Euros who put an end 
to slavery worldwide and, insofar as possible, to serfdom, disease, starvation, crime and 
war all over the 3rd world. If it were not for colonialism and the inventions of Euros there 
would be maybe 1/10 as many Diverse alive and they would mostly still be living as they 
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did 400 years ago. Likewise, it’s never mentioned that if not for the Euro’s, who were 
about 95% responsible for paying for and fighting and dying in WW2, the Germans and 
Japanese and/or the Communists would now control the world and only the Euros can 
prevent the CCP and/or the Muslims from doing so in the future. Also, it was mostly 
Euros who fought, are fighting and will be fighting the communists in Korea and Vietnam, 
and the Muslim fanatics in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan and the many others soon 
to come. 
Insofar as any revenge on the Euros is needed for their slavery (but slavery by other 
blacks in various forms has always existed), blacks have already had it abundantly. First, 
they have been largely supported and protected by the Euros for centuries. Second, the 
parasites they brought with them have infected and destroyed the lives of tens of millions 
of Euros. Malaria, schistosomes, filariasis, ascaris, yellow fever, smallpox etc., but above 
all hookworm, which was so common and so debilitating up to the early decades of this 
century that it was responsible for the widespread view of Southerners as stupid and lazy. 
All this is crushingly obvious, but I bet there is not one grade school or college text in the 
world that mentions any of it, as it’s clearly ‘racist’ to suggest that the Diverse owe 
anything to Euros or to point out that other Diverse in their countries of origin always 
have and always will treat them far worse than Euro do. And they are incapable of 
grasping the true horror that is coming or they would all be one in opposing any increase 
in the population by any group anywhere and any immigration into America. Well before 
2100 the Hispanics will control America, and the rest of the world will be dominated by 
Chinese and the rest by Muslims, who will increase from about 1/5th of the world now 
to about 1/3rd by 2100 and outnumber Christians, and neither group is noted for 
embracing multiculturalism, women’s rights, child rights, animal rights, gay rights, or 
any rights at all. So, the obvious fact is that overall the Euros have treated the Diverse 
much better than they have treated each other. And we now have the best of times, while 
by 2100 (give or take a generation or two) economic collapse and chaos will reign 
permanently except perhaps a few places that forcibly exclude Diverse. Again, keep in 
mind that in my view there is not, and almost certainly will never be, any evidence of a 
significant genetic difference between Euros and Diverse in psychology, or IQ, and that 
their tendency to excessive reproduction and other cultural limitations are accidents of 
history. 
Likewise, it never crosses Diverse, leftist, third world supremacist, Neomarxist minds 
that every year maybe 500 billion dollars are spent in the USA by federal, state and city 
govts. on education, medicine, transportation (highways, streets, rail, bus and airline 
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systems), police, fire and emergency care, numerous welfare programs, the government 
and judicial systems--the vast majority of it created, maintained and paid for by the Euros, 
assisted by the taxes of the small minority of well-off Diverse. Also, there is the FBI, NSA, 
CIA, and the armed forces of the USA (another 500 billion a year) and other Euro 
countries, without which there would be no USA and little or no peace, security or 
prosperity anywhere in the world, and they have also been created, run and staffed 
largely by the Euros, who constitute most of the dead and wounded in every war (less an 
issue for Hispanics who serve in the military at about half the rate of Euros) and in every 
police force from 1776 to now. Without medicine and public health measures, most of 
their ancestors (and the whole third world) would have suffered and often died of leprosy, 
malaria, worms, bacteria, flu, tuberculosis, smallpox, syphilis, HIV, hepatitis, yellow 
fever, encephalitis, and the tech for high cholesterol and blood pressure, heart, cancer, 
and liver surgery, transplants, MRI, XRAY, Ultrasound etc., etc., has almost all been 
invented, administered and overwhelmingly paid for by the Euro ‘racists’ and ‘white 
supremacists’. 
You think colonialism was bad? Just think what the 3rd world would be like without it, 
or what it would be like living under the Nazis, communists or Japanese (and will be like 
living under the Chinese or Muslims once the Diverse destroy America). This excuses 
nothing but just points out the facts of history. But fine, let’s undo the ‘injustice’ and pass 
a Back to Africa (and Latin America and Asia etc.) law providing funds to repatriate 
everyone. They could sell their assets here and most could live like kings there, but of 
course there would be very few takers. And by the next century there will be 3 billion 
more Africans (the official estimate) and the whole continent will be a sewer, and 1 billion 
more Asians, and even India and China (who will add a hundred million or so each) will 
look like paradise in comparison to Africa, at least until the resources run out (oil, gas, 
coal, topsoil, fresh water, fish, minerals, forests). 
If you look on the net you find the Diverse incessantly whining about their oppression, 
even when it occurred decades or centuries ago, but I don’t see how anything that’s done 
by others, even today, is my responsibility, and much less so in the past. If you want to 
hold every Euro responsible for what the vast majority now alive are completely innocent 
of, then we want to hold all Diverse responsible for all the crimes committed by any of 
them here or their relatives in their countries of origin over the last 400 years, and for 
their share of all the tens of trillions spent to build and defend the USA and to keep them 
safe, healthy and well fed. Yes, most blacks and Hispanics are poor due to historical 
factors beyond their control, just as Euros are often richer due to historical factors beyond 
theirs, but the important points are that we now alive did not cause this, and that here, as 
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almost everywhere that the Diverse are a significant percentage, they commit most of the 
crime, collect most of the welfare, pay the least taxes and continue breeding excessively 
and dragging their countries and the world into the abyss. 
Consider as well that the evils of colonialism are only prominent because they were recent. 
If we look carefully, we find that nearly every group in every country has an endless 
history of murder, rape, plunder and exploitation of their neighbors that continues today. 
It’s not far off the mark to suggest that the best thing that could happen was to be 
conquered by the Euros. 
Once again, keep in mind that there is not and almost certainly will never be any evidence 
of a significant genetic difference between Euros and Diverse and that their limitations 
are almost certainly due to culture. The problem is not the Diverse nor Euros, but that 
people are selfish, stupid, dishonest, lazy, crazy, and cowardly and will only behave 
decently, honestly, and fairly if forced to do so. Giving people rights instead of having 
privileges they must earn is a fatal mistake that will destroy any society and any world. 
In the tiny groups in which we evolved, where everyone was our relative, reciprocal 
altruism worked, but in a world soon swelling to 11 billion, this impulse to help others is 
suicidal. The world is totally preoccupied with terrorists, but their effects are actually 
trivial compared e.g., to traffic accidents, murders, drug addiction, disease, soil erosion 
etc., and every day the 7.7 billion do vastly more damage to the world just by living. The 
mothers of the third world increase the population by about 200,000 every day, and so do 
hugely more damage every hour than all the terrorists worldwide will do in the whole 
21st century (until they get their hands on the bomb). Just the Diverse in the USA in one 
year will do far more damage to the USA and the world by destroying resources, eroding 
topsoil and creating CO2 and other pollution than all terrorism worldwide in all of 
history. Is there even one politician or entertainer or business person who has a clue? And 
if they did would they say or do anything— certainly not—who wants to be attacked for 
‘racism’. 
People everywhere are lazy, stupid and dishonest and democracy, justice and equality in 
a large Diverse welfare state are an open invitation to limitless exploitation of their 
neighbors and few will resist. In 1979 7% of Americans got means-tested govt. benefits 
while in 2009 it was over 30% and of course the increase is mostly the diverse. Food 
stamps rose from 17 million persons in 2000 to about 43 million now. In the first few years 
of Obama over 3 million enrolled to get ‘disability’ checks and over 20% of the adult 
population is now on ‘disability’ which according to the Census Bureau includes 
categories such as “had difficulty finding a job or remaining employed “and “had 
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difficulty  with  schoolwork”. There are now  almost  60  million  working  age (16 to 65) 
adults who are not employed or about 40% of the labor force. Illegal families get about 
$2.50 in direct benefits for every dollar they pay in taxes and about another $2.50 indirect 
benefits (and not counting their damage to the biosphere) so they are a huge and ever 
increasing drain in spite of frequent fake ‘news stories’ on the net about their great value. 
Interest payments on our national debt are projected to rise to 85% of our total federal 
income by 2050. About half of our debt is owned by foreign govts., about a quarter by 
China, and if China continues to buy our debt at current rates, very soon our interest 
payments to them will cover their total annual military budget (ca. 80 billion vs U.S. of ca 
$600 billion) and (depending on interest rates) in a few years they would be able to triple 
or quadruple their military expenditures and it would all be paid for by US taxpayers. 
Actually, I have not seen it noted, but their lower costs mean that they are actually 
spending maybe 300 billion. And it is rarely mentioned why the US military budget is so 
enormous, and how it ties into the high lifestyle and huge govt. subsidies in Europe and 
worldwide for that matter. The USA is the world’s free policeman, providing technology, 
money and troops for keeping the peace and fighting wars worldwide and is too stupid 
to ask the other countries to pay their share--until the recent comments by Trump. To a 
significant extent, the ability of the Europeans and countries worldwide to have a high 
standard of living is due to the American taxpayers (without of course being asked) 
paying for their defense for the last 75 years. 
The CIS reports total immigration will reach about 51 million by 2023, about 85% of the 
total population increase (all the rest due to the Diverse already here) and will soon 
comprise about 15% of the total population—by far the largest percentage in any big 
country in recent history. It was reported that the Dept. of Homeland Security New 
Americans Taskforce was directed to process the citizenship applications of the 9 million 
green card holders ASAP to try to influence the 2016 election. 
The federal govt. is a cancer which now takes about 40% of all income from the minority 
who pay significant taxes and federal govt. civilian employees are hugely overpaid, 
averaging ca. $81,000 salary and $42,000 benefits while private employees get about 
$51,000 salary and $11,000 benefits. About 25% of all the goods and services produced in 
the USA are consumed by the govt. and about 75% of total govt. income is given out as 
business and farm subsidies and welfare. If all federal taxes were increased by 30% and 
spending was not increased, the budget might balance in 25 years. Of course, the 
spending would increase immediately if more money was available, and also the 
economy would take a huge hit as there would be less incentive to earn or to stay in the 
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USA and business investment and earnings would drop. It is estimated that private sector 
compliance with govt. regulations costs about 
1.8 trillion a year or about 12% of our total GDP, and of course it is growing constantly, 
so we waste more on govt. paperwork every year than the GDP of most countries. The 
main push for evermore confiscation of our money (years of our working lives) by the 
govt. is the communism/socialism/fascism forced on us by the rapid increase of Diverse, 
but being the world’s police force for free has cost us trillions, which also translates into 
years of our working lives as detailed elsewhere here. 
The poor are almost always spoken of as though they were somehow superior to the rich 
and it is implicit that we ought to make sacrifices for them, but they are only the rich in 
waiting and when they get rich they are inevitably exactly as loathsome and exploitative. 
This is due to our innate psychology, which in the small groups in which we evolved 
made sense, as everyone was our relative, but in a world that is fast collapsing due to the 
expansion of the Diverse it makes no sense. The poor care no more about others than the 
rich. 
Marvelous that even Obama and the Pope speak about the coming horrors of climate 
change, but of course not a word about the irresponsible parenthood that is its cause. The 
most you get from any govt. official, academic or TV documentary is a meek suggestion 
that climate change needs to be dealt with, but rarely a hint that overpopulation is the 
source of it and that most of it for the last century and all of it from now on is from the 
3rd world. China now creates twice the C02 of the USA and this will rise as it is expected 
to about double the size of our GDP by 2030 or so, and USA Diverse create about 20% of 
USA pollution, which will rise to about 50% by the next century. 
Ann Coulter in “Adios America” describes the outrageous story of what seems to be the 
only occasion on which Americans actually got to vote on the immigration issue—what 
some call “the great Prop 187 democracy ripoff”. 
In 1994 Californians, outraged to see ever more Hispanics crowding into the state and 
using up tax money, put on the ballot Proposition 187 which barred illegals from 
receiving state money. In spite of the expected opposition and outrageous lies from all 
the self-serving, boot licking Neomarxist third world supremacists, it passed 
overwhelmingly winning 2/3 of white, 56% of black, 57% of Asian and even 1/3 of 
Hispanic votes (yes, many middle and upper class Hispanics realize being taken over by 
Mexico will be a disaster). Note that all these people are ‘racists’ or ‘white supremacists’ 
(or in slightly more polite columns of the Carlos Slim Helu controlled NY Times etc. 
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‘bigots’ or ‘nativists’) according to the current use of this word by a large percentage of 
liberals, many Hispanics, the Sierra Club, the ACLU and even Nobel Prize winning 
economist Paul Krugman (who recently called Trump a ‘racist’ for daring to tell the truth 
while defending the USA from annexation by Mexico). 
It even carried the hopeless Republican candidate for Governor, Pete Wilson to a 
landslide victory, with 1/3 of his voters stating his support for Prop 187 was their reason 
for voting for him. However, the “ACLU and other anti- American groups” (Coulter) 
brought suit and it was soon struck down by a Democratic appointed (i.e., ‘honorary 
Mexican’) District Court Judge for being unconstitutional (i.e., protecting Americans 
rather than aliens). As with the 1898 and 1982 Supreme Court decisions giving citizenship 
to anyone who is born here, it was another hallucinatory interpretation of our laws and a 
clear demonstration of the hopelessness of the court system, or any branch of the 
government (at least a Democrat dominated one) in protecting Americans from a third 
world takeover. It has been suggested that the ACLU change its name to the Alien Civil 
Liberties Union and that it, along with the many other organizations and individuals 
working to destroy the USA, be forced to register as agents of a foreign government or 
preferably, be classified as terrorists and all their employees and donors deported or 
quarantined. 
In spite of this, neither the state nor federal govt. has done anything whatsoever to 
prevent the takeover, and Coulter notes that when G.W. Bush ran for president, he 
campaigned in America with the corrupt Mexican president Gortari (see comments on 
Carlos Slim below), had brother Jeb ‘Illegal Immigration is an act of love’ Bush speak in 
Spanish at the Republican National Convention, and after winning, gave weekly radio 
addresses in Spanish, added a Spanish page to the White House website, held a huge 
Cinco de Mayo party at the White House, and gave a speech to the blatantly racist 
National Council of La Raza, in which, among other outrages, he promised $100 million 
in federal money (i.e., our money) to speed immigration applications! Clearly with both 
the Republican and Democratic parties seeking annexation by Mexico, there is no hope 
for the democratic process in America unless it is drastically changed and clearly this will 
never happen by using the democratic process. 
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California is the 6th largest in economy in the world, ahead of France, Brazil, Italy, South 
Korea, Australia, Spain, India, Russia, and Canada, and more than double that of Mexico, 
and in about 10 years, when their 10 million kids grow up and the total Hispanic 
population of Calif is about 22 million (counting only legals), they will own the state and 
it will have been annexed by Mexico. 
In recent years, Calif. Governor Brown signed legislation granting drivers licenses to 
illegals, and paying for free medical care for their children (i.e., of course we the taxpayers 
pay). He agreed to let noncitizens monitor polls for elections, and they have been 
appointed to other government positions such as city councils without state govt. 
approval. He also forced all state officials to commit obstruction of justice by signing a 
law known as the Trust Act (i.e., trust they won’t rob, rape, murder, sell drugs etc.), which 
specifies that unless immigrants have committed certain serious crimes, they cannot be 
detained (for delivery to the feds for deportation) past when they would otherwise 
become eligible for release. The batch of new “lets become part of Mexico” laws also 
included one that would allow immigrants without legal status to be admitted to the state 
bar and practice law in California. But he vetoed the bill allowing illegal aliens to serve 
on juries. So, the only thing that prevented the final step in turning over the Calif. Courts 
to Mexico was the arbitrary decision of one man! However, it won’t be more than a few 
years before an Hispanic is Governor and then this and endless other atrocities will ensue, 
including presumably giving illegals the right to vote perhaps by passing another state 
law that violates or obstructs the federal one. In any case, there will soon by little 
distinction in California between being a citizen of the USA and a citizen of any other 
country who can sneak across the border. Note that as usual the Citizens of California 
were never permitted to vote on any of these issues, which were passed by the 
Democratic controlled state legislature. Why don’t they just be honest and change the 
name to Neomarxist Party of Mexico? At least they should be forced to register as the 
agent of a foreign government. 
It is certain that California (and by the end of the century the USA) is lost to civilization 
(i.e., it will be like Mexico, which of course will be far worse by then since most of the 
world’s resources will be gone and another 3 billion people will by demanding them) 
unless the govt. sends federal troops into California (and other states with sanctuary cities) 
to deport illegals and arrest all those (including numerous elected officials) who are 
violating federal law. Even this will only slow up the catastrophe unless a law is passed 
terminating anchor babies (i.e., those getting citizenship because they are born here), 
preferably retroactively to 1982 or better to 1898, and rescinding citizenship for them and 
all those who gained it from them—i.e. all their descendants and relatives. Also of course 
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the 1965 immigration law must be declared unconstitutional and all those (and relatives 
and descendants) who immigrated since then have their status reviewed with the 
significant taxpayers remaining and the non or low payers repatriated. Hard to get 
precise statistics, as its ‘racist’ to even think about it, but in Stockton, California and Dallas, 
Texas about 70% of all births are to illegals and maybe 90% of the total counting all 
Hispanics, and of course the bills are almost all paid by Euros and ‘rich’ Diverse via forced 
taxation, which of course they never get to vote on. 
To end birthright, a new law has to be passed and not an old one repealed, as there is no 
such law— this was an utterly arbitrary opinion of Justice Willie, “anchor baby” Brennan 
and only a handful of justices ever voted for this hallucinatory interpretation of the law. 
Those who want to see how the Supreme Court destroyed our country by eroding the 
boundary between being an American citizen and a person who was passing through 
(and the lack of basic common sense in the law and the hopelessness of the American 
legal system- and the contrary opinions of legal experts) can consult Levin’s ‘Men in Black’ 
or see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (yes it was a Chinese who 
began the assault on America over a century ago) where 6 lawyers (i.e., justices of the 
court) granted citizenship to the children of resident aliens and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982) where 5 lawyers (with 4 disagreeing) granted citizenship to the children of illegal 
aliens and anyone giving birth while visiting. If just one of the 5 morons who voted for 
this had changed their mind we would have maybe 10 million fewer on the welfare rolls 
now and perhaps 50 million fewer by 2100. Of course, none of the other 450 million or so 
adults alive between then and now have ever been permitted to vote on this or any of the 
basic issues leading inexorably to collapse. As we now see in the media every day, in a 
‘representative’ democracy what is represented is not America’s interests, but egomania, 
greed, stupidity and third world supremacism. 
How many people did it take to hand America to Mexico? For the TKO Immigration 
disaster in 1965 there were 320 representatives and 76 senators, and for anchor babies the 
two Supreme Court decisions totaling 11 lawyers, most of these ‘outstanding citizens’ 
now dead, so out of the approx. 245 million adult Americans citizens alive now, about 
120 very senior citizens actually voted for the handover. As clear a demonstration of the 
hopelessness of representative democracy (as practiced here) as one could want. 
Clearly, if America is to remain a decent place to live for anyone, the 1965 act, and all 
subsequent ones, need to be repealed by a law that puts a moratorium on all immigration 
and naturalization, and preferably rescinds or at least reviews citizenship for everyone 
naturalized since 1965 (or preferably since the first absurd birthright ruling in 1898), along 
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with all their relatives and descendants. All their cases could be reviewed and citizenship 
conferred on select individuals who scored high enough on a point scale, with welfare 
recipients, the chronically unemployed, felons, and their descendants ineligible, those 
with college or medical degrees, teachers, engineers, business owners etc., getting points 
towards eligibility, i.e., just basic common sense if America is to survive. 
Following Ann Coulter (‘Adios America’), we note that corporate tax in the USA is one 
the highest in the world of major countries at 39% and as the govt. continues to raise taxes 
to support the half of the country that is on some kind of welfare (if one includes social 
security, unemployment, food stamps, housing subsidies, welfare and veterans benefits), 
inevitably capital and jobs will leave, and entering the next century with vanishing 
resources, and since the entire annual population increase of 2.4 million is now Diverse, 
that means about 200 million more of them ( for a total of around 350 million out of about 
500 million) by 2100, a fragmented populace fighting for resources, and a drastically 
reduced standard of living with eventual collapse is inevitable, even without the 
predatory evils of the Seven Senile Sociopaths (i.e., the CCP).. 
Regarding the tax situation, in 2013, those with gross incomes above $250,000 (nearly all 
of them Euros) paid nearly half (48.9%) of all individual income taxes, though they 
accounted for only 2.4% of all returns filed and their average tax rate was 25.6%. The 
bottom 50% of filers (those making under $34,000-maybe half Diverse and half Euros) 
paid an average of 1.2% federal income tax for total share of 2.4% while the next 35% of 
filers (those making $34k to $69k) averaged 21% tax rate for a total share of 10.5% of total 
federal income tax collected. So, it is obvious that contrary to the common view of the 
Democrats/third world supremacists/Neomarxists, the upper and upper middle class are 
giving the poor a largely free ride, and that we already have one foot in communism. 
However, we must not forget the $2.5 billion a day the US is going into debt and the total 
$80 trillion or more unfunded liabilities (e.g., social security and medicare), which will 
have to eventually be paid by some combo of increased taxes and decreased benefits to 
their descendants. Consider this: “When we combine the populations of non- payers and 
non- filers and look to see what overall percentage of each group is not paying taxes, we 
find that: 50.7 percent of African American households pay no income taxes, 35.5 percent 
of Asian American households do not, 37.6 percent of White American households do 
not, and 52 percent of (legal) Hispanics pay no income taxes.” There are about 5X as many 
Euros (whites) as blacks and 
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4X as many Euros as Hispanics in the USA, and there are about the same % of whites and 
blacks on welfare (39%) and about 50% of Hispanics, so percentage wise that means 
blacks are about 5X and Hispanics about 8X as likely to be on welfare as Euros. 
Including property taxes, sales taxes etc. brings the average middle class ($34k to $69k 
income) tax up to about 30%, so 4 months/year or about 15 years labor in a 50 year lifetime 
goes to the government, a large percentage to support immigrants who are destroying 
America and the world, and another large percentage for the military, which is a free 
police force for the rest of the world. 
Counting all support as enumerated above (i.e., not just food stamps etc., but the poor’s 
fair share of all other expenses) the average middle class family works roughly 5 
weeks/year or 5 years of their working life to support the poor. Neither mass immigration, 
nor slavery, nor anchor babies, nor excessive breeding, nor unemployment, nor crimes 
and drugs are their fault, but the middle and upper class pay for the poor, and their kids 
will pay more (likely at least 10 years of their 50 year working life well before 2100) until 
the standard of living and quality of life is about the same as that of Diverse countries, 
and they will both drop continually every year until collapse, even if the Gang of Seven 
Sociopaths is destroyed. 
Of course, every statistic has a counter statistic and the Neomarxist Third World 
Supremacists and the Fifty Cent Army of the CCP are busily spreading disinformation 
and trolling all social media, but as a rough guide we find a recent study that found that 
37% of Hispanic immigrant households got the majority of their income from welfare 
while 17% of blacks did (whites were not reported but I would guess about 10%). Of the 
$ 3.5 trillion budget, about 595 billion is deficit and about 486 billion goes to welfare, so 
eliminating welfare would almost balance it and eliminating all the costs associated with 
persons and their descendants naturalized since 1965 would put the USA solidly in the 
black and would probably allow paying off the $18 trillion national debt before the end 
of the century, while implementing a Naturalized Citizens Repatriation Act would likely 
allow this closer to midcentury. 
As I write this I see a ‘news item’ (i.e., one of the endless barrage of paid lies planted there 
every day by the Diverse and the Fifty Cent Army) on Yahoo that tells me that illegals are 
doing us a big favor as the majority are working and pay about $1000 each tax per year. 
But they don’t tell us that they cost the country maybe $25,000 each in direct traceable 
costs and if you add their share of all the other costs (to maintain the govt. the police, the 
courts, the army, the streets etc., etc.) it’s likely double that. As Coulter tells you on p47 
of Adios America, a college educated person pays an average $29k taxes more per year 
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than they get back in govt. services. Legal immigrants however get back an average $4344 
more than they pay, while those without a high school degree get back about $37k more 
than they pay. She says that about 71% of illegal households get welfare. 
About 20% of US families get 75% of their income from the govt (i.e., extorted from 
taxpayers and borrowed from banks at 2.5 billion/day) and another 20% get 40%. In the 
UK, which is about on a par with the USA on its Diverse/Neomarxist path to ruin, about 
5 million persons or 10% of able adults live totally on welfare and have not worked a day 
since the Labour govt. took over in 1997, and another 30% receive partial support. Greece, 
famous for it’s recent huge bailout, is a typical case of how the masses always drag a 
country into chaos if permitted. People normally retire on full govt. pensions in their 50’s 
and as early as 45, and when retirement at 50 was permitted for a couple of hazardous 
jobs like bomb disposal, it soon was enlarged to cover over 500 occupations including 
hairdressers (hazardous chemicals like shampoo) and radio and TV announcers (bacteria 
on microphones)—no I am not joking. 
People often praise European countries for their generous welfare, but in fact it is mainly 
possible because nearly all their defense since the 50’s (to say nothing about the two world 
wars, the Korean and Vietnamese wars, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Serbia etc., etc.), 
i.e., about $10 trillion in direct costs and perhaps another $10 trillion indirect) has been 
paid for by the USA (and by American lives and injuries), i.e., by the 20% of US taxpayers 
who pay any significant tax, plus much of the $18 trillion debt. In fact, like all the world, 
they would not even be independent countries if not for the USA who defeated the 
Germans in two wars and the Japanese and kept the communists and now the Muslims 
under control for half a century. So not only is the U.S. bled dry by the poor and Diverse 
here, but we pay for them all over the world as well as helping the rich there get richer. 
Typical of all Europe, in France, where the Muslims have become a huge problem, even 
when not slaughtering people, most of them are on welfare, paid for in part by the USA. 
For about a decade the biggest voting bloc in the U.N is the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation which controls e.g., the Human Rights Council, where they allow only the 
rights permitted by Islamic law, and so forget women’s rights, children’s rights, gay 
rights, freedom of religion, free speech etc. and in fact freedom of any kind. As the 
Muslims unrestrained breeding increases their percent of world population from 1/5 to 
1/3 by 2100 or so and civilization collapses, this will get much worse. 
Islam is defended with such ferocity because in the poor 3rd world countries it has been 
the only defense against selfishness and it provides poor men with a guarantee of 
reproduction and survival. The same used to be the case for Christianity. It is also clear 
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that as the 22nd century approaches and America collapses, China will replace it as the 
‘Great Satan’ since it will be dominant worldwide, protecting its ever- growing 
investments and Chinese citizens, and eventually doing whatever it wants, as 
‘Diversification’ results in control of America by Mexicans and Africans and it loses 
military superiority and the money and will to fight. And of course, the Chinese will not 
follow America’s path and be ‘diversified’ into collapse, unless via some great misfortune 
they become democratic/Neomarxist (they are of course now only communist in name). 
A bit off the mark but too nice to pass up is a lovely example of devolution (dysgenics) 
that is second only to overpopulation in bringing about the collapse of industrial 
civilization (though political correctness forbids discussion anywhere). 
U.K. Pakistanis, who often import their cousins to marry and so are inbreeding with up 
to 5 children a family, sometimes with multiple wives, produce 30% of the rare diseases 
in the UK, though they are 2% of the population. Of course, most are on welfare and the 
defectives result in huge expenses for full time nursing care and special education (for 
those not deaf and blind). And the European High Court, like the US Supreme Court, has 
forgotten its real reason for existing and enraptured by Suicidal Utopian Delusions, has 
ruled the govt must pay full spousal benefits to all the wives and can’t draw the line at 
two. 
A good part of Coulter’s book is spent on crime, and we should first note (Coulter does 
not seem to, though I expect she knows) that it is rarely considered that it is hugely 
underreported, especially among the poor and Diverse. Thus, the BJS says that about 3.4 
million violent crimes per year go unreported and the figures for nonviolent ones 
(burglary, assault, petty theft, vandalism, drug dealing, etc.) must be in the hundreds of 
millions, disproportionately committed by (and suffered by) the Diverse. One finds that 
the percent of adult males incarcerated for whites is 0.7, for Hispanics 1.5 and for blacks 
4.7. It appears impossible to find any precise national figures for the cost of incarceration 
but $35K/year seems a minimum, and perhaps $50K for the legal system, and perhaps 
another $50k in medical and psychological costs, rehab programs, loss of work by their 
victims etc. According to the BJS non-Hispanic blacks accounted for 39.4% of the prison 
and jail population in 2009, while non-Hispanic whites were 34.2%, and Hispanics (of any 
race) 20.6%. According to a 2009 report by the Pew Hispanic Center, in 2007 Latinos 
"accounted for 40% of all sentenced federal offenders- -more than triple their share (13%) 
of the total U.S. adult population”. Again, keep in mind there is not and almost certainly 
will never be any evidence of a significant genetic difference between Euros and Diverse 
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in psychology, or IQ, and that their greater incidence of problems must be wholly due to 
their culture. 
If one counted only illegals, the crime and imprisonment rate would likely be double that 
reported for legal Hispanics. As Coulter notes (p101-2) it’s impossible to get the actual 
figures for immigrant crime since it’s of course ‘racist’ to even suggest they should be 
collected (and as noted, all crime among Diverse is greatly underreported and many 
Hispanics are misclassified as whites), but it’s definitely above that stated, so their actual 
rate could be near that of blacks. One set of data showed about 1/3 of the 2.2 million state 
and local prisoners are foreign born and maybe another 5% are American born Hispanics 
and another 30% black, leaving about 32% white. The foreign born were 70% more likely 
to have committed a violent crime and twice as likely a class A felony. As Coulter notes, 
virtually all immigrant groups have a higher crime rate than natives. As the invasion 
continues, bribery and extortion will see huge increases as they rise to the third world 
standard. Bribes (the mildest form of extortion) in cash or equivalent is the normal 
interaction between people in the third world and police, the military, customs and 
immigration officers, health and fire inspectors, teachers, school admissions officers, and 
even doctors, surgeons and nurses. I am not guessing here as I spent a decade of my life 
in the third world and experienced and heard countless stories about all of the above. As 
time passes, we can expect this to become routine here as well (first of course in California 
and the other Western states) and the nationwide norm thereafter. In addition to 
continued increases in crime of all kinds we will see the percentage of crimes solved drop 
to the extremely low levels of the third world. More resources are devoted to the solution 
of murders than any other crime and about 65% are solved in the USA, but in Mexico less 
than 2% are solved and as you get outside Mexico City the rate drops to near zero. Also 
note that the rate here used to be about 80%, but it has dropped in parallel with the 
increase in Diverse. Also 65% is the average but if you could get statistics I am sure it 
would rise with the percent of Euro’s in a city and drop as the percent of Diverse increases. 
In Detroit only 30% are solved. If you keep track of who robs, rapes and murders, it’s 
obvious that black lives matter lots more to Euros than they do to other blacks. 
Spanish may become the official and mandatory language and Roman Catholicism the 
official religion, and of course the Mexican cartels will be the dominant criminal 
organizations, at least for the Southwestern states by midcentury and likely the whole 
country by 2100. 
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Of course, as Coulter points out, it’s very hard to get statistics on race and crime or 
increasingly on race and anything, as it’s considered ‘racism’ even to ask and the govt. 
refuses to collect it. Finding the truth is made much more difficult since Hispanic special 
interest groups (i.e., third world supremacists), abetted by Euro liberals, who have lost or 
sold whatever common sense or decency they may have had, are hard at work spreading 
disinformation with hundreds of thousands of false or misleading items on the net and 
social media every week. She does not seem to mention the massive deception facilitated 
by Yahoo, Bing, Facebook and others, who present among their news items, paid 
disinformation which presents ‘news’ that is deliberately false or hugely misleading, such 
as the item mentioned above (repeated many times a day somewhere on the net) which 
says that illegals are a good thing as they are paying taxes. 
In spite of being given a largely free ride, the Diverse take it all for granted (especially as 
it’s ‘racist’, ‘hate’ and ‘white supremacist’ to point out their free ride, so you won’t find it 
in the major media) and have no problem suing the police, hospitals, and every branch 
of government for any imagined infraction. The Euros should get a clue and sue them 
back! They and the US govt, now that Trump is president, could file millions of suits or 
criminal cases against people who riot in the streets, picket and protest disrupting traffic, 
smashing windows and causing business losses, psychological trauma, etc. Sue and/or 
arrest all the criminals and their families for the damages to property, police, loss of 
business income and work, etc. Also sue the police and every branch of government for 
failing to protect them every time a crime is committed, especially by illegal Diverse. 
As I wrote this the parents of a young San Francisco woman murdered by an illegal alien 
criminal, who had been deported numerous times, and then shielded from deportation 
by the San Francisco police (obstruction of justice), is suing them and the feds (and they 
should sue the board of Supervisors and Governor Brown and the state legislature who 
voted for the sanctuary rules and Trust Act as well). Predictably he was found not guilty 
and in the sanctuary city of San Francisco (and now the sanctuary state of California) is 
able to live out his life of crime while being supported at public expense. 
Hundreds of thousands are robbed, assaulted, raped or murdered by Diverse, and 
perhaps 100 million victimized in lesser ways every year, and the injured parties (most 
often Diverse) should sue every time. To facilitate this, the Euros could establish a fund 
and various organizations to eliminate illegals and crime against Euros. And of course, 
all the countries that foreign born criminals come from should be forced to pay the cost 
of policing and prosecuting them and of keeping them here—welfare, medical care, 
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schooling, and their share of all the goods and services mentioned above, including 
national defense. Mexico should pay all the costs of policing the border and for all the 
crimes and for all the upkeep of illegals here since day one—i.e., back to say 1965. And 
they and Colombia etc. should pay for the cost of drug enforcement, addict treatment and 
jailing, and say a $20 million fine every time someone is raped, disabled or murdered by 
a drug addict or by an illegal or a naturalized citizen or descendant of a person originating 
in their country. If they won’t we could expel everyone born there and cut off all trade 
and visas, or just confiscate their oil, mineral and food production. Like many of the ideas 
here it sounds bizarre because the cowardice and stupidity of ‘our’ leaders (i.e., not 
actually ours as we are never asked) has gotten us so used to being abused. We are the 
last country that should put up with abuse but the politicians and leftist morons have 
made us the easiest mark on the planet. Yes 9/11 is the most striking abuse, but in fact we 
suffer as many deaths and injuries from the Diverse every year (e.g., just from drugs and 
addicts or just from wars), and far more damage every day, if you extrapolate the 
consequences of their presence here into the future. 
Much controversy was generated when Trump mentioned we were letting rapists into 
the country, but he was just stating the facts. Most crimes in Diverse communities are 
never reported, often because they are committed by the Hispanic gangs who control 
them. Coulter recounts a few (the publisher cut the book in half and she says she can 
easily produce 50 cases for every one cited) of the more outrageous immigrant rape 
crimes committed here, noting a study in which Latino women here reported childhood 
sexual abuse at about 80X the rate of other American women, and since it seems likely 
many did not want to talk about it, it could be higher. She notes that in much of Latin 
America raping teenagers is not considered a crime (e.g., the age of consent in Mexico is 
12) and in any case, it is rare that anything is done about it, since it’s often connected to 
gang members or their families and if you protest you die. 
 
Coulter notes that illegals have made large areas of SouthWestern USA public lands and 
parks unsafe and some have been closed. Half of some 60 forest fires on federal or tribal 
land between 2006 and 2010 were started by illegals, many of them set deliberately to 
avoid capture. The cost of fighting these 30 alone might pay for a good start on a secure 
border fence. 
I assume everyone knows about the massive marijuana growing operations conducted 
by the Mexican cartels in our national forests. In addition to the erosion and pollution, it 
is the norm for growers to kill numerous animals and threaten hikers. Most depressing 
of all is the sellout of the Sierra Club (who suddenly changed their tune after getting a 
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$100 million contribution from billionaire David Gelbaum with the proviso that they 
support immigration— clearly confused as his right hand protects nature while the left 
destroys it), who are now devoted to mass immigration, denouncing anyone opposed as 
“white racists” even when they are Diverse. So, they are another group that should be 
made to register as an agent of a foreign government and their executives and major 
contributors made to join the other criminals quarantined on an island (the Aleutians 
would be perfect but even Cuba would do) where they can’t do more harm. Considering 
the blatant trashing of California by Hispanics, and the clear as day end of nature in 
America as the immigrants about double the population during the next century or so, 
this is truly amazing from one viewpoint, but cowardice and stupidity are only to be 
expected. 
One murder in the USA is said to total about $9 million lifetime costs and if they get death 
it is several million more. At about 15,000/year that would be about $150 billion/year just 
for homicides-most by Diverse. Mexico has about 5X the murder rate of the USA and 
Honduras about 20X and your descendants can certainly look forward to our rate moving 
in that direction. Coulter notes that Hispanics have committed about 23,000 murders here 
in the last few decades. As I write, this item appeared on the net. “In an undated file photo, 
Jose Manuel Martinez arrives at the Lawrence County Judicial Building in Moulton, Ala., 
before pleading guilty to shooting Jose Ruiz in Lawrence County, Ala., in March 2013. 
Martinez has admitted to killing dozens of people across the United States as an enforcer 
for drug cartels in Mexico.” Not of course rare, just one of the few to make the headlines 
recently. 
Figuring about 2.2 million prisoners (over 1% of the adult population) and a cost to put 
them in jail from the start of their criminal career of maybe $50,000 each or about $100 
billion and the cost to keep them there of about $35,000 each or about $75 billion means a 
minimum of $150 billion a year, not including other governmental and social costs. I don’t 
see any really clear estimates on the net for the total cost of crime in the USA, but in 2013 
it was estimated that violent crime alone cost the UK (where guns are much less frequent 
and the Mexican and Colombian mafias don’t operate significantly) ca. $150 billion or 
about $6000/household, or about 8% of GDP, but the USA has a much higher percentage 
of immigrants, guns and drugs, so including all the nonviolent crimes and figuring only 
5% of the GDP, that would be about 900 billion per year. Figuring about 60% of crime due 
to the Diverse, or maybe 80% if you count that of Euros addicted to drugs imported by 
Diverse, we pay something like 700 billion a year to support Diverse crime. 
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Of course, all those guilty of felonies, regardless of national origin, history or status could 
have their citizenship rescinded and be deported or quarantined on an island, where their 
cost of upkeep could be from $0 to $1000/year rather than $35,000 and it could be made a 
one-way trip to avoid recidivism. Yes, its sci-fi now, but as the 22nd century approaches 
and civilization collapses, the tolerance of crime will diminish of necessity. For now, 
nothing will be done, and crime here will reach the levels in Mexico as the border 
continues to dissolve and environmental collapse and approaching bankruptcy dissolve 
the economy. Inside Mexico in 2014 alone, 100 U.S. citizens were known to have been 
murdered and more than 130 kidnapped and others just disappeared, and if you add 
other foreigners and Mexicans it runs into the thousands. Even a tiny lightly traveled 
country like Honduras manages some 10 murders and 2 kidnappings a year of US citizens. 
And of course, these are the best of times—it is getting steadily worse as unrestrained 
breeding and resource depletion bring collapse ever closer. 
In another index of how far out of control Mexico is, the criminal cartels, believed to 
generate well over $21 billion each year from drugs, illegal mining, fishing and logging, 
theft, prostitution, extortion, kidnapping and embezzlement, are an increasing threat to 
Pemex, the Mexican oil monopoly. Between 2009 and 2016, thieves tapped the pipelines 
roughly every 1.4 kms along Pemex’s approximately 14,000 km pipeline network, getting 
more than $1 billion in annual revenue from the gas which they sell on the black market. 
They are able to do this by terrorizing Pemex employees to obtain info on its operations, 
offering them the same as they do for everyone in Mexico—silver or lead, i.e., take the 
bribes or you and your family die. 
Euros hear constantly about how bad they are not to want to give the Diverse even more. 
OK fine, lets agree to do it provided the third world country they are from lets in 
immigrants until they comprise about 30% of their population now and 60% by 2100, 
enforces legislation that gives all foreigners in their country, legally or not, citizenship for 
their babies, welfare, free food, free medical care, free schooling, immunity to deportation, 
free emergency care, drivers licenses, license to practice law, right to serve on juries, right 
to bring in all their relatives (who also get all these privileges), right to setup 
organizations that help them to lie on immigration forms, to evade deportation, to 
suppress free speech and to subvert the political process so that they can take over the 
country. Actually, let’s make it easy and do it if even one of their countries implements 
even a few of these. Of course, it will never happen. 
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Naturally, those with every kind of mental or physical deficiency are dissatisfied with 
their level of welfare and are getting organized too. Those with autism, actually a 
spectrum of genetic deficiencies due to as many as 1000 genes, are now campaigning to 
be regarded as not deficient but ‘neurodiverse’ and ‘neurotypicals’ should regard them 
as peers or even their superiors. No problem for me if someone wants to have a ‘friend’ 
or spouse who cannot experience love or friendship and who feels the same when they 
die as they do when their goldfish does (except being more annoyed by the greater 
inconvenience). And those with more than mild cases will never hold a job and will be a 
burden to their relatives and society (i.e., the minority who pay taxes) all their lives, and 
have a strong tendency to pass the problem on to any offspring they have, so it will likely 
increase continually, the same as hundreds of other genetic problems with significant 
heritability. As diagnosis has improved, so has the incidence of autism, which now 
exceeds 1%, as does that for schizophrenia, schizotypal disorders, ADHD, drug addiction, 
alcoholism, alexithymia, low IQ, depression, bipolar disorder, etc., etc., so perhaps the 
combined incidence of disabling mental disorders exceeds 10% and those with physical 
problems who need partial or complete lifelong support is probably similar, and both are 
rising in number and percent, the inevitable results of ‘civilization’, ‘democracy’ and 
‘human rights’. Clearly, as the economy collapses, the costs of health care rise, and an 
ever-larger percentage are nonworking elderly and mentally or physically disabled, this 
lunatic system will collapse-i.e., the USA will eventually have about the same handouts 
for everyone as third world countries by the early 22nd century— none. 
Coulter comments on Mexican citizen Carlos Slim Helu (the world’s third richest person 
as I write this) in the context of the near universal lying about and evasion of immigration 
issues by the New York Times and other media. He gave a huge loan to the Times a few 
years ago, to save it from bankruptcy, and this likely accounts for its subsequent failure 
to cover immigration issues in a meaningful way. Slim is the world’s premiere 
monopolist and his companies control 90% of the Mexican telephone market and many 
of its major industries (Mexican’s refer to their country as Slimlandia). His wealth is the 
equivalent of roughly 5% of Mexico's GDP. To add perspective, since the USA has about 
15 times Mexico’s GDP, to be comparable, Bill Gates or Warren Buffet would have to be 
worth about a trillion dollars each or about 12X their worth as of 2019. 
California is the biggest money making US state for Slim, whose take of Mexican goods 
and services is about $140 million/day. To get the flavor of how things were when Slim 
managed to acquire the Mexican telephone company (and what can be expected here 
soon), Gortari (chosen by G.W. Bush to campaign with him) was president of the vicious 
Mexican political monopoly PRI, and in subsequent years Gortari’s brother was found 
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murdered, his relatives were apprehended by Swiss police when they tried to withdraw 
$84 million from his brother’s bank account, and he fled Mexico for Ireland, where he 
remains. These are among the reasons Coulter calls Slim a robber baron and a baneful 
influence on Mexico and America. She notes that about $20 billion of Slim’s yearly income 
from his telephone monopoly comes from Mexicans living here. He is Lebanese on both 
sides, so Mexico has experienced it’s own foreign takeover. 
The bleeding hearts insist Americans show ever more “humanity” and guarantee our 
own collapse to help the mob, but what humanity do the Diverse show? They breed like 
rabbits and consume without restraint, thus condemning everyone, including their own 
descendants, to Hell on Earth. There is nothing noble about the poor—they are just the 
rich in waiting. Showing the typical oblivion of the establishment, our Secretary of State 
Kerry praises China for ‘lifting 200 million people out of poverty’ but fails to note this 
placed a huge drain on the world resources, and is done by stealing from the future, 
including their own descendants, and that this is unsustainable. Ten or 11 billion (by 2100) 
all trying to stay out of poverty guarantees the collapse of the world. China’s higher QOL, 
like our own, is only temporary, obtained at the cost of their own descendants and the 
worlds future. 
How much Quality of Life (QOL- a general measure including wealth, crime rate, stress, 
traffic, drug problems, happiness etc.) might Americans gain by various measures? 
Banning anchor babies might up QOL 5% by mid-century and 10% by the end, relative 
to doing nothing. Making the ban retroactive to 1982, or preferably to 1898, and thus 
deporting most of those naturalized by being related to anchor babies, might raise QOL 
another 5% immediately. Banning immigration might raise it another 10% by end of 
century, while making the ban retroactive to 1965 and deporting most immigrants along 
with their descendants and naturalized relatives might give Americans (Diverse and 
Euros) another 20% more QOL immediately. 
And there might be a Back to Africa or Slavery Restitution Act which sent all blacks, or 
at least those on welfare, unemployed or in prison, back to their homelands so we would 
never again have to listen to their inane complaints about being kidnapped (as noted, 
they never consider that if not for slavery they would not exist and if not for colonialism 
and Euro technology maybe 90% of the people in the third world would not exist), not to 
mention if not for Euro’s they would now be living (or dying ) under the Nazi’s or the 
Japanese or the communists. Of course, one could do this on a case by case basis, keeping 
all the skilled (e.g., medical and hitech personnel). Instead of or prior to the slow 
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deportation process, one could cancel the citizenship or at least the voting privileges of 
all the naturalized citizens and their descendants since 1965. 
The 42 million African-Americans (about 74 million by 2100) who account for 4.5x as 
many prisoners per capita as Euros, get a largely free ride for all essential services and 
welfare, take over and render uninhabitable large areas of cities, increase the crowding 
and traffic by about 13% etc., so they may decrease the QOL of all Americans about 20% 
on average but to unliveable for those who are in poor neighborhoods. Hispanics amount 
to about 18% (or about 25% including illegals) and they account for a minimum of 2.5X 
as many prisoners as Euros and have all the other issues, thus causing a QOL drop of 
about 30% or again to unliveable in areas they dominate, which soon will include the 
whole southwestern USA. So overall, it’s a fair guess that deporting most Diverse would 
about double the QOL (or say from just bearable to wonderful) right now for the average 
person, but of course much more increase for the poorer and less for the richer. If one 
compares likely QOL in 2119 (i.e., a century from now), if all the possible anti-diversity 
measures were adopted, relative to what it will be if little or nothing is done, I expect 
QOL would be about 3X higher or again from intolerable to fantastic. 
After documenting the incompetence of the INS and the govt., and the countless 
treasonous and blatantly anti-white racist (in the original meaningful sense of racist) 
organizations (e.g., the National Council of La Raza) helping to swamp us with 
immigrants (partial list on p247 of Adios America) Coulter says “The only thing that 
stands between America and oblivion is a total immigration moratorium” and “The 
billion dollar immigration industry has turned every single aspect of immigration law 
into an engine of fraud. The family reunifications are frauds, the “farmworkers” are 
frauds, the high-tech visas are frauds and the asylum and refugee cases are monumental 
frauds.” Her book is heavily documented (and most data were left out due to size 
constraints) and of course nearly all the data can be found on the net. 
As Coulter notes, a 2015 poll shows that more Americans had a favorable opinion of 
North Korea (11%) than wanted to increase immigration (7%,) but most Democrats, the 
Clintons, the Bush’s, Obama, casino mogul Sheldon Adelson, Hedge Fund billionaire 
David Gelbaum, Carlos Slim, Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman and 
megabillionaire Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg don’t want Americans to ever vote 
on it. She also mentions that then Florida Governor Jeb Bush (with a Mexican wife) 
pushed for a bill to give drivers licenses to illegal aliens (copying California) just 3 years 
after 13 of the 9/11 terrorists had used Florida drivers licenses to board the planes. Yes, 
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the same Jeb Bush who recently called Illegal immigration “an act of love” (of course he 
means love for Mexico and hatred for the USA, or at least its Euros). 
 
The inexorable collapse of the USA (and other first world countries in Europe are just a 
step or two behind, as they have let in Diverse who are producing children at about 3 
times Euro rates) shows the fatal flaws in representative democracy. If they are to survive 
and not turn into third world hellholes, they must establish a meritocracy. Change the 
voting age to 35 minimum and 65 maximum, with minimum IQ 110, proof of mental 
stability, lack of drug or alcohol dependence, no felony convictions, and a minimum score 
on the SAT test that would get one into a good college. But the sorry state of what passes 
for civilization is shown by a recent Gallup poll which found that about 50% of Americans 
believed the Devil influences daily events, and that UFO’s are real, while 36% believe in 
telepathy and about 25% in ghosts. A yes on any of these would seem to be a good reason 
for lifetime exclusion from voting and preferably loss of citizenship as should a ‘yes’ or 
‘possibly’ or ‘probably’ answer to “Do you think O.J. Simpson is innocent”. 
Perhaps it will lessen the pain slightly to realize that it is not only the American 
government that is moronic and treasonous, as versions of its suicide are happening in 
other democracies. In Britain, the National Children’s Bureau has urged daycare teachers 
to report any ‘racist’ utterance of children as young as three. About 40% of Britons receive 
some form of welfare. London has more violent crime than Istanbul or New York and is 
said to have almost 1/3 of the world’s CCTV cameras, which record the average citizen 
about 300 times a day. Of course, as usual, there are no trustworthy statistics for China, 
where some of the most successful electronics companies are in the CCTV business and 
where facial recognition software can often identify any random person in minutes. The 
UK has the highest rate in Europe of STD’s, unwed mothers, drug addiction and abortion. 
One fifth of all children have no working adult in their house, almost a million people 
have been on sick leave for over a decade, the courts forced the govt. to give a disabled 
man money to fly to Amsterdam to have sex with a prostitute because to deny it would 
be a “violation of his human rights”. The number of indictable offenses per 1000 rose from 
about 10 in the 1950’s to about 110 in the 1990’s in parallel with the increase in Diverse. 
Thanks to Mark Steyn’s “After America”, which is required reading for all bright, 
civilized Americans who want their country to survive, though barring a military coup, 
there is not a chance. 
Coulter points out the absurdity of politicians fawning on the Hispanic voters 
(Hispandering). If presidential candidate Mitt Romney had won 71% of the 
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Hispanic vote instead of 27% he still would have lost, but if he had won only 4% more of 
the white vote he would have won. In fact, 72% of voters are non- Hispanic white, so even 
if someone got ALL the nonwhite votes, a presidential candidate could still win by a 
landslide, as we saw in the Trump election. The problem is a sizeable percent of white 
voters are morons and lunatics who are unable to act in their own self-interest. The 
absurdity of letting average citizens vote was shown when many were seriously 
considering Ben Carson for president in 2016--a Seventh Day Adventist bible thumping 
creationist Detroit ghetto homeboy of such obvious immaturity and stupidity that no 
sane country would permit him to occupy any public office whatsoever (of course one 
could say the same of most people and most politicians). He has however, the huge 
advantage that his defects give him much in common with the average American. It 
appears to me his limitations include autism-the reason for his famous “flat affect”. Do 
not be fooled by his occasional simulations of laughter--autistics learn to mimic emotions 
at an early age and some even have successful careers as comedians. Famous comedian 
Dan Aykroyd had this to say about his Asperger’s -- "One of my symptoms included my 
obsession with ghosts and law enforcement -- I carry around a police badge with me, for 
example. I became obsessed by Hans Holzer, the greatest ghost hunter ever. That’s when 
the idea of my film Ghostbusters was born." 
“Gentle Ben” Carson wants to outlaw abortion, even in cases of rape and incest, thinks 
we should ditch Medicare, and adheres to many weird conspiracy theories, such as the 
pyramids not being built by the pharaohs as tombs, but by the biblical Joseph for the 
storage of grain! He proposes to turn the Department of Education into a fascist overseer 
of proper morals, with students reporting professors who displayed political bias (i.e., 
anyone whatsoever) to the government so universities' funding could be cut. “I 
personally believe that this theory that Darwin came up with was something that was 
encouraged by the Adversary.” The Adversary is a nickname for the devil; it’s the actual 
translation of the word “Satan.” He also dismissed the Big Bang, calling it a “fairy tale.” 
Like all creationists, that means that he rejects most of modern science--i.e., everything 
that lets us make sense of biology, geology, physics and the universe and puts them on 
all fours with people who lived 100,000 years ago--i.e., Neanderthals. Of course, to the 
sane, intelligent and educated, "fairy tales" are about heaven, hell, angels and devils, but 
these are at exactly the right level for the average low class American, Diverse or Euro. 
Hard to believe we could do worse than the Clinton’s, Nixon, Reagan, Obama and G.W. 
Bush, but it will happen, and your descendants will see an endless line of politicians 
who's only real qualifications are greed, dishonesty, stupidity, sociopathy, dark skin or a 
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Spanish surname. In any case, it's unavoidable in a mobocracy that morons, lunatics and 
the merely clueless will take over and run the show until it collapses, which is inevitable 
unless democracy as currently practiced changes radically and Diversity decreases. 
Now that we have a reasonably sane, intelligent, patriotic person as president (though 
seeing this thru the massive disinformation and libel produced by the Neomarxist Third 
World Supremacists can be difficult) and enough Republicans in congress (the Democrats 
having sold out their country long ago) we could theoretically deport the illegals, but 
unless we terminate immigration and retroactively deport most of those naturalized since 
1965, it will only slow the disaster and not stop it. However nearly everything Trump 
tries to do is blocked by the Neomarxist judges and the democrats who long ago ceased 
to represent America’s interests. 
Hillary Clinton was preferable to Obama, who was trained as a constitutional lawyer, so 
he knew our systems fatal weaknesses, and how much further he could go in creating a 
communist state enforced by fascism, like his much- admired model Cuba. I can easily 
forgive Hillary for Benghazi and her emails and Bill for Monica, but not for their utterly 
cynical pardoning of clients of Hillary’s brother Hugh, tax cheat Marc Rich and four 
Hasids convicted in 1999 of bilking the federal government of more than $30 million in 
federal housing subsidies, small business loans and student grants, in order to curry favor 
with N.Y. Jews. This is very well known and in fact just about everything I say here is 
easily findable on the net. 
Even though our mobocracy is a slow-motion nightmare, if we had a direct democracy 
(as we easily could in the computer age) and people were actually polled on important 
issues, perhaps most of our major problems would be disposed of quickly. Suppose 
tomorrow there was a vote of every registered voter with an email address or smartphone 
on questions something like this: 
Should all illegal aliens be deported within one year? Should welfare be cut in half within 
1year? Should all convicted felons born in another country or one of whose parents were, 
have their citizenship canceled and be deported within 90 days? Should all immigration 
be terminated except temporary work visas for those with special skills? Should all child 
molesters, rapists, murderers, and drug addicts have their citizenship canceled and 
deported, or if a native citizen, quarantined on an island? 
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So much the better if voting was restricted to those whose parents and/or all four 
grandparents are native born, who are non- felons, who have paid more than 5% of their 
income in taxes the last 3 years and passed mental health, current events and IQ tests. 
Again, the biggest benefactors would be the Diverse who remained here, but of course 
the majority will resist any change that requires intelligence or education to grasp. 
I am not against a Diverse society, but to save America for your children (recall I have no 
descendants nor close relatives), it should be capped at say 20% and that would mean 
about 40% of the Diverse here now would be repatriated. Actually I would not object to 
keeping the % Diverse we have now (about 37%) provided half the ones here were 
replaced by carefully screened Asians or by people from anywhere provided they are 
carefully screened (i.e., no criminals, mental or physical defectives, no religious nuts, no 
drug addicts, well educated with a proven useful profession), and that they agree to have 
no more than two children, with immediate deportation if they produce a third, commit 
a major felony, or remain on welfare for more than one year. And no relatives are 
permitted entry. In fact, it would be a huge step forward to replace all the Euro criminals, 
drug addicts, mental cases, welfare users, and chronically unemployed etc. with suitable 
Diverse. Of course, it’s impossible now, but as civilization collapses and the Seven 
Sociopaths of the CCP take over, many amazing things will happen, all of them extremely 
unpleasant for billions of people, with the Diverse having the most suffering and dying. 
Coulter jokingly suggests inviting Israel to occupy the border with Mexico, as they have 
shown how to guard one. However, I would suggest really doing it— either giving them 
the Southern portion of each border state or perhaps just occupying the border section of 
Mexico (which we could do in a few days). Israel should be delighted to have a second 
country, since their position in Israel will become untenable as the USA, France etc. lose 
the ability to be the world’s policemen, and nuclear capable third world countries 
collapse. However, we should require the Israelis to leave the strict orthodox at home 
where the Muslims will soon get them, as we already have enough rabbit breeding 
religious lunatics. 
Speaking of the collapse of nuclear capable third world countries, it should be obvious 
that as this happens, probably before the end of this century, but certainly in the next, 
with H Bombs in possession of fanatics, it is just a matter of time before they begin 
vaporizing American and European cities. The only definitive defense will be preemptive 
“nucleation” of any such country that collapses, or where Muslim radicals take over. It 
must be obvious to Israel that they will have no other choice but a preemptive strike on 
Pakistan, Iran and maybe others. Another lovely gift from the Diverse. 
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In a late 2015 poll by You.Gov, 29 percent of respondents said they can imagine a situation 
in which they would support the military taking control of the federal government – that 
translates into over 70 million American adults. And these again are the best of times. At 
this time in the next century, give or take a few decades, (much sooner in many third 
world countries), with industrial civilization collapsing, starvation, crime, disease and 
war worldwide, military coups will be happening everywhere. It’s almost certainly the 
only cure for America’s problems, but of course nobody will get to vote on it. 
In sum, this is the American chapter of the sad story of the inexorable destructionof the 
world by unrestrained motherhood. Fifty-four years ago, 396 US politicians voted to  
embrace the destruction of America by the third world, via the “no significant 
demographic impact” immigration act. Without the changes they and the Supreme Idiots 
Court made (along with failure to enforce our immigration laws), we would have about 
80 million fewer people now and at least 150 million fewer in 2100, along with tens of 
trillions of dollars in savings. We would have a chance to deal with the immense 
problems America and the world face. But, burdened with a fatally fragmented (i.e., 
Diverse) population about twice the size we might have had, half of which will not 
contribute to the solution, but rather constitute the problem, it is impossible. What we see 
is that democracy as practiced here and now guarantees a fatally inept government. Peace 
and prosperity worldwide will vanish and starvation, disease, crime, military coups, 
terrorism and warlords will become routine, probably in this century, certainly during 
the next. 
To me it’s clear that nothing will restrain motherhood and that there is no hope for 
America or the world regardless of what happens in technology, green living or politics 
anywhere. Everything tranquil, pure, wild, sane, safe and decent is doomed. There is no 
problem understanding the stupidity, laziness, dishonesty, self- deception, cowardice, 
arrogance, greed and insanity of hairless monkeys, but it ought to seem a bit odd that so 
many reasonably sane and more or less educated people could welcome into their 
country (or at least permit the entry and tolerate the presence of) large numbers of 
immigrants who proceed to take over and destroy it. Monkey psychology (shared by all 
humans) is only capable of seriously considering oneself and immediate relatives for a 
short time into the future (reciprocal altruism or inclusive fitness), maybe decades at most, 
so there is no internal restraint. Democracy is the ideal breeding ground for catastrophe. 
Most people are neither smart nor well educated, but one can see collapse happening in 
front of us, and above all in the big urban areas and in the Southwest, especially California 
and Texas. Sheer laziness, ignorance and a lack of understanding of ecology and the 
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nature of population growth is part of it, but I think that the innate reciprocal altruism 
we share with all animals must have a big role. When we evolved in Africa we lived in 
small groups, probably seldom more than a few hundred and often less than 20, and so 
all those around us were our close relatives, and our behavior was selected to treat them 
reasonably well as they shared our genes (inclusive fitness) and would reciprocate good 
deeds (reciprocal altruism). We stopped evolving and began devolving, replacing 
evolution by natural selection with devolution (genetic degeneration) by unnatural 
selection about 100,000 years ago, when culture evolved to the point where language, fire 
and tools gave us a huge advantage over other animals, and there was no longer major 
selective force for changing behavior or increasing or maintaining health and intelligence. 
So, to this day we still have the tendency, when we do not feel in immediate physical 
danger, to act in a more or less friendly manner to those around us. The temporary peace, 
brought about by advanced communications and weaponry and the merciless rape of the 
planets resources, has expanded this ‘one big family’ delusion. Though the more 
intelligent and reflective persons (which of course includes many Diverse) can see the 
danger to their descendants, those who are poorly educated, dull witted, or emotionally 
unstable, sociopathic, autistic, or mentally ill (i.e., the vast majority) won’t see it or won’t 
act on it. But how about Adelson, Zuckerberg, Gelbaum, Biden, Clinton, Obama, 
Krugman and a very long list of the rich and famous? They have at least some education 
and intelligence, so how can they want to destroy their country and their own children’s 
future? Actually, they are no more well educated, perceptive and future oriented than the 
average college graduate (i.e., not very), and also, they and their relatives live in gated 
communities and often have bodyguards, so they will not be seriously concerned about 
or even aware of trashed neighborhoods, beaches and parks, drive by shootings, home 
invasions, rapes and murders, nor about paying taxes or making ends meet. They are just 
not thinking about the fate of their great grandchildren, nor anyone’s, or if it does cross 
their mind, like the vast majority, they don’t have clue a about human ecology, nor 
dysgenics, and can’t see the inexorable path to collapse. Insofar as they do, they will not 
risk personal discomforts by saying or doing anything about it (selfishness and 
cowardice). 
A reader suggested I was talking about ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Diverse by Euros, but what’s 
happening worldwide is exactly the reverse. I had not actually thought of the destruction 
of America and industrial civilization by Diverse as genocide, but since the number of 
Euros of all types (and many groups of Diverse such as Japanese and Koreans) will 
steadily decline, and their countries be taken over by Diverse, it does have that aspect, 
though it’s the Euros failure to produce enough children that is responsible for their 
declining numbers. A few zealots (but not so few in the future as Muslims will increase 
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from about 1/5 of the world to about 1/3 by 2100, stimulating the conditions which breed 
fanaticism) like Al Qaeda and ISIS want to eliminate all Euro's (and Jews and Sunni’s and 
Feminists and Christians etc., etc.) and the Arabs will certainly demolish Israel by and by, 
but otherwise there is little motivation to get rid of those who are giving you a free lunch 
(though of course few Diverse will grasp how big the lunch really is until it stops and 
civilization collapses). However, as time passes and the competition for space and 
resources gets ever more desperate, genocide of all Euro groups may become an explicit 
goal, though mostly it will be far overshadowed by attacks of various Diverse groups on 
others, which has always been the case and always will. In any event, all Euro and many 
Diverse groups are certainly doomed--we are talking roughly 2100 and beyond, when the 
USA (then a part of Mexico) and Europe will no longer have the money or the will to 
suppress anarchy everywhere, as they will be unable to control it at home. 
Shocking as it is for me to come to these realizations (I never really thought about these 
issues in a serious way until recently), I don’t see any hope for America or the other 
‘democracies’ (America has one foot in Fascism and the other in Communism already) 
without a drastic change in the way “democracy” works, or in its complete abandonment. 
Of course, it’s going to be pretty much the same elsewhere and both Euros and Diverse 
ought to pray the Chinese adopt democracy soon (so they collapse too) or they are 
doomed from outside and inside. That democracy is a fatally flawed system is not news 
to anyone with a grasp of history or human nature. Our second president John Adams 
had this to say in 1814: 
“I do not say that democracy has been more pernicious on the whole, and in the long run, 
than monarchy or aristocracy. Democracy has never been and never can be so durable as 
aristocracy or monarchy; but while it lasts, it is more bloody than either. … Remember, 
democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was 
a democracy yet that did not commit suicide. It is in vain to say that democracy is less 
vain, less proud, less selfish, less ambitious, or less avaricious than aristocracy or 
monarchy. It is not true, in fact, and nowhere appears in history. Those passions are the 
same in all men, under all forms of simple government, and when unchecked, produce 
the same effects of fraud, violence, and cruelty. When clear prospects are opened before 
vanity, pride, avarice, or ambition, for their easy gratification, it is hard for the most 
considerate philosophers and the most conscientious moralists to resist the temptation. 
Individuals have conquered themselves. Nations and large bodies of men, never.” John 
Adams, The Letters of John and Abigail Adams 
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The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough resources in 
America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep 
them there. The attempt to do this is bankrupting America and destroying the world. The 
earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. And now, 
as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich. Without 
dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, 
or any country that follows a democratic system. 
So, it is clear that Ann Coulter is right and unless some truly miraculous changes happen 
very soon, it’s goodbye America and hello Third World Hellhole. The only consolations 
are that we older folk can take comfort in knowing it will not be finalized during our 
lifetime, that those like myself who are childless will have no descendants to suffer the 
consequences, and, since the descendants of those who let this happen (i.e., nearly 
everyone) will be as loathsome as their ancestors, they will richly deserve hell on earth. 
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How the Seven Sociopaths Who Rule China are 
Winning World War Three and Three Ways to 
Stop Them 
 
ABSTRACT 
The first thing we must keep in mind is that when saying that China says this or China 
does that, we are not speaking of the Chinese people, but of the Sociopaths who control 
the CCP -- Chinese Communist Party, i.e., the Seven Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers 
(SSSSK) of the Standing Committee of the CCP or the 25 members of the Politburo etc.. 
The CCP’s plans for WW3 and total domination are laid out quite clearly in Chinese govt 
publications and speeches and this is Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. It is a dream only for 
the tiny minority (perhaps a few dozen to a few hundred) who rule China and a 
nightmare for everyone else (including 1.4 billion Chinese). The 10 billion dollars yearly 
enables them or their puppets to own or control newspapers, magazines, TV and radio 
channels and place fake news in most major media everywhere every day. In addition, 
they have an army (maybe millions of people) who troll all the media placing more 
propaganda and drowning out legitimate commentary (the 50 cent army). 
In addition to stripping the 3rd world of resources, a major thrust of the multi-trillion 
dollar Belt and Road Initiative is building military bases worldwide. They are forcing the 
free world into a massive high-tech arms race that makes the cold war with the Soviet 
Union look like a picnic. 
Though the SSSSK, and the rest of the world’s military, are spending huge sums on 
advanced hardware, it is highly likely that WW3 (or the smaller engagements leading up 
to it) will be software dominated. It is not out of the question that the SSSSK, with 
probably more hackers (coders) working for them then all the rest of the world combined, 
will win future wars with minimal physical conflict, just by paralyzing their enemies via 
the net. No satellites, no phones, no communications, no financial transactions, no power 
grid, no internet, no advanced weapons, no vehicles, trains, ships or planes. 
There are only two main paths to removing the CCP, freeing 1.4 billion Chinese prisoners, 
and ending the lunatic march to WW3. The peaceful one is to launch an all-out trade war 
to devastate the Chinese economy until the military gets fed up and boots out the CCP. 
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An alternative to shutting down China’s economy is a limited war, such as a targeted 
strike by say 50 thermobaric drones on the 20th Congress of the CCP, when all the top 
members are in one place, but that won’t take place until 2022 so one could hit the annual 
plenary meeting. The Chinese would be informed, as the attack happened, that they must 
lay down their arms and prepare to hold a democratic election or be nuked into the stone 
age. The other alternative is an all-out nuclear attack. Military confrontation is 
unavoidable given the CCP’s present course. It will likely happen over the islands in the 
South China Sea or Taiwan within a few decades, but as they establish military bases 
worldwide it could happen anywhere (see Crouching Tiger etc.). Future conflicts will 
have hardkill and softkill aspects with the stated objectives of the CCP to emphasize 
cyberwar by hacking and paralyzing control systems of all military and industrial 
communications, equipment, power plants, satellites, internet, banks, and any device or 
vehicle connected to the net. The SS are slowly fielding a worldwide array of manned and 
autonomous surface and underwater subs or drones capable of launching conventional 
or nuclear weapons that may lie dormant awaiting a signal from China or even looking 
for the signature of US ships or planes. While destroying our satellites, thus eliminating 
communication between the USA and our forces worldwide, they will use theirs, in 
conjunction with drones to target and destroy our currently superior naval forces. Of 
course, all of this is increasingly done automatically by AI. 
By far the biggest ally of the CCP is the Democratic party of the USA. 
 
The choice is to stop the CCP now or watch as they extend the Chinese prison over the 
whole world. 
Of course, universal surveillance and digitizing of our lives is inevitable everywhere. 
Anyone who does not think so is profoundly out of touch. 
It is the optimists who expect the Chinese sociopaths to rule the world while the 
pessimists (who view themselves as realists) expect AI (Artificial Intelligence or as I call 
it Artificial Ignorance or Artificial Insanity) to take over, perhaps by 2030. 
Those interested in further details on the lunatic path of modern society may consult my 
other works such as Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 4th 
Edition (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human 
Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2019) 
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The first thing we must keep in mind is that when saying that China says this or China 
does that, we are not speaking of the Chinese people, but of the Sociopaths who control 
of CCP (Chinese Communist Party, i.e., the Seven Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers (SSSSK) 
of the Standing Committee of the CCP or the 25 members of the Politburo. I recently 
watched some typical leftist fake news programs (pretty much the only kind one can find 
in the media, i.e., nearly everything now –i.e., Yahoo, CNN, The New York Times, etc.) 
on YouTube, one by VICE which mentioned that 1000 economists (and 15 Nobel Prize 
winners) sent a letter to Trump telling him that the trade war was a mistake, and another 
which interviewed an academic economist who said that Trump’s move was a 
provocation for starting World War 3. They are right about the disruption of global trade, 
but have no grasp of the big picture, which is that the Seven Sociopaths have total world 
domination, with the elimination of freedom everywhere, as their goal, and that there are 
only two ways to stop them—a total trade embargo that devastates the Chinese economy 
and leads their military to force out the CCP and hold elections, or WW3, which can be 
limited (conventional arms with maybe a few nukes) or total (all the nukes at once). Clear 
as day, but all these “brilliant” academics can’t see it. If the Sociopaths are not removed 
now, in as little as 15 years it will be too late and your descendants slowly but inexorably 
will be subject to the same fate as Chinese—total surveillance with kidnapping, torture 
and murder of any dissenters. 
Of course, the CCP started WW3 long ago (you could see their invasions of Tibet or Korea 
as the beginning) and is pursuing it in every possible way, except for bullets and bombs, 
and they will come soon. The CCP fought the USA in Korea, invaded and massacred 
Tibet, and fought border skirmishes with Russia and India. It conducts massive hacking 
operations against all industrial and military databases worldwide and has stolen the 
classified data on virtually all current US and European military and space systems, 
analyzed their weaknesses and fielded improved versions within a few years. Tens of 
thousands, and maybe hundreds of thousands, of CCP employees have been hacking into 
military, industrial, financial and social media databases worldwide since the early days 
of the net and there are hundreds of known recent hacks in the USA alone. As the major 
institutions and military have hardened their firewalls, the SSSSK have moved to minor 
institutions and to defense subcontractors and to our allies, which are easier targets. 
While it ignores the crushing poverty of hundreds of millions and the marginal existence 
of most of its people, it has built up a massive military and space presence, which grows 
larger every year, and whose only reason for existence is waging war to eliminate 
freedom everywhere. In addition to stripping the 3rd world of resources, a major thrust 
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of the multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative is building military bases worldwide. 
They are forcing the free world into a massive high-tech arms race that makes the cold 
war with the Soviet Union look like a picnic. The Russians are not stupid, and in spite of 
pretending friendship with the Sociopaths, they surely grasp that the CCP is going to eat 
them alive, that their only hope is to ally themselves with the West, and Trump is right 
on the money in befriending Putin. Of course, the Neomarxist Third World Supremacist 
Fascists (i.e., the Democratic Party) will likely take total control of the USA in 2020 and 
nothing could be more to the liking of the CCP. Snowden (another clueless twenty 
something) helped the SSSSK more than any other single individual, with the possible 
exception of all the American presidents since WW2, who have pursued the suicidal 
policy of appeasement. The USA has no choice but to monitor all communications and to 
compile a dossier on everyone, as it’s essential not only to control criminals and terrorists, 
but to counter the SSSSK, who are rapidly doing the same thing, with the intent of 
removing freedom completely. 
Though the SSSSK, and the rest of the world’s military, are spending huge sums on 
advanced hardware, it is highly likely that WW3 (or the smaller engagements leading up 
to it) will be software dominated. It is not out of the question that the SSSSK, with 
probably more hackers (coders) working for them then all the rest of the world combined, 
will win future wars with minimal physical conflict, just by paralyzing their enemies via 
the net. No satellites, no phones, no communications, no financial transactions, no power 
grid, no internet, no advanced weapons, no vehicles, trains, ships or planes. 
Some may question that the CCP (and of course the top tiers of the police, army and 610 
Office) are really mentally aberrant, so here are some of the common characteristics of 
sociopaths (formerly called psychopaths) that you can find on the net. Of course, some of 
these are shared by many autistics and alexithymics, and sociopaths differ from “normal” 
people only in degree. 
Superficial Charm, Manipulative and Cunning, Grandiose Sense of Self, Lack of Remorse, 
Shame or Guilt, Shallow Emotions, Incapacity for Love, Callousness/Lack of Empathy, 
Poor Behavioral Controls/Impulsive Nature, Believe they are all-powerful, all-knowing, 
entitled to every wish, no sense of personal boundaries, no concern for their impact on 
others. Problems in making and keeping friends. Aberrant behaviors such as cruelty to 
people or animals, Stealing, Promiscuity, Criminal or Entrepreneurial Versatility, Change 
their image as needed, Do not perceive that anything is wrong with them, Authoritarian, 
Secretive, Paranoid, Seek out situations where their tyrannical behavior will be tolerated, 
condoned, or admired (e.g., CCP, Police, Military, Predatory Capitalism), Conventional 
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appearance, Goal of enslavement of their victims, Seek to exercise despotic control over 
every aspect of other’s lives, Have an emotional need to justify their actions and therefore 
need their victim's affirmation (respect, gratitude), Ultimate goal is the creation of a 
willing victim. Incapable of real human attachment to another, Unable to feel remorse or 
guilt, Extreme narcissism and grandiosity, Their goal is to rule the world. Pathological 
Liars. 
This last is one of the most striking characteristics of the CCP. Virtually everything they 
say in opposition to others is an obvious lie, or distortion, mostly so absurd that any well- 
educated ten year old will laugh at them. Yet they persist in saturating all the media every 
day (an estimated $10 billion annual budget just for foreign propaganda) with 
preposterous statements. The fact that they are so out of touch with reality that they think 
they will be taken seriously clearly shows what any rational person will regard as mental 
illness (sociopathy). 
There are only two main paths to removing the CCP, freeing 1.4 billion Chinese prisoners, 
and ending the lunatic march to WW3. The peaceful one is to launch an all-out trade war 
to devastate the Chinese economy until the military gets fed up and boots out the CCP. 
The USA needs, by any means necessary, to join all its allies in reducing the trade with 
China to near zero—no imports of any product from China or any entity with more that 
10% Chinese ownership anywhere in the world, including any product with any 
component of such origin. No export of anything whatsoever to China or any entity that 
reexports to China or that has more than 10 % Chinese ownership, with severe and 
immediate consequences for any violators. Yes, it would temporarily cost millions of jobs 
and a major worldwide recession, and yes I know that a large part of their exports are 
from joint ventures with American companies, but the alternative is that every country 
will become the dog of the Seven Sociopaths (and like all edible animal they keep dogs 
in small cages while they fatten them for the kill) and/or experience the horrors of WW3. 
Other possible steps are to send home all Chinese students and workers in science and 
tech, freeze all assets of any entity more than 10% Chinese owned, forbid foreign travel 
to any Chinese citizen, prohibit any Chinese or any entity more than 10% owned by 
Chinese from buying any company, land, product or technology from the USA or any of 
its allies. All these measures would be phased in as appropriate. 
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We should keep in mind that the Chinese monster is largely due to the suicidal utopian 
delusions, cowardice and stupidity of our politicians. Truman refused to let McArthur 
nuke them in Korea, President Carter gave them the right to send students to the USA 
(there are currently about 300,000), use our intellectual property without paying royalties, 
gave them most favored nation trading status, and by decree canceled our recognition of 
Taiwan and our mutual defense agreement (i.e., with no vote by anyone – he should be 
an honorary CCP member, along with the Bushes, the Obamas, the Clintons, Edward 
Snowden, etc.). These were the first in a long series of conciliatory gestures to the world’s 
most vicious dictatorship which made it possible for them to prosper, and set the stage 
for their coming invasion of Taiwan, the South Sea Islands and other countries as they 
wish. These measures along with our failure to invade in the 40’s to prevent their takeover 
of China, our failure to nuke their army and hence the CCP out of existence during the 
Korean War, our failure to prevent their massacre of Tibet, our failure to do anything 
when they exploded their first nuclear weapons, our failure to take them out in 1966 when 
they launched their first nuclear capable ICBM, our (or rather Bush’s) failure to do 
anything about the Tiananmen massacre, our failure to shut down the Confucius 
Institutes present in many universities worldwide, which are fronts for the CCP, our 
failure to ban the purchase of companies , property, mining rights etc. worldwide, which 
is another way to acquire high-tech and other vital assets, our failure to do anything over 
the last 20 years about their continual industrial and military espionage and hacking into 
our databases stealing nearly all our advanced weaponry, our failure to stop their allies 
North Korea and Pakistan from developing nukes and ICBM’s and receiving equipment 
from China (e.g., their mobile missile launchers, which they claim were for hauling logs 
and it was pure coincidence they exactly fit the Korean missiles), our failure to stop them 
from violating our embargo on Iran’s oil (they buy much of it, registering their ships in 
Iran), and its nuclear program (equipment and technicians go back and forth to N. Korea 
via China), our failure to stop them from providing military tech and weapons 
worldwide (e.g., North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, the cartels in Mexico, and over 30 other 
countries), our failure to stop the flow of dangerous drugs and their precursors directly 
or indirectly (e.g., nearly all Fentanyl and Carfentanyl sent worldwide, and meth 
precursors for the Mexican cartels come from China), and our failure to do anything 
about their building “ports” (i.e., military bases) all over the world, which is ongoing. 
An alternative to shutting down China’s economy is a limited war, such as a targeted 
strike by say 50 thermobaric drones on the 20th Congress of the CCP, when all the top 
members are in one place, but that won’t take place until 2022 so one could hit the annual 
plenary meeting. The Chinese would be informed, as the attack happened, that they must 
lay down their arms and prepare to hold a democratic election or be nuked into the stone 
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age. The other alternative is an all-out nuclear attack. Military confrontation is 
unavoidable given the CCP’s present course. It will likely happen over the islands in the 
South China Sea or Taiwan within a few decades, but as they establish military bases 
worldwide it could happen anywhere (see Crouching Tiger etc.). Future conflicts will 
have hardkill and softkill aspects with the stated objectives of the CCP to emphasize 
cyberwar by hacking and paralyzing control systems of all military and industrial 
communications, equipment, power plants, satellites, internet, banks, and any device or 
vehicle connected to the net. The SS are slowly fielding a worldwide array of manned and 
autonomous surface and underwater subs or drones capable of launching conventional 
or nuclear weapons that may lie dormant awaiting a signal from China or even looking 
for the signature of US ships or planes. While destroying our satellites, thus eliminating 
communication between the USA and our forces worldwide, they will use theirs, in 
conjunction with drones to target and destroy our currently superior naval forces. 
Perhaps worst of all is the rapid development of robots and drones of all sizes and 
capabilities which will inevitably be employed by criminals and terrorists to act from 
anywhere in the world, and massive swarms of which will be used by or instead of 
soldiers to fight ever more numerous and vicious wars. Of course, all of this is 
increasingly done automatically by AI. 
All this is totally obvious to anyone who spends a little time on the net. Two of the best 
sources to start with are the book Crouching Tiger (and the five YouTube videos with the 
same name), and the long series of short satirical pieces on the China Uncensored channel 
on YouTube or their new one www.chinauncensored.tv. The CCP’s plans for WW3 and 
total domination are laid out quite clearly in Chinese govt publications and speeches and 
this is Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. It is a dream only for the tiny minority (perhaps a few 
dozen to a few hundred) who rule China and a nightmare for everyone else (including 
1.4 billion Chinese). The 10 billion dollars yearly enables them or their puppets to own or 
control newspapers, magazines, TV and radio channels and place fake news in most 
major media everywhere every day. In addition, they have an army (maybe millions of 
people) who troll all the media placing more propaganda and drowning out legitimate 
commentary (the 50 cent army). 
The rule of the SSSSK (or 25 SSSK if you focus on the Politburo rather than it’s standing 
committee) is a surrealistic tragicomedy like Snow White and the Seven Dwarves, but 
without Snow White, endearing personalities, or a happy ending. They are the wardens 
of the world’s biggest prison, but they are by far the worst criminals, committing by proxy 
every year millions of assaults, rapes, robberies, bribes, kidnappings, tortures, and 
murders, most of them presumably by their own secret police of the 610 Office created 
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on June 10, 1999 by Jiang Zemin to persecute the qigong meditators of Falun Gong, and 
anyone else deemed a threat, now including anyone making any critical comment and 
including all religious and political groups not under their direct rule. By far the biggest 
ally of the Seven Dwarves is the Democratic party of the USA, which, at a time when 
America needs more than ever to be strong and united, is doing everything possible to 
divide America into warring factions with ever more of its resources going to sustain the 
burgeoning legions of the lower classes and driving it into bankruptcy, though of course 
they have no insight into this whatsoever. The CCP is by far the most evil group in world 
history, robbing, raping, kidnapping, imprisoning, torturing, starving to death and 
murdering more people that all the other dictators in history (an estimated 100 million 
dead), and in a few years will have a total surveillance state recording every action of 
everyone in China, which is already expanding worldwide as they include data from 
hacking and from all who pass thru territories under their control, buy tickets on Chinese 
airlines etc. 
Though the SSSSK treat us as an enemy, in fact, the USA is the Chinese people’s greatest 
friend and the CCP their greatest enemy. From another perspective, other Chinese are the 
greatest enemies of Chinese, as they demolish all the world’s resources. 
Of course, some say that China will collapse of its own accord, and it’s possible, but the 
price of being wrong is the end of freedom and WW3 or a long series of conflicts which 
the Seven Sociopaths will almost certainly win. One must keep in mind that they have 
controls on their population and weapons that Stalin, Hitler, Gaddafi and Idi Amin never 
dreamed of. CCTV cameras (currently maybe 300 million and increasing rapidly) on 
highspeed networks with AI image analysis, tracking software on every phone which 
people are required to use, and GPS trackers on all vehicles, all transactions payable only 
by phone already dominant there and universal and mandatory soon, total automatic 
monitoring of all communications by AI and an estimated 2 million online human censors. 
In addition to millions of police and army cadres, there may be as many as 10 million 
plainclothes secret police of 610 Office created by Jiang Zemin, with black prisons (i.e., 
unofficial and unmarked), instant updating of the digital dossier on all 1.4 billion Chinese 
and soon on everyone on earth who uses the net or phones. It’s often called the Social 
Credit System and it enables the Sociopaths to shut down the communications, 
purchasing ability, travel, bank accounts etc. of anyone. This is not fantasy but already 
largely implemented for the Muslims of Xinjiang and spreading rapidly— see YouTube, 
China Uncensored etc. Of course, universal surveillance and digitizing of our lives is 
inevitable everywhere. Anyone who does not think so is profoundly out of touch. 
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The choice is to stop the CCP now or watch as they extend the Chinese prison over the 
whole world. 
The biggest ally of the CCP is the Democratic Party of the USA. 
 
Of course, it is the optimists who expect the Chinese sociopaths to rule the world while 
the pessimists (who view themselves as realists) expect AI sociopathy (or as I call it – i.e., 
Artificial Ignorance or Artificial Insanity) to take over. It is the opinion of many 
thoughtful persons- Musk, Gates, Hawking etc., including top AI researchers (see the 
many TED talks on YouTube) that AI will reach explosive self-growth (increasing its 
power thousands or millions of times in days, minutes or microseconds) at some time in 
the next few decades – 2030 is sometimes mentioned, escaping through the net and 
infecting all sufficiently powerful computers. AS will be unstoppable, especially since it 
appears that it will be running on quantum computers which will increase its speed more 
thousands or millions of times). If you are optimistic, it will keep humans and other 
animals around as pets and the world will become a zoo with a eugenic captive breeding 
program, if a pessimist, it will eliminate humans or even all organic life as an annoying 
competition for resources. The science fiction of today is likely to be the reality of 
tomorrow. 
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PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHY AS PSYCHOLOGY 
          MICHAEL STARKS 
Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity 
of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only 
in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion,  etc., 
but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the 
real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever-present and Wittgenstein, arguably the greatest 
intuitive psychologist of all time, has laid it before us long ago, beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930 ’s. 
Language is programmed in our genes and is involved in nearly all our social behavior.  Philosophy in the strict sense (i.e., 
academic philosophy), is as Wittgenstein showed us, the study of the way language is used (language games) and I regard it 
as the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (i.e., pretty much everything involving language which is often called 
System 2 or slow  thinking). However, as I hope I have shown in my writings over the last decade, nonlinguistic behavior or 
System 1 or fast thinking is also described with language and this leads to endless confusion which I have tried to clarify here 
and which is summarized in the tables that I present.   
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features 
prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it 
encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). 
Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both 
conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic System 1 actions or reflexes. 
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of two of the most eminent students of behavior of modern times, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my 
starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all  truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about 
how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the 
context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can 
say anything, but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very 
specific context. I analyze various writings by and about them from the modern perspective of the two systems of thought 
(popularized as ‘thinking fast, thinking slow’), employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. I 
show that this is a powerful heuristic for describing behavior with critical reviews of the writings of a wide variety of 
behavioral scientists (i.e., everyone). 
The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. 
In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion 
and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the 
rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. 
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